Autonomy and ethics are related to each other in complex ways. The paper starts by distinguishing and characterizing three basic dimensions of this relation. It proceeds by arguing for the compatibility of moral realism with a due respect for human autonomy. Nevertheless, supernaturalist moral realism seems to pose a special challenge for the autonomy of ethics as a self-standing normative realm. The paper ends with some considerations on the role of divine authority both in metaethics and in the general theory (...) of value. (shrink)

In non-philosophical discourse, “identity” is often used when the specific character of artefacts is described or evaluated. We argue that this usage of “identity” can be explicated as referring to the symbol properties of artefacts as they are conceptualized in the symbol theory of Goodman and Elgin. This explication is backed by an analysis of various uses of “identity”. The explicandum clearly differs from the concepts of numerical identity, qualitative identity and essence, but it has a range of similarities with (...) the notion of self-concept used in psychology and practical philosophy. The proposed explication is used to analyse claims about identity-pluralism and identity-conflicts. Firstly, the explication allows us to distinguish various ways how the same artefact can have a plurality of identities. Secondly, more or less sharp conflicts within an identity or between identities of an artefact are distinguished. Thirdly, many phenomena called “identity-conflicts” are only apparently identity-conflicts and can be analysed as involving some other form of tension. (shrink)

We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that enable epistemic authorities to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 5 Seiten: 855-859.

A interlocution containing a stimulating lead essay on the relationship between law and violence by one of the key third-generation Frankfurt School philosophers, Christoph Menke, and engaged responses by a variety of influential critics.

For Proclus, like other Platonists, logic, epistemology, and philosophy of language are not distinct as a tool and parts of philosophy respectively, but are all part of dialectic. This chapter first briefly addresses Proclus’ logic, specifically the ‘rule of obversion’ ascribed to him, and his naturalist philosophy of language, and thereafter moves on to epistemology. The author discusses Proclus’ top-down psychology, where the highest faculty is the paradigm for the lower ones; the Iamblichean principle that knower determines knowledge; the essential (...) reason-principles, or lower forms constituting the soul’s essence; Proclus’ rich notion of recollection; his solutions to two challenges to his epistemology: the knowledge of things of which there is no Form, and the use of images in cognition. Finally, in the conclusion the author assesses Proclus’ originality and discusses the fact that for late Neoplatonists knowledge is not an end in itself. (shrink)

We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as 'before' and 'after' (rather than, say, 'past', 'present' and 'future'), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process that (...) is being experienced. Both claims have been made before, though usually separately from each other, and I don't believe the connection between them has been sufficiently recognized. (shrink)

According to Fred Dretske's externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the information that p. Another famous feature of Dretske's epistemology is his denial that knowledge is closed under known entailment. I argue that, given Dretske's construal of information, he is in fact committed to the view that both information and knowledge are closed under known entailment. Hence, if it is true (...) that, as Dretske also believes, accepting closure leads to skepticism, he must either embrace skepticism or abandon his information theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Guidelines recommend a ‘do-not-resuscitate’ code status for inpatients in which cardiopulmonary resuscitation attempts are considered futile because of low probability of survival with good neurological outcome. We retrospectively assessed the prevalence of DNR code status and its association with presumed CPR futility defined by the Good Outcome Following Attempted Resuscitation score and the Clinical Frailty Scale in patients hospitalised in the Divisions of Internal Medicine and Traumatology/Orthopedics at the University Hospital of Basel between September 2018 and June 2019. The definition (...) of presumed CPR futility was met in 467 of 2889 patients. 866 patients had a DNR code status. In a regression model adjusted for age, gender, main diagnosis, nationality, language and religion, presumed CPR futility was associated with a higher likelihood of a DNR code status. In the subgroup of patients with presumed futile CPR, 144 of 467 had a full code status, which was independently associated with younger age, male gender, non-Christian religion and non-Swiss citizenship. We found a significant proportion of hospitalised patients to have a full code status despite the fact that CPR had to be considered futile according to an established definition. Whether these decisions were based on patient preferences or whether there was a lack of patient involvement in decision-making needs further investigation. (shrink)

In the first part (sections 2-5) an empirical theory of practical reasons is sketched and defended. It consists of: hypotheses about what intentions are, namely optimality beliefs, (2), hypotheses about how intentions are formed on the basis of probabilistic beliefs and intrinsic desires (3), a pluralist theory about intrinsic desires (4) and a theory about motives for moral action (5). In the second part (sections 6-8) it is argued that normative practical philosophy must rely on empirical theories of practical reasons (...) (6). Then it is shown that theories of prudential practical rationality and of morals that are not based on such empirical theories run into problems. And it is sketched how the empirical theory outlined in the first part can be used as a basis for a reconstructive approach to practical rationality and of an internalist approach to morals (7-8). (shrink)

The introduction charts Hans-Johann Glock’s academic career, introduces some of his core philosophical views, and provides an overview of the chapters included in the festschrift.

This article develops an assessment of the present-day European crisis management, referring to Wolfgang Streeck’s recent interpretation of the European ‘consolidation state’ as an attempt to install a ‘Hayekian’ regime of liberalized transnational markets. This article arrives at a diagnosis different from Streeck’s: if there has been a ‘Hayekian’ regime, it had already developed after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 and the subsequent dismantling of capital controls in the USA and Europe. As it appeared in the (...) financial crisis of 2007–2008, the ultimate practical test of the Hayekian vision was dramatically negative. European crisis management, as it is still largely occupied with the imperative to maintain the solvency of troubled Euro states vis-à-vis the capital markets, is not following a Hayekian script. Rather, it is confronted with the challenge of removing the debris of the collapse of the former Hayekian regime, taking the form of zombie banks and large uncovered capital claims. To master this challenge, not only intact European institutions and transnational cooperation in Europe would be required, but also much more democratic pressure from below. (shrink)

Heuristics make decisions not only fast and frugally, but often nearly as well as “full” rationality or even better. Using such heuristics should therefore meet health care standards under liability law. But an independent court often has little chance to verify the necessary information. And judgments based on heuristics might appear to have little legitimacy, given the widespread belief in formal rationality.

Das 12. Jahrhundert gilt als eine Epoche gro.

A tendency of auditory cortical neurons to respond at the beginning of major transitions in sounds rather than providing a continuously updated spectral-temporal profile may impede the generation of combination-sensitivity for certain classes of stimuli. Potential consequences of the cortical encoding of voiced stop-consonants on representational principles derived from orderly output constraints are discussed.

This paper explores the phenomenon of meta-emotions. Meta-emotions are emotions people have about their own emotions. We analyze the intentional structure of meta-emotions and show how psychological findings support our account. Acknowledgement of meta-emotions can elucidate a number of important issues in the philosophy of mind and, more specifically, the philosophy and psychology of emotions. Among them are (allegedly) ambivalent or paradoxical emotions, emotional communication, emotional self-regulation, privileged access failure for repressed emotions, and survivor guilt.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 66 Heft: 5 Seiten: 650-652.