In the area of teaching sciences, the authors study the space given to the collaboration concept in order to enlighten the co-production and practices management processes in the area of change conduct and support, especially when these practices are hold by research-intervention. Base on the analysis of a common work dedicated to the change conduct and support, the authors situate the idea of collaboration in the theoretical object formulation of the “change conduct and support” and clarify its place and role (...) among the terms and conditions of research-intervention implemented. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the conceptual problems arising when using network analysis in person- centered care (PCC) in psychiatry. Personalized network models are potentially helpful tools for PCC, but we argue that using them in psychiatric practice raises boundary problems, i.e., problems in demarcating what should and should not be included in the model, which may limit their ability to provide clinically-relevant knowledge. Models can have explanatory and representational boundaries, among others. We argue that we can make more explicit (...) what kind of questions personalized network models can address in PCC, given their representational and explanatory boundaries, using perspectival reasoning. (shrink)

Regular musical activity as a complex multimodal lifestyle activity is proposed to be protective against age-related cognitive decline and Alzheimer’s disease. This cross-sectional study investigated the association and interplay between musical instrument playing during life, multi-domain cognitive abilities and brain morphology in older adults from the DZNE-Longitudinal Cognitive Impairment and Dementia Study study. Participants reporting having played a musical instrument across three life periods were compared to controls without a history of musical instrument playing, well-matched for reserve proxies of education, (...) intelligence, socioeconomic status and physical activity. Participants with musical activity outperformed controls in global cognition, working memory, executive functions, language, and visuospatial abilities, with no effects seen for learning and memory. The musically active group had greater gray matter volume in the somatosensory area, but did not differ from controls in higher-order frontal, temporal, or hippocampal volumes. However, the association between gray matter volume in distributed frontal-to-temporal regions and cognitive abilities was enhanced in participants with musical activity compared to controls. We show that playing a musical instrument during life relates to better late-life cognitive abilities and greater brain capacities in OA. Musical activity may serve as a multimodal enrichment strategy that could help preserve cognitive and brain health in late life. Longitudinal and interventional studies are needed to support this notion. (shrink)

BackgroundBiobanking biospecimens and consent are common practice in paediatric research. We need to explore children and young people’s (CYP) knowledge and perspectives around the use of and consent to biobanking. This will ensure meaningful informed consent can be obtained and improve current consent procedures.MethodsWe designed a survey, in co-production with CYP, collecting demographic data, views on biobanking, and consent using three scenarios: 1) prospective consent, 2) deferred consent, and 3) reconsent and assent at age of capacity. The survey was disseminated (...) via the Young Person’s Advisory Group North England (YPAGne) and participating CYP’s secondary schools. Data were analysed using a qualitative thematic approach by three independent reviewers (including CYP) to identify common themes. Data triangulation occurred independently by a fourth reviewer.ResultsOne hundred two CYP completed the survey. Most were between 16–18 years (63.7%, N = 65) and female (66.7%, N = 68). 72.3% had no prior knowledge of biobanking (N = 73).Acceptability of prospective consent for biobanking was high (91.2%, N = 93) with common themes: ‘altruism’, ‘potential benefits outweigh individual risk’, 'frugality', and ‘(in)convenience’.Deferred consent was also deemed acceptable in the large majority (84.3%, N = 86), with common themes: ‘altruism’, ‘body integrity’ and ‘sample frugality’. 76.5% preferred to reconsent when cognitively mature enough to give assent (N = 78), even if parental consent was previously in place. 79.2% wanted to be informed if their biobanked biospecimen is reused (N = 80).ConclusionProspective and deferred consent acceptability for biobanking is high among CYP in the UK. Altruism, frugality, body integrity, and privacy are the most important themes. Clear communication and justification are paramount to obtain consent. Any CYP with capacity should be part of the consenting procedure, if possible. (shrink)

Background: Although convolutional neural networks (CNNs) achieve high diagnostic accuracy for detecting Alzheimer’s disease (AD) dementia based on magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans, they are not yet applied in clinical routine. One important reason for this is a lack of model comprehensibility. Recently developed visualization methods for deriving CNN relevance maps may help to fill this gap as they allow the visualization of key input image features that drive the decision of the model. We investigated whether models with higher accuracy (...) also rely more on discriminative brain regions predefined by prior knowledge. Methods: We trained a CNN for the detection of AD in N = 663 T1-weighted MRI scans of patients with dementia and amnestic mild cognitive impairment (MCI) and verified the accuracy of the models via cross-validation and in three independent samples including in total N = 1655 cases. We evaluated the association of relevance scores and hippocampus volume to validate the clinical utility of this approach. To improve model comprehensibility, we implemented an interactive visualization of 3D CNN relevance maps, thereby allowing intuitive model inspection. Results: Across the three independent datasets, group separation showed high accuracy for AD dementia versus controls (AUC ≥ 0.91) and moderate accuracy for amnestic MCI versus controls (AUC ≈ 0.74). Relevance maps indicated that hippocampal atrophy was considered the most informative factor for AD detection, with additional contributions from atrophy in other cortical and subcortical regions. Relevance scores within the hippocampus were highly correlated with hippocampal volumes (Pearson’s r ≈ −0.86, p < 0.001). Conclusion: The relevance maps highlighted atrophy in regions that we had hypothesized a priori. This strengthens the comprehensibility of the CNN models, which were trained in a purely data-driven manner based on the scans and diagnosis labels. The high hippocampus relevance scores as well as the high performance achieved in independent samples support the validity of the CNN models in the detection of AD-related MRI abnormalities. The presented data-driven and hypothesis-free CNN modeling approach might provide a useful tool to automatically derive discriminative features for complex diagnostic tasks where clear clinical criteria are still missing, for instance for the differential diagnosis between various types of dementia. (shrink)

Los materiales producidos por entidades ligadas a la salud de las infancias como la OMS, UNICEF o la OPS tienden a enumerar argumentos en contra de las tecnologías, desde los que se desalienta el “uso”, la “exposición” o el “consumo” de pantallas por parte de niñas y niños. Los diseños curriculares para la educación inicial, al contrario, se refieren a las tecnologías como parte de los saberes a enseñar, como oportunidades para la innovación, potenciales recursos para la enseñanza o incluso (...) como rasgos de las llamadas nuevas infancias. En este artículo procuraremos analizar los escenarios de encuentro entre infancias y tecnologías que surgen de ambas fuentes, sobre la hipótesis de que consideran escenarios muy diferentes: no hablan de las mismas tecnologías ni de las mismas infancias. La producción se inscribe en un estudio en curso de la Universidad Pedagógica Nacional, titulado “Infancias, tecnologías digitales y escuela: un análisis desde la educación infantil”. (shrink)

Este artículo aborda la acción educativa mapuche kimeltuwün como aporte a la solución del problema que implica la contextualización de los contenidos que se enseñan en la escuela a niños y niñas de origen mapuche que inician su proceso de escolarización. Se trata de saberes vernáculos que se centran principalmente en contenidos actitudinales relacionados con la memoria social mapuche. Se revelan conceptos y métodos educativos que utilizan los kimches (sabios portadores del conocimiento social y cultural) para formar a niños, niñas (...) y jóvenes en el contexto de la familia y comunidad. Para ello, los sabios recurren a la lógica sociocultural sobre la cual se fundamentan sus saberes educativos. Los resultados muestran la vigencia de categorías de conocimientos educativos mapuches para la formación de las personas. (shrink)

La idea social de infancia, y la propia experiencia de ser niño o niña está interpelada en nuestros días por las mediaciones digitales en las relaciones. Es usual referirse a las nuevas generaciones como “digitales”, o particularmente como nativos digitales. Se habla de nuevas infancias en virtud del modo en que manejan las tecnologías y se plantea la idea de que la diferencia entre las generaciones adultas y jóvenes está epocalmente trastocada o invertida en una época definida como “era digital”. (...) El mandato pedagógico es, a nivel discursivo, “incluir” o “incorporar” tecnologías en la enseñanza. En este artículo nos interesa explorar la relación entre infancias y tecnologías más allá del territorio demarcado por estos discursos instrumentalistas y de cierto determinismo tecnológico, que nos proponemos poner en cuestión a partir de los avances iniciales de una investigación en curso. Nos planteamos como preguntas orientadoras: ¿cómo se re-configura la experiencia de ser niño o niña en una cultura atravesada por las tecnologías y medios digitales? ¿Cómo puede pensarse el lugar de la escuela en el marco de estas transformaciones? Se concluye subrayando algunas formas de resistencia ante los aspectos alienantes de la cultura digital que pueden pensarse como uno de los desafíos pedagógicos y políticos que se abren ante la escuela en nuestros días. (shrink)

Moral debunking arguments are meant to show that, by realist lights, moral beliefs are not explained by moral facts, which in turn is meant to show that they lack some significant counterfactual connection to the moral facts (e.g., safety, sensitivity, reliability). The dominant, “minimalist” response to the arguments—sometimes defended under the heading of “third-factors” or “pre-established harmonies”—involves affirming that moral beliefs enjoy the relevant counterfactual connection while granting that these beliefs are not explained by the moral facts. We show that (...) the minimalist gambit rests on a controversial thesis about epistemic priority: that explanatory concessions derive their epistemic import from what they reveal about counterfactual connections. We then challenge this epistemic priority thesis, which undermines the minimalist response to debunking arguments (in ethics and elsewhere). (shrink)

An influential proposal is that knowledge involves safe belief. A belief is safe, in the relevant sense, just in case it is true in nearby metaphysically possible worlds. In this paper, I introduce a distinct but complementary notion of safety, understood in terms of epistemically possible worlds. The main aim, in doing so, is to add to the epistemologist’s tool-kit. To demonstrate the usefulness of the tool, I use it to advance and assess substantive proposals concerning knowledge and justification.

Justification depends on context: even if E on its own justifies H, still it might fail to justify in the context of D. This sort of effect, epistemologists think, is due to defeaters, which undermine or rebut a would-be justifier. I argue that there is another fundamental sort of contextual feature, disqualification, which doesn't involve rebuttal or undercutting, and which cannot be reduced to any notion of screening-off. A disqualifier makes some would-be justifier otiose, as direct testimony sometimes does to (...) distal testimony, and as manifestly decisive evidence might do to gratuitous evidence on the same team. Basing a belief on disqualified evidence, moreover, is distinctively irrational. One is not necessarily irresponsible. Instead one is turning down a free upgrade to a sleeker, stabler basis for one's beliefs. Such an upgrade would prevent wastes of epistemic effort, since someone who bases her belief on a disqualified proposition E will need to remember E and rethink her belief should E ever be defeated. The upgrade might also reduce reliance on unwieldy evidence, if E is relevant only thanks to some labyrinthine argument; and if even ideal agents should doubt their ability to follow such arguments, even they should care about disqualifiers. (shrink)

I defend the view that linguistic meaning is a relation borne by an expression to a type of speech act, and that this relation holds in virtue of our overlapping communicative dispositions, and not in virtue of linguistic conventions. I argue that this theory gives the right account of the semantics–pragmatics interface and the best-available semantics for non-declarative clauses, and show that it allows for the construction of a rigorous compositional semantic theory with greater explanatory power than both truth-conditional and (...) dynamic semantics. (shrink)

Believing in God requires not only a leap of faith but also an extension of people’s normal capacity to perceive the minds of others. Usually, people perceive minds of all kinds by trying to understand their conscious experience (what it is like to be them) and their agency (what they can do). Although humans are perceived to have both agency and experience, humans appear to see God as possessing agency, but not experience. God’s unique mind is due, the authors suggest, (...) to the uniquely moral role He occupies. In this article, the authors propose that God is seen as the ultimate moral agent, the entity people blame and praise when they receive anomalous harm and help. Support for this proposition comes from research on mind perception, morality, and moral typecasting. Interestingly, although people perceive God as the author of salvation, suffering seems to evoke even more attributions to the divine. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe notion of immunity to error through misidentification has played a central role in discussions of first-person thought. It seems like a way of making precise the idea of thinking about oneself ‘as subject’. Asking whether bodily first-person judgments can be IEM is a way of asking whether one can think about oneself simultaneously as a subject and as a bodily thing. The majority view is that one cannot. I rebut that view, arguing that on all the notions of IEM (...) that have so far been successfully defined, bodily first-person judgments can be IEM. (shrink)

The growing presence of smart devices in our lives turns all of society into something largely unknown to us. The strategy of demanding transparency stems from the desire to reduce the ignorance to which this automated society seems to condemn us. An evaluation of this strategy first requires that we distinguish the different types of non-transparency. Once we reveal the limits of the transparency needed to confront these devices, the article examines the alternative strategy of explainable artificial intelligence and concludes (...) with the idea that these types of complex realities exceed individual capacities and are only comprehensible in a collective fashion. (shrink)

A concept of diversity is an understanding of what makes a group diverse that may be applicable in a variety of contexts. We distinguish three diversity concepts, show that each can be found in discussions of diversity in science, and explain how they tend to be associated with distinct epistemic and ethical rationales. Yet philosophical literature on diversity among scientists has given little attention to distinct concepts of diversity. This is significant because the unappreciated existence of multiple diversity concepts can (...) generate unclarity about the meaning of “diversity,” lead to problematic inferences from empirical research, and obscure complex ethical-epistemic questions about how to define diversity in specific cases. We illustrate some ethical-epistemic implications of our proposal by reference to an example of deliberative mini-publics on human tissue biobanking. (shrink)

This article considers the question of the responsibility that present day generations bear as a result of the actions of their ancestors. Is it morally significant that we share a national identity with those responsible for the perpetration of historic injustice? The article argues that we can be guilty of wrongdoing stemming from past wrongdoing if we are members of nations that are responsible for an ongoing failure to fulfil rectificatory duties. This rests upon three claims: that the failure to (...) fulfil rectificatory duties is unjust; that nations can bear collective responsibility for the actions of their leaders; and that nations are comprised of overlapping generations rather than successive generations. The claim that present day parties should apologise for historic injustice is then considered, and it is argued that such an apology is best understood in relation to an ongoing failure to fulfil rectificatory duties. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline a heuristic for thinking about the relation between explanation and understanding that can be used to capture various levels of “intimacy”, between them. I argue that the level of complexity in the structure of explanation is inversely proportional to the level of intimacy between explanation and understanding, i.e. the more complexity the less intimacy. I further argue that the level of complexity in the structure of explanation also affects the explanatory depth in a similar way (...) to intimacy between explanation and understanding, i.e. the less complexity the greater explanatory depth and vice versa. (shrink)

Gareth Evans famously observed that he can answer the question ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’ by attending to “precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’”. I argue that this observation follows from two independently plausible ideas in philosophy of mind. The first is about rationality and consciousness: it is that to be rational is in part to be (...) required to believe that you are in a conscious state if you are in one, at least if various background conditions are met. The second is about consciousness and attention: it is that consciousness in a belief state consists in its subject engaging, to a sufficient extent, in a certain sort of world-directed attention. I also argue that this suggestion is superior to others that have been made in the literature regarding Evan’s observation. (shrink)

If, as is alleged, challenge trials of vaccines against COVID-19 are likely to save thousands of lives and vastly diminish the economic and social harms of the pandemic while subjecting volunteers to risks that are comparable to kidney donation, then it would seem that the only sensible objection to such trials would be to deny that they have low risks or can be expected to have immense benefits. This essay searches for a philosophical rationale for rejecting challenge trials while supposing (...) that they have huge benefits and relatively low risks. Although it finds some force in objections to challenge trials grounded in the obligations of researchers to limit the harms imposed on some individuals for the benefit of others, it argues that there is no compelling objection to challenge trials of vaccines for COVID-19—if they have the benefits and risks that have been claimed. (shrink)

This chapter provides an introduction to possible worlds semantics in both logic and the philosophy of language, including a discussion of some of the advantages and challenges for possible worlds semantics.

Actor-network theory has contributed greatly to the development of science and technology studies. However, recent critiques appear to have left ANT in a gloomy theoretical black box. What is the likelihood of ANT exiting its current theoretical discontent? Is ANT worthy of salvation and on what grounds? Law argues that recent critiques stem from ANT’s development into a particular theoretical strategy. However, this article will argue that by focusing on strategy as messy and impure, ANT can be afforded the opportunity (...) to shift from a fixed approach to an ambiguous and contingent strategy, well placed to carry on. The article achieves such an argument by first highlighting how ANT has contributed to a recent study of strategy in action; second, by outlining the strategic aspects of ANT; and third, by using the study of strategy in action as a means of engaging with ANT’s current theoretical discontent. (shrink)

The study reported in this paper sought to examine the extent to which organisational leadership support and organisational culture explain the effect of regulation on sustainable procurement practice, as insights into this relationship is lacking in the extant literature. Useable survey data from 322 Ghanaian organisations were analysed using descriptive statistics, and structural equation modelling techniques. The analysis examined the nature of sustainable procurement practice in an African context, and the potential mediating effects of organisational leadership support and organisational culture (...) on regulation’s relationship with sustainable procurement. The findings reveal a moderate sustainable procurement practice in Ghanaian organisations, a significantly positive effect of regulation on related practices, and a mediation effect of organisational leadership support on regulation’s relationship with sustainable procurement. There was, however, no mediation effect relative to organisational culture. Potential relevance and implications of the study for theory and practice are explored in the discussion and conclusion sections. (shrink)

Rights of nature is an idea that has come of age. In recent years, a diverse range of countries and jurisdictions have adopted these norms, which involve granting legal rights to nature or natural objects, such as rivers, forests, or ecosystems. This book critically examines the idea of natural objects as right-holders, and analyses legal cases, policies, and philosophical issues relating to this development. -/- Drawing on contributions from a range of experts in the field, Rights of Nature: A Re-examination (...) investigates the potential for this innovative idea to revolutionize the concepts of rights, standing, and recognition as traditionally understood in many legal systems. Taking as its starting point Stone’s influential 1972 article ‘Should Trees Have Standing?’, the book examines the progress rights of nature have made since that time, by identifying central themes, unifying principles, and key distinctions in how rights of nature discourse has been operationalized in the disciplines of law, philosophy, and the social sciences. These themes and principles are illustrated through a wide variety of examples, including ecosystem services, indigenous thinking, and ecological restoration, demonstrating how the relationship between humanity and the natural world may be transforming. -/- Taking a philosophical, political, and legal perspective, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of environmental law and policy, environmental ethics, and philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAdam Smith infused the expression ‘impartial spectator’ with a plexus of related meanings, one of which is a super-being, which bears parallels to monotheistic ideas of God. As for any genuine, identified, human spectator, he can be deemed impartial only presumptively. Such presumptive impartiality as regards the incident does not of itself carry extensive implications about his intelligence, nor about his being aligned with benevolence towards any larger whole. We may posit, however, a being who is impartial and who holds (...) higher levels of intelligence and of benevolence, and then converse over what her sentiments would be about the matter under discussion. It is natural to conceive of a being who is unsurpassable in such qualities, who is morally supreme, and who naturally takes the definite article the without having been definitized by the writer. Signal passages, new to edition 6, suggest that Smith formulates the man within the breast as a representative of the always present and everywhere morally supreme impartial spectator. When Smith speaks of the man within the breast as ‘the supposed impartial spectator’, we interpret ‘supposed’ as sup-pos-ed, not sup-pos’d. (shrink)

Philosophical analyses of scientific concepts are legion. However, this literature is replete with methodological errors that have largely gone unnoticed. Five distinct projects are conflated which has led to faulty inferences, ambiguities, and mischaracterizations. There has also been some recent enthusiasm for approaches that attempt to rectify problematic scientific concepts but the motivations for these approaches are questionable. I am hopeful that by bringing these various issues to light that it will lead practitioners to be more explicit about their aims (...) and subsequently result in better analyses. (shrink)

For those who find Dreyfus’s critique of AI compelling, the prospects for producing true artificial human intelligence are bleak. An important question thus becomes, what are the prospects for producing artificial non-human intelligence? Applying Dreyfus’s work to this question is difficult, however, because his work is so thoroughly human-centered. Granting Dreyfus that the body is fundamental to intelligence, how are we to conceive of non-human bodies? In this paper, I argue that bringing Dreyfus’s work into conversation with the work of (...) Mark Bickhard offers a way of answering this question, and I try to suggest what doing so means for AI research. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom holds two seemingly opposed beliefs. One is that communities are often much better than individuals at dealing with certain situations or solving certain problems. The other is that crowds are usually, and some say always, at best as intelligent as their least intelligent members and at worst even less. Consistency would seem to be easily re-established by distinguishing between advanced, sophisticated social organizations which afford the supporting communities a high level of collective performance, and primitive, mob-like structures which (...) pull the group towards the lower end of the achievement scale. But this reconciliation meets with some objections. The most familiar ones concern the mixed record of elaborate social systems, which are said to occasionally or even, according to some accounts, systematically produce wrong decisions, poor assessments, disastrous plans, counterproductive measures, etc. A more recent set of objections rests on cases where ‘crowds’, i,e, groups not organized in a sophisticated way, produce good results, in fact, results which better those of most, or even all, members of the group. Such cases are collected in James Surowiecki’s book The Wisdom of Crowds, which argues more generally in favor of an ‘order out of chaos’ view of collective thinking: whether sophisticated or simple, social organizations for the production of knowledge or problem-solving can benefit from the absence of certain individualistc constraints which are traditionally thought to foster excellence in cognitive tasks. This flavor of paradox is enhanced by Surowiecki’s choice of phrase: at the surface level, ‘wisdom of crowds’ conflicts with the well-entrenched cliché of the folly1 of crowds; but at a deeper level, Surowiecki seems to appeal to one frequent connotation of ‘wisdom’ which is precisely its paradoxical character. Whether Surowiecki actually intended to exploit this.. (shrink)

The aftermath of war is always messy and complicated. When should objects or resources that were unjustly taken in wartime be returned to the victims of misappropriation, or their heirs? This article advances two arguments that are intended to buttress claims for the restitution of property in general, and particularly claims advanced by the heirs of the original victims of misappropriation.

This article adopts a population-level bioethics approach to analyzing the ethical implications of novel deep-brain stimulation (DBS) technologies. I claim that a microlevel focus on costs and benefits is necessary but insufficient to address the concerns of social justice and health equity that attend the potential utilization of DBS technologies. A macrosocial, population-based analysis notes two ethically significant trends regarding novel health technologies: (1) that they are the prime mover of hyperinflationary health cost trajectories, and (2) that even where they (...) improve overall population health such technologies may expand health inequalities. Such an expansion could exacerbate what Powers and Faden have identified as “densely-woven patterns of disadvantage,” and therein could contravene mandates of social justice. Such concerns of justice and equity are sharpened by the fact that those populations that bear the highest risk of suffering the injuries and illnesses for which DBS technologies might be warranted are among the most disadvantaged groups in American society. Accordingly, ethical analysis of DBS technologies must include an assessment of the evidence suggesting that in their capacity to improve health and compress health inequalities, whole-population approaches that address the upstream factors that shape distributions of neuropsychiatric injuries and illness may be preferable to acute health interventions. However, the article warns against the false-choice fallacy, and notes that whole-population policies and acute care interventions can be simultaneously endorsed. The article concludes by suggesting that the ethical issue of relative priority between these approaches is best framed via a population-level analysis. (shrink)

Daniel, Michael E Review of: My door is always open: A conversation on faith, hope and the church in a time of change, by Pope Francis with Antonio Spadaro, trans. Shaun Whiteside, London: Bloomsbury, 2014, pp. 172, $30.00.

Non-Reductive Physicalism is similar in many ways with, what I will call, Orthodox Theism. This strongly suggests that Non-Reductive Physicalist solutions to the Supervenience Argument can be adapted to offer Orthodox Theistic solutions to the Conservation is Continuous Creation Argument. One particular Non-Reductive Physicalist solution will be examined in detail and then applied in the debate over Occasionalism.

Daniel Dumouchel | : Le nom de Johann Georg Sulzer reste attaché à la naissance de l’esthétique philosophique en Allemagne, principalement à travers son oeuvre majeure, la Théorie générale des beaux-arts. Il s’agira de montrer ici comment ce membre influent de la classe de philosophie spéculative de l’Académie de Berlin, fortement influencé par la pensée de Leibniz et de Wolff, mais également très attentif aux particularités psychopathologiques de l’esprit humain et aux composantes corporelles de l’activité psychique, prétend fournir une (...) assise métaphysique à la théorie du beau en la fondant sur ce que, depuis Wolff, on appelle la psychologie. À partir de l’étude d’une série de Mémoires dont la rédaction s’étend de 1751 à 1763, on portera une attention particulière au projet de déduction des sentiments agréables et désagréables, que Sulzer entend opérer à partir du principe d’activité de l’âme, pour mieux saisir la nature des plaisirs que nous procure la beauté. Sur cette base, on reviendra en fin de parcours à la question de la fonction des beaux-arts dans la pensée de Sulzer, pour soutenir l’idée que l’énergie de l’art ne peut être réduite à la question de la beauté. | : Johann Georg Sulzer’s name is associated with the birth of philosophical aesthetics in Germany, above all through his major work, General Theory of the Fine Arts. The paper will show how this influential member of the division of speculative philosophy at the Berlin Academy, who was deeply influenced by the thought of Leibniz and Wolff but who was also attentive to psychopathological particularities of the human mind and to the corporeal components of psychic activity, claims to present a metaphysical foundation for the theory of beauty, by basing it on what, since Wolff, was called psychology. Starting from a study of a series of ‘Mémoires’ composed between 1751 and 1763, we will focus our attention on the project of the deduction of pleasant and unpleasant feelings, something that Sulzer understands to proceed from the principle of activity of the soul, in order better to grasp the nature of the pleasures that beauty affords us. On this basis, we will return at the end to the question of the function of the fine arts in Sulzer’s thought, in order to defend the idea that the energy of art cannot be reduced to the question of beauty. (shrink)

Disagreement over what exists is so fundamental that it tends to hinder or even to block dialogue among disputants. The various controversies between believers and atheists, or realists and nominalists, are only two kinds of examples. Interested in contributing to the intelligibility of the debate on ontology, in 1939 Willard van Orman Quine began a series of works which introduces the notion of ontological commitment and proposes an allegedly objective criterion to identify the exact conditions under which a theoretical discourse (...) signals an assumption of existence. I intend to present the concept of ontological commitment and the Quinean criterion, to expose and evaluate some of the many criticisms to which the criterion has subject and to situate it in the context of Quine’s philosophy. As a product of such analyses, I hope to contribute to the discussion on the application and relevance of the notion of ontological commitment. (shrink)

In the original publication of the article, the Acknowledgement section was inadvertently not included. The Acknowledgement is given in this Correction.

A pergunta pelo sentido do ser será aqui orientada para a afirmação do postulado de uma condição essencialmente precária do mortal, a partir da qual ele deverá ser radicalmente situado em seu horizonte histórico-metafísico fundamentalmente através do seu comprometimento existencial com uma abertura abissal do fenômeno de mundo que excede sua capacidade de apreensão.