Organizational legitimacy is an important resource, which provides access to other resources. As such, it impacts the survival chances of organizations. In this study, we examine the individual judgments of the owner-managers of small-and-medium size enterprises (SMEs) of the legitimacy of their own enterprise as well as their perception of the legitimacy evaluations of relevant stakeholders. This research is based on interviews with owner-managers of SMEs located in the Lorraine region of France. The results show that when legitimacy is perceived (...) as acquired, their judgments are based on instrumental, relational and moral evaluations, whereas when legitimacy is perceived as being deferred, judgement is based on mainly instrumental evaluations and when they report not being in position to judge their own legitimacy, their judgements are based on moral evaluations. In addition, the legitimacy judgements employed are associated with the different types of legitimacy sought by the SME owner-managers. Moreover, they perceive the validity cues coming from clients and employees as the most important sources of legitimacy. Other stakeholders are accorded secondary importance in granting legitimacy. (shrink)

Nesse artigo, trato da comparatio entre dois personagens, como forma de pôr em evidência qualidades ou defeitos, em comum (simile) ou em pares de contrários (contrarium), partindo do exemplo de Tibério, nos seis primeiros livros dos Annales. Para ajudar a compor o retrato do imperador nessa obra, Tácito emprega o simile, associando Tibério ao cruel Sejano, chefe da guarda, e o contrarium, comparando sua personagem principal ao herói militar Germânico.

Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral philosophers: voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. She traces their history, showing (...) how each developed in response to the prior one and comparing their early versions with those on the contemporary philosophical scene. Kant's theory that normativity springs from our own autonomy emerges as a synthesis of the other three, and Korsgaard concludes with her own version of the Kantian account. Her discussion is followed by commentary from G. A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, and a reply by Korsgaard. (shrink)

Christine Korsgaard has become one of the leading interpreters of Kant's moral philosophy. She is identified with a small group of philosophers who are intent on producing a version of Kant's moral philosophy that is at once sensitive to its historical roots while revealing its particular relevance to contemporary problems. She rejects the traditional picture of Kant's ethics as a cold vision of the moral life which emphasises duty at the expense of love and value. Rather, Kant's work is (...) seen as providing a resource for addressing not only the metaphysics of morals, but also for tackling practical questions about personal relations, politics, and everyday human interaction. This collection contains some of the finest current work on Kant's ethics and will command the attention of all those involved in teaching and studying moral theory. (shrink)

Christine M. Korsgaard is one of today's leading moral philosophers: this volume collects ten influential papers by her on practical reason and moral psychology ...

In this paper I mainly draw attention to the largely discussed § 244 of the Philosophical Investigations of Ludwig Wittgenstein. I begin by providing what I take to be a right reconstruction of the argument in it, in which Wittgenstein maintains that, in contradistinction to the presup-positions of the supporter of a private language, we learn words for sen-sations, like “pain”, for example, not by correlating the sign directly with the corresponding sensation. Instead, “pain” is learned in connection with the (...) natural expression of pain, with pain-behavior, so that the word takes the place of the natural expression. Next, I develop two lines of criticism on Wittgenstein’s argument. First, I argue that Wittgenstein does not explain how the learner substitutes the conventional expression for the natural one. Second, I maintain that, in his explanation of how we learn words for sensations, Wittgenstein shares one of the most impor-tant presuppositions of the private language, the very one that he wanted to discard once and for all, namely, that one can know from her own case what pain is. (shrink)

Agency and identity -- Necessitation -- Acts and actions -- Aristotle and Kant -- Agency and practical identity -- The metaphysics of normativity -- Constitutive standards -- The constitution of life -- In defense of teleology -- The paradox of self-constitution -- Formal and substantive principles of reason -- Formal versus substantive -- Testing versus weighing -- Maximizing and prudence -- Practical reason and the unity of the will -- The empiricist account of normativity -- The rationalist account of normativity (...) -- Kant on the hypothetical imperative -- Against particularistic willing -- Deciding and predicting -- Autonomy and efficacy -- The function of action -- The possibility of agency -- Non-rational action -- Action -- Attribution -- The psychology of action -- Expulsion from the garden : the transition to humanity -- Instinct, emotion, intelligence, and reason -- The parts of the soul -- Inside or outside -- Pull yourself together -- The constitutional model -- Models of the soul -- The city and the soul -- Platonic virtues -- Justice : substantive, procedural, and platonic -- Kant and the constitutional model -- Defective action -- The problem of bad action -- Being governed by the wrong law -- Or five bad constitutions -- Conceptions of evil -- Degrees of action -- Integrity and interaction -- Deciding to be bad -- The ordinary cases -- Dealing with the disunified -- Kant's theory of interaction -- My reasons -- Deciding to treat someone as an end in himself -- Interacting with yourself -- How to be a person -- What's left of me? (shrink)

El realismo de Zubiri se sitúa en la superación del dualismo gnoseológico establecido por el realismo clásico y su crítica moderna. La superación pasa por su conocida inteligencia sentiente, con la que gracias a la congenereidad de inteligir y sentir o sentir e inteligir, tradicionalmente escindidas, se puede establecer una relación con la realidad y, consecuentemente, con uno mismo, radicalmente diversa. Esta accesibilidad se apoya en lo sentiente, que no tiene que ver solo con lo perceptivo –que también– sino que (...) es extensible a lo relacionado con el ámbito afectivo humano. No por ello hay que abandonar la inteligencia como tal, pues ello implicaría un irracionalismo totalmente ajeno al pensar zubiriano; todo lo contrario, hay que considerarla pero desde este nuevo cuadro de coordenadas establecido por la aprehensión intelectivo-sentiente de la realidad, verdadero antídoto para evitar una autorreferencialidad en un uso concipiente de la inteligencia abandonada a sí misma. En sus obras Zubiri ha tratado más el momento intelectivo, siempre incardinado en el seno de la inteligencia sentiente. Queda, pues, una tarea muy importante como es articular filosóficamente el otro momento, el sentiente, en el acto aprehensor de la realidad. En este sentido, su análisis estético puede presentar a mi modo de ver grandes posibilidades. (shrink)

Divisão do trabalho e apologia da ordem em Thomas Hobbes e Norbert Elias Resumo: O artigo expõe os juízos afirmativos granjeados por Thomas Hobbes e Norbert Elias a respeito da divisão do trabalho e de suas relações com a ordem social, a despeito das diferenças de métodos e de métricas dos autores em pauta. De Thomas Hobbes, recolhe-se a demonstração, com subjacência no raciocínio hipotético-dedutivo do filósofo inglês, de que, do indivíduo, palmilha-se à sociedade, do contrato que edifica o Estado, (...) envereda-se à divisão do trabalho como uma das maneiras de estatuir o conforto necessário à manutenção da sociedade civil. De Norbert Elias, apanha-se a relação processual entre sociogênese e psicogênese que, sem opor indivíduo e sociedade, trata da formação da divisão do trabalho e da individualidade como fenômenos inseparáveis e peculiares ao processo civilizador. Palavras-chave: Divisão do trabalho. Ordem social. Thomas Hobbes. Norbert Elias. Division of work and apology of the order in thomas hobbes and norbert elias: The article exposes the assertive judgments made by Thomas Hobbes and Norbert Elias concerning the division of labor and its relations with the social order, despite the differences of methods and metrics of the authors in question. From Thomas Hobbes, the demonstration, based on the hypothetical-deductive reasoning of the English philosopher, is gathered from the demonstration that, from the individual, ingrained in society, from the contract that builds the State, the division of labor is divided as one of the ways of establishing the comfort necessary for the maintenance of civil society. From Norbert Elias, one picks up the procedural relation between sociogenesis and psychogenesis that, without opposing individual and society, deals with the formation of the division of labor and individuality as inseparable phenomena peculiar to the civilizing process. Key-words: Division of labor. Social order. Thomas Hobbes. Norbert Elias. División del trabajo y apología del orden en thomas hobbes y norbert elias Resumen: El artículo expone los juicios afirmativos desmenuzados por Thomas Hobbes y Norbert Elias acerca de la división del trabajo y de sus relaciones con el orden social, a pesar de las diferencias de métodos y de métricas de los autores en pauta. De Thomas Hobbes, se recoge la demostración, con subyacencia en el razonamiento hipotético-deductivo del filósofo inglés, de que, del individuo, se adapta a la sociedad, del contrato que edifica el Estado, se entra en la división del trabajo como una de las formas de estatuir el confort necesario para el mantenimiento de la sociedad civil. De Norbert Elias, se recoge la relación procesal entre sociogénesis y psicogénesis que, sin oponer individuo y sociedad, trata de la formación de la división del trabajo y de la individualidad como fenómenos inseparables y peculiares al proceso civilizador. Palabras clave: División del trabajo. Orden social. Thomas Hobbes. Norbert Elias. (shrink)

Osteopathy is a person-centred healthcare discipline that emphasizes the body’s structure-function interrelationship—and its self-regulatory mechanisms—to inform a whole-person approach to health and wellbeing. This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework for developing an integrative hypothesis in osteopathy, which is based on the enactivist and active inference accounts. We propose that osteopathic care can be reconceptualised under active inference as a unifying framework. Active inference suggests that action-perception cycles operate to minimize uncertainty and optimize an individual’s internal model of the (...) lived world and, crucially, the consequences of their behaviour. We argue that active inference offers an integrative framework for osteopathy, which can evince the mechanisms underlying dyadic and triadic exchanges and osteopathic care outcomes. We propose that this theoretical framework can underpin osteopathic care across the lifespan, from preterm infants to the elderly and those with persistent pain and other physical symptoms. In situations of chronicity, as an ecological niche, the patient-practitioner dyad provides the osteopath and the patient with a set of affordances, i.e., possibilities for action provided by the environment, that through shared intentionally, can promote adaptations and restoration of productive agency. Through a dyadic therapeutic relationship, as they engage with their ecological niche’s affordances—a structured set of affordances shared by agents—osteopath and patient actively construct a shared sense-making narrative and realise a shared generative model of their relation to the niche. In general, touch plays a critical role in developing a robust therapeutic alliance, mental state alignment, and biobehavioural synchrony between patient and practitioner. However, its role is particularly crucial in the fields of neonatology and paediatrics, where it becomes central in regulating allostasis and restoring homeostasis. We argue that from an active inference standpoint, the dyadic shared ecological niche underwrites a robust therapeutic alliance, which is crucial to the effectiveness of osteopathic care. Considerations and implications of this model—to clinical practice and research, both within- and outside osteopathy—are critically discussed. (shrink)

This study is divided in three parts. First, it shows which are the specific truths of Christianism, that distinguish it from other monotheistic religions. In the second part, establish the lullian metaphysics´suppositions that consent to embrace this truths. Finally, the third part is an attempt to expose the arguments and demonstrations characteristic of Lullian theory of knowledge.

Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address the question of whether or not content skepticism is (...) justified. I want only to establish the fact that motivational skepticism has no independent force. (shrink)

Many forms of virtue ethics, like certain forms of utilitarianism, suffer from the problem of indirection. In those forms, the criterion for status of a trait as a virtue is not the same as the criterion for the status of an act as right. Furthermore, if the virtues for example are meant to promote the nourishing of the agent, the virtuous agent is not standardly supposed to be motivated by concern for her own flourishing in her activity. In this paper, (...) I propose a virtue ethics which does not suffer from the problem. Traits are not virtues because their cultivation and manifestation promote a value such as agent flourishing. They are virtues in so far as they are habits of appropriate response to various relevant values. This means that there is a direct connection between the rationale of a virtue and what makes an action virtuous or right. (shrink)

In this paper, I set an aspect of what it is to live a flourishing life against the backdrop of neo liberal trends that continue to influence educational policy across the globe. The view I set out is in sharp contrast to any narrow assumption that education’s main task is the measurement of high performing individuals who will thus contribute to an economically viable society. Instead, I explore and argue for a conception of what constitutes a flourishing life that is (...) embedded in a more pragmatist analysis of what education may be. The argument begins with developing the centrality of embodiment to aesthetic sensibility and goes on to suggest how collective understanding of this within a community could constitute a sense of performance and thus contribute to the educational aim of developing a full and flourishing life. The argument is that this way of seeing life could have implications for educational practice, the role of the teacher and could help to reconfigure how education is experienced by the young. (shrink)

A continuing challenge for researchers and practitioners alike is the lack of data on the effectiveness of corporate–community investment programmes. The focus of this article is on the minerals industry, where companies currently face the challenge of matching corporate drivers for strategic partnership with community needs for programmes that contribute to local and regional sustainability. While many global mining companies advocate a strategic approach to partnerships, there is no evidence currently available that suggests companies are monitoring these partnerships to see (...) if they do, in fact, represent ‘strategic’ investments. This article argues that applying the management concept of ‘investment performance’ to corporate–community partnerships requires questioning traditional evaluation methods that focus on the results of programmes or activities. We adopt a case study approach to introduce an evaluation framework that considers performance from both corporate and community perspectives and that conceptualises partnership performance as comprising four aspects: (1) the contribution of the partnership to the overall portfolio of a company’s community investment programmes, (2) the appropriateness of the partnership model, (3) the effectiveness of the partnering relationship and (4) the ability of the partners to achieve programme goals. The application of this evaluation framework to an established corporate–community partnership programme provided some useful insights as to how partnership performance can be improved. (shrink)

Christine Swanton presents a new target centred virtue ethics, which is opposed to orthodox virtue ethics in two major ways. She rejects the 'natural goodness' metaphysics of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in favour of a 'hermeneutic ontology' of ethics, and she offers a new target centred framework for assessing rightness of acts.

Christine M. Korsgaard is Arthur Kingsley Porter Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University. She was educated at the University of Illinois and received a Ph.D. from Harvard. She has held positions at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago, and visiting positions at Berkeley and UCLA. She is a member of the American Philosophical Association and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has published extensively on Kant, and about (...) moral philosophy and its history, the theory of practical reason, the philosophy of action, and personal identity. Her two published books are The Sources of Normativity (1992) and Creating the King- dom of Ends (1996). (shrink)

What do we mean when we say we act "for a reason"? What is the connection between Reason, as a faculty, and the reasons of our actions? This article maintains that Aristotle and Kant had a similar answer to this question. Moreover: the answer they give can help us to clarify the controversy between moral realism and empiricism regarding the ontological and epistemological status of what we call the reason of an action.

Estudam-se realidades básicas da moral - o ente, o ato de ser e a causalidade eficiente intrínseca - e se conclui que se harmonizam apenas com aquelas metafísicas denominadas do ser. que concebem o ser como a primeira perfeição à qual se reduzem todas as outras. Critica-se a posição essencialista. Examina-se a noção de ser implícita nos escritos de Tomás de Aquino que, por superar a concepção formalista do ser, permite uma compreensão adequada da vida moral.,Da mesma maneira, a noção (...) do ser que se extrai da obra de Raimundo Lúlio não difere essencialmente daquelas apresentadas pelas metafisicas do ser, e por isso a moral Juliana sobre ela assente é permanente e adequada à pessoa humana. (shrink)

La pensée de Walter Benjamin constitue la tentative aussi lucide que désespérée d’un intellectuel de contrer ce qu’il sait inévitable : la déshumanisation d’un monde dont la tradition et les valeurs culturelles ont été liquidées par l’expérience de la grande guerre et l’avènement de la barbarie fasciste qui fera de l’histoire une catastrophe. Les stratégies politiques et esthétiques que Benjamin développe afin de combattre la menace du fascisme peuvent être résumées sous la notion de « barbar...

In this theoretical paper, motives for CSR are considered. An underlying assumption is that the commercial imperative is not the sole driver of CSR decision-making in private sector companies, but that the formal adoption and implementation of CSR by corporations could be associated with the changing personal values of individual managers. These values may find expression through the opportunity to exercise discretion, which may arise in various ways. It is suggested that in so far as CSR initiatives represent individuals' values, (...) so the responsibility in evidence is less obviously corporate. Our emphasis on personal initiative is intended to counter a tendency to view the corporation as the agent, and may serve to remind us that individuals can, indeed, make a difference. (shrink)