Content skepticism about practical reason is doubt about the bearing of rational considerations on the activities of deliberation and choice. Motivational skepticism is doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. Some people think that motivational considerations alone provide grounds for skepticism about the project of founding ethics on practical reason. I will argue, against this view, that motivational skepticism must always be based on content skepticism. I will not address the question of whether or not content skepticism is (...) justified. I want only to establish the fact that motivational skepticism has no independent force. (shrink)

In this theoretical paper, motives for CSR are considered. An underlying assumption is that the commercial imperative is not the sole driver of CSR decision-making in private sector companies, but that the formal adoption and implementation of CSR by corporations could be associated with the changing personal values of individual managers. These values may find expression through the opportunity to exercise discretion, which may arise in various ways. It is suggested that in so far as CSR initiatives represent individuals' values, (...) so the responsibility in evidence is less obviously corporate. Our emphasis on personal initiative is intended to counter a tendency to view the corporation as the agent, and may serve to remind us that individuals can, indeed, make a difference. (shrink)

One of the great difficulties with Kant’s moral philosophy is that it seems to imply that our moral obligations leave us powerless in the face of evil. Kant’s theory sets a high ideal of conduct and tells us to live up to that ideal regardless of what other persons are doing. The results may be very bad. But Kant says that the law "remains in full force, because it commands categorically" (G, 438-39/57).* The most weI1—known example of...

Plato and Kant advance a constitutional model of the soul, in which reason and appetite or passion have different structural and functional roles in the generation of motivation, as opposed to the familiar Combat Model in which they are portrayed as independent sources of motivation struggling for control. In terms of the constitutional model we may explain what makes an action different from an event. What makes an action attributable to a person, and therefore what makes it an action, is (...) that it issues from the person''s constitution, and therefore from the person as a whole, rather than from some force working on or in the person. This in turn implies an account of what makes an action good: what makes an action good is that it is deliberated upon and chosen in a way that unifies the person into a constitutional system. Through deliberative action we constitute ourselves as unified agents. Platonic justice and Kant''s categorical imperative are shown to be normative standards for action because they are principles of self-constitution. (shrink)

Some are concerned about the possibility that offering money for research participation can constitute coercion or undue influence capable of distorting the judgment of potential research subjects and compromising the voluntariness of their informed consent. The author recognizes that more often than not there are multiple influences leading to decisions, including decisions about research participation. The concept of undue influence is explored, as well as the question of whether or not there is something uniquely distorting about money as opposed to (...) a chance for treatment or medical care. An amount of money that is not excessive and is calculated on the basis of time or contribution may, rather than constitute an undue inducement, be an indication of respect for the time and contribution that research subjects make. (shrink)

Kant holds that the good will is a source of value, In the sense that other things acquire their values from standing in an appropriate relation to it. I argue that aristotle holds a similar view about contemplation, And that this explains his preference for the contemplative life. They differ about what the source of value is because they differ about which kind of activity, ethical or contemplative, discovers meaning and purpose in the world.

The Covid-19 pandemic has led to severe shortages of many essential goods and services, from hand sanitizers and N-95 masks to ICU beds and ventilators. Although rationing is not unprecedented, never before has the American public been faced with the prospect of having to ration medical goods and services on this scale.

Most legal systems divide the world into persons and property, treating human beings as persons, and pretty much everything else, including non-human animals, as property. Persons are the subjects of both rights and obligations, including the right to own property, while objects of property, being by their very nature for the use of persons, have no rights at all. I will call this the “legal bifurcation.” We might look to Immanuel Kant’s moral and political philosophy to provide a philosophical vindication (...) of the legal bifurcation, for reasons I will lay out in a moment. But in one way, that would be backwards, because Kant, in constructing the metaphysical categories that he used to talk about rights, was following the tradition of Roman law. (shrink)

ExtractThe idea that all the entities in the world may be, for legal and moral purposes, divided into the two categories of ‘persons’ and ‘things’ comes down to us from the tradition of Roman law. In the law, a ‘person’ is essentially the subject of rights and obligations, while a thing may be owned as property. In ethics, a person is an object of respect, to be valued for her own sake, and never to be used as a mere means (...) to an end, while a thing has only a derivative value, and may be used as a means to some person's ends. This bifurcation is unfortunate because it seems to leave us with no alternative but to categorize everything as either a person or a thing. Yet some of the entities that give rise to the most vexing ethical problems are exactly the ones that do not seem to fit comfortably into either category. For various, different, kinds of reasons, it seems inappropriate to categorize a fetus, a non-human animal, the environment, or an object of great beauty, as a person, but neither does it seem right to say of such things that they are to be valued only as means.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE LAWVolume 12, Issue 34Christine M. KorsgaardDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000018Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE LAWVolume 12, Issue 34Christine M. KorsgaardDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000018Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS, AND THE LAWVolume 12, Issue 34Christine M. KorsgaardDOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1477175613000018Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation. (shrink)

In this article I begin by discussing the persistent problem of relations between educational inequality and the attainment gap in schools. Because benefits accruing from an education are substantial, the ‘gap’ leads to large disparities in the quality of life many young people can expect to experience in the future. Curriculum knowledge has been a focus for debate in England in relation to educational equality for over 40 years. Given the contestation surrounding views about curriculum knowledge and equality I consider (...) the thinking of two philosophers, Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas, and their work on justice, to trouble the curriculum framework and discourse of knowledge promoted through the policy text of The Importance of Teaching: The Schools White Paper (2010) and later associated policy reforms to the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) curriculum in England. The Schools White Paper aims to make the curriculum more challenging to students by introducing tight controls in terms of the assessment framework and curriculum knowledge. I argue that, when considered through Derrida's perspective on language and meaning and Levinas' view on the ethical responsibility for the other, the reforms present obstacles to the search for a just curriculum. I look to the work of Sharon Todd and Paul Standish for a re-imagination of curriculum as or through relations in the light of Derrida's and Levinas' philosophies. (shrink)

Phenomenology provides a method for disability theorists to describe embodied subjectivity lacking within the social model of disability. Within the literature on body integrity identity disorder (BIID), dominant narratives of disability are influential, individual bodies are considered in isolation, and experiences of disabled people are omitted. Research on BIID tends to incorporate an individualist ontology. In this article, I argue that Merleau-Ponty's conceptualization of “being in the world,” which recognizes subjectivity as embodied and intersubjective, provides a better starting point for (...) research describing the experiences of those with BIID and amputees. (shrink)

Sometimes beliefs that are shared are treated as if they are knowledge in spite of a lack of evidence or even in the face of evidence to the contrary. Beliefs informed by prejudices and ignorance about people with disabilities are often treated as certain and reinforced by social practices. In this paper, I distinguish between knowledge claims and beliefs that are treated as if they are true. I use Wittgenstein’s account of the connection between epistemic and other social practices in (...) On Certainty to consider how it is possible to change beliefs about disability. I draw on Naomi Scheman’s “Forms of life: Mapping the Rough Ground” to consider political applications of Wittgenstein’s thought. I use a Wittgensteinian framework to critique Peter Singer’s claims regarding the lives of disabilities in Practical Ethics. I draw attention to the ways in which unjustified beliefs about disability can inform and be reified through social practices. Likewise, changes in social practices can dislodge common ableist beliefs about disability. (shrink)

L’étude menée sur les coupes de Droop attiques découvertes dans les fouilles de l’Artémision de Thasos a permis d’attirer notre attention sur un groupe de fragments décorés d’un thème peu fréquent sur cette forme : le retour d’Héphaïstos dans l’Olympe. Il n’est cependant pas rare sur d’autres classes de coupes contemporaines, en particulier sur les coupes à bande des Petits Maîtres dont la coupe de Droop est une variante. Mais si l’étude des fragments de l’Artémision permet de renforcer le lien (...) étroit existant dans la seconde moitié du vie s. av. J.‑C. entre la production des coupes à bande et celle des coupes de Droop, elle permet surtout de mettre en valeur une œuvre d’exception par la rareté de sa thématique, la qualité de son décor et ses dimensions généreuses. Son attribution au Peintre d’Oakeshott, proche compagnon du Peintre d’Amasis, lui confère une place privilégiée au sein des découvertes de céramiques attiques de l’île de Thasos. (shrink)

We explore an unsolved challenge in the era of evidence-based medicine (EBM): the recognition of the patient as an epistemic agent or ‘knower’. While patients are increasingly acknowledged as carriers of values and preferences, it seems more challenging to acknowledge them as carriers of important causal information. In contrast, the science of pharmacovigilance depends on patient testimonies as valuable sources of causal evidence. This incompatibility can give rise to cases of what has been called participatory epistemic injustice. We analyse the (...) testimony of a chronic pain patient and co-author of this article, Christine. Christine gives an auto-ethnographic account of her interactions with healthcare professionals trying to find the right pharmacological treatment for her condition. Through the analysis of her own story, she identifies some relevant themes for the epistemic interaction between healthcare professionals and chronic pain patients. We argue that such epistemic interactions are increasingly shaped by EBM and its conception of causality, which devalues patient subjective testimonies and emphasises statistical evidence. We conclude that outlier patients face an inherent risk of being left vulnerable to participatory epistemic injustice, particularly regarding the discovery of novel, rare adverse effects of medicines. (shrink)

A serious moral weakness of reproductive ‘surrogacy’ is that it can be harmful to the children who are created. This article presents a proposal for mitigating this weakness. Currently, the practice of commercial ‘surrogacy’ operates only in the interests of the adults involved , not in the interests of the child who is created. Whether ‘surrogacy’ is seen as the purchase of a baby, the purchase of parental rights, or the purchase of reproductive labor, all three views share the same (...) significant flaws. They endorse the transfer, for a fee, of the infant from the woman who gestated it to those who commissioned it, but without justifying such a transfer; they fail to demonstrate that the commissioners have any entitlement to the infant, or, for that matter, suitability to be the infant's parents; and they fail to take any notice of the infant's needs, interests, and wellbeing. A mere genetic connection is not enough to establish that the commissioners are entitled to receive the baby or that they are competent to raise it. Their good intentions, however caring, are not enough. Therefore, just as in the practice of adoption, there should be a formal institutionalized system for screening and licensing the prospective social parents, which would make the infant's needs, interests, and wellbeing paramount. I reply to several potential objections to this proposal, including the objection that genetic parents who raise their own child are not screened and licensed. (shrink)

Although many women experience harmful behaviors that fit the legal definition of sexual harassment, very few ever label their experiences as such. I explore how psychological ambivalence expressed as sadomasochism may account for some of this gap. Following Lynn Chancer, I argue that certain structural circumstances characteristic of highly stratified bureaucratic organizations may promote these psychological responses. After discussing two illustrations of this dynamic, I draw out the implications for sexual harassment theory and policy.

The article attempts to determine whether aristotle's conception of epideictic rhetoric included not only display of the orator's powers but also the functions of judgment and comprehension. It is argued that the term "theoria" or "observation" implies judgment and comprehension as well as perception as the function of epideictic, Therefore paralleling the faculty of practical understanding as described in the "nicomachean ethics". The result is a view of epideictic as an intellectual process through which the audience assesses the speaker's ability (...) to make judgments and, In turn, Receives critical insight into the praiseworthy or blamable object. (shrink)

The recent increased prevalence of diseases related to unhealthy lifestyles raises difficulties for healthcare insurance systems traditionally based on the principles of risk-management, solidarity, and selective altruism: since these diseases are, to some extent, predictable and avoidable, patients seem to bear some responsibility for their condition and may not deserve full access to social medical services. Here, we investigate with objective criteria to what extent it is warranted to hold patients responsible for their illness and to sanction them accordingly. We (...) ground our analysis on a series of minimal conditions for ‘practical’ and for ‘moral’ responsibility attribution. By applying these criteria consistently, we highlight that individual responsibility applies to risk-taking life choices rather than stigmatized sickness. We explain that responsibility is a matter of degree, that it varies across life-history, and can be affected by factors beyond the patients’ grasp. We point out that scientific knowledge about the effect of these factors generates responsibilities for other parties such as public health agencies and private industry. The upshot of our analysis is that health policies targeting the ‘liable’ undeserving sick are mostly unwarranted, and tend to increase unequal treatment of already vulnerable groups: the unlucky sick. (shrink)

This article explores the reasons some pregnant women enter maternity homes with the plan to place their babies for adoption. The authors discuss changes in maternity homes over the twentieth century and report on findings from a survey of currently licensed homes in Texas. Next, the authors discuss the findings from fieldwork and in-depth interviews with residents of two maternity homes. They identify three major reasons why birth mothers enter maternity homes: the desire to escape abusive or stressful family lives, (...) the desire to avoid the stigma of placing a child for adoption, and the desire to provide their children, and in some cases themselves, with a stable and loving family life. The authors contend that entering a maternity home with the intention of placing their babies for adoption represents an effort on the part of birth mothers to reconfigure their own, often impoverished family lives. (shrink)

Part-time work schedules are a popular option for many women struggling to reconcile the competing demands of employment and motherhood. They are controversial among feminists because they are associated with job penalties that promote gender inequality. Previous research on this topic has focused on issues confronting women workers in professional and managerial jobs. In this article, we compare and contrast the experiences of women in professional and secondary part-time jobs, drawing on 60 in-depth interviews with mothers working in such “good” (...) and “bad” jobs. We find that mothers at the top and at the bottom of the employment hierarchy face unique disadvantages from their part-time employment to which they respond in different ways. Yet in both instances, mothers assume responsibility for their “choices,” which absolves organizations of blame for exploitation and discrimination against part-time workers. We suggest alternative possibilities for the organization of work in the conclusion. (shrink)

"_Minding Women _embraces a generation of scholarship, culminating in major new work by leading scholars who are reconfiguring feminist research. This important collection will again change the way we think about race, history, education, and the lives of girls." —_Sally Schwager_, Director Women's History Institute, Harvard University Research on women and girls has exploded during the past twenty years. Since 1977, when the _Harvard Educational Review_ published Carol Gilligan's now-classic article "In a Different Voice," in which she argued so persuasively (...) that women and girls must be understood on their own terms, researchers have been discovering, uncovering, and recovering women's ways of knowing, being, thinking, teaching, and learning. _Minding Women_ charts the wealth of thought and writing related to women and girls and education that this process of discovery has produced. _Minding Women_ begins with a "Classics" section—articles that call attention to the lack of research on girls and women and describe the effect this has had on knowledge and society. The contributors then discuss feminist pedagogy, and how it has changed and been refined over time. Girls and young women are the focus of the next section. Too often their voices and viewpoints are excluded from these discussions, so some of their own writings are included here. The book then explores women's educational history, showcasing some of the rich work in this area over the past twenty years. Identity issues are addressed in the final section, acknowledging that substantial differences exist among groups of women and girls on how they experience the world and their roles, prospects, and lives. (shrink)

(1997). Semantic fields and meaning: A bridge between mind and matter. World Futures: Vol. 48, The Concept of Collective Consiousness: Research Perspectives, pp. 161-170.

The “demand” for selective termination of pregnancy is a socially constructed response to prior medical interventions in women's reproductive processes, themselves dependent on cultural views of infertility.

Wittgensteins Aufzeichnungen zur Mathematik erscheinen fragmentarisch, sind jedoch erstaunlich tiefgründig, präzise und kohärent. Sie erlauben daher weitreichende Einblicke in seine grundlegende philosophische Denkweise. Ausgehend von Wittgensteins Kritik an Cantors Diagonalbeweis und seiner Einschätzung reeller Zahlen wird in der vorliegenden Arbeit Wittgensteins Philosophie der Mathematik einer Neubewertung zugeführt. Es wird dargelegt, dass seine Einwände gegen den Diagonalbeweis weder so unbegründet sind, wie ihm seine Gegner vorwerfen, noch so diplomatisch, wie seinen Verteidigern lieb wäre. Vielmehr illustrieren sie die konstruktivistischen, konventionalistischen und revisionistischen (...) Züge seiner Philosophie der Mathematik. (shrink)

This paper takes a novel approach to studying the existence and stability of Nash equilibria in N-firm Cournot–Bertrand oligopolies. First, we show that such games can be monotonically embedded into a game of strategic heterogeneity, so that each firm best responds to the choices of all other firms in a monotonic way. We then show that this monotonicity can be exploited to derive conditions which guarantee the existence of a unique, dominance solvable Nash equilibrium which is stable under all adaptive (...) dynamics. These conditions constitute a strict improvement over existing results in the literature. Finally, we examine the effect on these conditions resulting from additional firms entering the market. (shrink)

Ce compte rendu a déjà paru le 1er novembre 2015 dans la Nouvelle revue du travail, n° 7 S. Montchatre et B. Woehl, Temps de travail et travail du temps, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2014, 250 p. « Comment le temps nous travaille-t-il, nous et nos sociétés, à partir du temps demandé par le travail? » Le titre retenu Temps de travail et travail du temps n'est pas un simple jeu de mots. Issu d'une série de séminaires organisés à (...) Strasbourg en 2010-2011, l'ouvrage collectif - Recensions. (shrink)

A cell contains many copies of mitochondrial DNA. The distribution of a mitochondrial gene mutation in a cell culture is governed by the way in which the mtDNA molecules of a cell are replicated and partitioned between the two daughter cells during mitosis. Assuming that this partition process is random, we describe the evolution of the mitochondrial genetic state of a cell culture. The mutated mtDNA is ultimately segregated and the rate of the trend to segregation is relatively slow. It (...) is nevertheless greatly accelerated if the model takes into account the spatial mtDNA partition by the mitochondrial compartments. (shrink)

Here, we describe how Casas Grandes Medio period (AD 1200 to 1450) shamanic practices of the North American Southwest used tobacco shamanism, a ritual stance called the Tennessee Diviner (TD) posture, and cultural expectations to generate trance experiences of soul flight and divination. We introduce a conceptual model that holds that specific trance experiences are the emergent result of human minds interacting with additional factors including entheogens, cultural expectations, physiological states, postures/movement, and sound/stimulation. Experimental and ethnographic evidence indicates initiating trance (...) with either tobacco intoxication or the TD posture accompanied with a rapidly beating drum or rattle corresponds with perceptions of soul flight, transformation, and divination/information acquisition. Both have similar results but pairing them together as they were during the Medio period likely helped ensure the culturally desired trance experiences. This practice of mutually reinforcing factors was likely part of tobacco‐based shamanism found in other New World cultures as well. We suggest our general model can be applied to other contexts to examine how various aspects of trance induction interact to produce the cultural patterns (and resulting cosmological and spiritual frameworks) anthropologists have documented in other cultures. (shrink)