We investigate how epistemic injustice can manifest itself in mathematical practices. We do this as both a social epistemological and virtue-theoretic investigation of mathematical practices. We delineate the concept both positively—we show that a certain type of folk theorem can be a source of epistemic injustice in mathematics—and negatively by exploring cases where the obstacles to participation in a mathematical practice do not amount to epistemic injustice. Having explored what epistemic injustice in mathematics can amount to, we use the concept (...) to highlight a potential danger of intellectual enculturation. (shrink)

The demise of behaviorism has made ethologists more willing to ascribe mental states to animals. However, a methodology that can avoid the charge of excessive anthropomorphism is needed. We describe a series of experiments that could help determine whether the behavior of nonhuman animals towards dead conspecifics is concept mediated. These experiments form the basis of a general point. The behavior of some animals is clearly guided by complex mental processes. The techniques developed by comparative psychologists and behavioral ecologists are (...) able to provide us with the tools to critically evaluate hypotheses concerning the continuity between human minds and animal minds. (shrink)

In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in the work of Emmanuel Levinas, widely recognized as one of the most important yet difficult philosophers of the 20th century. In this much-needed introduction, Davis unpacks the concepts at the centre of Levinas's thought - alterity, the Other, the Face, infinity - concepts which have previously presented readers with major problems of interpretation. Davis traces the development of Levinas's thought over six decades, describing the context in which he worked, (...) and the impact of his writings. He argues that Levinas's work remains tied to the ontological tradition with which he wants to break, and demonstrates how his later writing tries to overcome this dependency by its increasingly disruptive, sometimes opaque, textual practice. He discusses Levinas's theological writings and his relationship to Judaism, as well as the reception of his work by contemporary thinkers, arguing that the influence of his work has led to a growing interest in ethical issues among poststructuralist and postmodernist thinkers in recent years. Comprehensive and clearly written, this book will be essential reading for students and researchers in continental philosophy, French studies, literary theory and theology. (shrink)

In this paper we1 assess the potential for research on nonhuman animals to address questions about the phenomenology of painful experiences. Nociception, the basic capacity for sensing noxious stimuli, is widespread in the animal kingdom. Even rel- atively primitive animals such as leeches and sea slugs possess nociceptors, neurons that are functionally specialized for sensing noxious stimuli (Walters 1996). Vertebrate spinal cords play a sophisticated role in processing and modulating nociceptive signals, providing direct control of some motor responses to noxious (...) stimuli, and a basic capacity for Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning (Grau et al. 1990; Grau 2002). Higher brain systems provide additional layers of association, top-down control, and cognition. In humans, at least, these higher brain systems also give rise to the conscious experiences that are characteristic of pain. What can be said about the experiences of other animals who possess nervous systems that are similar but not identical to humans? (shrink)

Many people place great stock in the importance of civic virtue to the success of democratic communities. Is this hope well-grounded? The fundamental question is whether it is even possible to cultivate ethical and civic virtues in the first place. Taking for granted that it is possible, at least three further questions arise: What are the key elements of civic virtue? How should we cultivate these virtuous dispositions? And finally, how should schools be organized in order to make the education (...) of citizen possible? These interrelated questions are the focus of this collection. By considering these questions from a variety of philosophical perspectives ranging from moral psychology, philosophy of education, and political philosophy, the nine essays assembled here advance our understanding of the challenges we face in trying to shape children to be virtuous citizens. -/- . (shrink)

Logical consequence is the relation that obtains between premises and conclusion(s) in a valid argument. Orthodoxy has it that valid arguments are necessarily truth-preserving, but this platitude only raises a number of further questions, such as: how does the truth of premises guarantee the truth of a conclusion, and what constraints does validity impose on rational belief? This volume presents thirteen essays by some of the most important scholars in the field of philosophical logic. The essays offer ground-breaking new insights (...) into the nature of logical consequence; the relation between logic and inference; how the semantics and pragmatics of natural language bear on logic; the relativity of logic; and the structural properties of the consequence relation. (shrink)

Malebranche holds that the feeling of having a body comes in three main varieties. A perceiver sensorily experiences herself (1) as causally connected to her body, in so far as the senses represent the body as causing her sensory experiences and as uniquely responsive to her will, (2) as materially connected to her body, in so far as the senses represent the perceiver as a material being wrapped up with the body, and (3) as perspectivally connected to her body, in (...) so far as the external senses represent the world from the body’s perspective. In addition to distinguishing these varieties of embodied experience, I explain why the perceiver experiences her connection to the body in these ways. Although Malebranche often casts the experience of embodiment in a negative light, his considered view is that this experience contributes to our survival and salvation. (shrink)

Although dignity figures prominently in modern ethical discourse, and in the writings of moral and political philosophers writing today, we still lack a clear account of how the concept of dignity might be implicated in various forms of moral reasoning. This essay tries to make progress on two fronts. First, it attempts to clarify the possible roles the concept of dignity might play in moral discourse, with particular reference to Hart's distinction between positive and critical morality. Second, it offers a (...) new typology of dignity concepts and mobilizes it to, on the one hand, criticize some familiar construals of and, on the other, to advertise the possible virtues of an unfamiliar way of thinking about dignity as a moral concept. (shrink)

Three experiments investigated two timed implicit tests of memory—word reading and color naming. Using the study–test procedure, Experiments 1 and 2 showed that studied words caused reliable facilitation in word reading but no interference in color naming relative to unstudied words. Indeed, there was a small amount of facilitation in color naming as well. Experiment 3 further explored the color naming task by alternating shorter study and test intervals and adding control trials consisting of letter strings. Although both studied and (...) unstudied words showed interference relative to the control letter strings, the amounts of interference they showed did not differ. Overall, word reading consistently displayed facilitation whereas color naming never exhibited increased interference due to word priming. Priming appears to be process-specific: It is restricted to facilitating repetition of processing previously applied to a stimulus and does not extend to influencing performance on a different task involving the same studied materials. (shrink)

In this piece the author takes issue with Mario Bunge’s claims that conceptual and semiotic systems have "compositions, environments and structures, but no mechanisms." Structures, according to Bunge, can never be mechanisms in conceptual and semiotic systems. Contra this the author argues that in social systems, social structures (which are concept-dependent and reproduced and/or transformed, at least in part, semiotically), can be mechanisms in the sense that such structures are one of the processes in a concrete system that makes itwhat (...) it is. As such, not only may conceptual and semiotic systems have mechanisms, but they may also themselves be considered some of the mechanisms that make the social what it is. As such, they can be said to possess powers and liabilities that neither reside at lower levels nor are explainable in terms of the lower level. To hold out the prospect of social explanation by conceptual and/or semiotic mechanisms does not represent an attempt to decouple these systems from material factors. What it does mean is that conceptual and/or semiotic systems can, potentially at least, play a role in social explanation; and themselves be subject to explanation. Key Words: mechanisms • social • structures • cause • explanation • realism • emergence • reductionism. (shrink)

By an argument form I shall mean a schema consisting of a string of symbols that are place-­‐holders for either logical terms or non-­‐logical (descriptive/content) terms: substituting terms of the appropriate kind for the symbols yields an argument. A substitution instance of an argument form is an argument that arises as a result of such a substitution. By a valid argument I shall mean an argument such that it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. (...) Thus, an invalid argument is an argument such that it is possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. (shrink)

This lucidly written book looks at the interpretative audacity of five major "overreaders"—Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Emmanuel Levinas, Slavoj Žižek and Stanley Cavell—and asks what is at stake and what is to be gained by their ...

The study of corporate governance is importantly concerned with individuals and institutions and how individuals and institutions relate with/in society in such a manner that the good obtains. This paper begins with an analysis of Ayi Kwei Armah’s The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born in order to introduce the post-colonial African condition of corruption and abject suffering as one that begs recognition of the place of corporate governance in advancing the good life. The question raised is of where the (...) things are that would prepare the way to the good or ‘beautyful’ life. This question is raised in the understanding that situations inform how individuals behave. Two case studies of business organisations acting against HIV and AIDS are then looked at to suggest how business has a key role in turning individuals and thereby societies of Africa towards the good. The observation is that work being done to combat the harmful effects of HIV and AIDS is instructive of ways in which corruption and abject suffering may be arrested in post-colonial Africa by advancing a culture of recognition and granting of human dignity that is reflective of and supportive of good corporate governance practices and principles. (shrink)

The following principles may plausibly be included in a wide range of theories of epistemic justification: (1) There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a falsehood, (2) There are circumstances in which an agent is justified in believing a principle of epistemic justification, (3) Beliefs acquired in compliance with a justifiably-believed epistemic principle are justified. I argue that it follows from these three individually plausible claims that an agent's belief may be both justified and unjustified. I (...) consider how theories may avoid this paradox, and conclude that deontological theories of epistemic justification face considerable, perhaps insurmountable, difficulties. (shrink)

This essay introduces, for theological consideration, some recent work in the field of cultural evolutionary theory, specifically the kin‐influence hypothesis. This theory holds that, following the beginnings of industrialization and economic growth, a nation's fertility rate commences a decline, which is further abetted by the consequent and increasing imbalance in the relative influence of kin versus nonkin influences on individuals in favor of the latter. It is further proposed that this process is itself a major independent factor in the emergence (...) of many of the features of what is called modernity, among which is that of secularization. Extending further this work, I argue that, given the historic alignment of family and religious values in Christian nations, a loss of religious belief and practice is, at least in part, the spill over effect of the opposing influence of values emerging from ever more dominant nonfamily social interaction. I conclude with some reflections on possible theological implications. (shrink)

In Part One of The Examined Life I recalled certain episodes from my childhood and youth in which, as I came to realize later, I had been exercised by a philosophical problem. By so doing I hoped not only to convey to non-professionals what philosophy is—or is like—but to show them that they too were philosophers, i.e., had been exercised by philosophical questions. In Part Two I gave some examples of how such problems may be treated by a professional, in (...) articles. (shrink)

In the second chapter of his Modality, Probability and Rationality, James Sennett argues that Plantinga’s famed S5 Modal Argument (hereafter “MA”) for the existence of an unsurpassably great being is objectionably circular since it’s impossible for one to understand the premises of Plantinga’s MA without understanding these premises to logically entail its conclusion. That is to say, Sennett’s charge is that Plantinga’s MA is circular since there is no understanding of the premises of Plantinga’s MA that is independent of its (...) conclusion. In this paper I argue that Sennett has shown no such thing and that, contrary to strong prima facie appearances, there is an understanding of the premises of Plantinga’s MA that is independent of its conclusion. Consequently, Plantinga’s MA is not circular inthe way that Sennett alleges. (shrink)

This paper seeks to demonstrate that propositions 23–27 of the Euclidian Optics originated in the context of geometrical astronomy. These entries, which deal with the geometry of spheres and rays, present material that overlaps considerably with propositions 1–3 of Aristarchus of Samos’ On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun and the Moon. While all these theorems deal with material that could conceivably be native to celestial illumination, the proofs do not work for binocular vision. It therefore seems probable that (...) the proofs were borrowed from Aristarchus or, more likely, some common astronomical predecessor. As an extension of this observation, this paper argues that the Optics displays a far less unified purpose than has typically been assumed. Instead, it reflects a conglomerate of concerns, goals and dependencies, insofar as it presents multiple proofs that emerge from a set of geometrical concerns not directly related to vision as a physical phenomenon. These entries complicate the idea that the Optics is about explaining light, sight or false appearances in any straightforward sense. Instead, the text is oriented toward a somewhat more diffuse goal: simply to articulate the geometry of vision and rays. Optics as a discipline should should therefore be understood not as a purely mathematical explanation of vision, but as a target-field of explanation constituted by features and boundaries derived from extra-visual geometric concerns. (shrink)

So-called family values and their part in education are considered. ‘Traditional’‘modern’ and ‘deviant’ patterns of family relationships are discussed and the moral superiority of the first is questioned. The single life without family involvement is also proposed as a possibly fulfilling mode of existence in its own right.

This paper argues that young people are unlikely to integrate themselves positively into adult life - to adopt its values, responsibilities and opportunities - unless that life is made more morally acceptable in their terms. Central to this process of community building and reconciliation with the young is the condition of solidarity which both results from and results in common values and a shared conception of the good life.

A notion of Education for Active Citizenship is identified in the pronouncements of certain politically influential individuals. Key elements in this are seen to include action, the citizen, appreciating the benefits of democracy and freedom, respect for the rule of law, a due balance between rights and duties, participation and service to the community. These are shown to be systematically ambiguous, simultaneously capable of evoking critical, independent-minded, socially effective citizens and docile conforming subjects. Clarification is held to be a necessary (...) precondition of translating the ideal of citizenship into specific curricular goals. (shrink)

Efforts to resolve the tension within the Christian moral theological tradition between just war theory and pacifism have so far not produced any broadly accepted resolution. Key sticking points lie both in the fact that even a just war typically involves the taking of human life, both combatant and civilian, and that the distinction between intentional and unintentional killing, so important to Christian moral reflection, is difficult to sustain in practice. Yet, with the prospect of the development of effective non-lethal (...) weapons, the path may be opened up to a genuine resolution of the tension. This article describes in general terms the way that such a development might be pursued, but also argues that the use of non-lethal weaponry would necessitate a re-interpretation of warfare as an exercise in a form of international policing. A number of potential criticisms of such a proposal are considered. (shrink)

Current models of insulin binding to the insulin receptor (IR) propose (i) that there are two binding sites on the surface of insulin which engage with two binding sites on the receptor and (ii) that ligand binding involves structural changes in both the ligand and the receptor. Many of the features of insulin binding to its receptor, namely B‐chain helix interactions with the leucine‐rich repeat domain and A‐chain residue interactions with peptide loops from another part of the receptor, are also (...) seen in models of relaxin and insulin‐like peptide 3 binding to their receptors. We show that these principles can likely be extended to the group of mimetic peptides described by Schäffer and coworkers, which are reported to have no sequence identity with insulin. This review summarizes our current understanding of ligand‐induced activation of the IR and highlights the key issues that remain to be addressed. (shrink)