How can evil exist in a world governed by providence? That is the main question addressed in this chapter. To answer it, the author first sets out Proclus’ defence of providence, which combines the gods’ transcendence with their sharing goodness. The next step is to show that despite providence, evils have reality as well. There is, however, no substance or principle of evil, and only human and irrational souls and material bodies are susceptible to it. Evil’s having a ‘parhypostasis’ is (...) explained as its existing upon and alongside real existents; uncaused because a result of weakness, not power; not pure privation because parasitic on good existents, and hence a ‘subcontrary’ of the good. Finally, the author returns to the relation between providence and evil, showing that bodily evil fits the good of the universe, and that providence will punish evil souls in due course. (shrink)

The suppression of trade barriers and liberalization of financial flows inherent to the expansive dynamic of globalization have not extended to international flows of workers. To impede the free movement of workers, restrictive migratory policies have been implemented, and borders have been fortified with walls and fences. In the face of this widespread phenomenon, this chapter presents an alternative consisting of three steps. First, it is noted that in the current migratory context, borders play a key role in reproducing inequalities (...) between countries. Next, it is argued that given the incompatibility of this function with global justice, it is necessary to seek some remedy to put an end to the suffering caused by this structural injustice, a suffering that is endured by an immense number of people unlucky enough to have been born on the wrong side of a border. After presenting a conception of borders that, unlike walls, would enable the movements of people, finally, a scenario is proposed in which the rights of political membership would be reassigned in a cosmopolitan manner and in which borders would usually remain open. Although this does not entail a radical suppression of the aforementioned injustice, its implementation would contribute to not only its reduction but also to the compensation of victims. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to present a logical framework that allow to formalize a kind of prima facie duties, defeasible conditional duties, indefeasible conditional duties and actual (indefeasible) duties, as well as to show their logical interconnections.

La teoría de la justicia de John Rawls constituye uno de los trabajos en materia de filosofía política más importantes de la última centuria, el cual, dado su enorme impacto, ha sido objeto de múltiples análisis y críticas por parte de diversos sectores y espectros de la filosofía política. El propósito de este ensayo es contribuir a ese debate, formulando una postura crítica respecto a dos instrumentos que dicen combatir y remediar las profundas desigualdades sociales que padecen nuestras actuales sociedades (...) marcadamente neoliberales: por un lado, las denominadas acciones afirmativas y, por otro, la meritocracia. Se defenderá la tesis de que ambos mecanismos pueden deducirse directamente del segundo subprincipio del segundo principio de justicia de Rawls (justa o equitativa igualdad de oportunidades), como instrumentos que aparentemente pretenden materializarlo, pero que, por el contrario, bajo ciertas condiciones especiales terminan por causar una mayor desigualdad y una justificación a ese estado de cosas inequitativo. (shrink)

The existence of sovereign rights over genetic resources is today well recognized in international law. However, the legal status of such resources in terms of property rights is still unclear. The consideration of this issue requires a clear distinction between physical and intangible property. Legislation in developed countries has extended patent protection to genetic resources, in addition to the protection of plant varieties via breeders' rights. The extension of protection and the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement may have important implications (...) for breeding programs and trade in seeds. While intellectual property protection of genetic resources is rapidly advancing, considerable work is still to be done to ensure the compensation for the informal innovations made by local and indigenous communities. (shrink)

La logique spécifique des jugements de valeur est à chercher dans le discours rhétorique. Cette thèse développée par Ch. Perelman dans L'Empire rhétorique (1977) nous rappelle l'introduction à l'éthique de Jean Buridan (XIVe s.). Selon Buridan la philosophie morale ne peut se contenter d'appliquer la logique générale: elle a besoin d'une logique spéciale, une „logique morale” qui n'est rien autre que la technique persuasive qu'on étudie dans la Rhétorique. Roger Bacon (XlIIe s.) a même essayé d'intégrer cette rhétorique dans l'éthique (...) : elle est la partie pratique de la science morale. Bien que leur textes rappellent parfois les considérations de la ‘nouvelle rhétorique’, la relation entre l'éthique et la rhétorique y est envisagée d'une manière toute différente. Pour les auteurs médiévaux la rhétorique est une science auxiliaire de l'éthique : elle sert de liaison entre la théorie et la pratique. Dans la partie théorétique de l'éthique la logique ‘générale’ reste en vigeur. Ce n'est que pour mettre en pratique les règles et valeurs qui ont été ‘démontrées’ par la théorie qu'on a recours à la technique persuasive et sa logique ‘spéciale’. La rhétorique n'a donc qu'une fonction subsidaire. On retrouve la même conception au début des temps modernes chez Francis Bacon qui attribue à la rhétorique la fonction d'appliquer le dictamen rationis à l'imagination pour exciter ainsi la volonté. Une tout autre conception est défendue par l'humaniste Lorenzo Valla qui essaie de réintégrer l'argumentation morale dans le discours rhétorique où elle trouve sa place originaire. Notre propre point de vue est développé en confrontation avec Aristote, de qui nous avons hérité le projet d'une ‘science pratique’ et l'ambiguité qui en est inhérente 1° La rhétorique présuppose l'éthique. 2° L'éthique qui se veut epistème, ne relève pas de la rhétorique qui n'est qu'une technè. Elle se présente comme une science à caractère dialectique. 3° Les difficultés arrivent dès qu'on exalte la fonction pratique de cette science (cf. récemment R. Hare). Dès que l'éthique veut être efficace dans la vie concrète, elle devient une argumentation qui relève plutôt du discours épidectique (Weltanschauung). Notre société, en pleine crise morale, a certainement besoin d'un tel discours qui essaie d'intensifier l'adhésion à des valeurs morales. Mais il nous semble qu'il reste à côté d'un tel discours - en pleine expansion des nos jours - une place bien discrète pour une reflection critique qui en analyse les raisons : qui n'est pas inutile, bien que peu efficace. (shrink)

This book focuses on the emerging scientific discipline of astrobiology, exploring the humanistic issues of this multidisciplinary field. To be sure, there are myriad scientific questions that astrobiologists have only begun to address. However, this is not a purely scientific enterprise. More research on the broader social and conceptual aspects of astrobiology is needed. Just what are our ethical obligations toward different sorts of alien life? Should we attempt to communicate with life beyond our planet? What is “life” in the (...) most general sense? The current volume addresses these questions by looking at different perspectives from philosophers, historians, theologians, social scientists, and legal scholars. It sets a benchmark for future work in astrobiology, giving readers the groundwork from which to base the continuous scholarship coming from this ever-growing scientific field. (shrink)

Excerpt from Conocimiento y AccionY bien: cuando se afirma que el dogmatismo es indis pensable [para laa accion, y que el escepticismo fatalmente la paraliza. no se hara una afirmacion falsa o extre madamente exagerada, basada en lo que podria. Suceder, c en lo que pareceria. Razonable que sucediera, mas que en lo que sucede de hecho; mas en el raciocinio que en la observacion? Es precisamente lo que sostengo.About the PublisherForgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic (...) books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.comThis book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on the stimulus-reinforcer hypothesis of resistance to change. The overall context of reinforcement can account for resistance to extinction. There are ways to systematically test the hypothesis that Pavlovian contingencies account for the behavioral “mass” of discriminated operant behavior.

The aim of this paper is to point out significant and meaningful overlapping between several styles of scientific thinking, as they were proposed by Crombie (1981) and discussed by Hacking (1985; 2009). This paper is divided in four sections. First, I examine an interpretation made by Barnes (2004) about the incompatibility among scientific styles. As explained by its author, this interpretation denies any possibility of similarities between styles of scientific reasoning. In opposition, the following sections of this paper include explanations (...) of relevant characteristics of Geometry, as stated in Euclid's Elements, which are also present in other three scientific styles: modeling, experimental exploration and taxonomic style (and some of the shared characteristics are even used to define such styles). By stressing out these characteristics I argue that these four styles discussed by Hacking are not so different from each other, in fact, they overlap and may even be abridged into one foundational style: geometric. El objetivo de este artículo consiste en explicar traslapes importantes y significativos entre varios estilos de pensamiento científico, tal como fueron propuestos por Crombie (1981) y discutidos por Hacking (1985; 2009). El presente artículo está dividido en cuatro secciones. Primero, se examina la interpretación de Barnes (2004) sobre la incompatibilidad entre diversos estilos. Según este autor, no existe posibilidad alguna de encontrar similitudes en los estilos de razonamiento científico. En oposición a esta interpretación, las siguientes secciones explican características relevantes de la Geometría, tal como fueron plasmadas en Los Elementos de Euclides, y que están presentes en otros tres estilos: de modelación, de experimentación y taxonómico (las características compartidas incluso definen algunos de estos estilos). Destacar estas características me permite argumentar que estos cuatro estilos discutidos por Hacking no son tan diferentes entre sí, de hecho, se traslapan e incluso pueden ser condensados en un estilo fundacional: el geométrico. (shrink)

Even though Pato ka never acheived a critique of the political limits of Husserl´s and Heidegger´s philosophies, he did clearly set the limits of those philosophies, limits after which the phenomenological philosophy of Patocka adopts a new dimension. En this paper we argue that vis-a-vis Husserl´s ..

Research on moral responsibility and the related problem of free will is among the liveliest areas in contemporary analytical philosophy. Traditionally, these problems have been dealt with in conne...

In this paper, I propose that time representation should be classified as agent dependent motor-intentional, agent dependent conceptual and agent independent conceptual. I employ this classification to explain certain features of psychological and cultural time and discuss how biological time constrains such features. The paper argues that motor-intentional time is a crucial psychophysical link that bridges the gap between purely biochemical cycles and conceptual-intentional representations of time, and proposes that the best way to understand the transitions from biological to psychological (...) time is to characterize them as phase transitions that emerge on the global properties of a system regardless of specific aspects of the underlying processing units. With respect to hierarchical models of time, the paper claims that although the hierarchical organization of constraints limits the number of possible instantiations of temporal information, informational phases have principles of organization of their own. Based on these proposals, I conclude that since information assembles itself into the temporal behavior of an agent, it is more accurate to call the principles governing such a behavioral unity a phase, rather than a hierarchy. To support these theses, the paper draws upon research in biology, neuroscience, philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

Many experts have warned that environmental degradation is increasing the likelihood of future pandemics like COVID-19, as habitat loss and poaching increase close contact between wildlife and people. This fact has been framed as a reason to increase wildlife conservation efforts. We have many good reasons to step up conservation efforts, but arguments for doing so on the basis of pandemic prevention are rhetorically, ethically, and empricially flawed.

The very idea of novel ecosystems has been controversial in ecology. Critics have complained about its imprecision, and that it illicitly smuggles problematic ethical and political values into the science. By labelling a human-modified system a ‘novel ecosystem,‘ they worry, we give policymakers a “license to trash nature.“ The critics are right to be suspicious. I show that proponents of the novel ecosystem concept have been unable to make it both value-free and precise enough to allow for applied use.Also, the (...) critics are right to be suspicious, because a goal for many proponents of novel ecosystems is to bring new values into applied ecology. But the critics are wrong that this is illicit. I defend a value-laden conception of novel ecosystems, showing that applied ecologists are comfortable with other value-laden concepts, and that the value shift motivating discussion of novel ecosystems is necessary if we want to understand and protect nature in a changing world. (shrink)

Supposedly, stubbornness on the part of scientists—an unwillingness to change one’s position on a scientific issue even in the face of countervailing evidence—helps efficiently divide scientific labor. Maintaining disagreement is important because it keeps scientists pursuing a diversity of leads rather than all working on the most promising, and stubbornness helps preserve this disagreement. Planck’s observation that “Science progresses one funeral at a time” might therefore be an insight into epistemically beneficial stubbornness on the part of researchers. In conversation with (...) extant formal models, recent empirical research, and a novel agent-based model of my own I explore whether the epistemic goods which stubbornness can secure—disagreement and diversity—are attainable through less-costly methods. I make the case that they are, at least in part, and also use my modeling results to show that if stubbornness is scientifically valuable, it still involves a willingness to change one’s mind. (shrink)

In this article, I review a recent book edited by Gregory R. Smulewicz-Zucker that presents novel frameworks and refreshing perspectives on the issue of the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals.

Innovation is often seen as essential for ventures to succeed. High business failure rates in entrepreneurship, however, suggest that innovations are frequently driven by entrepreneurs blinded by overconfidence. Thus, anticipating when and why entrepreneurs will be motivated to innovate is fundamental for entrepreneurial success. Using a large sample obtained from population surveys conducted in 77 countries, this study analyzes the variables that are significantly associated with innovative behaviors. The research tests a model proposing that the joint effects of hubris, growth (...) aspirations, and an entrepreneur’s level of entrepreneurial experience have a crucial impact on innovative endeavors. It finds that hubris is significantly related to entrepreneurs’ growth aspirations and that ambition, in turn, is positively related to innovative behaviors. In addition, the study finds that both relationships are moderated by the level of entrepreneurial experience. These findings highlight the need to wise up amateur entrepreneurs before they embark on innovative endeavors. (shrink)

The author deals with one aspect of the justification of governmental action and its product (the law). He focuses on the authoritative character of legal rule, analyzing the apparent capacity of governments to produce reasons for action not grounded on substantive moral considerations. The assumption of that capacity seems necessary in order to establish a general moral obligation to obey a government irrespective of the actions required. This question is faced in connection with the thesis that only a particular form (...) of government, democracy, is morally justified insofar as it rests on legal rules issued by a legitimate source. (shrink)

This article aims at contributing to the contemporary reception of Heidegger’s thought in eco-philosophical perspective. Its point of departure is Heidegger’s claim, in his Bremen lectures and The Question Concerning Technology, that today the earth is submitted to permanent requisition and planned ordering, and that, having thus lost sight of its auto-poiesis, we are no longer capable of listening, tuning in, and singing back to what he calls in his course on Heraclitus the “song of the earth.” Accordingly, first we (...) examine how the inherently reciprocal dynamics of “earth” and “world,” as thematised by Heidegger in The Origin of the Work of Art, have become opaque. Second, we analyse whether it is possible to find those same dynamics at play behind Heidegger’s “Fourfold,” which we propose to reread in binary key in dialogue with contemporary anthropology, from Bateson and Lévi-Strauss to Wagner and Viveiros de Castro, and in light of Guattari’s notion of “trans-entitarian generativity.” Third, we stress the need to reposition Heidegger’s thought alongside contemporary concerns on “worlding” and we explore its plausible intersections with today’s object-oriented ethnography. Lastly, we discuss the possibility of rereading Heidegger’s Fourfold afresh against the backdrop of Heidegger’s non-foundational thinking, as a conceptual metaphor for the joint dynamics of Abgrund and Grund. (shrink)

Este artigo, ao conceituar a ideia de arqueologia política do saber, propõe algumas referências históricas sobre o que denomino de corpo desarrazoado a partir do primeiro capítulo de História da Loucura, mais especificamente, a partir do tema da lepra no livro. Esta discussão pretende dar uma resposta ao problema da dissociação entre desrazão e loucura levantado a respeito do livro, mostrando que o discurso de desrazão tem como solo histórico o modo pelo qual Foucault fundamentou sua ideia de exclusão do (...) leproso. O artigo termina avaliando o tema da exclusão do leproso por meio das considerações de Foucault sobre o modelo da peste. (shrink)

Las reflexiones de Pascal sobre la diversión, que arrojan luces sobre las complejas singularidades de la condición humana, destacando su precariedad, ¿son pertinentes para la sociedad actual? Esa es la pregunta a la que intenta responder este artículo. En el mundo actual estamos inmersos en una paradoja donde divertirse es un régimen de elementos dispersos, que se traduce en la cultura de lo efímero, a la que hay que renunciar para restaurar algo consistente; pero, gran paradoja, mientras uno se divierte (...) no deja de involucrarse, en un mundo al revés, en caminos laterales, luchando por crear nuevas formas de diversión, por el miedo o la incapacidad para enfrentarse a sí mismo. Pascal nos ayuda a encontrar luces para salir de esa disyuntiva. (shrink)

In this book, authors from a variety of disciplines examine how the interpretative disciplines deal with the lack or loss of certainty for their signs and texts.

One can intend the actions of others, even when one believes such actions are not under one’s control. Call the objects of intentions “ends”; the ends that consist of other people’s actions “social”; and the ends that consist of things one believes one cannot control “recalcitrant”. The thesis, then, is that one can intend recalcitrant social ends. I present a positive argument in favor of this idea, and then argue against some purported conditions on the possible content of intentions that (...) would rule out the possibility of intending such ends. The positive argument is the following: intentions are realized by a certain cluster of dispositions. One can come to be so disposed towards recalcitrant social ends. So one can come to be disposed toward such ends in the manner that realizes an intention. So one can intend recalcitrant social ends. The conditions against which I argue are known in the literature as the Own Action Condition, the Control Condition, and the Settle Condition. I present cases where, intuitively, agents genuinely intend ends that would be ruled out by these conditions. (shrink)

Resumen Este texto formula una teoría de los problemas complejos, que trata de distinguir cuándo y cómo un problema puede ser dicho como complejo y cuándo no. Un mundo diferente de suma cero, altamente entreverado, con múltiples sensibilidades y con crisis sistémicas y sistemáticas demanda una teoría de problemas complejos, inexistente a la fecha. Negativamente, las comprensiones o aproximaciones analíticas son insuficientes. Es precisa una estructura sintética sobre los problemas. Para ello, tres ejes emergen como referencias: la teoría matemática de (...) nudos, la teoría de la complejidad computacional y los problemas retorcidos. Este texto elabora una síntesis de estos tres ejes y propone una teoría para problemas entrelazados, dinámicos, difíciles, con fuertes implicaciones en varios planos y contextos entre sí. En una cuarta sección se trata de apreciar cómo la teoría de los problemas complejos contribuye a la epistemología de las ciencias sociales. Abstract This paper brings forth a theory of complex problems, distinguishing when and why a problem can be said to be complex, and when and why not. A world of non-zero sum, highly intertwined, with multiple sensitivities, with systemic and systematic crises requires a theory of complex systems, which does not exist today. Negatively said, analytical understandings and approaches are insufficient. It is needed, we argue, a synthetic structure regarding problems. Henceforth three axes emerge as referents: mathematical knots theory, theory of computational complexity, and the wicked problems. This paper consists of a synthesis of the three axes, and develops a theory for problems highly intertwined, dynamic, difficult, and with strong implications in various levels and contexts. A fourth section is devoted to the study of how the epistemology of the social sciences can benefit from the theory of complex systems. (shrink)

In this essay I expose two historical examples of the ambivalence of the place of philosophical knowledge in society. The symptomatic starting point is Aristotle’s characterization of the philosopher. Then, through the specification of Descartes’s views on philosophy, culture, the human and the artificial, I will show that there exists certain tension between the development of philosophy as a free knowledge available to everyone and philosophy as a specialized knowledge only suitable for initiates. Nowadays, when philosophy is in a critical (...) situation maybe because of that ambivalence, the need arises to overcome this problem and democratize it. (shrink)