In this chapter I explore the reciprocal relationship between the metaphysical views mathematicians hold and their mathematical activity. I focus on the set-theoretic pluralism debate, in which set theorists disagree about the implications of their formal mathematical work. As a first case study, I discuss how Woodin’s monist argument for an Ultimate-L feeds on and is fed by mathematical results and metaphysical beliefs. In a second case study, I present Hamkins’ pluralist proposal and the mathematical research projects it endows with (...) relevance. These case studies support three claims: (1) the metaphysical views of mathematicians can shape what counts as relevant research; (2) mathematical results can shape the metaphysical beliefs of mathematicians; (3) metaphysical thought and mathematical activity develop in tandem in mathematical practices. This makes metaphysical thought an integral part of mathematical practices. (shrink)

Distinguishing mechanistic components from mere causally relevant background conditions remains a difficulty for mechanistic accounts of explanation. By distinguishing resources from mechanical parts, I argue that we can more effectively draw this boundary. Further, the distinction makes obvious that there are distinctive resource explanations which are not captured by a traditional part-based mechanistic account. While this suggests a straightforward extension of the mechanistic model, I argue that incorporating resources and resource explanations requires moving beyond the purely local account of levels (...) that some mechanists advocate. (shrink)

While green innovation has a positive impact on firms’ performance, some established firms that initiate green innovation activities could suffer from insufficient new green knowledge and skills. Since adopting a sustainability orientation helps firms commit to the creation of superior sustainable practices, and efficiently invest resources necessary to develop appropriate new green products, leading to superior green innovation performance, sustainability orientation offers an alternative approach for diversifying green entrants to achieve green innovation success. Building on resource-based, knowledge-based, and capabilities theories, (...) this study aims to identify key factors that enable sustainability orientation of diversifying green entrants and enhance its effect on green innovation performance. As sustainability issues frequently occur upstream at the supplier level, and since supplier involvement effectively determines new product success, this study theorizes that diversifying green entrants that adopt sustainability orientation require two types of green supplier involvement to enhance the effect of sustainability orientation on green innovation performance. Green knowledge-processing capability and green R&D capability complement green supplier involvement as a knowledge source and green supplier involvement as a co-creator, respectively, to further enhance the amount of green innovation performance. Based on a longitudinal dataset of 336 diversifying green entrants, the results support all our hypotheses. Interestingly, an additional analysis suggests that when diversifying green entrants implement green supplier involvement as a co-creator, they achieve greater green innovation performance than those who implement green supplier involvement as a knowledge source. These findings provide important theoretical implications and practical guidance for established firms to pursue green innovation. (shrink)

My thesis is: Consciousness is a being such that in its being the being of other being is known. To be conscious is to be in a state of knowingness. The essence of consciousness is knowledge.

Richard Rorty's pragmatism is a distinctively doubled philosophy formed at the twain of a rigorous antifoun‐dational philosophical perspective and a committed postmetaphysical cultural criticism. Rorty instead rigorously held to the line that no particular politics follows from anti‐foundational philosophy. Rorty's arguments against representationalism, foundationalism, and metaphysics‐first philosophy in Mirror are complex and not always easy to navigate without careful guidance. The risk of the approach in Mirror is that it could implicate Rorty in a foundationalist critique of foundationalism, or a (...) metaphysical critique of metaphysics. For ironism is the studied denial not of metaphysics itself, but only of strong forms of pro‐metaphysical argument. Rorty uses liberalism to avoid the metaphysical forbidding of metaphysics – substituting for it instead a liberal, perhaps even a critical, limiting of metaphysics. The most important insight of Contingency boils down to this: liberalism and ironism together give us something to strive for that the metaphysician would otherwise take as settled. (shrink)

In a well-known paper, Timothy Williamson claimed to prove with a coin-flipping example that infinitesimal-valued probabilities cannot save the principle of Regularity, because on pain of inconsistency the event ‘all tosses land heads’ must be assigned probability 0, whether the probability function is hyperreal-valued or not. A premise of Williamson’s argument is that two infinitary events in that example must be assigned the same probability because they are isomorphic. It was argued by Howson that the claim of isomorphism fails, but (...) a more radical objection to Williamson’s argument is that it had been, in effect, refuted long before it was published. (shrink)

Hayek and the Efficient Market Hypothesis are often seen as proposing a similar theory of prices. Hayek is seen as proposing to understand prices as information conveyer, incorporating inform...

In this piece the author takes issue with Mario Bunge’s claims that conceptual and semiotic systems have "compositions, environments and structures, but no mechanisms." Structures, according to Bunge, can never be mechanisms in conceptual and semiotic systems. Contra this the author argues that in social systems, social structures (which are concept-dependent and reproduced and/or transformed, at least in part, semiotically), can be mechanisms in the sense that such structures are one of the processes in a concrete system that makes itwhat (...) it is. As such, not only may conceptual and semiotic systems have mechanisms, but they may also themselves be considered some of the mechanisms that make the social what it is. As such, they can be said to possess powers and liabilities that neither reside at lower levels nor are explainable in terms of the lower level. To hold out the prospect of social explanation by conceptual and/or semiotic mechanisms does not represent an attempt to decouple these systems from material factors. What it does mean is that conceptual and/or semiotic systems can, potentially at least, play a role in social explanation; and themselves be subject to explanation. Key Words: mechanisms • social • structures • cause • explanation • realism • emergence • reductionism. (shrink)

Nathan Emmerich, in a recent issue of Research Ethics Review, has suggested that the ‘professional ethicist’ should be considered an ‘expert member’ in the research ethics committee. He raised a number of interesting questions and in seeking to answer them one may come to what may be regarded as an unexpected conclusion – that there is a prior need to clearly explain the concept of ‘ethical expertise’ and the ‘ethics professional’.

This paper discusses Rudyard Kipling's famous story 'The Man Who Would Be King' in terms of the leitmotif of Machiavellian political philosophy that is to be discerned in the unfolding of the story. Kipling introduces us to the twin founders of the new order in Kafiristan in the same way that Machiavelli dedicates his 'Discourses' to two young nobles. He then proceeds to describe how they acquired their new kingdom and then how they lost it. On closer examination it becomes (...) apparent that the initial success of the two English adventurers in the Hindu Kush was attributable to their following Machiavellian principles while their ultimate demise was rooted in their failure to to adhere to them once they had secured their new state and all the benefits which accompany princely rule over a subject population. (shrink)

Henry Lord Brougham (1778-1868) belongs with Thomas Jefferson and Horace Mann in the United States and Egerton Ryerson in Canada as one of the great promoters and founders of public education in the English-speaking world. His most famous phrase is The schoolmaster is abroad and this quote symbolizes his belief that the fate of the modern, liberal society depends on free access to education for the population at large. It is not that Brougham any more than Jefferson failed to draw (...) a distinction between the education that was fitted for the gifted few and that suited to the general public whose lives would lack the leisure for intellectual pursuits of the highest difficulty and training. Rather it is that Brougham adheres to a philosophy of enlightenment which sees the interests of science and society as ultimately indistinguishable and which insists that the spread of knowledge about both the natural and social worlds carries with it no price in terms of individual or social morality. This paper gives an overview of Brougham's philosophy of public enlightenment including his views on the example of Benjamin Franklin. It then reviews the attacks on this philosophy from the Anglican point of view in the form of the Reverend E.W. Grinfield's A Reply to Mr. Brougham's Practical Observations upon the Education of the People and from the Roman Catholic point of view in Cardinal Newman's famous Tamworth Reading Room and Discourse on University Education. (shrink)

Chris Voparil’s Reconstructing Pragmatism builds the best case to date that the neopragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty decisively and productively reshaped the lineage of pragmatist philosophy. In developing new directions for pragmatism, the book seeks to press past a number of recent debates. One such debate concerns the relative priority of experience and language as methodological starting points for pragmatist philosophy. While Voparil seeks to abandon this debate as outworn, this review argues that the issue of pragmatism’s methodological apparatus cannot be (...) easily set aside. Only by addressing head-on the disadvantages of experience-first pragmatism and language-first pragmatism can a next iteration of pragmatist philosophy properly develop a third methodological option, tantalizingly noted by Voparil, of a practice-first pragmatism. (shrink)

While we are sympathetic with Stibbard-Hawkes’ approach, we disagree with the proposal to switch to a “cognitively modern” null for all Homo species. We argue in favor of a more evidence-driven approach, inspired by recent debates in comparative cognition. Ultimately, parsing the contributions of different genetic and extra-genetic factors in human evolution is more promising than setting a priori nulls.

What will the demands of distributive justice be in the postgenetic revolutionary world? Will genetic inheritance be regarded as socially distributed goods? This may seem a more reasonable position to assert as biotechnology progresses further toward human genetic manipulation.

An argument has been recently proposed by Watkins, whose objective is to show the impossibility of a statistical explanation of single events. This present paper is an attempt to show that Watkins's argument is unsuccessful, and goes on to argue for an account of statistical explanation which has much in common with Hempel's classic treatment.

This book goes far beyond its title. Landry indeed surveys current definitions of “mathematical platonism” to show nothing like them applies to Socrates in Plat.

In this response to the work of Michael Dummett, McGinn aims to vindicate the plausibility of a realist outlook. Realism claims that a sentence's truth is ‘epistemically unconstrained’ or ‘knowledge‐transcendent’, in the sense that the world is as it is independently of our knowing truths about it. Contra Dummett's arguments against the tenability of this realist conviction, McGinn's counter‐argument proceeds by showing, first, ‘that it is an empiricist dogma to suppose that we cannot acquire conceptions that transcend our experience,’ and (...) second, ‘that we can connect experience‐transcendent conceptions with linguistic use by making the observation that such conceptions are fit subjects for communicative speech acts’. (shrink)

There is a need to increase the number of practicing medical doctors in South Africa. We examine the ethical implications of patients’ rights being affected in medical education in a South African context.The South African legal framework advocates public healthcare access. Yet, the State’s ethical obligations when it comes to guaranteeing public healthcare access, conflict with its utilitarian policy, that allows for medical education to help achieve the State’s public healthcare commitments, at the cost of eroding patients’ rights, and accepts (...) that certain actions are imperative, in line with Ubuntu, which is tenable yet nuanced. A patient treated by a licenced doctor today, benefits because other patients have allowed themselves to be used as hands-on learning material for medical students yesterday.Healthcare institutions need to take cognisance of the numbers of medical students that patients can reasonably be expected to endure. There is a need for the Health Professions Council of South Africa and medical schools to adopt guidelines on reasonable levels of medical student-patient interaction, and medical student-to-patient ratios in healthcare delivery. (shrink)

This paper seeks to demonstrate that propositions 23–27 of the Euclidian Optics originated in the context of geometrical astronomy. These entries, which deal with the geometry of spheres and rays, present material that overlaps considerably with propositions 1–3 of Aristarchus of Samos’ On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun and the Moon. While all these theorems deal with material that could conceivably be native to celestial illumination, the proofs do not work for binocular vision. It therefore seems probable that (...) the proofs were borrowed from Aristarchus or, more likely, some common astronomical predecessor. As an extension of this observation, this paper argues that the Optics displays a far less unified purpose than has typically been assumed. Instead, it reflects a conglomerate of concerns, goals and dependencies, insofar as it presents multiple proofs that emerge from a set of geometrical concerns not directly related to vision as a physical phenomenon. These entries complicate the idea that the Optics is about explaining light, sight or false appearances in any straightforward sense. Instead, the text is oriented toward a somewhat more diffuse goal: simply to articulate the geometry of vision and rays. Optics as a discipline should should therefore be understood not as a purely mathematical explanation of vision, but as a target-field of explanation constituted by features and boundaries derived from extra-visual geometric concerns. (shrink)