To date, research examining the socio-spatial effects of smart city technologies have charted how they are reconfiguring the production of space, spatiality and mobility, and how urban space is governed, but have paid little attention to how the temporality of cities is being reshaped by systems and infrastructure that capture, process and act on real-time data. In this article, we map out the ways in which city-scale Internet of Things infrastructures, and their associated networks of sensors, meters, transponders, actuators and (...) algorithms, are used to measure, monitor and regulate the polymorphic temporal rhythms of urban life. Drawing on Lefebvre, and subsequent research, we employ rhythmanalysis in conjunction with Miyazaki’s notion of ‘algorhythm’ and nascent work on algorithmic governance, to develop a concept of ‘algorhythmic governance’. We then use this framing to make sense of two empirical case studies: a traffic management system and sound monitoring and modelling. Our analysis reveals: how smart city technologies computationally perform rhythmanalysis and undertake rhythm-making that intervenes in space-time processes; distinct forms of algorhythmic governance, varying on the basis of adaptiveness, immediacy of action, and whether humans are in-, on-, or, off-the-loop; and a number of factors that shape how algorhythmic governance works in practice. (shrink)

This volume is based to a large extent on the understanding of biosemiotic literary criticism as a semiotic-model-making enterprise. For Jurij Lotman and Thomas A. Sebeok, “nature writing is essentially a model of the relationship between humans and nature” ; biosemiotic literary criticism, itself a form of nature writing and thus itself an ecological-niche-making enterprise, will be considered to be a model of modeling, a model of nature naturing. Modes and models of analysis drawn from Thomas A. Sebeok and Marcel (...) Danesi’s Forms of Meaning: Modeling Systems Theory and Semiotic Analysis as well as from Timo Maran’s work on “modeling the environment in literature,” Edwina Taborsky’s writing on Peircean semiosis, and, of course, Jesper Hoffmeyer’s formative work in biosemiotics are among the most important organizing elements for this volume. (shrink)

A central thesis of Louise Westling’s highly accomplished and provocative The Logos of the Living World: Merleau-Ponty, Animals, and Language is that “human language and aesthetic behaviors emerge from our animality” . What is perhaps most compelling about her thesis is that she supports it by exploring how an evolutionary continuity between an always already languaged world and human being-in-the-world can be understood without having to employ the dangerous logic of social Darwinism or some schools of evolutionary psychology and without (...) having to serve as yet another iteration of a naïve “metaphysics of presence”. Indeed, Derrida’s “fear of continuism” is based in fact on a “false dilemma” . As Westling writes, citing Matthew Calarco and Mary Midgley , “(to say that everything is composed of atoms and molecules is to assert material continuism, but no one would then cl .. (shrink)

Our purpose in this essay is twofold: to explore John Deely’s “semiotic” or “contextualized animal” as also a “contextualizing animal”, one that not only responds in context but one that changes first the context so as later to change itself—as all living things do; and to explore how this context-shifting “semiotic animal” has caused to emerge the very “signs upon which”, as Deely writes, “the whole of life depends”. Environmental ethics are inseparable from personal ethics, then, because (1) we are (...) in fact ourselves environments for others, (2) we carry models of our environments within us (our genetic / ontogenetic selves), and (3) even our free will (the basis of ethical choice) is an “environmental” phenomenon, as Martin Heisenberg argues in Nature (14 May 2009: 164–165) and as Deely writes in Semiotic Animal: “signs do not fall strictly among the things objectified by perceptions of sense but act prior to that perception to enable it to reconstruct the physical environment along objective lines that are meaningful to the species” (Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of Human Being Transcending Patriarchy and Feminism [2010]: 119). (shrink)

The Vitruvian Man of Leonardo da Vinci is one of the most famous and most studied drawings over the world as well as one of the most reproduced ones, e.g. in coins, space suit patches, books and movies. The aim of the present work is to discuss the Vitruvian Man as a figurative representation of the Leonardo’s scientific method. Our analysis is based on scientific elements both present in the drawing and provided by Leonardo in his approach to this drawing. (...) Our thesis is that the square symbolizes the measurable physical world and that the man inscribed within the square refers to the physics measurement process based on the operational definition of quantities, including the measurement unit system and the quantities conversion factors. Therefore, the measurement process is fundamental for the Leonardo’s approach to the scientific knowledge, albeit, the drawing also suggests that this latter does not correspond with the true knowledge. The circle, which has a different center with respect to the square, symbolizes the truth, to which the man inscribed in the square yearns, without ever achieving it, the truth being reachable only by the man inscribed within the circle. (shrink)

En este artículo intento mostrar que la desigualdad económica, la militarización de los Estados así como el odio y la violencia son las causas de gran parte de los conflictos bélicos. Ante lo cual, apoyándome en una línea que se genera en Oriente pero que no es ajena al pensamiento occidental, propongo seguir investigando en torno al pacifismo gandhiano, así como acerca de valores que el budismo cultiva conscientemente, como es el valor de la compasión universal, y que poseen una (...) gran importancia para consolidar una cultura de la paz. (shrink)

Resumen: El artículo busca observar el hecho religioso mapuche, a partir de la reflexión de Rudolf Otto respecto de lo numinoso y lo santo. Para ello se utiliza su metodología de análisis fenomenológico aplicada a los conceptos de mysterium, tremendum y fascinans o las dimensiones del temor, incorporadas en la cultura mapuche. Se concluye que el análisis de estos diversos momentos de la experiencia santo-numinoso en la vida religiosa del mapuche, permite constatar el dinamismo existente en la idea religiosa del (...) mapuche, lo que a su vez representa adecuadamente la relación entre el hombre religioso y lo santo.: This article seeks to observe the Mapuche religious fact, starting from Rudolf Otto’s reflection on the numinous and the holy. For this, it uses its methodology of phenomenological analysis applied to the concepts of mysterium, tremendum and fascinans or the dimensions of fear, incorporated in the Mapuche culture. It is concluded that the analysis of these different moments of the saint-numinous experience in the religious life of the mapuche, allows to verify the dynamism existing in the religious idea of ​​the mapuche, which in turn represents adequately the relationship between religious man and the Holy. (shrink)

In the following reflection Claudio Corradetti and Allen Wood engage in a controversy concerning the possibilities and the limits of textual interpretation. Should an interpreter still be authorized to call an author’s interpretation the logical stretch of text beyond its black printed letters? The authors offer two different standpoints on what can still be defined as textual interpretation. Whereas for Allen Wood a clear-cut separation must be kept between what a text shows and what an interpreter argues starting from (...) the text, for Claudio Corradetti such distinction remains internal to textual exegesis in so far as the interpreter’s conclusions follow a logical pattern of jus tification starting from evidential hints. (shrink)

Accountability is a cornerstone of the governance of artificial intelligence (AI). However, it is often defined too imprecisely because its multifaceted nature and the sociotechnical structure of AI systems imply a variety of values, practices, and measures to which accountability in AI can refer. We address this lack of clarity by defining accountability in terms of answerability, identifying three conditions of possibility (authority recognition, interrogation, and limitation of power), and an architecture of seven features (context, range, agent, forum, standards, process, (...) and implications). We analyse this architecture through four accountability goals (compliance, report, oversight, and enforcement). We argue that these goals are often complementary and that policy-makers emphasise or prioritise some over others depending on the proactive or reactive use of accountability and the missions of AI governance. (shrink)

On many currently live interpretations, quantum mechanics violates the classical supposition of value definiteness, according to which the properties of a given particle or system have precise values at all times. Here we consider whether either metaphysical supervaluationist or determinable-based approaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can accommodate quantum metaphysical indeterminacy (QMI). We start by discussing the standard theoretical indicator of QMI, and distinguishing three seemingly different sources of QMI (S1). We then show that previous arguments for the conclusion that metaphysical supervaluationism (...) cannot accommodate QMI, due to Darby 2010 and Skow 2010, are unsuccessful, in leaving open several supervaluationist responses. We go on to provide more comprehensive argumentation for the negative conclusion. Here, among other results, we establish that the problems for supervaluationism extend far beyond the concern that is the focus of Darby's and Skow's discussions (according to which a supervaluationist approach is incompatible with the orthodox interpretation, in light of the Kochen-Specker theorem) to also attach to common understandings of other interpretations on which there is QMI (S2). We then argue that a determinable-based account can successfully accommodate all three varieties of QMI (S3). We close by observing the positive mutual bearing of our results on the coherence and intelligibility of both quantum mechanics and metaphysical indeterminacy (S4). (shrink)

This volume serves as a reference on the field of cognitive semantics. It offers a systematic and original discussion of the issues at the core of the debate in semiotics and the cognitive sciences. It takes into account the problems of representation, the nature of mind, the structure of perception, beliefs associated with habits, social cognition, autism, intersubjectivity and subjectivity. The chapters in this volume present the foundation of semiotics as a theory of cognition, offer a semiotic model of cognitive (...) integration that combines Enactivism and the Extended Mind Theory, and investigate the role of imagination as the origin of perception. The author develops an account of beliefs that are associated with habits and meaning, grounded in Pragmatism, testing his Narrative Practice Semiotic Hypothesis on persons with autism spectrum disorders. He also integrates his ideas about the formation of the theory of mind with a theory of subjectivity, understood as self-consciousness which derives from semiotic cognitive abilities. This text appeals to students, professors and researchers in the field. (shrink)

The idea that qualities can be had partly or to an intermediate degree is controversial among contemporary metaphysicians, but also has a considerable pedigree among philosophers and scientists. In this paper, we first aim to show that metaphysical sense can be made of this idea by proposing a partial taxonomy of metaphysical accounts of graded qualities, focusing on three particular approaches: one which explicates having a quality to a degree in terms of having a property with an in-built degree, another (...) based on the idea that instantiation admits of degrees, and a third which derives the degree to which a quality is had from the aspects of multi-dimensional properties. Our second aim is to demonstrate that the choice between these accounts can make a substantial metaphysical difference. To make this point, we rely on two case studies (involving quantum observables and values) in which we apply the accounts in order to model apparent cases of metaphysical gradedness. (shrink)

The complexity and emergent autonomy of Generative AI systems introduce challenges in predictability and legal compliance. This paper analyses some of the legal and regulatory implications of such challenges in the European Union context, focusing on four areas: liability, privacy, intellectual property, and cybersecurity. It examines the adequacy of the existing and proposed EU legislation, including the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA), in addressing the challenges posed by Generative AI in general and LLMs in particular. The paper identifies potential gaps and (...) shortcomings in the EU legislative framework and proposes recommendations to ensure the safe and compliant deployment of generative models. (shrink)

The EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) defines four risk categories for AI systems: unacceptable, high, limited, and minimal. However, it lacks a clear methodology for the assessment of these risks in concrete situations. Risks are broadly categorized based on the application areas of AI systems and ambiguous risk factors. This paper suggests a methodology for assessing AI risk magnitudes, focusing on the construction of real-world risk scenarios. To this scope, we propose to integrate the AIA with a framework developed by (...) the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports and related literature. This approach enables a nuanced analysis of AI risk by exploring the interplay between (a) risk determinants, (b) individual drivers of determinants, and (c) multiple risk types. We further refine the proposed methodology by applying a proportionality test to balance the competing values involved in AI risk assessment. Finally, we present three uses of this approach under the AIA: to implement the Regulation, to assess the significance of risks, and to develop internal risk management systems for AI deployers. (shrink)

This paper explores quantum indeterminacy, as it is operative in the failure of value‐definiteness for quantum observables. It first addresses questions about its existence, its nature, and its relations to extant quantum interpretations. Then, it provides a critical discussions of the main accounts of quantum indeterminacy.

The EU proposal for the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) defines four risk categories: unacceptable, high, limited, and minimal. However, as these categories statically depend on broad fields of application of AI, the risk magnitude may be wrongly estimated, and the AIA may not be enforced effectively. This problem is particularly challenging when it comes to regulating general-purpose AI (GPAI), which has versatile and often unpredictable applications. Recent amendments to the compromise text, though introducing context-specific assessments, remain insufficient. To address this, (...) we propose applying the risk categories to specific AI scenarios, rather than solely to fields of application, using a risk assessment model that integrates the AIA with the risk approach arising from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and related literature. This model enables the estimation of the magnitude of AI risk by considering the interaction between (a) risk determinants, (b) individual drivers of determinants, and (c) multiple risk types. We use large language models (LLMs) as an example. (shrink)

In Calosi and Wilson (Phil Studies 2019/2018), we argue that on many interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM), there is quantum mechanical indeterminacy (QMI), and that a determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy (MI), as per Wilson 2013 and 2016, properly accommodates the full range of cases of QMI. Here we argue that this approach is superior to other treatments of QMI on offer, both realistic and deflationary, in providing the basis for an intelligible explanation of the interference patterns in the double-slit (...) experiment. We start with a brief overview of the motivations for QMI and for a determinable-based account of MI (§1). We then apply a developed 'glutty' implementation of determinable-based QMI to the superposition-based QMI present in the double-slit experiment, and positively compare the associated explanation of double-slit interference with that available on a metaphysical supervaluationist account of QMI (§2). We then present and respond to objections, due to Glick (2017) and Torza (2017), either to QMI (§3) or to our specific account of QMI (§4); in these sections we also positively compare our treatment of double-slit interference to that available on Glick's deflationary treatment of QMI. We conclude with some dialectical observations (§5). (shrink)

Regulation is nothing without enforcement. This particularly holds for the dynamic field of emerging technologies. Hence, this article has two ambitions. First, it explains how the EU´s new Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) will be implemented and enforced by various institutional bodies, thus clarifying the governance framework of the AIA. Second, it proposes a normative model of governance, providing recommendations to ensure uniform and coordinated execution of the AIA and the fulfilment of the legislation. Taken together, the article explores how the (...) AIA may be implemented by national and EU institutional bodies, encompassing longstanding bodies, such as the European Commission, and those newly established under the AIA, such as the AI Office. It investigates their roles across supranational and national levels, emphasizing how EU regulations influence institutional structures and operations. These regulations may not only directly dictate the structural design of institutions but also indirectly request administrative capacities needed to enforce the AIA. (shrink)

We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled systems are characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence among the component particles. We compare this coherentist viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement and further articulated.

Composition is Identity is the thesis that a whole is, strict and literally, its parts considered collectively. Mereological Nihilism is the thesis that there are no composite objects whatsoever instead. This paper argues that they are equivalent, at least insofar as Composition is Identity is phrased in a particular way. It then addresses some consequences of such equivalence.

The article argues that AI can enhance the measurement and implementation of democratic processes within political parties, known as Intra-Party Democracy (IPD). It identifies the limitations of traditional methods for measuring IPD, which often rely on formal parameters, self-reported data, and tools like surveys. Such limitations lead to partial data collection, rare updates, and significant resource demands. To address these issues, the article suggests that specific data management and Machine Learning techniques, such as natural language processing and sentiment analysis, can (...) improve the measurement and practice of IPD. (shrink)

According to perspectival realism, reality is (at least partially) constituted by “purely perspectival” facts, that is, facts that appear to describe reality only from a given “perspective”. Fragmentalism is a form of perspectival realism that maintains both that no perspective is privileged and that perspectival facts constitute reality absolutely. Assuming that reality is sufficiently variegated, fragmentalism entails that reality is absolutely constituted by incompatible facts. Given that incompatible facts can never obtain together, reality must be divided into a plurality of (...) “fragments” that never compose a coherent, unitary whole. The main aim of this paper is to provide the first rigorous, detailed map of fragmentalism and its rivals. First, we will argue that fragmentalism is best construed as having two “unitist” (that is, non-fragmentalist) boundaries, which we will call ‘coherent’ and ‘incoherent unitism’. Second, we will present what we take to be the six main viable versions of fragmentalism and show how they can be categorized according to whether they take the logical operations of conjunction and negation to be either “local” or “global”. (shrink)

Priority monism is roughly the view that the universe is the only fundamental object, that is, a concrete object that does not depend on any other concrete object. Schaffer, the main advocate of PM, claims that PM is compatible with dependence having two different directions: from parts to wholes for subcosmic wholes, and from whole to parts for the cosmic whole. Recently it has been argued that this position is untenable. Given plausible assumptions about dependence, PM entails that dependence has (...) only one direction, it always goes from wholes to parts. One such plausible assumption is a principle of Isolation. I argue that, given all extant accounts of dependence on the market, PM entails No Isolation. The argument depends upon a particular feature of the dependence relation, namely, necessitation and its direction. In the light of this, I contend that the argument is important, insofar as it suggests that we should distinguish dependence from other cognate notions, e.g. grounding. Once this distinction is made, I suggest we should also distinguish between two different notions of fundamentality that might turn out to be not-coextensive. (shrink)

This paper examines the debate on AI legal personhood, emphasizing the role of path dependencies in shaping current trajectories and prospects. Three primary path dependencies emerge: prevailing legal theories on personhood (singularist vs. clustered), the actual participation of AI in socio-digital institutions (instrumental vs. non-instrumental), and the impact of technological advancements. We argue that these factors dynamically interact, with technological optimism fostering broader attribution of the legal entitlements to AI entities and periods of scepticism narrowing such entitlements. Additional influences include (...) regulatory cross-linkages (e.g., data privacy, liability, cybersecurity) and historical legal precedents. Current regulatory frameworks, particularly in the EU, generally resist extending legal personhood to AI systems. Case law suggests that without explicit legislation, courts are unlikely to grant AI legal personhood on their own, although some authors suggest that the courts can do so. For this to happen, AI systems would first need to prove de facto legitimacy through sustained participation within socio-digital institutions. The chapter concludes by assessing near- and long-term prospects for legal personification, from generative AI and AI agents in the next 5–20 years to transformative possibilities such as AI integration with human cognition via Brain-Machine Interfaces in a more distant future. (shrink)

Monism is roughly the view that there is only one fundamental entity. One of the most powerful argument in its favor comes from quantum mechanics. Extant discussions of quantum monism are framed independently of any interpretation of the quantum theory. In contrast, this paper argues that matters of interpretation play a crucial role when assessing the viability of monism in the quantum realm. I consider four different interpretations: modal interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, many worlds interpretations, and wavefunction realism. In particular, I (...) extensively argue for the following claim: several interpretations of QM do not support monism at a more serious scrutiny, or do so only with further problematic assumptions, or even support different versions of it. (shrink)

The paper address the question of whether quantum mechanics (QM) favors Priority Monism, the view according to which the Universe is the only fundamental object. It develops formal frameworks to frame rigorously the question of fundamental mereology and its answers, namely (Priority) Pluralism and Monism. It then reconstructs the quantum mechanical argument in favor of the latter and provides a detailed and thorough criticism of it that sheds furthermore new light on the relation between parthood, composition and fundamentality in QM.

Even though the link between perceived corporate social responsibility fit and corporate reputation has received much attention from scholars, this tradition has ignored that the underpinnings of this association vary depending on the particular characteristics of each industry under study. To delve into this matter, we investigate in the increasingly relevant context of controversial industries how PCSR-fit could enhance corporate reputation and which are the mediating mechanisms of this association. Our academic contribution is twofold. First, we find that controversial sectors (...) indeed can increase corporate reputation through CSR activities. However, we find that to achieve this goal, the nature of PCSR-fit should be different than what extant literature indicates, because companies in these settings should directly focus on avoiding or reducing their inherent controversial harm or impact. Second, we evidence that “CSR initiatives' legitimacy” and “situational skepticism” mediate the PCSR-fit and corporate reputation relationship in CIs. Therefore, we further unravel the underpinnings of this association to advance what we know on the matter and aid practitioners in this particular context. (shrink)

This paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either strong composition as identity cannot retain the full strength of both the logical principles of one-one identity and its semantical principles or it only delivers cases of boring composition in that it entails mereological nihilism.

In this paper, we focus on two related reductive theses in metaphysics—Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity—and on their status in light of the indications coming from science, in particular quantum mechanics. While defenders of these reductive theses claim that they can be updated so as to resist the quantum evidence, we provide arguments against this contention. We claim that physics gives us reason for thinking that both Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity are at least contingently false, as the (...) very process of composition determines, at least in some cases, the nature of composed systems. The argument has essentially to do with the fact that denying the reductive theses in question allows one to provide better explanations for the quantum evidence. (shrink)