This is a contribution to a book on quantum gravity and philosophy. I discuss nature and origin of the problem of quantum gravity. I examine the knowledge that may guide us in addressing this problem, and the reliability of such knowledge. In particular, I discuss the subtle modification of the notions of space and time engendered by general relativity, and how these might merge into quantum theory. I also present some reflections on methodological questions, and on some general issues in (...) philosophy of science which are are raised by, or a relevant for, the research on quantum gravity. (shrink)

This article discusses the relation between empirical and normative approaches in bioethics. The issue of dwarf tossing, while admittedly unusual, is chosen as a point of departure because it challenges the reader to look with fresh eyes upon several central bioethical themes, including human dignity, autonomy, and the protection of vulnerable people. After an overview of current approaches to the integration of empirical and normative ethics, we consider five ways that the empirical and normative can be brought together to speak (...) to the problem of dwarf tossing: prescriptive applied ethics, theoretical ethics, critical applied ethics, particularist ethics and integrated empirical ethics. We defend a position of critical applied ethics that allows for a two-way relation between empirical and normative theories. Against efforts fully to integrate the normative and the empirical into one synthesis, we propose that the two should stand in tension and relation to one another. The approach we endorse acknowledges that a social practice can and should be judged both by the gathering of empirical data and by normative ethics. Critical applied ethics uses a five stage process that includes: (a) determination of the problem, (b) description of the problem, (c) empirical study of effects and alternatives, (d) normative weighing and (e) evaluation of the effects of a decision. In each stage, we explore the perspective from both the empirical (sociological) and the normative ethical point of view. We conclude by applying our five-stage critical applied ethics to the example of dwarf tossing. (shrink)

We observe entropy decrease towards the past. Does this imply that in the past the world was in a non-generic microstate? I point out an alternative. The subsystem to which we belong interacts with the universe via a relatively small number of quantities, which define a coarse graining. Entropy happens to depends on coarse-graining. Therefore the entropy we ascribe to the universe depends on the peculiar coupling between us and the rest of the universe. Low past entropy may be due (...) to the fact that this coupling is non-generic. I argue that for any generic microstate of a sufficiently rich system there are always special subsystems defining a coarse graining for which the entropy of the rest is low in one time direction. These are the subsystems allowing creatures that “live in time” —such as those in the biosphere— to exist. I reply to some objections raised to an earlier presentation of this idea, in particular by Bob Wald, David Albert and Jim Hartle. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics is not about 'quantum states': it is about values of physical variables. I give a short fresh presentation and update on the *relational* perspective on the theory, and a comment on its philosophical implications.

Background: For many years the body of literature known as ‘care ethics’ or ‘ethics of care’ has been discussed as regards its status and nature. There is much confusion and little structured discussion. The paper of Klaver et al. (2014) was written as a discussion article to which we respond. Objectives: We aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the status and nature of care ethics. Research design: Responding to ‘Demarcation of the ethics of care as a discipline’ by (...) Klaver et al. (2014) and ‘Three versions of an ethics of care’ by Edwards (2009), we identified shared concerns and formulated criticisms of both texts in order to develop an alternative view. Participants and research context: This paper has been written from the academic context of a master in care ethics an policy. Ethical considerations: We have tried to be fair and respectful to the authors discussed. Findings: Both Klaver et al. (2014) and Edwards (2009) raise important concerns about the question if care ethics can be considered an academic discipline, and to what extend it can be seen as a moral theory. Despite shared concerns, their arguments fail to convince us in all respects. Discussion and conclusion: We propose to conceive care ethics as an interdisciplinary field of inquiry, incorporating a dialectical relation between empirical research and theoretical reflection. Departing from the notion of caring as a practice of contributing to a life-sustaining web, we argue that care ethics can only profit from a loosely organized academic profile that allows for flexibility and critical attitude that brings us close to the good emerging in specific practices. This asks for ways of searching for a common focus and interest that is inherently democratic and dialogical and thus beyond demarcation. (shrink)

This article argues that political realists have at least two strategies to provide distinctively political normative judgements that have nothing to do with morality. The first ground is instrumental normativity, which states that if we believe that something is a necessary means to a goal we have, we have a reason to do it. In politics, certain means are required by any ends we may intend to pursue. The second ground is epistemic normativity, stating that if something is true, this (...) gives us a reason to believe it. In politics, there are certain empirical regularities that ought to be acknowledged for what they are. Both sources are flawed. Instrumental normativity only requires coherence between attitudes and beliefs, and one can hang on to false beliefs to preserve attitudes incompatible with reality. I may desire to eschew power relations, and accordingly I may imagine politics to be like a camping trip. Epistemic normativity, on the other hand, operates critically, striking down existing normative claims. It shows us that politics is nothing like a camping trip, but it doesn’t tell us what we should do about it. We conclude by showing that if the two are taken together, they remedy each other’s flaws. (shrink)

onl y to discuss some claims concerning the relationship between mathematical logic and the philosophy of mathematics that repeatedly occur in his writings. Although I do not know to what extent they are representative of his present position, they correspond to widespread views of the logical community and so seem worth discussing anyhow. Such claims will be used as reference to make some remarks about the present state of relations between mathematical logic and the philosophy of mathematics.

Science progresses through debate and disagreement, and scientific controversies play a crucial role in the growth of scientific knowledge. However, not all controversies and disagreements are progressive in science. Sometimes, controversies can be pseudoscientific; in fact, bogus controversies, and what seem like genuine scientific disagreements, can be a distortion of science set up by non-scientific actors. Bogus controversies are detrimental to science because they can hinder scientific progress and eventually bias science-based decisions. The first goal of this paper is to (...) elucidate the distinction between bogus and genuine scientific controversies and provide a qualitative methodology, based on the literature on expertise, for distinguishing between the two. We will illustrate six epistemic criteria for distinguishing bogus from genuine scientific debates in science and medicine. This heuristic strategy applies directly to scientific reports, and it relies mostly on the social structure of science. We will then apply the above criteria to a case study: the controversy over statins, which are widely prescribed drugs for reducing the level of cholesterol and preventing cardiovascular disease. (shrink)

The fragment 140 a S.-M. = G 8 Ruth. is likely to deal with two different feats of Herakles. The lines b 21–b 33 seem to concern Cycnus, an impious hero killed by Herakles by order of Apollo. The rest of the fragment seems to concern the beginning of Herakles’ expedition against Laomedon. I think Pindarus presupposes a legend according to which Herakles spent the most part of his life in Thebes; such an interpretation might explain both the obscure expression (...) πέραν ἰσϑμὸν διαβαίς and other details. The opinion the fragment belonged to the Paianes is in my view right. (shrink)

This article argues for a new interpretation of the realist claim that politics is autonomous from morality and involves specific political values. First, this article defends an original normative source: functional normativity. Second, it advocates a substantive functional standard: political institutions ought to be assessed by their capacity to select and implement collective decisions. Drawing from the ‘etiological account’ in philosophy of biology, I will argue that functions yield normative standards, which are independent from morality. For example, a ‘good heart’ (...) is one that pumps blood well, and a good army is one that it is effective at exerting military force. I then interpret realism’s naturalistic conception of politics as an etiological function of social groups: namely making binding collective decisions under persistent disagreement. I conclude that political institutions should be evaluated realistically by how well they perform this task. Finally, I assess trade-offs between this functional political normativity and other moral values. I conclude that justice, fairness, freedom and equality remain obviously important concerns, but only once the basic political function is secured. (shrink)

This volume examines the limitations of mathematical logic and proposes a new approach to logic intended to overcome them. To this end, the book compares mathematical logic with earlier views of logic, both in the ancient and in the modern age, including those of Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. From the comparison it is apparent that a basic limitation of mathematical logic is that it narrows down the scope of logic confining it to the study of deduction, without (...) providing tools for discovering anything new. As a result, mathematical logic has had little impact on scientific practice. Therefore, this volume proposes a view of logic according to which logic is intended, first of all, to provide rules of discovery, that is, non-deductive rules for finding hypotheses to solve problems. This is essential if logic is to play any relevant role in mathematics, science and even philosophy. To comply with this view of logic, this volume formulates several rules of discovery, such as induction, analogy, generalization, specialization, metaphor, metonymy, definition, and diagrams. A logic based on such rules is basically a logic of discovery, and involves a new view of the relation of logic to evolution, language, reason, method and knowledge, particularly mathematical knowledge. It also involves a new view of the relation of philosophy to knowledge. This book puts forward such new views, trying to open again many doors that the founding fathers of mathematical logic had closed historically. (shrink)

The problem of teleology is one of the major challenges for theoretical biology and, in general, for every philosophy of life. The debate about the nature of the organism and its difference from inorganic matter cannot come to terms with, at one point or another, the problem that arises from the unavoidable impression of teleology exhibited by the living itself. In this respect, the advantages that a systematic thinker such as Hartmann can offer to the philosophical analysis of life are (...) remarkable. The first discussion by Hartmann on the problem of causality can be found in Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie (1912), a work which, however accurate, takes a predominantly Kantian and neo-Kantian approach, and cannot rely on the original and fecund tools of Hartmann’s mature stratified ontology. Therefore, the present contribution will focus on Hartmann’s ontological works, in particular his Philosophie der Natur: Abriss der speziellen Kategorienlehre (1950), in order to highlight and discuss the theoretical advantages they present. In particular, the validity of Hartmann’s ontological approach will be revealed by three key points: 1) a careful categorial distinction between different forms of determination, and even of causality, present in nature; 2) the refusal of vitalism, with the resolute limitation of finality in the proper sense to human conscious action; and 3) a great openness to the possibility that the living could be a third realm, governed by an autonomous modality of determination whose nature has yet to be discovered. (shrink)

L’analyse réflexive, entendue dans le sens de la tradition spiritualiste française, doit pouvoir apporter un éclaircissement remarquable au problème des catégories. Dans l’effort pour y arriver, elle aboutit à une théorie des structures fondamentales, base et origine de toutes les formes catégorielles, qui peut prendre son point de départ dans Xexpérience des antinomies, laquelle opère en guise de réactif qui rend manifeste, en même temps que l’origine et la signification des antinomies, les structures fondamentales elles-mêmes. La théorie des structures fondamentales (...) paraît pouvoir réaliser l’éternel idéal d’une philosophie comme science exacte. (shrink)

In the past century the received view of definition in mathematics has been the stipulative conception, according to which a definition merely stipulates the meaning of a term in other terms which are supposed to be already well known. The stipulative conception has been so absolutely dominant and accepted as unproblematic that the nature of definition has not been much discussed, yet it is inadequate. This paper examines its shortcomings and proposes an alternative, the heuristic conception.

The definitive account of Aristotle's life and school This definitive biography shows that Aristotle's philosophy is best understood on the basis of a firm knowledge of his life and of the school he founded. First published in Italian, and now translated, updated, and expanded for English readers, this concise chronological narrative is the most authoritative account of Aristotle's life and his Lyceum available in any language. Gathering, distilling, and analyzing all the evidence and previous scholarship, Carlo Natali, one of (...) the world's leading Aristotle scholars, provides a masterful synthesis that is accessible to students yet filled with evidence and original interpretations that specialists will find informative and provocative. Cutting through the controversy and confusion that have surrounded Aristotle's biography, Natali tells the story of Aristotle's eventful life and sheds new light on his role in the foundation of the Lyceum. Natali offers the most detailed and persuasive argument yet for the view that the school, an important institution of higher learning and scientific research, was designed to foster a new intellectual way of life among Aristotle's followers, helping them fulfill an aristocratic ideal of the best way to use the leisure they enjoyed. Drawing a wealth of connections between Aristotle's life and thinking, Natali demonstrates how the two are mutually illuminating. For this edition, ancient texts have been freshly translated on the basis of the most recent critical editions; indexes have been added, including a comprehensive index of sources and an index to previous scholarship; and scholarship that has appeared since the book's original publication has been incorporated. (shrink)

According to Bohmian mechanics, we see the particle, not the pilot wave. But to make predictions we need to know the wave. How do we learn about the wave to make predictions, if we only see the particle? I show that the puzzle can be solved, but only thanks to decoherence.

La obra de Piana se caracteriza por el amplio interés en la música. La experiencia perceptiva del material sonoro representa para el filósofo italiano un misterio que debe indagarse en to-dos sus diferentes aspectos. Los sonidos, los materiales de la música, vehiculan expresividad gracias a su propia materialidad fenomenológica y difícilmente podríamos apenas abrir el tema de la expresividad musical, si la materia prima pudiera entenderse como algo expresivamente neutro. Esta declaración apunta a una serie de problemas que deben resolverse (...) en relación con las distinciones elementales que se aplican en este plano, y en el plano de la terminología que les corresponde. El objetivo de este artículo es introducir a los análisis de Piana sobre el soni-do y la experiencia de la escucha. (shrink)

In this paper we give some theoretical links between the wittgensteinian strategy of language-games and the strategy followed by students in Artificial Intelligence in the seventies. We refer also to the interpretation given by Dummett and Prawitz to the Wittgenstein's slogan of "meaning as use", showing the link of this ideas with the needs of Artificial Intelligence. We sustain that the concept of "procedure" as developed in early Artificial Intelligence is still one of the main attempt, realized in that field (...) of research, to give a definition of meaning , which gives good hopes to be a suitable explicatum of the idea of "meaning as use". (shrink)

Christopher Meckstroth’s book The Struggle for Democracy poses and attempts to solve a central problem of democratic theory: what he calls the ‘paradox of authorization’, whereby the very activity of spelling out the political content of democracy is said to potentially contradict its object, since the democratic theorist may end up substituting himself or herself for ‘the people’ in deciding what this form government amounts to in practice. In order to avoid this problem, Meckstroth suggests that the political content of (...) democracy ought to be extrapolated out of concrete political struggles, by submitting competing claims to represent the people’s will to a rational scrutiny that tests them for internal coherence. While pointing out the intrinsic interest and originality of this approach, the review also advances some reservations concerning the posited criterion’s capacity to perform all the work Meckstroth assigns it. In the end, the proposed solution to the ‘paradox of authorization’ may fall prey to... (shrink)

The paper focuses on Giulio Preti’s idea of discourse. According to Preti, everyday speech is the basis for scientific and logical research. The logical signs are not linguistic signs, are not a language, are not able to substitute the human language. Common speech contains historical presuppositions and fleeting figures of truth.

As a response to the semantic and logical paradoxes, theorists often reject some principles of classical logic. However, classical logic is entangled with mathematics, and giving up mathematics is too high a price to pay, even for nonclassical theorists. The so-called recapture theorems come to the rescue. When reasoning with concepts such as truth/class membership/property instantiation, (These are examples of concepts that are taken to satisfy naive rules such as the naive truth schema and naive comprehension, and that therefore are (...) compatible with a solution to paradox cast in the logics considered below. Other notions of similar kind can be added to the list.) if one is interested in consequences of the theory that only contain mathematical vocabulary, nothing is lost by reasoning in the nonclassical framework. This article shows that this claim is highly misleading, if not simply false. Under natural assumptions, some well-established approaches to recapture are incorrect. (shrink)

In their recent paper, Jackson and Pargetter have attempted to prove that simultaneity is not a matter of convention. They attempt to show that it is an empirical fact whether or not a moving rod A′B′ is perpendicular to a plane XY. If it is an empirical fact, then such a perpendicular rod can be used to synchronize clocks. We shall show that it is not an empirical fact, but it is in fact synchronization dependent.

Is reality three-dimensional and becoming real (Presentism), or is reality four-dimensional and becoming illusory (Eternalism)? Both options raise difficulties. I argue that we do not need to be trapped by this dilemma. There is a third possibility: reality has a more complex temporal structure than either of these two naive options. Fundamental becoming is real, but local and unoriented. A notion of present is well defined, but only locally and in the context of approximations.

We are still far from a religious history of Europe (l'histoire réligieuse de l'Europe) which would satisfy the requirements of modern religious scholarship. We do, however, have a picture of the religions of Europe, the old and the new, of their metamorphoses and effects on the intellectual world of European man, which we can use as a temporary survey. A modification in this survey concerns not only scholars; the religious history of Europe is our religious history, regardless of the value (...) it has for the individual as creed or philosophical doctrine. Unlike religion, religious history cannot be repudiated on the basis of doubts as to its truth or its existential validity (could this be “my” religion?). What is more, such a history cannot be side-stepped, for even the repudiation of all religion is an act within religious history; and a presentation of the religious history of Europe which does not concern itself with Nietzsche would not satisfy our demands as scholars. (shrink)

The first complete intellectual biography of one of the most influential and controversial philosophers of the twentieth century, Leo Strauss.

There are three concerns regarding Rachlin's altruism model. First, proximal causal mechanisms such as those identified by cognitive neuroscientists and behavioral neuropharmacologists are not emphasized. Second, there is a lack of clear testable hypotheses. And third, extreme forms of altruism are emphasized rather than common forms. We focus on an overarching theme – proximal mechanisms of individual differences in altruism.

Dans un procès qui eut lieu à la fin du XVIIe siècle en Livonie (aujourd’hui Latvia) un homme surnommé « le vieux Thiess » avoua être un loup garou. Les anomalies qui marquent ses aveux ont été l’objet d’interprétations différentes, qui soulèvent le problème des ambitions, et des limites, de la comparaison. L’essai explore, à travers le cas du « vieux Thiess », la possibilité d’utiliser a) la notion d’anomalies conjonctives, inspirée par la critique textuelle, b) la notion de « (...) ressemblances de famille » proposée par Francis Galton, en tant qu’instruments de comparaison dans le domaine de l’histoire des religions. (shrink)

We sharpen a recent observation by Tim Maudlin: differential calculus is a natural language for physics only if additional structure, like the definition of a Hodge dual or a metric, is given; but the discrete version of this calculus provides this additional structure for free.

According to the implicit commitment thesis, once accepting a mathematical formal system S, one is implicitly committed to additional resources not immediately available in S. Traditionally, this thesis has been understood as entailing that, in accepting S, we are bound to accept reflection principles for S and therefore claims in the language of S that are not derivable in S itself. It has recently become clear, however, that such reading of the implicit commitment thesis cannot be compatible with well-established positions (...) in the foundations of mathematics which consider a specific theory S as self-justifying and doubt the legitimacy of any principle that is not derivable in S: examples are Tait’s finitism and the role played in it by Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, Isaacson’s thesis and Peano Arithmetic, Nelson’s ultrafinitism and sub-exponential arithmetical systems. This casts doubts on the very adequacy of the implicit commitment thesis for arithmetical theories. In the paper we show that such foundational standpoints are nonetheless compatible with the implicit commitment thesis. We also show that they can even be compatible with genuine soundness extensions of S with suitable form of reflection. The analysis we propose is as follows: when accepting a system S, we are bound to accept a fixed set of principles extending S and expressing minimal soundness requirements for S, such as the fact that the non-logical axioms of S are true. We call this invariant component the semantic core of implicit commitment. But there is also a variable component of implicit commitment that crucially depends on the justification given for our acceptance of S in which, for instance, may or may not appear reflection principles for S. We claim that the proposed framework regulates in a natural and uniform way our acceptance of different arithmetical theories. (shrink)

We study the relationships between two clusters of axiomatizations of Kripke’s fixed-point models for languages containing a self-applicable truth predicate. The first cluster is represented by what we will call ‘\-like’ theories, originating in recent work by Halbach and Horsten, whose axioms and rules are all valid in fixed-point models; the second by ‘\-like’ theories first introduced by Solomon Feferman, that lose this property but reflect the classicality of the metatheory in which Kripke’s construction is carried out. We show that (...) to any natural system in one cluster—corresponding to natural variations on induction schemata—there is a corresponding system in the other proving the same sentences true, addressing a problem left open by Halbach and Horsten and accomplishing a suitably modified version of the project sketched by Reinhardt aiming at an instrumental reading of classical theories of self-applicable truth. (shrink)

In his 1956 book ‘The Direction of Time’, Hans Reichenbach offered a comprehensive analysis of the physical ground of the direction of time, the notion of physical cause, and the relation between the two. I review its conclusions and argue that at the light of recent advances in physics Reichenbach analysis provides the best account for the physical underpinning of these notions. I integrate results in cosmology, and on the physical underpinning of records and agency into Reichenbach’s account, and discuss (...) which questions it leaves open. (shrink)

One of the world's most renowned theoretical physicists, Carlo Rovelli has entranced millions of readers with his singular perspective on the cosmos. In Helgoland, Rovelli examines the enduring enigma of quantum theory. The quantum world Rovelli describes is as beautiful as it is unnerving. Helgoland is a treeless island in the North Sea where the 21-year-old Werner Heisenberg first developed quantum theory, setting off a century of scientific revolution. Full of alarming ideas (ghost waves, distant objects that seem to (...) be magically connected, cats that appear both dead and alive), quantum physics has led to countless discoveries and technological advancements. Today our understanding of the world is based on this theory, yet it is still profoundly mysterious. As scientists and philosophers continue to fiercly debate the theory's meaning, Rovelli argues that its most unsettling contradictions can be explained by seeing the world as fundamentally made of relationships, not substances. We and everything around us exist only in our interactions with one another. This bold idea suggests new directions for understanding the structure of reality and even the nature of consciousness. Rovelli makes learning about quantum mechanics an almost psychedelic experience. Shifting our perspective once again, he takes us on a riveting journey through the universe so we can better understand our place in it. (shrink)