In the opening lines of Aristophanes' Acharnians, Dicaeopolis counts first among his greatest joys ‘the five talents Cleon coughed up’, and he professes his love of the Knights for this service ‘worthy of Hellas’. The ancient scholiast gave what he thought an obvious explanation from Theopompus : he tells us that Cleon was accused of taking bribes to lighten the tribute of the islanders, and he was then fined ‘because of the outrage against the Knights’. Evidently Theopompus connected the charges (...) against Cleon with some earlier proceedings instigated by Cleon against the Cavalry. There is, as often, some difficulty in determining what Theopompus said and what the scholiast inferred, and, aside from that editorial problem, the scholiast's all-too-simple solution faces at least three major objections regarding the legal and political implications of such a trial. On the strength of such objections it was long ago supposed that Dicaeopolis rejoices not at a recent political defeat for the demagogue, but in recalling a theatrical expose in Babylonians of the previous year. This theory of a stage trial, however, encounters obstacles of its own in any reconstruction of the lost play. In recent work there have been many comments but no altogether satisfactory solution on this problem. It is the view of many that Cleon indeed suffered some political defeat in the year preceding Ach.; but, by this approach, ingenious solutions are required to make sense of the scholia. The assumption of a stage-trial, involving the Knights and Cleon in Babylonians, is still found persuasive by others, but if we are to discount the fragment of Theopompus, which has supporting testimony elsewhere in the scholiastic tradition, we would like to have something more than mere inference that Cleon was tried and convicted in Babylonians. The purpose of this paper is to find a more cogent explanation for these lines in Ach. and the equally puzzling scenario in Theopompus. It will be helpful to begin with the broad outlines of the problem , and then proceed to re-examine the prevailing views, the stage-trial theory and historical theories based upon the scholia. (shrink)

The manuscript of Andocides' speechOn the Mysteriescontains a series of documentary inserts culminating in the decrees of Patroclides, Tisamenus and Demophantus. These decrees seem to fit their historical context and they are presented at length, with at least a few of the formalities that we would expect to find in the official record. Modern commentators have relied upon them as substantially genuine, allowing for the usual errors in transmission, but now their authenticity is contested. A close reading by Mirko Canevaro (...) and Edward Harris rejects all three of these documents as products of feckless ‘forgery’. Alan Sommerstein responded with a strong defence of Demophantus' decree, and Mogens Hansen has recently defended Patroclides' decree and Tisamenus' as well. On many points the defenders are persuasive, but the sceptics make a good case, and so it seems reasonable to reconsider how these documents took shape. (shrink)

The ¿scrutiny of all the laws¿ that Andocides invokes in his defence On the Mysteries is usually interpreted as a recodification with the aim of barring prosecution for the crimes of civil conflict. This article advances four theses against that traditional reading: (1) In Andocides¿ argument the Scrutiny was designed for a more practicable purpose, not to pardon crimes unpunished but to quash any further action against former atimoi, those penalized under the old regime but restored to rights in 403. (...) In context, coming close upon the summary of Patrocleides¿ decree, ¿all the laws¿ means all laws affecting atimoi. (2) The other evidence from inscriptions and literary testimony, for the Athenian Amnesty and similar agreements, supports this reading: the oath that closed the covenants, mê mnêsikakein, functions as a rule of estoppel or ¿no reprise¿; it was not in itself a pledge of ¿political forgiveness¿. In regard to the Scrutiny, as in Patrocleides¿ decree, the oath means that old penalties, now cancelled, can never again be enforced. (3) The Scrutiny itself was a reauthorization of the old laws for summary arrest and other standard remedies against atimoi who trespass or violate their restrictions. As a corollary to this re-enactment, the statute of limitations was introduced, ¿to apply the laws from Eucleides¿: the rules punishing the disfranchised cannot be used against those whose liabilities were incurred before 403. (4) Teisamenus¿ decree for new legislation was prior to this revision; it is not the decree that Andocides read to the court as a document of the Scrutiny. An ancient editor simply inserted the wrong document. Teisamenus envisioned no alteration of the ¿Solonian Code¿; the decree for Scrutiny was an unforeseen but necessary correction. These measures were successive reforms sorting out the new hierarchy of rules, a process whose complexity is attested in Diocles¿ law. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Edict of Oedipus (Oedipus Tyrannus 223–51)Edwin CarawanI utter to all Cadmeans this proclamation! Whoever among you knows at whose hands Laius, son of Labdacus, perished, him I command to tell me all! If he is afraid that if he removes upon himself, well and good, he shall suffer nothing else unwelcome, but shall leave the land unharmed. But if someone knows another of you, or a foreigner, to (...) be the killer, let him not be silent; for I can dispense rewards, and gratitude also shall be his. But if you remain silent and someone, fearing for a friend or for himself, rejects this order—what I shall do then you must hear from me! I forbid all belonging to this land, over which I rule and sit upon the throne to receive him or to speak to him, or let him share in prayers and sacrifices to the gods, or to touch holy water; but all must drive him from their homes, since we are polluted as the Pythian oracle of god has just now revealed to me. This is how I shall fight side by side with the god and with the man who died.(223–45)[And I pray that the doer of the deed, whether a single man has gone undetected or he has acted with others, may wear away a miserable life in misery, miserable as he is. And I pray further that if he is by the hearth in my own house with my own knowledge, I may suffer the fate with which I have just cursed others.](246–51)1 [End Page 187]The speech of Oedipus to the assembled Thebans contains this notorious pronouncement of his own doom. It is a troublesome text and has been treated with much ingenuity. I quote above the recent Loeb translation by Lloyd–Jones, not because it has any singular defect, but on the contrary because it is an apt and representative treatment and the translator has fully justified his changes to the text. In the first paragraph he supposes that Oedipus sentences the killer of Laius to exile or excommunication, as almost all other commentators suppose: the penalties described in lines 228–29 and 236–41 must apply to the killer himself. Unfortunately, the text that has come down to us in the manuscripts does not quite say as much. So, as many scholars do, Lloyd– Jones finds a lacuna after line 227 and makes other alterations to suit; the curse against the killer in lines 246–51 now seems superfluous, so he brackets it. These changes are not prompted by any difficulty in the text itself but by the editor's understanding of what the text must mean. One presumes that Oedipus is addressing his every remedy against the perpetrator, the killer who slew Laius by his own hand.2 This essay challenges that presumption and the editorial license that derives from it.In the first section we consider the text that is preserved in the manuscripts, along with the major editorial changes, and find that modern editors, almost without exception, have proceeded on the assumption that the order for exile and excommunication can only apply to the actual killer or "author of the crime." The second section presents the evidence for a different assumption on the part of the ancient audience: that anyone who conceals and consorts with a killer bears a measure of guilt and may be punished accordingly. In the third section I offer a new interpretation of the edict and its implications later in the play, based upon this presumption of guilt by association.§ 1 The speech of Oedipus to the Theban assembly (216–75), as found in the manuscripts, has three sections. There is first a preamble (216–22), lamenting the difficulty of the task. We are then presented with what I shall call "the edict" (223–51), including various measures to assure discovery and punishment of the guilty parties and concluding with [End Page 188] the curse that Oedipus takes upon himself (the passage that Lloyd–Jones bracketed, 246–51). The edict is followed... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:...

Durkheim écrit ce livre avec un but double : d'abord il voulait expliquer ce qui crée une société, ce qui la tient ensemble ; ensuite il voulait éclaircir l'influence qu'a la société sur la pensée logique. Pour Durkheim, la religion est la clé utilisée pour déverrouiller ces deux problématiques.Dans ce livre, Durkheim argumente que les représentations religieuses sont en fait des représentations collectives : l'essence du religieux ne peut être que le sacré. Il est une caractéristique qui se trouve universellement (...) dans toutes les religions. Le sacré, être collectif et impersonnel, représente ainsi la société elle-même. Ensuite il argumente que la société a un impact majeur dans la genèse de la pensée logique. C'est la société qui fournit à l'individu les catégories (le temps, l'espace, le nombre etc.) et les concepts nécessaires pour la pensée logique. (shrink)

É bem conhecida a oposição estabelecida por Kant entre experiência possível e dialética, na medida em que esta última é caracterizada como a “lógica da ilusão”. Ao mesmo tempo, o modo de pensar metafísico, que ocorre dialeticamente, em sentido kantiano, é uma tendência inevitável da razão, expressa na exigência formal de completude das categorias. Como o pensar, enquanto exercício livre da razão, é em si mesmo mais amplo do que a atividade de conhecer, própria do entendimento, o pensar contém o (...) conhecimento, embora este se qualifique pelas regras e pelos limites determinantes da objetividade. A pergunta que tentaremos formular é se essa relação continente-conteúdo não poderia configurar também uma dependência da experiência em relação ao raciocínio dialético, que estaria de algum modo indicada na função reguladora das idéias da razão. Nesse caso, a oposição formal entre conhecer e pensar seria inseparável da inclusão estrutural (dependência) da experiência no âmbito da razão. Na raiz do problema estaria talvez a tensão (dialética) entre a aspiração subjetiva de totalidade e as exigências objetivas de limitação e segmentação da experiência e a forma da experiência teria de ser finalmente concebida a partir de um fundo de inteligibilidade problemática. Dialectics and experienceThe separation of possible experience as objective knowledge and dialetics as a non-objective or non-theoretical knowledge is one of the most important aspects of kantian critical philosophy. But Kant also says that the activity of reason, as a pure thinking, has more amplitude than understanding knowledge. So we could say that theoric knowledge would depend on rational ( and non-theoretical) knowledge, as something contained in it. If we accept that, the consequence would be a relation of dependence between the form of objective knowledge and the background of a problematic – even doubtful – inteligible knowledge. (shrink)

gl. 1. Ėkofilosofii︠a︡ kak zhiznesokhrani︠a︡i︠u︡shchiĭ kulʹturnyĭ proekt -- gl. 2. Obrazy kulʹtury mira v istoriko-personologicheskom izmerenii -- gl. 3. Borʹba za mir v sovremennom mire : opyt, kont︠s︡ept︠s︡ii, modeli resheniĭ.

Em artigo inédito, Franklin Leopoldo e Silva desenvolve os sentidos da memória na produção da identidade, destacando as relações significativas do presente com o passado e o futuro na construção da história. Desse ponto, o autor acentua o papel das instituições nesse processo – um processo de exercício de poder, no qual se tem, na verdade, a institucionalização do poder – e, dentre elas, em particular a instituição universitária.

O presente artigo visa analisar, a partir do pensamento do filósofo Michel Foucault, o exercício da liberdade sob uma perspectiva ética, no âmbito do estoicismo tardio. Liberdade essa que se faz possível a partir do cuidado de si, por meio de exercícios regulares que possibilitam ao indivíduo viver a vida como arte. Com efeito, é na prática do cuidado de si, que o indivíduo se coloca como transformador do mundo e de si mesmo, o qual dá-se no encontro com o (...) outro, longe de ser uma experiência solitária com o próprio eu, realiza-se na associação com outrem. (shrink)

Neste livro Gombrich discute as idéias e as posturas específicas que tiveram influência decisiva na prática da arte renascentista. Todos os estudos aqui reunidos tratam de algo a que se pode chamar clima renascentista de opiniões sobre a arte, além da influência desse clima sobre a prática e a crítica da arte.

Alfred Edward Housman (1859–1936), ki je kasneje postal angleški pesnik in eden največjih filologov svojega časa, je svoj zafrkantski »fragment« objavil pri triindvajsetih, leta 1883, v reviji Bromsgrovian. Revijo je izdajala Bromsgrove School, kjer se je šolal kot najstnik (1870–77); na šolo, ki je prva prepoznala njegov jezikovni in pesniški talent, se je za kratek čas (1881–82) vrnil kot pomožni učitelj po ne­pričakovanem študijskem porazu na Oxfordu. Kot ugotavlja Ralph Marcellino, ni naključje, da besedilo paro­dira predvsem Ajshila, ki je bil (...) Housmanov najljubši pesnik. V njem odzvanja Oresteja, zlasti drami Agamemnon in Prinašalke pitnih darov, verjetno zato, ker so ju dijaki na šoli, kjer je poučeval, pri pouku največ brali. Prav ta ciljna publika je znala ceniti norčevanje iz retoričnih figur ter sintaktičnih konstrukcij, ki jim jih je njihov pomožni učitelj vbijal v glavo. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s concepts shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I consider two different “positive” wittgensteinian accounts―Campbell’s idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass’ proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist, and a Rhodes’ and Gipp’s account, where epistemic aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. I argue that (...) none of them amounts to empathic-phenomenological understanding, but they provide examples of how philosophical concepts can contribute to scientific explanation, and to philosophical clarification respectively. (shrink)

Los recientes desarrollos de la inteligencia artificial generativa suponen desafíos a conceptos tradicionales del Derecho, uno de ellos es el de autoría. El problema que aborda este trabajo es cómo concebir la autoría de una obra escrita por una inteligencia artificial generativa en la que la intervención humana, en cuestiones de estilo y contenido, es nula o mínima. Para ello se enumeran casos recientes en los que se plantea ese problema a partir de artículos escritos empleando ese tipo de tecnología. (...) Pero el objetivo del trabajo es la revisión de la concepción de autoría que subyace a las normativas internacionales que regulan la propiedad intelectual y los presupuestos éticos que las justifican (la concepción de Locke, la concepción romántica y la concepción utilitarista). Sobre la base de una lectura de “¿Qué es un autor?” de Michel Foucault se sostiene que la noción de autoría cumple una función social que, al menos al estado del arte de la inteligencia artificial generativa, esta no puede cumplir y, por tanto, no debe ser reconocida como autora de las obras mencionadas. Concluyendo que las obras literarias elaboradas por inteligencia artificial generativa multipropósito con nula o escasa intervención humana deben ser consideradas como obras de dominio público. (shrink)

O objetivo deste texto é explorar aproximações e divergências no pensamento de Paulo Freire e Ivan Illich na forma como eles vêem a relação entre educação e transformação social. Acredita-se que a retomada da polêmica Freire e Illich sobre o problema educação e transformação social pode contribuir para melhor compreender e esclarecer a verdadeira natureza desse problema, já clássico na história da educação moderna.

Great advances have been made of late years in the understanding of ancient artillery, but the difference between the παλíντινιν and the εθτινιν seems to remain a riddle still inviting solution. In tentatively accepting the invitation, we are met at the outset by a certain amount of fog due to the fact that ancient guns were classed by two methods which produce a cross division. It will pay us to dispel this fog, or at any rate to find our bearings (...) in it as exactly as may be, before going further. (shrink)