The organizational account of biological functions interprets functions as contributions of a trait to the maintenance of the organization that, in turn, maintains the trait. As has been recently argued, however, the account seems unable to provide a unified grounding for both intra- and cross-generation functions, since the latter do not contribute to the maintenance of the same organization which produces them. To face this ‘ontological problem’, a splitting account has been proposed, according to which the two kinds of functions (...) require distinct organizational definitions. In this article, we propose a solution for the ontological problem, by arguing that intra- and cross-generation functions can be said to contribute in the same way to the maintenance of the biological organization, characterized in terms of organizational self-maintenance. As a consequence, we suggest maintaining a unified organizational account of biological functions. (shrink)

Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it is false that x (...) is worse than y with respect to V and (iii) it is false that x and y are equally good with respect to V . Most philosophers have followed Raz in adopting this account of incomparability. Recently, however, John Broome has advocated an alternative view, on which value incomparability is explained in terms of vagueness or indeterminacy . In this paper I aim to further Broome’s view in two ways. Firstly, I want to supply independent reasons for thinking that the phenomenon of value incomparability is indeed a matter of the indeterminacy inherent in our comparative predicates. Secondly, I attempt to defend Broome’s account by warding off several objections that worry him, due mainly to Erik Carlson and Ruth Chang. (shrink)

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems have the same scientific status as Einstein's principle of relativity, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and Watson and Crick's double helix model of DNA. Our aim is to discuss some new faces of the incompleteness phenomenon unveiled by an information-theoretic approach to randomness and recent developments in quantum computing.

The forfeiture thesis is posed as an independent thesis in moral philosophy according to which agents forfeit (or lose) rights if they perform certain act-types. According to many, this thesis plays a crucial role in the justification of (legal) punishment. In this paper, I argue that the forfeiture thesis is unnecessary – we can simply dismiss it without any substantive loss. Echoing an aspect of the specificationist approach to rights, the reason is that we may replace the forfeiture thesis with (...) an exception clause in the very content of the right not to be subjected to hard treatment: P has no right not to be subjected to hard treatment simpliciter, but a right not to be subjected to hard treatment unless P performs an act-type φ – e.g., murdering an innocent person. This alternative has substantive advantages over the forfeiture thesis, which, in turn, shows that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. (shrink)

Very large databases are a major opportunity for science and data analytics is a remarkable new field of investigation in computer science. The effectiveness of these tools is used to support a “philosophy” against the scientific method as developed throughout history. According to this view, computer-discovered correlations should replace understanding and guide prediction and action. Consequently, there will be no need to give scientific meaning to phenomena, by proposing, say, causal relations, since regularities in very large databases are enough: “with (...) enough data, the numbers speak for themselves”. The “end of science” is proclaimed. Using classical results from ergodic theory, Ramsey theory and algorithmic information theory, we show that this “philosophy” is wrong. For example, we prove that very large databases have to contain arbitrary correlations. These correlations appear only due to the size, not the nature, of data. They can be found in “randomly” generated, large enough databases, which—as we will prove—implies that most correlations are spurious. Too much information tends to behave like very little information. The scientific method can be enriched by computer mining in immense databases, but not replaced by it. (shrink)

El objetivo de la investigación es interpretar el discurso hegemónico (icónico-lingüístico) de los Fundamentalismos Religiosos de Iglesia Católica y grupos ligados a ella, respecto al aborto, junto a las protestas realizadas por movimientos de ciudadanas y ciudadanos por la defensa de los Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos de las mujeres en países de la Subregión Andina. La metodología utiliza un análisis de discurso. En conclusión: El discurso y penalización del aborto es ideológico, dominación patriarcal que hace adoptar a las mujeres el (...) aborto inseguro como resistencia paralegal, pudiendo enfermar o morir para obtener la libertad sobre su cuerpo, un derecho reproductivo. (shrink)

Em 1821, Friedrich W. Schelling inaugura um novo caminho para o seu pensamento. Esse novo caminho, como afirma o próprio filósofo, divide sua filosofia em duas partes, a saber, a filosofia negativa, que diz respeito a toda sua produção anterior, e a filosofia positiva que se inaugura a partir das aulas de Erlangen. Contudo, como veremos neste artigo, suas duas filosofias estão unidas na busca pelo pensamento da Unidade. Essa busca traduz-se na Spätphilosophie como busca do Absoluto. O presente artigo (...) tem como objetivo refletir sobre os escritos da chamada Filosofia da Mitologia que visam pensar o caminho do Absoluto. Tal caminho relaciona-se com o caminho percorrido pela própria consciência humana e, ao mesmo tempo, coincide com ela. Portanto, a análise culminará no que chamou de processo mitológico e sua relação com o politeísmo sucessivo, já que a mitologia teria se constituído graças à sucessão dos deuses efetuada na consciência humana. In 1821, Friedrich W. Schelling opens a new path for his thinking. This new path, as affirmed by the philosopher himself, he divides his philosophy in two parts: the negative philosophy, which concerns all his previous production, and the positive philosophy that is inaugurated by the Erlangen courses. However, both philosophies are linked together by the search of the thought of the Unity, a search manifested in the Spätphilosophie as the quest for the Absolute. The present article aims to reflect upon the writings of the so-called Philosophy of Mythology, which intends to think about the way to the Absolute. Such way is related to the path followed by the human conscience itself and, at the same time, it coincides with the conscience itself. Therefore, the analysis shall culminate in what Schelling called "mythological process" and in its relation with the successive polytheism, since mythology may have constituted itself by the succession of gods, effected in human conscience. (shrink)

Danaher suggests that doxological justice, grounded in an acute receptivity of the generosity of God, can decenter our current notions of justice. Instead I focus on what might be called doxological forgiveness, that is, grace-responsive forgiveness. The first section argues that a conception of forgiveness which I dub repentance-responsive is compatible with and even requires holding punitive attitudes. The second section sketches the alternative account of grace-responsive forgiveness. Those who embody this virtue have epistemic and theological warrant to entirely disavow (...) punitive emotions. The third section argues that God embodies a grace-responsive forgiveness that undermines retributivism and eclipses repentance-responsive forgiveness. (shrink)

So-called climate-ready GM crops can be of great help in adapting to a changing climate. Climate change, caused in great part by anthropogenic greenhouse gases released in the atmosphere since the industrial revolution by the developed world, is felt much stronger in the developing world, causing unexpected droughts and floods that will cause large harvest loss, leading to more hunger and malnutrition, rising death tolls and disease vulnerability. The current intellectual property regime (IPR) strikes an unfair balance between profit oriented (...) seed industry giants and low-acreage farmers. The biotechnology industry, mainly headquartered in the developed world, has started to patent new seed varieties, taking biomaterials from developing countries, with the claim, that they will be more tolerant to flood, drought, heat, and cold. Special sales contracts prohibit saving seeds from the harvest for the next season, thus forcing the farmers to buy them every season anew, which goes against traditional farming. Using a widely accepted concept of global justice, that tackles the fact that around 10% of the world's population profits from 90% of the earth's resources, and by taking into account the feasibility of a fair IPR, we will discuss three issues. First, an ethically acceptable IPR should prevent unjust and unfair assignments of property rights (e.g. patents) that completely ignore small-scale farmers inventiveness and efforts to save agrobiodiversity. As a second task, this regime should encourage globally a just distribution of the objects of innovation that are covered by patents. Third, such a regime should encourage innovations at a rate that is effective to cope with climate change. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to analyze the significance of the absence of the problem of living body in Heidegger's analytic of Dasein. In order to evaluate the occurrences of the problem of the body in Being and Time, I also refer to the context of some of Heidegger's later work where there is to be found a sketch of an ontological investigation of the living body. I analyze then in detail the scarce occurrences of body in the fundamental (...) ontology, showing finally that the lack of a proper phenomenological examination of living body generates a series of conceptual difficulties for the problem of Dasein's death, precisely when the issue of dead body is at stake. (shrink)

The debate about how neurotechnologies impact authenticity has focused on two inter-related dimensions: self-discovery and self-creation. In this paper, we develop a broader framework that includes the experimental and relational dimensions of authenticity, both understood as decisive for shaping one’s narrative identity. In our view, neurointerventions that alter someone’s personality traits will also impact her very own self-understanding across time. We argue that experimental authenticity only needs a minimum conception of narrative coherence of the self and that reversibility should remain (...) a key feature in the ethical assessment of neurotechnologies. The relational dimension of authenticity derives from the fact that a process of self-constitution is never a solitary business. The significant others act not just as subsequent judges of one’s life decisions, but as real co-authors of one’s self. We discuss relevant cases in which others are actively contributing to the meaning-making process, as to the direction one’s life is taking. We also claim that the experimental and the relational dimensions of authenticity should aim to correct each other. The relational dimension introduces socially approved standards as well as limitations to the array of available possibilities of self-fashioning or human enhancement. The experimental side enables us to avoid confusing one’s personal identity with a social and narrative construct that only bears the mark of social pressure and conformism. (shrink)

In this article I discuss the conditions under which sovereign debts are not morally binding for a state. Following an old legal doctrine, I call non-binding debts ‘odious'. I proceed as follows. First, I argue that alternative accounts on the morality of debts are unsatisfactory. The problem these accounts have are that they do not clearly identify the philosophical issues that underlie the notion of odious debts, or that they fail to specify what exactly the immorality of odious debts consists (...) in. Second, I defend the view that a debt is odious when two conditions are satisfied: borrowed funds were used by public officials for purposes for which they were not authorised lenders knew, or should have known, about possible unauthorised uses of those funds. If these two conditions are both satisfied, debts should not be considered debts of the state, but rather personal debts of rulers. Third, I discuss the feasibility of my approach by exploring how it would work in the current world. Finally, I d.. (shrink)

This chapter explores the implications of moral vagueness for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. It characterizes non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to seven theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. It starts by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which “red,” “tall,” and “heap” are said to be. It then argues that the moral non-naturalist seeking to countenance moral vagueness (...) faces a dilemma: are moral properties vague, or perfectly sharp? On either horn of the dilemma, serious problems arise for some of the central tenets of non-naturalism: vague properties seem to threaten Objectivism, Supervenience, and Non-reductivism; on the other hand, sharp properties raise problems for Supervenience and Rationalism. The difficulties on each horn of the dilemma are real, and while they may not be insuperable, they do, at the very least, drastically limit the things non-naturalists can consistently say about moral properties, facts, and reasons. (shrink)

The debate about how neurotechnologies impact authenticity has focused on two inter-related dimensions: self-discovery and self-creation. In this paper, we develop a broader framework that includes the experimental and relational dimensions of authenticity, both understood as decisive for shaping one’s narrative identity. In our view, neurointerventions that alter someone’s personality traits will also impact her very own self-understanding across time. We argue that experimental authenticity only needs a minimum conception of narrative coherence of the self and that reversibility should remain (...) a key feature in the ethical assessment of neurotechnologies. The relational dimension of authenticity derives from the fact that a process of self-constitution is never a solitary business. The significant others act not just as subsequent judges of one’s life decisions, but as real co-authors of one’s self. We discuss relevant cases in which others are actively contributing to the meaning-making process, as to the direction one’s life is taking. We also claim that the experimental and the relational dimensions of authenticity should aim to correct each other. The relational dimension introduces socially approved standards as well as limitations to the array of available possibilities of self-fashioning or human enhancement. The experimental side enables us to avoid confusing one’s personal identity with a social and narrative construct that only bears the mark of social pressure and conformism. (shrink)

In the philosophical debate on aging, it is common to raise the question of the theoretical definition of aging in terms of its possible characterization as a disease. Understanding aging as a disease seems to imply its medicalization, which has important practical consequences. In this paper, we analyze the question of whether aging is a disease by appealing to the concept of disease in the philosophy of medicine. As a result of this analysis, we argue that a pragmatist approach to (...) the conception of disease is the best alternative to highlight the relevance of the medicalization of aging. From this pragmatist perspective, it can be seen that the notion of aging is going through a conceptual change, and aging can today be understood as a not radically different process from any other condition that is usually considered a disease. (shrink)

En el presente artículo, señalaremos que la determinación husserliana de lo vivo incluye tanto momentos genéticos como generativos, los cuales funcionan en paralelo y que no pueden ser ignorados. A partir del análisis de las propuestas de Steinbock y de Walton sobre la tensión que existe entre el método generativo y el genético, mostraremos que la determinación del mundo humano contiene elementos biológicos que son indispensables de considerar y que, por lo tanto, la generatividad debe incluirlo. De este modo, sostendremos (...) que el ser humano pertenece a un doble contexto biogenerativo que lo pone en relación con otros seres a quienes identifica como vivientes. Finalmente, tomando en consideración las reflexiones tardías de Husserl, concluiremos señalando que el mundo de la vida no puede ser el mundo puramente humano, pues los seres vivos también están incluidos en él de manera constitutiva. (shrink)

Cartea pe care o prezentăm poate fi privită ca ilustrare a unei concepţii idealiste despre ştiinţă. Este meritul filozofului Edmund Husserl de a fi tulburat secolul trecut prin perseverenţa cu care a urmărit realizarea unei filozofii în formă riguroasă, ştiinţifică. Dacă sintagma în cauză a putut să apară pentru mulţi ca fiind nepotrivită pentru sensul şi posibilităţile filozofiei, lucrurile stau astfel şi pentru că filozofia gânditorului german a rămas pentru ei, într-o oarecare măsură, insondabilă. Voi susţine aici contrariul: ea este (...) o filozofie deschisă interpretării. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss Sartre’s critic of the Heideggerian Being-towards-death and I identify two stages in Sartre’s confrontation with Heidegger. The first one is to be found in his “war diary” of 1939-1940, where Sartre criticizes Heidegger’s idea that the relationship to one’s own death individualizes the self. For Sartre, one is free not for death, as Heidegger assumes, but free against death. The second approach, which is also a more elaborated one, is to be found in Being and (...) Nothingness. Sartre contests some fundamental aspects of the Heideggerian description of death, among which the idea that death belongs to the self, that it is a possibility, that it gives the meaning of life and that it is the mark of one’s own self. After analyzing these two levels, I am critically discussing Sartre’s critic, underlining a kind of hermeneutical incomprehension and inconsequence in Sartre’s reading of Heidegger, especially in the understanding of the ontological possibility. (shrink)

En este artículo me interesa abordar el carácter terapéutico de la filosofía socrática según los diálogos aporéticos de Platón. Considero que la terapia de Sócrates es un cuidado de sí mismo cuyo ejercicio se lleva a cabo con los otros de manera dialéctica, por lo cual la naturaleza de sí mismo no es nunca resultado de una reflexión aislada, sino una búsqueda constante a través del diálogo. Para ello es necesario aclarar el sentido de la relación que establece el diálogo (...) socrático, la estructura de la pregunta terapéutica y el objetivo que motiva la terapia socrática. (shrink)

The general idea of this investigation is to emphasize the elusiveness of the concept of terrorism and the pitfalls of the so-called “War on Terror” by way of confronting, roughly, the reflections made in the immediate following of 9/11 by Habermas and Derrida on the legacy of Enlightenment, globalization and tolerance, with Foucault’s concept of biopolitics seen as the modern political paradigm and Agamben’s understanding of “the state of exception” in the context of liberal democratic governments. The main argument will (...) state that the modern Western individual and the modern terrorist are in a way linked together as products of the same biopolitical network. So I shall argue that religious fundamentalism and international terrorism are not external factors to the Western civilization, nor even some radical late forms of ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ threatening the Western ‘way of life,’ but phenomena revealing what we could call, borrowing J. Derrida’s biological metaphor, a “crisis of autoimmunization” of Western neo-liberal democracies. The only long-term solution to the threat of global terrorism would have to involve the “deconstruction” of our common notion of tolerance and the experience of an unconditional hospitality that is actually the inversion of the terrorist action that is threatening us “from within,” according to Derrida. But we cannot reasonably hope for this radical change in our relationship to others unless we aren’t really trying to modify the relationship to the self that is prevalent in contemporary Western societies: a vision of us as self-encapsulated monads or ‘nuclear’ selves, for whom genuine community life is, at the most, only a nostalgic evocation of a past long gone, and the respect for the others, a strategic name for moral indifference. (shrink)

This text attempts to trace the evolution of the political and philosophical thought of Georg Lukács, after his magnum opus History and class consciousness, as well as the influence that historical events had on this evolution. Against the dominant consensus that dismisses Lukács’s late work as an effect of his alleged “reconciliation with reality”, I argue that the line of continuity in his thought was the idea of peaceful coexistence, derived from the objective conditions – the isolation of the Soviet (...) Union and the stabilization of Western capitalism. So, rather than explaining his choice to defend coexistence, or “socialism in one country” as a consequence of his reconciliation with, or surrender to Stalinism, one should see his compromise with Stalinism as a consequence of this choice. His commitment to the coexistence thesis shaped his final version of Marxism in a number of ways. From a political perspective, a readjustment of the temporal scale of the transition to socialism in post-revolutionary society constrained him to advocate a more realist strategy that combined revolutionary movements with evolutionary processes – this was reflected in his option for the Popular Front strategy and later in his support for the Western pacifist movements. His late philosophical work also bears the marks of this enduring political choice. (shrink)

The present paper seeks to expose the recent problematic disclosed by some authors like Gerardo Aboy Carlés and Soledad Montero, among others, about Ernesto Laclau’s work, which has traced a new analytical path whose goal is to study with accuracy what kind of political identity-logic is the populist one. With a broader discourse perspective and understanding populism as an identity management, we consider the use of the concept of populism relevant in order to revise historical cases such as the one (...) leaded by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Colombia in the middle of the 20th century. In this text we contrast the populist identity with others more related to the use of force and the physical elimination of the adversary, suggesting to study gaitanist identity as one that configures ítself in an ambivalent game which oscillates between the call to radical belligerency and the privileged use of expressions pertaining to the democratic tradition which moderated the totalitarian elements of Gaitan’s speech. In this vein, we open to discussion the mostly obliterated relationship between violence and populism, with the hope to contribute to a more accurate characterization of the populist phenomenon in Latin America. (shrink)

El desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial (IA) ha abierto una nueva discusión sobre la capacidad lingüística de esta tecnología y su potencial impacto en todas las dimensiones de la actividad humana (Brynjolfsson y McAfee, 2014). A fin de evaluar similitudes o diferencias entre la capacidad lingüística de la IA y la humana, este trabajo analiza específicamente el comportamiento argumentativo en términos de los puntos de vista que adopta Chat GPT, versión 3.5, frente a una situación controversial expresada en un dilema (...) moral del Cuestionario D.I.T. (Rest, 2013) y se compara con una muestra similar de adultos humanos (Noemi, 2019), sometida a la misma tarea discursiva. La investigación siguió un estudio comparativo de casos múltiples (Flick, 2020) a través de una metodología mixta (Johnson y Onwuegbuzie, 2004), que combinó un enfoque cuantitativo con uno cualitativo. Los resultados muestran que el 100% de la muestra de IH emite un punto de vista (a favor o en contra), mientras que de la muestra producida por el Chat GPT, sólo el 23,4% lo hace. Los resultados animan a pensar que las diferencias encontradas se podrían explicar por la debilidad de la IA de ser sensible al contexto (falta de una competencia pragmática relevante) y la inexistencia de un proceso de autoimplicación para enfrentar tareas de razonamiento moral. (shrink)

The article presents the current missionary formation in the Romanian Orthodox Church. I evaluated the national curricula from the faculties of Orthodox Theology, following the missionary orientated topics in each subject, and I analyzed the curricula of Missiology taught in the faculties.The article underlines the relation between the content of the Missiology curriculum and the historical context in which the Orthodox Church in Romania developed, and it explains why there are both innovative and conservative themes within the curriculum. Finally, the (...) specificities of the orthodox missionary formation in Romania are emphasized, such as the spiritual education, the central place of the liturgy, and the focus on internal mission. (shrink)

Injusticia epistémica es una etiqueta conceptual que ha tenido, al menos, un doble rendimiento. Por una parte, el concepto que ha propuesto Miranda Fricker en Injusticia Epistémica ha permitido profundizar en el diálogo filosófico respecto de cómo se generan y justifican las creencias y las pretensiones de conocimiento y, por otra parte, ha permitido en el dominio social nombrar distintas prácticas culturales de abuso, invisibilización, o asimetrías de poder que benefician algunos y deterioran a otros. Ya han pasado quince años (...) desde la publicación del libro de Fricker que permitió tales avances, en la esfera disciplinaria y en la esfera política. El presente volumen, por un lado, intenta celebrar esta importante obra que generó un espacio indiscutido en el terreno filosófico mediante la consideración de sus temas y, por otra parte, intenta contribuir ofreciendo el análisis de problemas reales y contingentes en distintas culturas epistémicas, y de prácticas sociales ancladas en distintos países de Latinoamérica. CRISTIÁN SANTIBÁÑEZ Es investigador y profesor de la Facultad de Educación de la Universidad Católica de la Santísima de Concepción, Chile, y miembro del Centro de Investigación en Educación y Desarrollo de la misma universidad. Se doctoró en lingüística en la Universidad de Houston, USA. Ha propuesto una perspectiva cognitiva y evolutiva de la competencia argumentativa en Origen y función de la argumentación (Palestra, 2018). Desarrolla investigación en teoría de la argumentación, cognición, epistemología y filosofía del lenguaje. LEANDRO DE BRASI es Doctor en Filosofía del King's College London y Profesor Asociado del Departamento de Ciencias Sociales (Área de Investigación Filosófica) de la Universidad de La Frontera (Chile). Sus intereses de investigación se concentran principalmente en la epistemología social, política y legal y ha publicado sobre estos y otros temas en revistas tales como The International Journal of Evidence and Proof, Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society, IEEE Technology and Society, y Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation. Actualmente se encuentra investigando distintas patologías epistémicas de la esfera pública, con especial énfasis en injusticias epistémicas. (shrink)

Because of the way that the international lending system works, poor nations have been forced to repay sovereign debts without having a moral obligation to do so. Suppose a corrupt public official borrows money from an international agency, or from private investors, and later on embezzles this money, or uses it to oppress the population. Suppose, further, that the lender is aware of the potential of this situation and still lends. Typically, the international community considers that successor governments have the (...) obligation to repay the funds and the interests associated to them. In fact, this is what they usually end up doing. Public officials are all aware that if they do not honour sovereign debts, they will face all kinds of negative consequences, including exclusion from future markets, loss of reputation and legal sanctions. Owing to this mechanism, entire generations have been burdened with debts fraudulently incurred in their name by governments in the past. These kinds of debts have been known in the legal literature as ‘odious’.In this article, I discuss the conditions defining the bindingness of a debt. I suggest that they can be made explicit by looking at the rules under which the lending system works at the domestic level, and by then extending these rules to the international domain. I argue that, because of their plausibility, these are the rules that should govern international lending from now on. I also discuss the feasibility of extending these rules globally, and consider potential objections to my proposal. (shrink)

This paper argues for a revised concept of authenticity entailing two demands that must be balanced. The first demand moves authenticity from the position of a strictly self-regarding virtue towards the position of a fully social virtue, acknowledging the crucial feature of steadiness, i.e. self-consistency, as being precisely what we ‘naturally’ lack. Nevertheless, the value of personal authenticity in a modern, open society comes from the fact that it brings about not only steadiness, but also the public development of a (...) variety of existential options that can be understood as Millian ‘original experiments in living’. Thus the second demand of authenticity is a demand for ‘experimental’ authenticity which covers the whole spectrum of technologies of the self, from Nietzschean ‘brief habits’, to the use of enhancement technologies. (shrink)

Le § 45 de Sein und Zeit met en relation la totalité et la mort. En fait, il y a chez Heidegger, trois concepts de totalité : 1 / la totalité ontologico-existentiale et a priori de l'êtreau-monde et du souci ; 2 /la totalité a posteriori des choses intramondaines composées de parties ; 3 / la totalité existentielle temporelle de l'existence « entre » la naissance et la mort. Heidegger essaie de résoudre la tension entre un moment essentiel de la (...) totalité ontologique (notamment de l' « en avant de soi » ) et la totalité existentielle qui est constituée par le ne-pas-encore qui sépare le Dasein de sa mort. Cela s'accomplit par la modification du concept de totalité (Ganzheit) comme être-tout (Ganzsein), être-tout possible (mögliche Ganzsein) et pouvoir d'être-tout (Ganzseinkönnen), mais aussi par l'élaboration des rapports structurels entre l'idée de totalité et l'idée de fin, ce qui implique l'analyse détaillée de plusieurs variations structurelles de ces notions. Traitant cette question, Heidegger se réfère aux analyses platoniciennes, aristotéliciennes et husserliennes. Sein und Zeit's paragraph 45 relates totality and death. In fact, with Heidegger there are three concepts of totality : 1 / an existential-ontological totality which is a priori of the being-in-the world and care ; 2 / an a posteriori totality of intra-mundane things made of parts ; and 3 / a time existential totality of existence lying « between » birth and death. Heidegger tries to solve the tension between an essential moment of the ontological totality (namely the « afore one's self » ) and the existential totality composed of the not-yet which separates the Dasein from death. It occurs through the change of the concept of totality (Ganzheit) as all-being (Ganzsein), all-possible being (mögliche Ganzsein) and power to be all (Ganzseinkönnen), but also through the elaboration of the structural relationships between the idea of a totality and the idea of end, which implies a detailed analysis of several structural variations of such notions. While dealing with these matters, Heidegger refers to Plato's, Aristotle's and Husserl's analyses. (shrink)

There is an essentialist view that requires one to specify the set of necessary and sufficient properties of the things that exist when establishing definitions. The endorsement of essentialism for definitions in economics has been largely motivated by the Taxonomic Tower of Babel (TTB), which encompasses two intellectual fears. The fear of scientific aphasia is the fear that scientific progress is hampered because economists do not agree on the definitions they use. The fear of nihilism refers to the fear of (...) the advent of an unmanageable proliferation of definitions of the same term. We advocate the abandonment of essentialism by offering three arguments. First, essentialism seems impracticable in economics because essences are either mostly unavailable or useless. Second, the TTB, rather than a bug, is a feature of economics. Third, the TTB does not necessarily display the negative implications presumably associated with its existence. (shrink)

In contrast to the “normativist” view, “naturalist” theorists claim that the concept of health refers to natural or normal states and propose different characterizations of healthy and diseased conditions that are meant to be objectivist and biologically grounded. In this article, we examine the core concept of these naturalist accounts of disease, i.e., the concept of biological malfunction, and develop a new formulation of the notion of malfunction following the recent organizational approach to functions in the philosophy of biology. We (...) focus on the notions of adaptive regulation and functional presupposition to develop a new conceptual framework that justifies the ascription of malfunctional behaviors to biological systems according to the embodied normativity of biological organizations. (shrink)

En este trabajo sostenemos que el giro jonasiano experimentado por la teoría autopoiética de Varela, que tuvo como finalidad incluir un complemento teleológico para la autopoiesis, puede reemplazarse por la fenomenología de la biología del filósofo alemán Helmuth Plessner. Esta última, a diferencia de la propuesta jonasiana, no incluye presupuestos existenciales antropocentristas en la consideración de los seres vivos. Nuestro argumento se despliega en cuatro pasos: a) en primer lugar, desarrollaremos los elementos fundamentales de la versión clásica de la teoría (...) autopoiética, elaborada por Maturana y Varela en los años ’70, la que, entre otras cosas, es decididamente antiteleológica; b) luego, mostraremos que años más tarde, Varela se vuelca hacia la teleología en el llamado “giro jonasiano”, que incluye dentro de la teoría autopoiética elementos de la fenomenología existencial; c) posteriormente, desarrollaremos algunos de los elementos más relevantes de la fenomenología biológica plessneriana, especialmente los referidos al concepto de posicionalidad y que sirven para esta complementariedad entre la posición autopoiética y la plessneriana; d) para finalizar, concluiremos que la teoría autopoiética, debido a las acusaciones que recibe por haber girado hacia una filosofía existencialista, puede migrar hacia la fenomenología biológica plessneriana, la cual no adolece de los problemas antropocéntricos atribuidos a la fenomenología jonasiana. (shrink)