Critically discussing the causal social ontologies presented by Dave Elder-Vass and John Searle, the article argues that these views implausibly identify the causal ontological source of human sociality in collectively known, recognized and accepted statuses, criteria, norms and the like. This is implausible, for it ignores human sociality as occurring in temporally and spatially dispersed on-going processes of human interaction of differently placed, often unequal, and thus epistemically differently equipped actors in division of labour. Human scientific concepts are best seen (...) as picking out (aspects of) such complex and heterogeneous processes, not what the participating actors allegedly collectively know, accept or recognize about them. The article observes that similar appeals to collective recognition are also common in Wittgensteinian literature that, however, have claimed to reject the causal ontological view. It is argued that the ultimate value in rejecting the causal ontological view, and the accompanying idea of collective recognition, resides in that we thereby avoid epistemically homogenizing and over-intellectualizing the diverse mass of dispersed, often unequal, but interacting actors. (shrink)

This paper approaches questions of collective intentionality by drawing inspiration from theories of recognition (e.g. Honneth 1995, Ricoeur 2005, Brandom 2007). After some remarks about recognition and groups, the paper examines whether the kind of dependence on recognition that holds of individual agents is equally true of group agents. In the debates on collective intentionality it is often stressed that the identity, existence, ethos, and membership-issues of the group are up to the group to decide (...) (e.g. Tuomela 2007). The members collectively accept (recognize) status functions, goals and beliefs for the group. This paper asks whether this thesis of "forgroupness" should be re-evaluated: could the status functions, goals and beliefs be in some significant sense "for others" as well? Can the group be dependent on others’ takes? -/- . (shrink)

Many moral theories hold individuals responsible for their marginal impact on massive patterns (for instance overall value or equality of opportunity) or for following whichever rules would realise that pattern on the whole. But each of these injunctions is problematic. Intuitively, the first gives individuals responsibility for too much, and the second gives them responsibility for too little. I offer the outlines of a new approach to ethics in collective action contexts. I defend a new collaborative principle that assigns (...) recognisably worthwhile responsibilities to agencies wherever possible. This principle supports a fractal model of moral responsibility, one that favours restructuring divisions of labour in ways that enhance the prospects of recognition at every level of social organisation. This essay is programmatic: starting from a conjecture about the moral significance of recognition, it sketches a new way of approaching a range of collective action problems that combines the importance of the perspectives of both moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

The concept of recognition has played a role in two debates. In political philosophy, it is part of a communitarian response to liberal theories of distributive justice. It describes what it means to respect others’ right to self-determination. In ethics, Stephen Darwall argues that it comprises our judgment that we owe others moral consideration. I present a competing account of recognition on the grounds that most accounts answer the question of why others deserve recognition without answering the (...) question of what is involved in recognizing them. This paper answers the latter. I argue that, in general, recognition is something that we do to others rather than something that we think about others. In particular, recognition is an intentional action to treat another individual as a legitimate, self-determining agent. I then show that recognition's realizability requires that agents understand their intentions as dependent on others for their satisfaction. Thus, relations of recognition are instances of collective intentionality. (shrink)

In a distributed multi-agent system, an idle agent may be available to assist other agents in the system. An agent architecture called intent recognition is proposed in this article to accomplish this with minimal communication. To assist other agents in the system, an agent performing recognition observes the tasks other agents are performing. Unlike the much-studied field of plan recognition, the overall intent of an agent is recognized instead of a specific plan. The observing agent may use (...) capabilities that it has not observed. In this study, the key research question is: What are intent-recognition systems and how can these be used to have agents autonomously assist each other effectively and efficiently? A conceptual framework is proposed to address this question. An implementation of the conceptual framework is tested and evaluated. A set of metrics, including task time and number of communications, is used to compare the performance of plan recognition and intent recognition. This research shows that under certain conditions, an intent-recognition system is more efficient than a plan recognition system. (shrink)

This unique collection examines the connections between two complementary approaches to philosophical social theory: Hegel-inspired theories of recognition, and analytical social ontology.

Individuals frequently utilize social media platforms (SMPs) to express their positive features and receive recognition. Axel Honneth proposes that recognition plays an essential role in social life, explaining both social conflicts and guiding normative social development. While SMPs appear as a perfect tool for the pursuit of recognition, they often fail to achieve the intended results. This paper argues that the failure to achieve recognition through SMPs occurs because SMPs operate according to the neoliberal principle of (...) competition. Competition arises because several structural affordances (quantification, homogeneity, and availability of information) allow for comparing different expressions of recognition. I argue that the competitive pursuit of recognition on SMPs results in several problematic developments, causing the manifestation of perfectionism, ressentiment, and collective narcissism. I conclude that the normative potential of Honneth’s theory is compromised if recognition is pursued competitively. (shrink)

In this article, we give an overview over both past and present as well as possible future debates around recognition in and in connection with feminist thought. In principle, recognition can involve persons, collectives, and institutions, but here we are primarily concerned with the recognition of persons by other persons. In the first section, we start with a discussion of care as a form of recognition and the recognition of care work. In the second section, (...) we turn to critiques of recognition in feminist thought. In the third section, we outline a new field of research that should be of interest to both feminist and recognition theorists, namely our credibility economy. Since there is a separate article on Judith Butler and queer feminism in this handbook, we exclude their contributions from our discussion here. (shrink)

A substantial article length introduction to a collection on social ontology and mutual recognition.

The objective of this article is to see whether desire for recognition might contain an emancipatory aspect. Could this desire be a political ally? The argumentative strategy is to fully acknowledge the oppressive mechanisms at work before trying to find a way to other outcomes, including emancipation, with which desire for recognition has been associated in the tradition from Hegel. Through a re-interpretation of the master-and-slave dialectic, supplemented by sociological research on status expectations, I suggest a way out (...) of the vicious circle, where desire produced by power finds satisfaction through a preexisting other, resulting in an endless dynamic of compulsive conformity and regressive assertion of status. The hold of this dynamic must not be underestimated, yet, as I argue, both desire and what satisfies desire are liable to change, through struggle. The transformation of the generalized other, which provides recognition, is seen to be a crucial feature of all collective struggle. The very source of recognition is transformed, behind the backs of the actors, in turn affecting their desire. This can but must not lead to the emancipatory outcomes which are traditionally tied to recognition in the Hegelian tradition. (shrink)

The results of a previous study (Craig & Lipp, 2018) into the effects of multiple social category cues (face race and face sex) on facial emotion recognition indicate that face sex dominates face race, and moreover, participant sex differences contribute little to the observed effects. Here, I modelled the same dataset (https://osf.io/rsmxb/) using the ex-Gaussian, a distribution that is 1) well suited to RT data and 2) separates slow from relatively fast influences. Corroborating recent results (Tipples, 2022) current results (...) show larger effects of face sex (for the faces of White individuals) for female participants. Further novel interaction effects were revealed. For example, results support a different time course for the influence of face sex on expression for the faces of Black compared to White individuals. (shrink)

This review article takes up certain key issues that are at stake in the valuable collection of essays edited by Lovell. It considers critically the argument that the adoption of Fraser's perspectival dualism implies regression to a base—superstructure theory of the social. It assesses the advantages of extending the dualism of redistribution and recognition to include also the need for participatory parity in the post-Westphalian political order. It raises again the question of whether Honneth is sociologically more forceful than (...) Fraser in arguing that material inequality is merely a facet of a more profound disrespect (lack of recognition). Lovell's assessment of Honneth's `recognition monism' is commended in that it resurrects an earlier critique of structural-functionalism to make a helpful distinction between social integration and (non-normative) system integration. She addresses these issues in terms of a wider critical realism concerned with disaggregating those social relations which are more causally generative from others: an approach which permits illuminating debates over the degree to which patriarchy and heteronormativity are contingent or necessary to late capitalism. Lovell also introduces Bourdieu into the debate, and especially his conceptions of misrecognition and symbolic violence. Finally, Sayer's vigorous arguments about the moral significance of distribution and class are considered as contributing to the current ethical turn. The article ends with an attempt to defend Bourdieu, whom Sayer sees both as a profound sociologist of class but also a theorist oriented too exclusively to agents' egoistic search for strategic advantage. The author concludes that although Fraser's perspectival trinity (or dualism) approach seems preferable to Honneth's monism, this should not obscure the empirical interweaving of deficiencies of distribution and of recognition in social reality. Indeed, new studies show the far-reaching consequences of this. In those societies where maldistribution is most marked, exposure to certain psychosocial risks such as low status (recognition) and low social capital literally incorporate stress, via biological pathways. Hence unequal health outcomes of a surprising range can also be detected. (shrink)

The recognition perspective is a valuable lens through which identity struggles and historical marginalization and abuses can be explored. This study analyzes Ireland’s Justice for Magdalene (JFM) campaign between 2009–2013; JFM was a group that fought for a state apology and redress for women and girls confined to Catholic-run laundries between the 1920s and 1990s. Such institutions formed part of the post-colonial Irish identity and church-state structure, within which many women and girls once suffered. We document the rhetorical dimension (...) of how a resolution was ultimately reached following the campaign’s transformation of women’s individual experiences into the collective voice of an advocacy group with targeted political goals. Focusing on JFM’s public press releases, we consider the media logic and rhetorical strategies of the group, which effectively built a case against the state. At the core of the discussion is the balance between the instrumental and constitutive functions of the organization’s messaging. (shrink)

The revival of recognition theory has brought new energy to critical theory. In general terms, recognition theory aims to critically evaluate social structures against a standard of social freedom identified with norms of interaction which are freely recognized by all parties. Until now, attention has primarily focused on the categories and forms of recognition theory. However, the influence of contemporary French theory upon the development of theories of recognition has not yet received the consideration it merits. (...) The book takes up this task. With chapters by internationally recognized authors, the collection outlines the current state of recognition theory, studies the impact of French theory, and uses French thought to identity aspects of the recognitive process which are often overlooked. Exploring French accounts of agonistic identity construction, vulnerability, power, ethical obligation, and reflexive theory construction, this book supports the intentions of critical theory with heightened attentiveness to oppression in all of its forms. (shrink)

In the words of Catharine MacKinnon, "a woman is not yet a name for a way of being human." In other words, women are still excluded, as authors and agents, from identifying what it is to be human and what therefore violates the dignity and integrity of humans. Recognition, Responsibility, and Rights is written in response to that failure. This collection of essays by prominent feminist thinkers advances the positive feminist project of remapping the moral landscape by developing theory (...) that acknowledges the diversity of women. (shrink)

Two arguments apparently support the thesis that collective identity presupposes an Other: the recognition argument, according to which seeing myself as a self requires recognition by an other whom I also recognize as a self (Hegel); and the dialogic argument, according to which my sense of self can only develop dialogically (Taylor). But applying these arguments to collective identity involves a compositional fallacy. Two modern ideologies mask the particularist thesis’s falsehood. The ideology of indivisible state sovereignty (...) makes sovereignty as such appear particularistic by fusing “internal” with “external” sovereignty; nationalism imagines national identity as particularistic by linking it to sovereignty. But the concatenation of internal sovereignty, external sovereignty, and nation is contingent. Schmitt’s thesis that “the political” presupposes an other conflates internal and external sovereignty, while Mouffe’s neo-Schmittianism conflates difference (Derrida) with alterity. A shared global identity may face many obstacles, but metaphysical impossibility and conceptual confusion are not among them. (shrink)

The problem of the social foundations of normativity can be illuminated by discussing the narrower question whether rule-following is necessarily a social matter. The problems with individualistic theories of rule-following seem to make such a conclusion unavoidable. Social theories of rule-following, however, seem to only push back one level the dilemma of having to choose either an infinite regress of interpretations or a collapse into non-normative descriptions. The most plausible of these models, Haugeland's conformism, can avoid these objections if it (...) is supplemented with an ontologically reasonable concept of the collective attitude of a group. Groups of individuals who are bound to shared norms by recognizing each other as equipped with a standard authority of criticism have the necessary properties for ascribing to those groups such collective attitudes. Given such a weak notion of a collective attitude, there is hope for a plausible collectivist theory of rule-following. (shrink)

This article reports on developing and evaluating a generic Handwritten Text Recognition (HTR) model created for the automatic computer-assisted transcription of Ukrainian handwriting publicly available via the HTR platform Transkribus. The model’s training process encompasses diverse datasets, including historical manuscripts by renowned poets Taras Shevchenko and Lesya Ukrainka, along with private correspondence used for the General Regionally Annotated Corpus of Ukrainian (GRAC) and a diary procured at the Holodomor Museum collection. We evaluate the model’s performance by comparing its theoretical (...) accuracy, with a character error rate (CER) of 4.2%, against its practical efficacy when augmented with an AI-based language model for Ukrainian and a Large Language Model. The model is versatile and functional and can thus be applied for mass-digitization of Ukrainian cultural heritage. In our outlook section, we identify possibilities for further improving the model. (shrink)

Recognition is not only a response to social pathologies. It is also an unstable and often ambivalent relationship that has its own pathologies. Owing to the intertwining between recognition and power, certain forms of recognition turn out to be forms of alienation in or from the world. Such pathologies affect inter-individual recognition as well as the recognition between individuals and the socio-political institutions. The article proposes a joint reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy (...) of Right, which provide norms for identifying and dealing with these pathologies. The norm for inter-individual recognition is set out in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the norm for state/citizen recognition in the Philosophy of Right. The analysis envisages two other aspects of recognition: the interference of the ‘I–Me’ with the ‘I–You’ relationship and the incorporation of the ‘I–We’ into the ‘We–Us' dimension of recognition. As regards the interpretation of Hegel’s practical philosophy, the article analyses the link between Hegel’s concept of recognition and his theory of action. In this view, the highest form of recognition has more to do with reconciliation – reconciliation between human beings, reconciliation with the ‘finitude of action’ – than with the problematic of individual and collective identity. (shrink)

This collection of essays considers some of the conceptual and philosophical contentions that Nancy Fraser's theory of justice has provoked and presents some compelling examples of its analytical power in a range of contexts in which the politics of social justice are at issue.

This volume brings together a range of theoretical responses to issues in Irish politics. Its organising ideas: recognition, equality, and democracy set the terms of political debate within both jurisdictions. For some, there are significant tensions between the grammar of recognition, concerned with esteem, respect and the symbolic aspects of social life, and the logic of equality, which is primarily concerned with the distribution of material resources and formal opportunities, while for others, tensions are produced rather by certain (...) interpretations of these ideas while alternative readings may, by contrast, serve as the basis for a systematic account of social and political inequality. The essays in this collection will explore these interconnections with reference to the politics of Northern Ireland and the Republic. The Republic has gone through a period in which its constitution was the focus for a liberal politics aimed at securing personal autonomy, while Northern Ireland’s political landscape has been shaped by the problem of securing political autonomy and democratic legitimacy. While the papers address key questions facing each particular polity, the issues themselves have resonances for politics on each side of the border. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to investigate emotion recognition and processing in patients with mild cognitive impairment in order to update the state of current literature on this important but undervalued topic. We identified 15 papers published between 2012 and 2022 that meet the inclusion criteria. Paper search, selection, and extraction followed the PRISMA guidelines. We used a narrative synthesis approach in order to report a summary of the main findings taken from all papers. The results collected are (...) still ambiguous: some studies did not find any differences between MCI and healthy controls groups in emotion recognition and processing, and other results reported emotion-specific deficits in emotion recognition regarding MCI patients. It is essential to underline that these findings could not be generalized to the whole MCI population due to the heterogeneous use of measures and composition of the sample. This does not allow us to make a comprehensive comparison between the results. Our suggestion for future research is to align the results using the same type of tests and emotion recognition assessment. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 17.1 (2003) 73-75 [Access article in PDF] Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics. Sonia Kruks. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001. Pp. xii + 200. $35.00 h.c. 0-8014-3387-8; $16.95 pbk. 0-8014-8417-0. Sonia Kruks' latest book, Retrieving Experience, is a valuable contribution to ongoing debates about the relevance of feminist philosophy in a period of relative political quietism. It also offers (...) timely reminders of historical continuities between phenomenological and postmodern conceptions of subjectivity and political engagement. Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir, Fanon, and the later Sartre, Kruks proposes to "explore women's embodied experiences" and to "ask whether they might not offer some means to help build affective bonds among women who are in many ways radically different from one another" (6). The book approaches this task by means of two secondary issues. First, should feminist thought be oriented by phenomenological or postmodernist theoretical strategies? Second, can women's embodied experience be the conceptual basis for political and epistemological practices that avoid the pitfalls of "identity politics" or an "epistemology of provenance"? The answer to both questions comes through the notion of praxis developed in Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason. By thinking of embodiment as praxis or work, a strategy implicit in Beauvoir's idea that "one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman." Kruks seeks to resolve the ethical affront of finding one's individuality reduced to the "generality" of a collective—the ethical affront to which feminists of various generations and theoretical persuasions must respond.Retrieving Experience explores the significance of recognition as a political norm. Identifying Sartre's Anti-Semite and Jew as a pivotal work in the history of identitarian theorizing, she situates recent appeals for race- and gender-based political mobilization in the United States with respect to the dialectical relationship between the Look, shame, and recognition existentialists observed in situations of anti-Semitic and colonial domination during and immediately after the Second World War. Legitimating knowledge gained under oppressive conditions formed an important element of African, Southeast Asian, and ultimately African-American and feminist resistance to cultural imperialism. However, Kruks warns, discourses of "recognition" risk placing the blame for group domination on individuals' face-to-face interactions while concealing the role of state and economic institutions in enabling social disdain to systematically damage a group's quality of life. Moreover, they suggest that the experience of subjugation alone justifies knowledge claims or counts, without further elaboration, as an act of political engagement. Kruks argues that knowers and actors need to identify conceptual and practical mediations enabling individual interactions, experiences, and strategies to prompt the recognition and transformation of [End Page 73] group situations. Sartre's notion of praxis, she suggests, explains how an individual can participate in a collectivity while acting autonomously or acquiescing to subjection.The most important passages in Retrieving Experience examine the affective aspects of the decision to take up a political identity or engage in political action. Going beyond Sartre's account of mediations, Kruks suggests that the sensory and emotional qualities of embodiment are themselves mediators, the products of praxis as well as its vehicles. Since any act of social knowledge involves the emotions, affect plays an important role in the process whereby individuals from different cultural, economic, and bodily situations learn about and shape one another's' environment through the act of knowledge. Individuals, then, may have a moral responsibility to learn about others in a way that gives them "sympathetic bodies." Drawing on Maria Lugones' social epistemology, Kruks argues that "world-traveling" or existing simultaneously in several communities or sets of power relations is a bodily act, but also a fully cultural, ethical act rather than a natural way of being. One is not born, but becomes, an embodied knower. Understanding female embodiment as a kind of work or "world-traveling" praxis enables feminist solidarity—"respectful recognition" to replace a historically implausible "sisterhood" or a distinct epistemological perspective as a regulative ideal for feminist politics.But how far can the... (shrink)

It is always great good fortune for an author to have his writings meet with a receptive circle of readers who take them up in their own work and clarify them further. Indeed, it may even be the secret of all theoretical productivity that one reaches an opportune point in one's own creative process when others' queries, suggestions, and criticisms give one no peace, until one has been forced to come up with new answers and solutions. The four essays collected (...) here, in any event, jointly represent an ideal form of such a challenge: I am now compelled to make further theoretical developments and clarifications that lead me to a whole new stage of my own endeavours, well beyond what I initially had in mind in The Struggle for Recognition . For this reason, I will not concentrate here on interpretative issues regarding my earlier work but will instead take up the problems and challenges that have occasioned several revisions on my part. For this reason, it makes sense to begin (in section I) with the points that Carl-Göran Heidegren makes, in terms of a history of social theory, regarding my proposed theory of recognition. The issues that still motivate me today can best be expressed via an engagement with the conscientious interpretations he offers. The core of this rejoinder is based on Heikki Ikäheimo's and Arto Laitinen's suggestions and corrections, which they have used to develop my initial approach further, to the point where the theoretical outlines of a precise and general concept of recognition come into view. It is primarily these two contributions that helped me develop a productive elaboration of my originally vague intuitions (section II). By way of conclusion (in section III), I take up the penetrating questions raised by Antti Kauppinen regarding the use of the concept of recognition in the broader context of social criticism; he has compelled me to take on several extremely helpful clarifications, and they give me the opportunity, in conclusion, to summarize my overarching intentions. (shrink)

The concept of recognition, and its relationship to the way we theorise identity and justice, has emerged as part of an important debate in contemporary political and social theory. With contributions from Nancy Fraser and international commentators, this new collection examines key theoretical and practical problems of 'recognition' in politics. Beyond important normative issues in social theory, such as how cultural claims to difference may be justly accommodated in liberal polities, it addresses a range of practical problems in (...) which a politics of recognition approach casts new light on old conflicts and tensions, examining these problems within the context of processes of globalisation and increasing cultural diversity. Organised into three sections, Recognition in Politics: Theory, Policy and Practice analyses new theoretical directions, the challenges of managing multicultural societies, and social policy case studies. Featuring a recent paper by Professor Nancy Fraser based on her 2004 Spinoza Lecture, this collection examines core issues in contemporary debates over recognition, extending these debates in new and significant ways. The contributors extend the literature on recognition by applying the theory to practical, contemporary political problems. These papers reveal the capacity of the recognition paradigm to generate new insights into political problems, but also the limitations of the concept's theoretical purview. Together, these commentaries offer an invaluable road map to the most recent scholarship on recognition. (shrink)

While it is well recognized that many everyday consumer behaviors, such as purchases of sweatshop goods, come at a cost to the global poor, it has proven difficult to argue that even knowing, repeat contributors are somehow morally complicit in those outcomes. Some recent approaches contend that marginal contributions to distant harms are consequences that consumers straightforwardly should have born in mind, which would make consumers seem reckless or negligent. Critics reasonably reply that the bad luck that my innocent purchase (...) contributes distantly to harm provides insufficient grounds for moral blame; moreover, such distant and seemingly inevitable collective effects are not by themselves obvious reasons for agents to refrain from acting. Granting these criticisms, I argue that the harm that agents do through knowing contributions to distant collective harm actually builds on the morally sparse agential phenomenology of everyday purchases and decisions: contributors who knowingly disregard distant harms, rather than being reckless or negligent about consequences they should have foreseen, very directly perpetuate the moral invisibility and the lack of recognition from which the global poor generally suffer. This provides agents with clearer moral reasons to refrain from knowing participation in unstructured collective harms, and clearer reason to bear them in mind in acting. (shrink)

The recognition in electroencephalogram of action idea is to identify what action people want to do by EEG. The significance of this project is to help people who have trouble in movement. Their action ideas are identified by EEG, and then robot hands can assist them to complete the action. This paper, with comparative experiments, used OpenBCI to collect EEG action ideas during static action and dynamic action and used the EEG recognition model Conv1D-GRU to training and (...) class='Hi'>recognition action, respectively. The experimental result shows that the brain wave action idea is easier to recognize in static state. The accuracy of brain wave action idea recognition in dynamic state is only 72.27%, and the accuracy of brain wave action idea recognition in static state is 99.98%. The experimental result confirms that the action idea will be of great help to people with mobility difficulties. (shrink)

This paper is an introduction to the special issue on Pathologies of Recognition. The first subsection briefly introduces the notion of recognition and trace its development from Fichte and Hegel to Honneth and his critics, and the second subsection turns to the concept of a social pathology. The third section provides a brief look at the individual papers. -/- The special issue focuses on two central concepts in contemporary critical social theory: namely ‘recognition’ and ‘social pathology’. For (...) defenders of a theory of recognition, adequate recognition is itself a key normative criterion for analysing social wrongs and pathologies which fall short of the ideal. For critics, the focus on recognition – even at its best – rather conceals social wrongs. While the contributors in this collection represent slightly different approaches, the general consensus amongst them is that recognition as such is a good ideal but like all good ideals it can go wrong in various ways and take pathological forms itself. In this introduction we focus first briefly on the concepts of recognition and social pathology, and finally present the papers of this special issue. (shrink)

_Toleration, Respect and Recognition in Education_ brings together a collection of papers examining the complexity of different interpretations of toleration, respect and recognition in education. Discusses different theories of toleration and shows how it lies at the centre of a liberal pluralistic society Brings together the work of leading scholars from a range of disciplines Examines how education can accommodate diversity and promote shared public values.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and resulting health and economic crisis has caused major disruptions in the functioning of food systems and revived the discussion on what forms balanced, effective and responsible crisis management. As part of its thought leadership and its social responsibility in times of crisis, WUR is uniquely placed to contribute to the scientific knowledge base and data collection mechanisms required for early recognition and rapid response. In addition, WUR takes on the challenge to generate timely insights (...) into the possible scenarios for the prevention of a crisis and during and after emergencies to enable our clients and stakeholders to make informed decisions. Lastly, WUR can provide a better understanding of the mechanisms of spillover, and tangible and practical tools to help reduce the risk of spillover events from occurring, prevent pathogen spread, or mitigate the impacts of a future pandemic. In its research institutes and university, WUR brings together expertise in human, animal, plant and environmental health, the global agri-food system, economics, social sciences, food safety and security, ethics, and policy. Here, in the knowledge that COVID-19 will not be the last pandemic, we present WUR’s ambition and capabilities towards an integrated global multi-stakeholder approach to the prevention and management of potentially pandemic diseases, across the four phases of crisis management; prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery and learning. (shrink)

Communitarian writers argue that social identity is deeply important to individual autonomy and thus liberal societies have an obligation to recognize identity. Any liberal view that attempts to account for this charge must specify a procedure to recognize identity that also ensures that the liberal sense of autonomy is not weakened. In this article, I develop such an account. I argue that liberals must distinguish an identity that belongs to particular persons (particularized identity) from the collective form of that (...) identity. For instance, Naisha will have her own particularized way of being Indian in addition to the collective form of the culture that she shares with others. To determine which acts would be about recognizing the particularized form, I provide a counterfactual test. One major implication of the test is that special collective rights would not be endorsed. At the same time, the test is not equivalent to the liberal positions of insisting either that rights belong to individuals or that individuals are not harmed. Because identity is almost always viewed in terms of groups, valuing identity seems to be at odds with the principles of liberalism and democratic theory in which individual persons are the ultimate source of value. I show that there is a significant way to recognize identity that is harmonious with these principles. (shrink)

Edited by Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch & Christopher Zurn. This volume collects original, cutting-edge essays on the philosophy of recognition by international scholars eminent in the field. By considering the topic of recognition as addressed by both classical and contemporary authors, the volume explores the connections between historical and contemporary recognition research and makes substantive contributions to the further development of contemporary theories of recognition.

The article examines the processes of individualization in relation to the emergence and existence of various forms of collectivity. It analyzes the complexities of this process, which, while a necessary characteristic of modern society, can lead to atomization, frustration, and loss of meaning in life. Particular attention is paid to the nature of individualization: on one hand, it presupposes the uniqueness of each individual; on the other, it is inextricably linked to an individual’s association with certain collectives and the internalization (...) of supra-individual values. The article asserts that new forms of collectivity are emerging in the modern era that, rather than suppressing individuality, foster creative self-realization. The research explores issues of depersonalization and pseudo-collectivity, as well as the interplay between freedom and responsibility in the context of global digitalization. The author elucidates the dangers associated with the virtualization of personality, the erosion of boundaries between private and public spheres, and the potential for total control over individuals. Contemporary forms of virtual individualization, while creating an illusion of freedom, may in fact lead to a loss of personal individuality. The article further explores the impact of digital technologies on the transformation and evolution of both individual and collective memory, as well as their role in shaping identity. It underscores that digitalization not only offers new opportunities but also poses significant anthropological challenges. Dialogue is examined as a means of resolving conflicts and facilitating both individual and collective self-realization. The author contrasts M.M. Bakhtin’s dialogical approach with J.-P. Sartre’s existentialist interpretation of the relationship between the Self and the Other. It is emphasized that genuine dialogue requires mutual recognition and respect among participants, a shared space for communication, and a willingness to reconsider one’s own position. In conclusion, the study posits that addressing many of the problems generated by modern processes of individualization and collectivization in the age of global digitalization necessitates the creation of conditions conducive to interpersonal, intergroup, and intercultural dialogue. (shrink)

L’expertise scientifique collective « variétés tolérantes aux herbicides » a mobilisé une vingtaine d’experts de disciplines très différentes autour d’un sujet « sensible ». L’article décrit la façon dont ces experts ont été choisis, les modes d’interaction avec les commanditaires ministériels de l’expertise, le fonctionnement du collectif d’experts, ainsi que les « rendus » de l’expertise. Cet article aborde la question du traitement des avis minoritaires au sein du collectif et pose également la question centrale de la valorisation pour (...) les scientifiques participant du travail fourni en lien avec les attentes des organismes de recherche.These collective expert scientific studies on “herbicide-tolerant varieties” involved some twenty experts from very different disciplines in a “sensitive” topic. This article describes how the experts were chosen, how they interacted with their ministerial clients, how the group of experts functioned and the outcomes of its assessments. It investigates the way minority opinions were handled by the expert group, as well as the crucial question of recognition of the work of the scientists who took part, in relation to expectations among the research organisations. (shrink)

In the human-computer interaction, electroencephalogram access for automatic emotion recognition is an effective way for robot brains to perceive human behavior. In order to improve the accuracy of the emotion recognition, a method of EEG access for emotion recognition based on a deep hybrid network was proposed in this paper. Firstly, the collected EEG was decomposed into four frequency band signals, and the multiscale sample entropy features of each frequency band were extracted. Secondly, the constructed 3D MSE (...) feature matrices were fed into a deep hybrid network for autonomous learning. The deep hybrid network was composed of a continuous convolutional neural network and hidden Markov models. Lastly, HMMs trained with multiple observation sequences were used to replace the artificial neural network classifier in the CNN, and the emotion recognition task was completed by HMM classifiers. The proposed method was applied to the DEAP dataset for emotion recognition experiments, and the average accuracy could achieve 79.77% on arousal, 83.09% on valence, and 81.83% on dominance. Compared with the latest related methods, the accuracy was improved by 0.99% on valence and 14.58% on dominance, which verified the effectiveness of the proposed method. (shrink)

In the 2000s, several psychiatrists cited the lack of relational disorders in the DSM-IV as one of the two most glaring gaps in psychiatric nosology, and campaigned for their inclusion in the DSM-5. This campaign failed, however, presumably in part due to serious “ontological concerns” haunting such disorders. Here, I offer a path to quell such ontological concerns, adding to previous conceptual work by Jerome Wakefield and Christian Perring. Specifically, I adduce reasons to think that collective disorders are compatible (...) with key metaphysical commitments of contemporary scientific psychiatry, and argue that if one accepts the existence of mental disorders in individuals as medical, then one has good reasons to accept the existence of collective disorders as medical. First, I outline how collective disorders are reconcilable with both the harmful dysfunction model of disorder and a denial of mind-body dualism. I then identify some potential weaknesses in the main pre-existing example of a collective disorder, offering my own examples as supplements. These examples’ medical plausibility is bolstered by: work in philosophy of biology on the generalized selected effects theory of function, and work in analytic philosophy of mind on collective mentality. Finally, after offering preliminary responses to the objection that the recognition of collective disorders may lead to an overpathologization of everyday life, I spell out ways in which this recognition may have empowering effects for some would-be patients; for example, by providing substance to the notion of a “sane response to an insane world.”. (shrink)

There has been limited research investigating the effects of the recognition form of respect between leaders and their followers within the organisation literature. We investigated whether mutual recognition respect was associated with follower job performance and well-being after controlling for measures of liking and appraisal respect. Based on data we collected from 203 matched leader–follower dyads in the Insurance industry in Malaysia, we found mutual recognition respect predicted both follower job performance and well-being. Significantly, appraisal respect was (...) only found to be positively associated with job performance. Our findings suggest mutual recognition respect is an important form of respect in workplace relationships that can bring benefits to both the individual and the organisation. (shrink)

This book brings together philosophical approaches to explore the relation of recognition and poverty. This volume examines how critical theories of recognition can be utilized to enhance our understanding, evaluation and critique of poverty and social inequalities. Furthermore, chapters in this book explore anti-poverty policies, development aid and duties towards the (global) poor. This book includes critical examinations of reflections on poverty and related issues in the work of past and present philosophers of recognition. This book hopes (...) to contribute to the ongoing and expanding debate on recognition in ethics, political and social philosophy by focusing on poverty, which is one highly important social and global challenge. -/- “If one believed that the theme of “recognition” had been theoretically exhausted over the last couple of years, this book sets the record straight. The central point of all the studies collected here is that poverty is best understood in its social causes, psychic consequences and moral injustice when studied within the framework of recognition theory. Regardless of how recognition is defined in detail, poverty is best captured as the absence of all material and cultural conditions for being recognized as a human being. Whoever is interested in the many facets of poverty is well advised to consult this path-breaking book.” Axel Honneth, Columbia University. (shrink)

This entry concerns Kant's conception of moral recognition, mutual recognition, and dignity.

This paper draws from two central intuitions that characterize modern western societies. The first is the normative claim that our identities should be recognized in an authentic way. The second intuition is that our common matters are best organized through democratic decision-making and democratic institutions. It is argued here that while deliberative democracy is a promising candidate for just organization of recognition relationships, it cannot fulfil its promise if recognition is understood either as recognition of ‘authentic’ (...) class='Hi'>collective identities or as recognition of too atomistic or individualized subjects. If deliberative democracy is to be understood as successfully providing authentic recognition of individual identities, it requires a specific understanding of how individuals’ recognition needs and desires are collectively and institutionally constituted. Furthermore, it is argued that even if deliberative democracy can provide the necessary circumstances for individual self-realization, it comes with homogenizing tendencies and cannot fully avoid the problems of multiculturalism. (shrink)

This collection of papers by prominent feminist thinkers advances the positive feminist project of remapping the moral by developing theory that acknowledges the diversity of women.

The paper argues that in our usage of moral language we relate three concepts: guilt, forgiveness, and reconciliation. This assumes that we can distinguish between external actions and internal executions, because guilt as well as forgiveness and reconciliation are realities that first affect our inner humanity. When a relationship has been damaged by culpable actions (sometimes even by both sides), forgiveness is the precondition of reconciliation. As long as people accuse each other, there can be no talk of true reconciliation. (...) Although these are attitudes, that is, inner engagements, reconciliation also becomes outwardly recognizable as peace. However, these relationships can only be explained well in the connections of individual persons to each other. When political communities confront each other, our moral sense becomes fuzzy, because it is not so easy to say how such collectives (e.g., peoples) are to be determined in their inside and outside. Who can and may forgive, if other persons have become victims of culpable actions, but cannot forgive themselves? Here, then, the difficulty of individuality and collectivity is added. The essay pleads for maintaining the conceptual conjunction between individual and collective forgiveness. However, this should not be done at the price of a complete socio-ontological dissolution of collectives. Therefore, one must also be cautious about rash universalistic appropriation of the Other or the other group, because this is usually accompanied by a failure to recognize and endure the selfhood of the Other. Before it comes to a “false” reconciliation in this way, it is better to at least recognize each other – also in diversity. This should also be reflected in the rules of conflict, which must above all be oriented toward ensuring that conflicts are not carried out in such a way that the manner in which the conflict is carried out makes reconciliation impossible. But in both collective and individual reconciliation, the person does not have the outcome of the process entirely in his or her own hands. Reconciliation is not a technique, but a relational event that is carried out in an “open space.”. (shrink)

Ludwig Feuerbach is famous for his critical hermeneutics of religion. At the heart of it lie arguments of philosophical anthropology that directly anticipate contemporary developments in the theory of recognition. He counts amongst the great philosophers who, immediately following Kant, emphasised the constitutive importance for human beings of interpersonal and social relations. Indeed, his theory of intersubjectivity contains features that are highly original, notably the link between individual and community, and between recognition and recollection.

Abstract The view that mirror self-recognition (MSR) is a definitive demonstration of self-awareness is far from universally accepted, and those who do support the view need a more robust argument than the mere assumption that self-recognition implies a self-concept (e.g. Gallup in Socioecology and Psychology of Primates, Mouton, Hague, 1975 ; Gallup and Suarez in Psychological Perspectives on the Self, vol 3, Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 1986 ). In this paper I offer a new argument in favour of the view (...) that MSR shows self-awareness by examining the nature of the mirror image itself. I argue, using the results of ‘symbol-mindedness’ experiments by Deloache (Trends Cogn Sci 8(2):66–70, 2004) , that where self-recognition exists, the mirror image must be functioning as a symbol from the perspective of the subject and the subject must therefore be ‘symbol-minded’ and hence concept possessing. Further to this, according to the Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness (Savanah in Conscious Cogn 2011 ), concept possession alone is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of self-awareness. Thus MSR as a demonstration of symbol-mindedness implies the existence of self-awareness. I begin by defending the ‘mark test’ protocol as a robust methodology for determining self-recognition. Then follows a critical examination of the extreme views both for and against the interpretation of MSR as an indication of self-awareness: although the non-mentalistic interpretation of MSR is unconvincing, the argument presented by Gallup is also inadequate. I then present the symbol-mindedness argument to fill in the gaps in the Gallup approach. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-17 DOI 10.1007/s10539-012-9318-2 Authors Stephane Savanah, ARC Centre of Excellence in Cognition and its Disorders (CCD), Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia Journal Biology and Philosophy Online ISSN 1572-8404 Print ISSN 0169-3867. (shrink)

Nearest-neighbor correlation-based similarity computation in the space of outputs of complex-type receptive elds can support robust recognition of 3D objects. Our experiments with four collections of objects resulted in mean recognition rates between 84% and 94%, over a 40 40 range of viewpoints, centered on a stored canonical view and related to it by rotations in depth. This result has interesting implications for the design of a front end to an arti cial object recognition system, and for (...) the understanding of the faculty of object recognition in primate vision. (shrink)

A portrait recognition system can play an important role in emergency evacuation in mass emergencies. This paper designed a portrait recognition system, analyzed the overall structure of the system and the method of image preprocessing, and used the Single Shot MultiBox Detector (SSD) algorithm for portrait detection. It also designed an improved algorithm combining principal component analysis (PCA) with linear discriminant analysis (LDA) for portrait recognition and tested the system by applying it in a shopping mall to (...) collect and monitor the portrait and establish a data set. The results showed that the missing detection rate and false detection rate of the SSD algorithm were 0.78 and 2.89%, respectively, which were lower than those of the AdaBoost algorithm. Comparisons with PCA, LDA, and PCA + LDA algorithms demonstrated that the recognition rate of the improved PCA + LDA algorithm was the highest, which was 95.8%, the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve was the largest, and the recognition time was the shortest, which was 465 ms. The experimental results show that the improved PCA + LDA algorithm is reliable in portrait recognition and can be used for emergency evacuation in mass emergencies. (shrink)