Do you need a release for a photo of someone you took in public? How about photos of buildings? Does it make a difference if the subject was paid to be in the picture? You can't answer these questions without more information. As the photographer, you need to understand your buyer's concerns in order to make savvy decisions about how you market your photos and to whom. Here's how to make money from all your photos, whether or not they have (...) releases, by understanding the business aspects of the law. (shrink)

RésuméĽincorporation?on;un isotope radioactif à une solution nutritive permet de suivre à la trace ľélément absorbé,?on;en distinguer les entrées et les sorties en en dégageant les modalites. Etonna‐ment précise, la méthode a largement comribuéà la mise en évidence des pompes métaboliques qui assurent les transports au travers des membranes biologiques. Mais elle cache des pièges que le spécialiste lui‐même a souvent du mal à déjouer.The inclusion of a radioisotope in a nutrient solution enables us to detect traces of the particular element (...) during the course of its absorption, to distinguish between its entrance and its exit, and to generally clarify some of the mechanisms involved in the process. This surprisingly precise method has contributed extensively to the evidence that transport across biological membranes is mediated by metabolic pumps. However, one should remember that it is strewn with hidden pitfalls which even a specialist is at pains to avoid.ZusammenfassungDas Einschleusen radioaktiver Isotope in eine Nahrlösung erlaubt es, die Fortbewegungen der so aufgenommenen Elemente genau zu verfolgen, deren Eintritt und Austritt zu unterschei‐den und damit den entstehenden Mechanismus zu zeigen. Diese Methode hat viel dazu beigetra‐gen, den Transfer durch biologische Membranen, der von metabolischen Pumpen vollbracht wird, erstaunlich zu veranschaulichen. Jedoch verbirgt sie Fallen, die selbst für den Spezialisten schwer zu entdecken und zu umgehen sind. (shrink)

L’admission des femmes à l’ordination presbytérale ou au pastorat dans les Églises issues de la Réforme est liée à la situation historique particulière des États-Unis. Actuellement, aucun argument biblique ou théologique n’est jugé insurmontable pour l’ordination des femmes. Il existe certes de vives tensions, mais des ruptures effectives interviennent plutôt à la suite de l’ordination d’hommes et de femmes homosexuels. L’admission des femmes au ministère ordonné semble reposer sur l’hypothèse qu’un clergé mixte à tous les degrés du sacrement de l’ordre (...) assure à une Église la stabilité et la paix interne. Les débats au sein de ces Églises ont montré la faiblesse d’une interprétation de l’Écriture en termes de complémentarité entre l’homme et la femme. Ils les ont aussi conduites à une redécouverte de la grande variété de la tradition ecclésiale en la matière. L’article pose la question des enseignements que l’Église catholique romaine devrait à l’avenir tirer de l’expérience des Églises chrétiennes des États-Unis. (shrink)

Le travail théorique du juriste et philosophe Hermann Heller reste très peu connu en France. Alors que les ouvrages de son principal adversaire de cette époque, Carl Schmitt, sont traduits partout dans le monde, la grande majorité des écrits constituant les trois tomes de l’œuvre complète de Heller, rééditée en 1992 à Tübingen par la maison d’édition Mohr,..

Aunque la discusión sobre los principios jurídicos encuentra su punto de quiebre con las obras de Ronald Dworkin y Robert Alexy, la cuestión reconoce desarrollos anteriores y encuentra una de sus formulaciones más profundas en reacción al pensamiento jurídico positivista de entreguerras. En este trabajo destacamos los aportes del jurista socialdemócrata Hermann Heller a la teoría de las normas que, a diferencia de los que hizo a la teoría del Estado, permanecen en un lugar olvidado. Se reconstruye su concepción (...) del derecho con el fin de mostrar que sus ideas sobre la estructura del sistema jurídico y los fundamentos de los principios jurídicos dan cuenta de la relación entre derecho y poder en los Estados constitucionales modernos y del rol de los jueces en una democracia, al tiempo que resultan precursoras de las que desarrollaría con posterioridad Robert Alexy. (shrink)

L’article dont on trouvera ci-dessous la traduction est d’abord paru en 1928, à Berlin, dans le recueil Probleme der Demokratie, première série, fascicule V : Politische Wissenschaft : Schriftenreihe der deutschen Hochschule für Politik, Walter Rothschild, p. 35-47 et a été repris..

Short abstract (98 words). Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given humans’ exceptional dependence on communication and vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of (...) evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. (shrink)

The article takes issue with the proposal that dominant accounts of collective intentionality suffer from an individualist bias and that one should instead reverse the order of explanation and give primacy to the we and the community. It discusses different versions of the community first view and argues that they fail because they operate with too simplistic a conception of what it means to be a self and misunderstand what it means to be (part of) a we. In presenting this (...) argument, the article seeks to demonstrate that a thorough investigation of collective intentionality has to address the status and nature of the we, and that doing so will require an analysis of the relation between the we and the I, which in turn will call for a more explicit engagement with the question of selfhood than is customary in contemporary discussions of collective intentionality. (shrink)

Humans have two kinds of beliefs, intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are a fundamental category of cognition, defined in the architecture of the mind. They are formulated in an intuitive mental lexicon. Humans are also capable of entertaining an indefinite variety of higher‐order or‘reflective’propositional attitudes, many of which are of a credat sort. Reasons to hold reflective beliefs are provided by other beliefs that describe the source of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide an explicit argument (...) in favour of the reflective belief. The mental lexicon of reflective beliefs includes not only intuitive, but also reflective concepts. (shrink)

The contemporary debate on collective intentionality in analytic philosophy has lasted several decades, but questions concerning the nature of ‘we’ and the relation between the individual and the community are obviously far older. We can find a particularly rich discussion in early phenomenology. Indeed, while starting out with an interest in the individual mind, phenomenologists began their exploration of dyadic forms of interpersonal relations shortly before the start of World War I and were already deeply engaged in extensive analyses of (...) collective forms of intentionality a few years later. A distinctive feature of the phenomenological contribution was its exploration of the relation between the first- and second-person singular and the first-person plural perspectives. How are I, you, and we intertwined? The aim of this paper is to present some core insights from this early debate. (shrink)

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The first of its kind to thoroughly cover language technology at all levels and with all modern technologies this book takes an empirical approach to the ...

For a cou ple of decades, higher-order the o ries of con scious ness have enjoyed great pop u lar ity, but they have recently been met with grow ing dis sat is - fac tion. Many have started to look else where for via ble alter na tives, and within the last few years, quite a few have redis cov ered Brentano. In this paper such a Brentanian one-level account of con scious ness will be out lined and dis (...) - cussed. It will be argued that it can con trib ute impor tant insights to our under - stand ing of the rela tion between con scious ness and self-aware ness, but it will also be argued that the account remains beset with some prob lems, and that it will ulti mately make more sense to take a closer look at Sartre, Husserl, and Heidegger, if one is on the look out for prom is ing alter na tives to the higher-order the o ries, than to return all the way to Brentano. (shrink)

Do carbon-offsetting schemes morally offset emissions? The moral equivalence thesis is the claim that the combination of emitting greenhouse gasses and offsetting those emissions is morally equivalent to not emitting at all. This thesis implies that in response to climate change, we need not make any lifestyle changes to reduce our emissions as long as we offset them. An influential argument in favor of this thesis is premised on two claims, one empirical and the other normative: (1) When you emit (...) + offset, the net result is the same as that of not emitting. (2) With emissions, the net result is what matters morally. I argue against both premises. The net result of emitting + offsetting is never equivalent to that of not emitting, and even if it were equivalent, the net result is not the only thing that matters morally. My conclusion is that although we should offset our emissions, avoiding emissions is morally preferable. This conclusion supports a stronger claim: that carbon offsets cannot relieve us of our duty to make significant lifestyle changes so as to reduce emissions and thus lesson our contribution to the harms of climate change. (shrink)

In the introduction to Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Husserl remarks that “we get entangled in the most peculiar difficulties, contradictions, and confusions” (Hua X, 4) the moment we seek to account for time-consciousness. I think most scholars of Husserl’s writings on these issues would agree. Attempting to unravel the inner workings of time-consciousness can indeed easily induce a kind of intellectual vertigo. Let us consequently start with some of the basic questions that motivated Husserl’s inquiry.

Through an investigation of Husserl's concept of horizontal intentionality, the article basically argues that the horizon is intrinsically intersubjective, and that it entails an implicit reference to the intentions of possible Others. Against this background it is argued that our perceptual experience of an embodied Other, our factual encounter with the Other, is not the most basic and fundamental type of intersubjectivity. On the contrary, it presupposes a type of intersubjectivity which belongs a priori to the structure of constituting subjectivity.

My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differences.

When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have— according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various think- ers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will con- trast Lipps’ account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone something of (...) a revival in the hands of contemporary simulationists—with various accounts of empa- thy found in the phenomenological tradition. I discuss the way Lipps was criticized by Scheler, Stein and Husserl, and outline some of the core features of their, at times diver- gent, alternatives. I then proceed by considering how their basic take on empathy and social cognition was taken up and modified by Schutz—a thinker whose contribution to the analysis of interpersonal understanding has been unjustly neglected in recent years. (shrink)

Sartre’s analysis of intersubjectivity in the third part of Being and Nothingness is guided by two main motives1. First of all, Sartre is simply expanding his ontological investigation of the essential structure of and relation between the for-itself (pour-soi) and the in-itself (en-soi). For as he points out, I need the Other in order fully to understand the structure of my own being, since the for-itself refers to the for-others (EN 267/303, 260/298); moreover, as he later adds, a treatment of (...) the relation to the in-itself must necessarily include an analysis of the Other precisely because this relation is played out in the presence of the Other (EN 410/472). Secondly, Sartre wants to supply a concrete solution to the problem of solipsism (EN 289/329, 296/337). This problem was already preoccupying him in The Transcendence of the Ego, but at that time, Sartre argued that solipsism could be avoided by means of a non-egological theory of consciousness, since such a theory—which sees the transcendental field of consciousness as non-personal and the I as a product of reflection (TE 36/52-53, 63/80- 81)—would no longer confer a privileged status to the I vis-à-vis the Other (TE 85/104). In Being and Nothingness, however, Sartre concedes that this renunciation of the transcendental I has in fact been of no help in overcoming solipsism (EN 280/318). The problem remains and has to be solved. As he is quick to add, however, a proper solution will not involve any proof of the existence of Others; rather, it will be a question of revealing the foundation of our “pre-ontological” certainty with regard to the existence of the Other (EN.. (shrink)

This chapter examines whether an individual’s being worse off than others should be a relevant consideration in the allocation of limited medical resources. It reviews arguments pressed by proponents of different theories of justice about whether being worse off than others makes special demands on health care resource prioritization. Even if there is good reason to restrict the concern for the worse off to those with worse health in the prioritization and allocation of health care resources, additional issues remain. One (...) is how to determine who has worse health, and whether the worse off are those with the worse overall health or those with the most serious medical condition now in need of treatment. Another issue is whether only individuals’ present health, or instead their lifetime health, including past and expected future health, is relevant. (shrink)

Faced with the choice between supporting industrial plant agriculture and hunting, Tom Regan’s rights view can be plausibly developed in a way that permits a form of hunting we call “dignitarian.” To motivate this claim, we begin by showing how the empirical literature on animal deaths in plant agriculture suggests that a non-trivial amount of hunting would not add to animal harm. We discuss how Tom Regan’s miniride principle appears to morally permit hunting in that case, and we address recent (...) objections by Jason Hanna to environmentally-based culling that may be seen to speak against this conclusion. We then turn to dignity, which is especially salient in scenarios where harm is necessary or justifiable. We situate “dignitarian” hunting within a larger framework of adversarial ethics, and argue that dignitarian hunting gives animals a more dignified death than the alternatives endemic to large-scale plant agriculture, and so is permissible based on the kinds of principles that Regan endorses. Indeed, dignitarian hunting may actually fit better with Regan’s widely endorsed animal rights framework than the practice of many vegans, and should only be rejected if we’re just as willing to condemn supporting conventional plant agriculture. (shrink)

Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. This article discusses three leading attempts to analyse this distinction that don’t appeal to the notion of nat-uralness: the duplication analysis endorsed by G. E. Moore and David Lewis, Peter Vallentyne’s analysis in terms of contractions of possible worlds, and the analysis of Gene Witmer, William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon in terms of grounding.

The text surveys the development of the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski regarding Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness. The main arguments on both sides are reconsidered, and a compromise is proposed.

The leader–member relationship has been identified as a key determinant of successful working relationships and business outcomes in China. A high-quality leader–member relationship helps managers and employees to meet the demands they face and gives them the opportunity to develop socially, emotionally and morally. Such relationships form the basis of the overall well-being and success of the organisation. This article contributes to relationally oriented leadership theories and more specifically to the leader–member exchange theory by examining the theory in the context (...) of Western expatriate managers and Chinese employees in China. The first aim of the study is to analyse the similarities and differences between the LMX theory, which owes its origins to Western corporate experience, and the social and moral norms of guanxi, a crucial element in the Chinese value system. Since Westerners and Chinese people can give different interpretations to guanxi, the second aim of the article is to discuss the ethical challenges to the Western manager arising from guanxi. The findings of this study have implications not only for China, but also for other Chinese communities where guanxi is endorsed and practised. (shrink)

Despite the effort on DSM-5 and ICD-11, few appear satisfied with these classification systems. We suggest that the core reason for dissatisfaction is expecting too much from them; they do not provide discrete categories that map to specific causes of disease, they describe clinical syndromes intended to guide treatment choices. Here we review work on anxiety and anxiety disorders to argue that while clinicians draw a pragmatic distinction between normal and abnormal emotions based on considerations such as severity and duration, (...) understanding the evolutionary origins and utility of the emotions, including the adaptive value of adverse emotions, is key for formulating comprehensive assessments of an individual patient’s symptoms and for providing a conceptual foundation for pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, and public health. (shrink)

We define a structure which is much simpler than a morass, but whose existence is equivalent to the existence of a morass.

The intense and extensive debate over human embryonic stem cell research has focused primarily on the moral status of the human embryo. Some commentators assign full moral status of normal adult human beings to the embryo from the moment of its conception. At the other extreme are those who believe that a human embryo has no significant moral status at the time it is used and destroyed in stem cell research. And in between are many intermediate positions that assign an (...) embryo some degree of moral status between none and full. This controversy and the respective positions, like the abortion controversy, is by now well understood, despite the lack of progress in resolving it. I have argued briefly elsewhere that early embryos do not have significant moral status, but I do not want to reenter that debate here. Instead, I want to focus on an issue that has had relatively little explicit and separate attention, but is likely to loom larger in light of the Obama administration’s partial lifting of the Bush administration’s restriction on the embryos that can be used in stem cell research that receives federal funding. (shrink)

An integrative psychological concept that bridges the sciences and humanities, narrative identity is the internalized and evolving story a person invents to explain how he or she has become the person he or she is becoming. Combining the selective reconstruction of the past with an imagined anticipated future, narrative identity provides human lives with a sense of unity, moral purpose, and temporal coherence. In this article, I discuss how the evolution of human storytelling provides the basic tools for constructing self-defining (...) life narratives. I then consider theory and research on the development of narrative identity over the human life course, socially consequential variations in narrative identity, and how culture shapes the stories people tell about themselves. My overall perspective on narrative identity was formulated within the fields of personality and developmental psychology, but it is also informed by concepts and constructs in evolutionary biology, cognitive neurosci­ence, philosophy, and literary studies. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Cognitive Linguistics Jahrgang: 25 Heft: 4 Seiten: 701-741.

Comment les objets matériels persistent-ils à travers le temps ? Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire qu'un objet change tout en étant un et le même ? Peut-il y avoir un monde sans temps ? Le temps s'écoule-t-il même si rien ne change ? Et, le temps lui-même, qu'est-ce que c'est ? Consiste-t-il seulement en l'instant présent, ou le passé et le futur existent-ils également ? Est-il possible de voyager dans le temps ? Quelles propriétés le temps doit-il avoir pour permettre (...) le voyage dans le temps ? Est-il possible de changer le passé ? Ce volume recueille des traductions inédites de textes issus de la philosophie du temps des XXe et XXIe siècles. Ces contributions de R. M. Adams, Jiri Benovsky, David Braddon-Mitchell, Michael Dummett, Graeme Forbes, Mark Heller, Paul Horwich, Robin Le Poidevin, David Lewis, D. H. Mellor, Sydney Shoemaker, Theodore Sider, J. J. C. Smart, W. V. O. Quine, et Peter Van Inwagen offrent des manières différentes de réagir à ces interrogations (et bien d'autres encore). Elles permettent ainsi au lecteur de découvrir la richesse des débats contemporains en philosophie du temps. On découvre ici une variété de notions, d'arguments et de théories, telles que l'endurantisme, le perdurantisme, le relationnisme et le substantialisme, mais également d'importantes considérations en ce qui concerne la causalité, l'identité, le changement, ou encore l'analyse de similarités entre le temps et l'espace. Le problème du voyage dans le temps se voit consacrer une section spéciale dans ce volume, car il a ceci de particulièrement intéressant : il sert de cas limite offrant la possibilité de tester les théories et de soulever de nombreuses questions philosophiques sur la nature du temps et du monde. (shrink)

El propósito de este texto es hacer un análisis de las actuales teorías de las emociones de Agnes Heller, Martha Nussbaum y Peter Hacker y los argumentos que proponen para rehabilitar las emociones dentro del campo moral y político. Para cumplir con este objetivo, primero, se analizan los argumentos que los tres filósofos proponen para sustentar la idea de que las emociones son importantes para la supervivencia y el desarrollo de la vida humana. Segundo, se explica lo que quieren (...) decir los autores al definir las emociones como fenómenos cognitivos. Tercero, se muestra la incidencia de la sociedad y la cultura en el aprendizaje y en la vivencia de las emociones. A partir de estas aclaraciones previas, la cuarta sección está dedicada a mostrar más precisamente el entretejimiento entre emociones, moral y política. Se concluye que a pesar de las diferencias conceptuales y metodológicas que existen entre los tres filósofos, su obra permite trazar coincidencias y complementaciones que dan un sólido sustento a la tesis de que las emociones son imprescindibles para la vida humana y su comportamiento moral y político. También que los resultados de esta puesta en diálogo son un marco conceptual que puede orientar trabajos más específicos sobre la relación del mundo afectivo y el mundo social y político. (shrink)

Les quinze sections de cet ouvrage proposent un parcours de réflexion à partir du démantèlement sadien de la normativité et de la déconstruction kierkegaardienne de la vie "bonne", qui engage des auteurs tels qu'Adorno, Arendt, Otto Gross, Agnes Heller, Kalivoda, Lacan, Cavell, Nussbaum, parmi d'autres, dans une analyse inusitée de la subjectivité révolutionnaire et des individualités révoltées. Ces critiques de l'aliénation comme "métaphysique de l'essence humaine" relancent, d'après l'autrice, la continuité artistique et l'aspiration politique du romantisme révolutionnaire, réinstallant ainsi (...) la dialectique permanente du libertinisme et du romanticisme au coeur même de l'échafaudage communiste comme scène réelle, symbolique et imaginaire de l'émancipation humaine."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Climate change is already a major global threat, but many of its worst impacts are still decades away. Many people who will eventually be affected by it still have opportunities to mitigate harm. When considering the avoidable burdens of climate change, it seems plausible victims will often share some responsibility for putting themselves into harm’s way. This fact should be incorporated into our thinking about the ethical significance of climate-induced harms, particularly to emphasize the importance of differential abilities to get (...) and stay out of harm’s way. Currently, many people face serious obstacles to reducing their vulnerability to climate change, such as poverty, lack of education, and political or legal obstacles to mobility. Climate policy discussions should do more to emphasize the alleviation of these sources of difficulties, thereby empowering people to choose what risks they will bear in a warming world. (shrink)

We present a generative distributional model for the unsupervised induction of natural language syntax which explicitly models constituent yields and contexts. Parameter search with EM produces higher quality analyses than previously exhibited by unsupervised systems, giving the best published unsupervised parsing results on the ATIS corpus. Experiments on Penn treebank sentences of comparable length show an even higher F1 of 71% on nontrivial brackets. We compare distributionally induced and actual part-of-speech tags as input data, and examine extensions to the basic (...) model. We discuss errors made by the system, compare the system to previous models, and discuss upper bounds, lower bounds, and stability for this task. (shrink)

We present a novel generative model for natural language tree structures in which semantic (lexical dependency) and syntactic (PCFG) structures are scored with separate models. This factorization provides conceptual simplicity, straightforward opportunities for separately improving the component models, and a level of performance comparable to similar, non-factored models. Most importantly, unlike other modern parsing models, the factored model admits an extremely effective A* parsing algorithm, which enables efficient, exact inference.

This paper presents a novel approach to the unsupervised learning of syntactic analyses of natural language text. Most previous work has focused on maximizing likelihood according to generative PCFG models. In contrast, we employ a simpler probabilistic model over trees based directly on constituent identity and linear context, and use an EM-like iterative procedure to induce structure. This method produces much higher quality analyses, giving the best published results on the ATIS dataset.

Communicate. We humans do it all the time, and most of the time we do it as a matter of course, without thinking about it. We talk, we listen, we write, we read - as you are doing now - or we draw, we mimic, we nod, we point, we shrug, and, somehow, we manage to make our thoughts known to one another. Of course, there are times when we view communication as something difficult or even impossible to achieve. Yet, (...) compared to other living kinds, we are amazingly good at it. Other species, if they communicate at all, have a narrow repertoire of signals that they use to convey again.. (shrink)

Analytic Philosophy, Volume 62, Issue 1, Page 97-105, March 2021.

I argue, with examples, that most human cognitive skills are neither instincts nor gadgets but mechanisms shaped both by evolved dispositions and by cultural inputs. This shaping can work either through evolved skills fulfilling their function with the help of cultural skills that they contribute to shape, or through cultural skills recruiting evolved skills and adjusting to them.