Philosophers, psychiatrists, and social scientists would welcome clarification of the distinction between rational and irrational desires. It may be proper to say that rational desires are those which manifest rationality. But since this seems a rather unilluminating characterization, philosophers sometimes offer definitions of what constitute such manifestations of rationality. I shall consider definitions provided by John Rawls and Richard Brandt. Their definitions are unsatisfactory mainly because they include subjunctive conditionals. An alternative approach, which avoids conditionals, is attractive. (...) But it encounters so many additional problems that I shall conclude that we are not now in a position to define rationality in this area and must treat it as a state or disposition which to date has only been partially characterized. Thus, if we want a definition of the difference between rational and irrational desires, we must at present settle for the rather unexciting one mentioned above. (shrink)

We consider the problem of constructing first-order definitions in the language of rings of holomorphy rings of one-variable function fields of characteristic 0 in their integral closures in finite extensions of their fraction fields and in bigger holomorphy subrings of their fraction fields. This line of questions is motivated by similar existential definability results over global fields and related questions of Diophantine decidability.

In this paper, we argue that the use of the term “rationality” in Judgment in Managerial Decision Making (JMDM) is extremely useful,and creates a useful dialogue between philosophical and psychological perspectives of ethics and morality. We conclude that whilebehavioral decision research can gain important insights by more fully including philosophical discussions of rationality, both intellectual communities should be clear in their definitions, provide falsifiable predictions, and offer insights that can be tested empirically. We believe that these are important contributions (...) of behavioral decision research not currently incorporated in philosophical critiques. (shrink)

According to some commentators of the Iranian Civil Code, the definition of sale stated in Article 183 is influenced by Article 1101 of French Civil Code. They have concluded that the essence of sale is confined to mutual consent, i.e. the sale would not be valid without the consent of either party. They have taken even a step further and considered the contents of Article 338 of the civil code, which describes contract of sale, contradictory to Article 183 and argued (...) that the sale of a specified concrete object is not contained in Article 183 while the sale of unascertained goods is obliged to that article. They believe that the definition of Article 183 of civil code excludes not only all commitments, but also swap contracts because there are two mutual commitments and two agreeing legal contracts in a swap contract while there is no mentioning of them in Article 183. However, the objections are not rightfully lodged because first, the contracts and obligations are not incompatible with the definition of Article 338 as the seller and the buyer within a contract of sale are obliged to give authority to the other party over the object of sale or the price. It means that there are two commitments and the obligation of the seller to give authority over the object of sale appears in two ways: dominion over concrete object while making a transaction and dominion over non-specified object with the obligation that it does not attend to fulfil possession by the time of the sale. Secondly, Article 183 contains the phrase “their acceptance” which includes swap contract too because this phrase indicates that the acceptance is mutual. (shrink)

In one of the Theological Tractates, Boethius wrote ‘ we have found the definition of Person, viz: “The individual substance of a rational nature”’. He justifies the definition partly by a consideration of Latin and Greek etymologies and partly by stating ‘what Person cannot be affirmed of’. Person cannot be affirmed of Universals, accidents, relations, lifeless bodies, living bodies without sense , nor of ‘that which is bereft of mind and reason’.

I will begin by considering how the social world appears to the scientific observer and ask the question of whether the world of scientific research, with all its categories of meaning interpretation and with all its conceptual schemes of action, is identical with the world in which the observed actor acts. Anticipating the result, I may state immediately that with the shift from one level to the other, all the conceptual schemes and all the terms of interpretation must be modified.Proceeding (...) in this direction, I encounter several problems overlapping with the problem of rational action and the “rational act unit” in Professor ParsonsParsons, Talcott’ sense. First: The conceptual scheme of rational action presupposes a more or less definite knowledge of, or orientation within, the world in which this action is performed. In this sense the term, “rationality”, is not specific to the conceptual scheme of action; it embraces the conceptual scheme of the world in general and is only one element in it. Therefore, we also must examine the problem of orientation in this world. Second: We ought to keep in mind that all interpretation of the social world has to start from the actor’s subjective point of view. Therefore, we cannot accept the term, “unit act”, as such, without trying to reduce it to its subjective meaning. Here I have to discuss in general terms why I insist on the subjective point of view. This is more than the whim of a few social scientists; social science cannot be built up except by taking cognizance of the subjective meaning the actor connects with his acting. Finally, I have to discuss the fact that there are social sciences operating on high theoretical levels that, like economics, apparently prefer to deal with statistical curves and mathematical formulae rather than with actions of human beings in the social world, yet they use the term, “rational action”, as an indispensable element of their systems. I will have to show what modification this term undergoes in these types of social sciences..). (shrink)

This book contributes to the developing dialogue between cognitive science and social sciences. It focuses on a central issue in both fields, i.e. the nature and the limitations of the rationality of beliefs and action. The development of cognitive science is one of the most important and fascinating intellectual advances of recent decades, and social scientists are paying increasing attention to the findings of this new branch of science that forces us to consider many classical issues related to epistemology and (...) philosophy of action in a new light. This book encourages scholars from different fields who are interested in the dialogue between cognitive science and social sciences, to develop and analyze new perspectives that allow us to elucidate the mystery of rationality. What is rationality? What are its limitations? What rationality assumptions must be used to study social and economic phenomena? The target audience primarily comprises researchers and experts in the field. Analysis of the concept of rationality is a leitmotiv in the history of the social sciences and has involved endless disputes. Since it is difficult to give a precise definition of this concept, and there is a lack of agreement about its meaning, it is possible to say that there is a ‘mystery of rationality’. What is it to be rational? Is rationality merely instrumental or does it also involve the endorsement of values, i.e. the choice of goals? Should we consider rationality to be a normative principle or a descriptive one? Can rationality be only Cartesian or can it also be argumentative? Is rationality a conscious skill or a partly tacit one? This book, which has been written by an outstanding collection of authors, including both philosophers and social scientists, tries to make a useful contribution to the debates on these problems and shed some light on the mystery of rationality. (shrink)

The interpretation of man which I have defended in my book, Theory of Man, agrees with the Linnaean designation of homo sapiens, which is more exact, in my opinion, than the classical one of “rational animal.” In that work I maintain that what is peculiar to man is that he is conscious of a reality outside of himself and of his own intimate being, or, in other words, that he recognizes the independent existence of the world and is an ego. (...) Both matters can be reduced to a unique primary function: the objectifying activity, which in normal, continuous, and accumulative operation belongs only to man, and from which all essentially human traits are derived. The peculiar characteristic of perception properly so called, that is, human perception, is the observation of things that are present, the recognition that a given thing exists. To perceive, then, is to attribute presence or existence to what is perceived, to admit it as an object existing by itself, certainly in different ways according to whether it is a question of external things, of the subjective entity, or of the processes and “states” inherent in it; let it be noted that when perceptive attention fastens upon the “states,” that is to say, on subjective, unintentional processes like those of coenesthesia which ordinarily are not perceived but are lived, enjoyed, or suffered, these become objectified without losing in themselves their condition of states. The capacity to objectify is the bedrock of human nature; animal conscience (if it deserves this name) must be imagined, save for rare exceptions, to be a succession of “states” to which objectifying attention is not applied because such attention can only come from an ego. (shrink)

While Boethius's definition of the person, ‘an individual substance of a rational nature’, plays a significant role in Christian theology and anthropology, its reception is by no means uncritical. In the last hundred years, virtually every element in it has been critiqued by theologians and secular scholars. Nevertheless, its context suggests that his understanding of the person is potentially far richer than supposed. This paper places Boethius's definition of the person in its historical framework and in the context of his (...) own thought, especially Contra Eutyches and Consolation of Philosophy, in order to demonstrate that despite shortcomings, it represents a dynamic and holistic characterisation of the person. (shrink)

I present the strict definition of intended effects and pose two questions for its critics: Apart from rationalizing moral intuitions about the craniotomy and other controversial cases, why classify an effect as intended if it does not explain the action? What definition of intended effects can people use to guide their actions? These questions show that broad definitions of intended effects have no basis in action theory and are too vague to guide people’s actions. I suggest that broad (...) class='Hi'>definitions seem plausible because people confuse what someone intends and what someone is responsible for causing. (shrink)

On the Definition of Religion in Hobbes’ Leviathan It has long been a controversial topic whether Hobbes was an atheistic philosopher or a sincere Christian. A clear understanding of the issue requires an investigation into Hobbes’ view of religion. This paper tends to provide such an examination. First, it analyses the legal point of view by which Hobbes distinguishes religion from superstition. Secondly, it examines the two elements by which Hobbes defines religion: fear and power. Thirdly, it explores what true (...) religion is for Hobbes. Fourthly, after dealing with Hobbes’ rational theology, it raises certain questions about difficulties and contradictions in Hobbes’ definition of religion and true religion. Fifthly and finally, drawing on the double teaching theory and taking the purpose of Hobbes’ political theory into account, it concludes that there is a double doctrine in Hobbes on the one hand and, on the other hand, Hobbes desires to publicize the esoteric philosophic teaching in accordance with the purpose of his political philosophy, i.e. with the pursuit of a rational and free world state. (shrink)

There is a general consensus among economists that the notion of rationality plays a central role in microeconomics. It is important to note, however, that they are far from agreement on the meaning of this notion. It would be difficult to lay out a set of welldefined concepts of rationality, but it might be useful to distinguish three quite different approaches around which economists tend to situate themselves when characterising this notion. I prefer to refer to three "approaches" rather than (...) to three concepts, as I did in the title of the paper, because the concepts of rationality which correspond to these approaches cannot be isolated easily. Indeed, their unsettled definitions often overlap, and even when they purport to be related to opposing approaches, they are more or less interrelated. In any case, I propose to refer to these three approaches as "rationality-purposefulness", "rationality-efficiency", and "rationality-consistency". According to rationalitypurposefulness, an action is rational if and only if it is oriented towards the satisfaction of the agent's purpose, as most Austrian economists would tend to say. According to rationality-efficiency, an action is rational if and only if it actually maximises a positively valued magnitude such as utility or profit, as many neoclassical economists would say, especially when adopting a traditional approach. By contrast, rationality-consistency states that choices are rational if and only if it they are consistent as a set, which implies in particular that they are transitive. (shrink)

This work contrasts the formalist approach to defining explanation in science, exemplified in the Deductive-Nomenological Model of Carl G. Hempel, with the contextualist approach of Thomas Kuhn. It is argued that both of these attempts to define the explanatory processes of science are inadequate. A connection is made between the view of rationality upon which each view is based and the way that it defines explanation. It is argued that a process of thought, which scientific explanation represents, is considered rational (...) by these thinkers only if it meets the criteria of constraint under a rule, distance from subjective considerations and instrumental connection of method and goal. Given this strong definition of rationality, explanation is defined by both Kuhn and Hempel as thought within the constraint of a theory or a theoretical paradigm. Under this construal, explanation is separated as a process from theory invention which both thinkers hold to involve primarily non-cognitive criteria of choice. It is argued in this work that such a view contradicts the actual practice of science where theory invention seems to be primarily a process of rational explaining. ;A detailed historical case of an attempt to explain organic morphogenesis is given. It centers on the theory of generation of Pierre Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, an 18th Century scientific thinker. This case is meant to illustrate the kinds of cognitive interest and strategies of invention that go into dealing with an explanatory problem in science. ;Finally some general programmatic conclusions are made relating the foregoing arguments and the case, to the need to explore the nature of scientific explanation in the domain of theory invention where the reasoning processes seem to involve analogical reasoning and critical metaphysical thought. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the consideration of the relationship of T. Kuhn (and his followers) with representatives of the school of internal realism. Theses of the article: Kuhn’s teaching does not contain an unambiguous understanding of the basis on which ideas within the paradigm are acceptable to a scientist; post-Kuhn discussions in the field of epistemology of scientific knowledge acquire not historical, but “human” character; they are conducted around the concept of “rational acceptability”; theoretical positions as epistemological anarchism, similarly, (...) internalism can equally be deduced from Kuhn’s teaching; the essentialist program of internal realists is excessively focused on criticizing the relativistic consequences of the doctrine of the paradigm; the revealed contradictions of Kuhn’s relativistic and internalist receptions prompt rejection of both these receptions. It is shown that Kuhn’s theory initially disposes to its transformation into a more consistent one in two ways: either due to radical antirealism, or due to an internalist approach, when its own epistemology is built within the framework of the paradigm with a mandatory definition of what is considered real and objective. Rational acceptability regulates the “value” aspect, i.e. preference for a certain theoretical model. Conclusions of the study: in internalism, the idea of the intersubjective nature of scientific knowledge is not lost; rational acceptability in internalism plays a restraining role in relation to the individual wills of scientists, acting as a collective form of intentionality that precedes any private scientific research with epistemological prerequisites; the criterion of rational acceptability is conservative, since it allows us to restrain the tendency of any language to lock itself in its own context; rational acceptability in internalism successfully balances between dogmatism and skepticism; the realistic and rational nature of the concept of “acceptability” allows us to reject the relativistic thesis about the closeness of science within a particular paradigm and assume that there is always “not-paradigmatic” component, rooted in the philosophical understanding of science. (shrink)

Does a coherentist version of rationality issue requirements on states? Or does it issue requirements on processes? This paper evalu- ates the possibility of process-requirements. It argues that there are two possible definitions of state- and process-requirements: a satisfaction- based definition and a content-based definition. I demonstrate that the satisfaction-based definition is inappropriate. It does not allow us to uphold a clear-cut distinction between state- and process-requirements. We should therefore use a content-based definition of state- and pro- cess-requirements. However, (...) a content-based definition entails that ra- tionality does not issue process-requirements. Content-based process- requirements violate the principle that ‘rationality requires’ implies ‘can satisfy’. The conclusion of this paper therefore amounts to a radical re- jection of process-requirements of rationality. (shrink)

This article serves as either an addendum or as an expansion of ideas and work developed in my 2024 book, The Rationality Project: Across the Millennia, issued by Palgrave Macmillan. The book explores 21 potential theories for explaining rationality in terms of why and how one among these can serve in the position of explanatory power. The book does not fully explain all of these candidate theories, assigning that complete role to this addendum or work-in-progress. The main reason for this (...) abbreviation in assessing all the theories in the book is that the complete coverage—which this addendum allows—of all 21 theories would become too detailed for some philosophical readers. This addendum; one may consider, is then for the more technically minded reader—although certainly not-too-technically minded readers are welcome to explore it. If it becomes too bogged in detail for those latter kinds of readers, they may end up skimming the material in this addendum, trying at least to get the general idea of how these addendum sections fit into the book's goals. (shrink)

One of the most discussed issues in psychology—presently and in the past—is how to define and measure the extent to which human cognition is rational. The rationality of human cognition is often evaluated in terms of normative standards based on a priori intuitions. Yet this approach has been challenged by two recent developments in psychology that we review in this article: ecological rationality and descriptivism. Going beyond these contributions, we consider it a good moment for psychologists and philosophers to join (...) forces and work toward a new foundation for the definition of rational cognition. We take a first step in this direction by proposing that the rationality of both cognitive and normative systems can be measured in terms of their cognitive success. Cognitive success can be defined and gauged in terms of two factors: ecological validity (the system's validity in conditions in which it is applicable) and the system's applicability (the scope of conditions under which it can be applied). As we show, prominent systems of reasoning—deductive reasoning, Bayesian reasoning, uncertain conditionals, and prediction and choice—perform rather differently on these two factors. Furthermore, we demonstrate that conceptualizing rationality according to its cognitive success offers a new perspective on the time-honored relationship between the descriptive (“is”) and the normative (“ought”) in psychology and philosophy. (shrink)

This paper aimed to vindicate that Aristotle’s method of reaching the definition of something in Z 12 of Metaphysics is incomplete and suggest the way in which we can reach its true definition. This paper claimed that the definition reached by genus and differentia (say, “a human is a featherless, two-footed animal.”) is not true but merely a taxonomic definition¾“what a definition is like” (1038a35). The combination of essential differentiae of something does not express what it is intrinsically but what (...) other things are not, although the definition is the account of the essence. The combination of the differentiae ‘featherless’ and ‘two-footed’ are not what makes us humans in a positive sense. These differentiae simply set us apart from all other animals. Moreover, his method is arbitrary. The combination of essential differentiae is subject to change insofar as we can swap out one differentia for another. However, the essence of something cannot be changeable. In order to make “a definition like” be “a true definition,” this paper suggests another interpretation of the ultimate differentia. As he presents it, the ultimate differentia is the one that cannot be further divided. However, this paper interprets the ultimate differentia of something as its activity (ἐνέργειά) and its end (τέλος). Hence, it is necessary to combine Aristotle’s method of differentiation with the teleological ultimate differentia of something if we want to reach its true definition. Aristotle at various times refers to human as a rational animal, at other times as a featherless two-footed animal throughout his corpus. This paper suggests that one is taxonomic, an example of what definition is like, and the other one represents the achievement that can be made when we know the true end of a thing¾that is, true definition, if a human is for thinking with our logos. Keywords: definition, essence, taxonomy, differentia, the ultimate differentia, activity, end. (shrink)

A multifactorial and growing crisis of health care systems in the developed world has affected medicine. In order to provide rational responses, some central concepts of the past, such as the definitions of health and disease, need to be updated. For this purpose physicians should initiate a new debate. As a point of departure the following definitions are proposed: Health is a dynamic state of wellbeing characterized by a physical, mental and social potential, which satisfies the demands of (...) a life commensurate with age, culture, and personal responsibility. If the potential is insufficient to satisfy these demands the state is disease. This term includes sickness, illness, ill health, and malady. The described potential is divided into a biologically given and a personally acquired partial potential. Their proportions vary throughout the life cycle. The proposed definitions render it empirically possible to diagnose persons as healthy or diseased and to apportion some of the responsibility for their state of health to individuals themselves. Treatment strategies should always consider three therapeutic routes: improvements of the biologically given and of the personally acquired partial potentials and adaptations of the demands of life. These consequences favourably contrast with those resulting from the WHO-definition of health. (shrink)

This paper defines in a formal and computational way the notion of ‘consilience’, a term introduced by Whewell in 1847 for the evaluation of scientific theories. Informally, as has been used to date, a model or theory is ‘consilient’ if it is predictive, explanatory and unifies the evide-nce. Centred in a constructive framework, where new terms can be intro-duced, we essay a formalisation of the idea of unification based on the avoidance of ‘sepa-ration’. However, it is soon manifest that this (...) classical approach is vulnerable to the introduction of fantastic concepts to unify disparate sub-theories. Our second approach is constructed by using a detailed evaluation of the relationship between the theory and the evid-ence by means of reinforcement propagation. With the use of reinfor-cement, fantastic concepts can be better detected and the role of con-silience for theory construction and revision can be specialised for dif-ferent inference mechanisms like explanatory induction, abduction, deduc-tion and analogy. (shrink)

There is no satisfactory account for the general phenomenon of confabulation, for the following reasons: (1) confabulation occurs in a number of pathological and non-pathological conditions; (2) impairments giving rise to confabulation are likely to have different neural bases; and (3) there is no unique theory explaining the aetiology of confabulations. An epistemic approach to defining confabulation could solve all of these issues, by focusing on the surface features of the phenomenon. However, existing epistemic accounts are unable to offer sufficient (...) conditions for confabulation and tend to emphasise only its epistemic disadvantages. In this paper, we argue that a satisfactory epistemic account of confabulation should also acknowledge those features which are (potentially) epistemically advantageous. For example, confabulation may allow subjects to exercise some control over their own cognitive life which is instrumental to the construction or preservation of their sense of self. (shrink)

The concept of engineering is problematic. Despite of the ancient practices of engineering, may be as old as humanity, engineering recently appeared as an academic discipline: engineering studies in universities can be traced back to the nineteenth century. Engineering has been defined as a practice, a process, a profession, and the application of scientific knowledge. However, if engineering is the application of scientific knowledge, there is a tacit assertion of the impossibility to count with proper engineering knowledge, leading to the (...) impossibility, or at least the difficulty, for engineering to own a proper body of knowledge and the rational possibility of doctoral studies in engineering. The main concern in this research is to state a conceptual definition of engineering enough strong that serves as a building block for ontological and epistemological research in philosophy of engineering. It is shown that science and engineering pursue different objectives and produces different results. Therefore, it is possible to make a distinction between one and the other. In this dissertation, epistemological elements of engineering are set apart from ontological elements that compose the concept of engineering to emphasize its nature and the genuine possibility to produce new knowledge of engineering independent of scientific knowledge. However, it is also recognized that even methodologically different, science and engineering are intertwined and interdependent, therefore scientific knowledge does not necessarily precede engineering knowledge. Consequently, there is no hierarchical relationship between science and engineering. (shrink)

Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000) is a major contribution to the field of informal logic, but the concept of argument that is central to its project suffers from a tension between the components that comprise it. This paper explores and addresses that tension by examining the implications of each of five aspects of the definition of ‘argument’.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.4 (2002) 639-658 [Access article in PDF] "The whole exercise of reason":Charles Mein's Account of Rationality James G. Buickerood L'Auteur de cet Ouvrage nous paroit meriter un rang distingué parmi les Auteurs Metaphysiques. Il seroit seulement à souhaiter qu'il eût traité ses matiéres avec un peu plus de Methode. Ce n'est pas qu'il ne soit très-intelligible, & que son Stile même ne soit (...) assez pur, mais un Auteur devroit se souvenir que ceux qui liront son ouvrage ne suivront pas ses pensées comme il les suit, & qu'on ne se rapellera pas ce qu'il a dit aussi facilement qu'il se le rapelle lui-même.... Il nous paroit que si l'Auteur veut encore s'exercer sur pareilles matieres il ne fera pas mal de repasser sur ce qui'il vient de publier, de donner des definitions plus intelligibles, & d'éclaircir le reste avec plus d'exactitude. — Bibliothèque raisonnée, June 1729 Two Dissertations concerning Sense, and the Imagination. With an Essay on Consciousness appeared anonymously in mid-summer 1728 over the prestigious imprint of Tonson in the Strand. 1 The "Essay on Consciousness" explicates the nature and functions of consciousness. The two dissertations modestly prepare for an inquiry into human understanding, which [End Page 639] is at present very much wanted; and towards which the removal of those Prejudices arising from Sense, and the Imagination, which hinder Men from discovering the Truth, or discerning it, tho' fairly offered to them, is the first Step to be made; and may be of some use to any one who shall hereafter undertake to explain and set forth, in a clear and perspicuous Light, the native and genuine Operations of the Understanding, as they are in Themselves, without mixing or confounding them with any Others. (1-2) A Bibliothèque raisonnée review twice noted the book's diffusion and inconvenient organization. 2 The book is nonetheless interesting for its clear defense of the cognitive superiority of reason over sense and imagination, its attack on contemporary conflations of human and brutal natures, and its treatment of consciousness, dreams, madness, and the self. In its assay of human understanding Two Dissertations implements Peripatetic, Cartesian, and even Lockean principles. The last notwithstanding, the work is an assault on the Lockean reduction of understanding to passive perception and on Locke's conception of knowledge as the perception of ideas and their relations. It is also an attempt to resuscitate reason in the teeth of nominalist accounts of rationality such as those of John Toland and allied freethinkers. 3 In pursuing these goals, it offers variations on traditional concepts of cognition, such as a conception of notions as acts of intellectual apprehension which an interpreting mind brings to bear on sensory appearances. This understanding of notions as acts falls within the British notional way marked by Digby, White, Sergeant, and especially Burthogge, antedating publication of George Berkeley's explicit distinction between passive ideas and notions owing to reflection. 4 Notions play an important role in Two Dissertations, contrasting the mind's active, rational contribution to knowledge with Lockean ideas. Yet the work's treatment of notions contains intimations of a more elaborate conception of rationality that includes a distinct order of reflective notions not deployed in this book (25-26).Clearly identifying the purposes, doctrine, and authorship of Two Dissertations is worthwhile insofar as its detailed analysis of consciousness is intrinsically interesting and quite possibly historically important, despite its neglect in the past century. For its "Essay on Consciousness" purports to be the "first Attempt that hath been made on the Subject" (sig. A3r ; cf. 141-42). While conventional [End Page 640] interpretations of modern philosophy may have habituated us to be skeptical of such a claim made as late as 1728, it is by no means outlandish, subject to textual and conceptual qualification. This paper concerns primarily just one function of the conscious mind addressed in Two Dissertations: the concept of... (shrink)

Emmanuel Levinas’ thought seems to be strictly neither rational, phenomenological nor ontological, and it thus intentionally exposes itself to the asking of the question ‘why call it philosophy at all’? While we may have trouble containing Levinas’ thought within our traditional philosophical boundaries, I argue that this gives us no reason to exclude him from philosophy proper as a mere poser, but rather provides the occasion for reflection on just what it means, in an ethical manner, to call something ‘philosophical’. (...) Instead of asking whether or not philosophy can ‘contain’ Levinas’ thought, I contend that it would be more ethical to instead re-phrase the question in terms of ‘sociality’. When we do this, I argue, we can indeed justifiably call Levinas’ thought philosophy. (shrink)

Certain realist critics of U.S. foreign policy put forth an alternative model of “offshore balancing” as a definitively rational alternative to what they regard as the current, and utterly disastrous, policy of “liberal hegemony.” They predict that the public will eventually recognize the hollowness of liberalism and demand a foreign policy rooted in hardnosed realism. They also promise that this rational outline will also be a positive good, maximizing national interests and moral values with no tradeoffs between them. I argue (...) that offshore balancing packages realist arguments in an idealist framework, whereby the good is both self-evident and bound to triumph. This inhibits the actual realist task of revealing the harsh facts of politics, which inevitably interfere with preferences. Offshore balancing traps itself between its claim of inevitability, which undercuts the need for advocacy, and desirability, which pushes against its inevitability. The only way they can resolve this contradiction is with an increasingly caustic account of liberalism as so utterly wrong and immoral that its opponents earn the mark of reason and goodness by sheer virtue of their opposition. Offshore balancing subordinates its account of the world as it is to a demand of how the world must not be. (shrink)

Blair's account, like the intelligence field in general, treats many distinct constructs as if they were practically interchangeable – this is not self-evident. Paradigm integration and rationalization of redundant nomenclature are important for the continued development of understanding. The prior task is to demonstrate where synonymity of constructs across paradigms occurs, and where it fails. We present arguments why this is the case. (Published Online April 5 2006).

For a ring R, Hilbert’s Tenth Problem $HTP$ is the set of polynomial equations over R, in several variables, with solutions in R. We view $HTP$ as an enumeration operator, mapping each set W of prime numbers to $HTP$, which is naturally viewed as a set of polynomials in $\mathbb {Z}[X_1,X_2,\ldots ]$. It is known that for almost all W, the jump $W'$ does not $1$ -reduce to $HTP$. In contrast, we show that every Turing degree contains a set W (...) for which such a $1$ -reduction does hold: these W are said to be HTP-complete. Continuing, we derive additional results regarding the impossibility that a decision procedure for $W'$ from $HTP$ can succeed uniformly on a set of measure $1$, and regarding the consequences for the boundary sets of the $HTP$ operator in case $\mathbb {Z}$ has an existential definition in $\mathbb {Q}$. (shrink)

The recent reemergence of theories that emphasize the semantic and conceptual aspects of emotions has also brought to attention questions about their rationality. There are essentially two standard senses in which emotions can be assessed for their rationality. First, emotions can be said to be categorically rational insofar as they presuppose our psychological capacities to be clearly conscious of distinctions, to engage and manipulate concepts, and hence to provide intentional descriptions as reasons for what we feel and are moved to (...) do. For this "cognitive" rationality we can apply the usual standards intrinsic to the processes of belief formation such as coherence, consistency, inferential validity, and appropriateness of evidence. Secondly, and derivatively of "rationality" as a teleological or strategic notion, emotions can be thought of as rational or irrational depending upon their function in fulfilling certain specified human purposes. While neither adhering to nor dismissing what these two mainstream perspectives afford, the following thesis is an alternative, yet complementary, project. Its aim is to "rationalize" emotions through insights obtained in programmatic examinations of their relationship to a number of critical features of being human: intentionality, expression and language, sense of self, responsibility, self-deception, and value cognition and moral agency. The idea is less to fit emotions within some formulaic description of rationality and more to let its potential definition emerge subsequently to these investigations. This reflects a conviction that rationality is not a unitary property of our minds but a complex stance towards the world. It also exhibits an awareness that, as evidenced by current debates, "rationality" is very much a contested notion. (shrink)

We propose a framework for including information‐processing bounds in rational analyses. It is an application of bounded optimality (Russell & Subramanian, 1995) to the challenges of developing theories of mechanism and behavior. The framework is based on the idea that behaviors are generated by cognitive mechanisms that are adapted to the structure of not only the environment but also the mind and brain itself. We call the framework computational rationality to emphasize the incorporation of computational mechanism into the definition of (...) rational action. Theories are specified as optimal program problems, defined by an adaptation environment, a bounded machine, and a utility function. Such theories yield different classes of explanation, depending on the extent to which they emphasize adaptation to bounds, and adaptation to some ecology that differs from the immediate local environment. We illustrate this variation with examples from three domains: visual attention in a linguistic task, manual response ordering, and reasoning. We explore the relation of this framework to existing “levels” approaches to explanation, and to other optimality‐based modeling approaches. (shrink)

Gert’s Morality is a remarkably original, lucid, ambitious, and wide-ranging book. No short essay can do justice to it. I offer four criticisms of Gert. First, he doesn’t adequately defend the priority he gives to avoiding evils over seeking goods. Second, he begs some important questions about moral realism in a way that is crucial for his definition of rationality and his larger purposes in the book. Third, his rejection of utilitarianism and religious morality rests on an assumption he doesn’t (...) adequately defend. Fourth, he is mistaken in claiming that moral judgments are not overriding. (shrink)

I argue that Kant acknowledges two models of spontaneous self-determination that rational beings are capable of. The first model involves absolute unconditional necessity and excludes any form of contingency. The second model involves (albeit not as a matter of definition) a form of contingency which entails alternative possibilities for determining oneself. The first model would be exhibited by a divine being; the second model is exhibited by human beings. Human beings do, however, partake in the divine model up to an (...) extent, namely, as far as the legislative spontaneity of their law-giving faculties are concerned. I conclude by suggesting that for Kant, the mechanistic principle that we are exclusively determined by natural causes poses a twofold threat for human agency. In one respect (in relation to the second model), it threatens us with the obliteration of contingency, or with the universality of hypothetical necessity. But in another respect (in relation to the first model), it threatens us (and our putative "laws") with the obliteration of absolute necessity, or with the universality of contingency. (shrink)

Resource constraints in developing countries compel policy makers to ration the provision of healthcare services. This article examines one such set of Guidelines: A patient dialysing in the state sector in South Africa may not refuse renal transplantation when a kidney becomes available. Refusal of transplantation can lead to exclusion from the state-funded dialysis programme. This Guideline is legally acceptable as related to Constitutional stipulations which allow for rationing healthcare resources in South Africa. Evaluating the ethical merit of the Guideline, (...) and exploring the ethical dilemma it poses, proves a more complex task. We examine the actions of healthcare professionals as constrained by the Guideline. From a best interests framework, we argue that in these circumstances directing patient decision making is not necessarily unethical or unacceptably paternalistic. We then scrutinise the guideline itself through several different ethical ‘lenses’. Here, we argue that bioethics does not provide a definitive answer as to the moral merit of rationing dialysis under these circumstances, however it can be considered just in this context. We conclude by examining a potential pitfall of the Guideline: Unwilling transplant recipients may not comply with immunosuppressive medication, which raises questions for policies based on resource management and rationing. (shrink)

Feature structures are employed in various forms in many areas of linguistics. Informally, one can picture a feature structure as a sort of tree decorated with information about constraints requiring that specific subtrees be identical (isomorphic). Here I show that this informal picture of feature structures can be used to characterize exactly the class of feature structures under their usual subsumption ordering. Furthermore, once a precise definition of tree is fixed, this characterization makes use only of standard domain-theoretic notions regarding (...) the information borne by elements in a domain, thus removing (or better, explaining) all apparentlyad hoc choices in the original definition of feature structures. In addition, I show how this characterization can be parameterized in order to yield similar characterizations of various different notions of feature structure, including acyclic structures, structures with appropriateness conditions and structures with apartness conditions (used to model path inequations). The generalizations to other notions of feature structure also emphasize that the construction given here is in fact independent of the application to feature structures. (shrink)

In the polemic with T.D. Sokolova’s article the issue is discussed addressing the question whether there is anything new that we can get from the methodology of interdisciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity for determination of scientific rationality and scientific progress. The solution of this question is connected with the intensions of a historical and social-cultural epistemologies. These intentions consist in a complex or “multidimensional” approach to the creation of conceptual designs that define the application of these concepts. None of the "measurements” (methodological, (...) psychological, social, etc.) provides them with a universal definition, but a “stereometric” image “restored” from them is capable to approximate to real use of these concepts of an epistemology and philosophy of science. It is necessary to remember that progress in science in one dimension can be regression in another just as the scientific rationality in a sociological dimension can be in no correspondence with the interpretation of rationality given to it by a certain methodological conception. Philosophy of science must avoid a dogmatic universalization of the criteria of rationality as well as the extremes of of relativism in this question. (shrink)

The subject of my dissertation is "rationality". In this book I undertake a comprehensive, systematic and independent treatment of the problem of rationality. This furthers progress toward a general theory of rationality, one that represents and defends a uniform conception of reason. The structure and general outline are as follows: Part I: General Definition of the Concept; Part II: Rationality in the Theoretical Realm; Part III: Rationality in the Practical Realm (parts II and III are divided respectively into A. Relative (...) Reasons and B. Absolute Reasons); Part IV: Grounds for the Principle of Reason. My aim in this work is to prove that a conception of rationality as justification of our usage of language is more significant than has been classically recognized, without, however, reducing the concept of rationality. After a definition of the term is provided in the first chapter by means of language analysis, the following three questions are dealt with in the subsequent chapters: a) Exhaustion of rationality in relative reasons—i.e., is reasoning exhausted by reference to existing views and goals, or does rationality also exist in a strong sense? The latter would be the case if the views and goals referred to the relative conception must themselves be justified de novo. I argue that such an absolute justification of views and goals cannot be provided. To this end, in the theoretical domain, I discuss a question prominent in the debate over the rationality of worldviews, namely the question of whether the standards of theoretical rationality are merely culturally relative (chapter V.). Here I arrive at the position that standards of theoretical rationality are only transcultural insofar as there are goals which are not themselves culturally-dependent. With regard to practically fundamental goals, the core standards of modern science can be justified. This justification strategy therefore requires that such goals be established. In practical terms, first I address (in Chapter VII) the so-called "final justification" of norms problem. Here I discuss above all the transcendental-pragmatic proposal and the contractualist conception. According to my view, neither succeed in providing a final rational grounding for norms. That grounding pertains instead to the rationale for objectives, and Chapter VIII demonstrates that even a final justification of objectives is impossible. This does not mean, however, that a person's goals cannot be criticized as irrational. But the warrant in this case depends on the rules that govern the genesis of desires being accepted by the subject. b) If substantive rationality does not exist because no absolute grounding for opinions and goals can obtain, then the question of how strong or weak the concept of rationality is acquires further weight. On that basis, relative theoretical and practical rationality is examined in detail. I aim with this analysis of (relative) rationality to apprehend the structural parallelism between rationality in both the practical and the theoretical domain, and therefore to defend a uniform conception of reason or rationality. This is accomplished by identifying a concept that exhibits the same structure in both theoretical and practical domains: the term "rational" is applied to actions and opinions in order to claim, first of all, that they are "well-founded." For example, one must inquire into the precise rational justification for opinions or actions. To determine the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions required for an opinion or action to be rational, one must first provide a formal characterization of the rationality of those opinions or actions. What is to count as a rational ground can only be explained by formal procedures and results achievable via those procedures. To be more specific, I claim that the process of opinion formation and practical reflection is subject to rational justification based on internalist rules. The rules governing theoretical rationality can have their content transformed in a further move, if one takes the result of the process of rational opinion-formation as the product of an epistemological determination, that is, as a decision about which opinion to hold that is made on the basis of epistemological or prudential goals. Implicit in this position is the controversial idea that one can actually decide to believe something. The rules of practical reason are the rules that guide the rational selection of objectives and actions. The structural parallelism of theoretical and practical rationality consists, therefore, in the fact that both refer to mental processes that are controlled by rules which one freely accepts and follows. In both cases, these rules are to be understood as governing the rational choice of a mental or physical action. c) Therefore, the question of whether rationality—being rational—can in turn be grounded by reasons can be answered in the following way: The rules of rationality can only be justified with reference to a person’s goals, as the best strategy for achieving those goals. If someone does not desire the optimal realization of his goals, there is no other way of arguing directly for rationality. One can only attempt to demonstrate—if the person is open to argument—that it is typically in the person's own best interest to adhere to the rules of rationality. (shrink)

Thick ethical concepts are characterized by having both a “world-guided”/descriptive and an “action-guiding”/prescriptive aspect. The purpose of this paper is to argue that if we conceive of rationality as a thick ethical concept we will be able to understand two things. First, why people are inclined to believe that rationality – even if defined in terms of rational requirements – actually is normative. The action-guiding aspect of the concept of ‘rationality’ is responsible for this. It is highlighted for example by (...) the fact that accusing somebody of behaving irrationally works as a stand-alone criticism of an action or actor. Second, we can also understand why those recent arguments by Broome and Kolodny trying to show just how rationality is normative fail. They are proceeding solely based on a world-guided definition of rationality. This does not lead to a misapplication of the concept stricto sensu; but to a thin concept which necessarily fails to grasp the evaluative force of the concept of ‘rationality’. This is particularly insightful for economists who often tend to use ‘rationality’ as a standard for judging behavior. (shrink)

Gupta has proposed a definition of strategic rationality cast in the framework of his revision theory of truth. His analysis, relative to a class of normal form games in which all players have a strict best reply to all other players’ strategy profiles, shows that game-theoretic concepts have revision-theoretic counterparts. We extend Gupta’s approach to deal with normal form games in which players’ may have weak best replies. We do so by adapting intuitions relative to Nash equilibrium refinements to the (...) revision-theoretic framework. We prove that there is a precise equivalence between trembling-hand perfect equilibria in two-player normal games and a revision-theoretic property. We then introduce lexicographic choice of action as a way to represent players’ expectations, which allows our analysis to reach full generality. Finally, we provide an example of the versatility of revision theory as applied to strategic interaction by formalizing a risk-and-compensation procedure of strategic choice in the revision-theoretic framework. (shrink)

I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational (...) decision rules. I argue that Maximizing Rationality necessarily structures conclusive reasons for action. Thus conations of any sort can base rational choices only if the conations are structured like a coherent preference function; rational actions maximize on such functions. Maximization-constraining dispositions cannot integrate into a coherent preference function. (shrink)

The article deals with a role of mass culture in term of the theory of the culture industry by M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno and the theory of communicative action by J. Habermas, who continues research of the Frankfurt school. It is known that Habermas says about two types of rationality — communicative and structural. The lifeworld and the system correspond them. Usually, culture correspond to lifeworld because it helps people`s socialization. Also it is a place for communication and finding (...) new meanings. However, a place of mass culture is very controver- sial. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish between popular and mass culture, because these definitions have been used as interchangeable for a long time. Popular culture is still an area of meanings. Moreover, it has the potential for protest. From this point of view, it is clearly part of the life world. But mass culture as a «cultural industry» is not so unambiguous. It is worth considering its characteristics and role in people’s life more detail. Above all, one cannot help paying attention to masses. Already in the last century, H. Arendt characterized them as an atomized and isolated group of people, and they are not united by any common ideas. After all, even in the modern world it is possible to see that they do not have and do not want to search for any ideas or meanings. Masses are a direct consumers of mass culture. It is consumerism that the characteristic feature of modernity. Therefore, mass culture is inseparably connected with the market. On the one hand, it sells entertainments, and on the other hand, it generates new consumers, because it is related to advertising. In the same way, mass culture is connected with agitation and propaganda. Thus, it is possible to speak about its connection with politics. The market and politics correspond to the system and are guided by strategic rationality. This fact gives reason to talk about mass culture as a strategic tool. Such culture with no meanings leads to a crisis in society. (shrink)

This paper takes as its starting point the observation of quasi-religious, ‘cultural’ characteristics in the dominant discourse of Western liberal democracy, and of ‘ideological’ characteristics in the discourse of Islamism – noting that both discourses rely, to some extent, upon the notion of rationality. Having provided working definitions of rationality, ideology, and culture, it goes on to argue that culture and ideology may be viewed as discursive macro-strategies which are related to the degree of power enjoyed by a given (...) social system at particular historical moments in time: the former being associated with the consolidation of established power and the latter with a bid to acquire power. It suggests that the general function of cultural and ideological strategies is to mask the underlying irrationalities of free-market democracy and Islamism, respectively, and concludes by considering some of the implications of this view in the context of globalization and the ‘war on terror’. (shrink)

The article addresses the two sides of the work of Nicholas Maxwell – his criticism of science and his call to bring about a revolution in academia encouraging it to become much more effective in tackling the real problems humanity is facing. I would use: It focuses on the connection of these two aspects of Maxwell’s work and provides a critical analysis of Maxwell’s conceptual framework. It is argued here that the two sides of Maxwell’s whole conception are not necessarily (...) connected, and do not have to be. Academia can be more effectively organized even without a change in our understanding of science. Maxwell has argued that academia has to aim at making wisdom rather than knowledge its goal. The knowledge-inquiry framework that currently prevails should be exchanged for wisdom-inquiry. Maxwell has explained his understanding of wisdom in several publications, while not being fully consistent in his explanations of what wisdom-inquiry has to embrace. In addition, Maxwell’s original approach to rationality goes against traditional attitudes. Maxwell is definitely critical of the Enlightenment but his attitude to Romanticism remains unclear. Related to these, the article addresses the future tasks of universities. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 2, pp 287 - 299 Holm Tetens attempts to define ‘god’ as part of his rational theology. The term ‘god’ is supposed to be defined as ‘the infinite I-subject’. This should be achieved through the customary definition of a singular term by description. However, definitions of this kind have to meet certain formal requirements, which a Rational Theology should adhere to. This paper aims to show that Tetens’ definition faces problems with these requirements since (...) vital arguments are either missing or incomplete in a substantial way. In the process, possible approaches to remedy the outlined problems are hinted at. Overall, this paper raises the question of an alternative interpretation of his definition of god, which is central to the author’s project.Holm Tetens versucht im Rahmen seiner rationalen Theologie, eine Definition Gottes vorzulegen. Die Konstante ‚Gott‘ soll als ‚das unendliche Ich-Subjekt‘ definiert werden. Dies soll nach dem üblichen Schema der Definition einer Individuenkonstante über eine Beschreibung erfolgen. Für derartige Setzungen gibt es jedoch formale Voraussetzungen, die gerade unter dem Anspruch, eine rationale Theologie vorzulegen, eingehalten werden sollten. Nachfolgend soll gezeigt werden, dass Tetens’ Definition unter diesen Voraussetzungen problematisch ist, da erforderliche Argumentationen entweder fehlen oder in einem kritischen Maße unvollständig sind. Dabei werden auch Maßnahmen zur Behebung der aufgezeigten Mängel angedeutet, wie etwa die vom Autor stillschweigend vorausgesetzten Aussagen explizit zu machen. Insgesamt wirft die Untersuchung Fragen nach einer alternativen Deutung der für das Gesamtprojekt zentralen Gottesdefinition auf. (shrink)

I argue that Kant acknowledges two models of spontaneous self-determination that rational beings are capable of. The first model involves absolute unconditional necessity and excludes any form of contingency. The second model involves (albeit not as a matter of definition) a form of contingency which entails alternative possibilities for determining oneself. The first model would be exhibited by a divine being; the second model is exhibited by human beings. Human beings do, however, partake in the divine model up to an (...) extent, namely, as far as the legislative spontaneity of their law-giving faculties are concerned. I conclude by suggesting that for Kant, the mechanistic principle that we are exclusively determined by natural causes poses a twofold threat for human agency. In one respect (in relation to the second model), it threatens us with the obliteration of contingency, or with the universality of hypothetical necessity. But in another respect (in relation to the first model), it threatens us (and our putative "laws") with the obliteration of absolute necessity, or with the universality of contingency. (shrink)