The discovery, made in Oxford, that crude penicillin could cure systemic and life‐threatening bacterial infections was followed by attempts to purify penicillin, to determine its structure and then to produce it by total chemical synthesis. The β‐lactam structure of the molecule, first proposed in October 1943, was a source of controversy until 1945. However, no useful chemical synthesis was achieved and fermentation became the commercial source of the antibiotic.In 1953, one of the products of a Cephalosporium sp. from Sardinia was (...) shown to be a new and hydrophilic penicillin (penicillin N). This was contaminated with a substance having the same side‐chain but a characteristic absorption spectrum. The latter, cephalosporin C, showed antibacterial activity but was not inactivated by a penicillinase. The determination of its β‐lactam structure and isolation of its nucleus enabled pharmaceutical companies to produce many semisynthetic cephalosporins.A new tripeptide was later found to be an intermediate in the biosynthesis of both penicillin N and cephalosporin C, and this was followed by the complete elucidation of the biosynthetic pathways leading to these compounds and to benzylpenicillin. (shrink)

This study defines the relationship between humanism and liberalism by comparing the two Victorian figures who were most concerned with the preservation of humanistic values in a free and democratic society: Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill. The book sets apart Arnold and Mill from their contemporaries and points out their similarities to one another in discussions of their theories of history, poetry, their celebration of the contemplative life and their willingness to welcome democracy. At the same time it examines (...) the differences between the two men, which he uses to create a dialogue between humanism and liberalism on the question of how a high cultural ideal can be realized in democratic society. (shrink)

The paper examines the current debates regarding human rights and international law. Two contrasting approaches are analyzed: One is represented by the neoconservative and neoliberal concepts, which justify forcibly “spreading democracy” through the unilateral intervention of a superpower, thus challenging the global rule of law. The other approach consists of strengthening international human rights law and cosmopolitan order. It is represented by the theorists of “discourse ethics” and “cosmopolitan democracy.” The paper analyses the internal relations and difference between the legislation (...) of a particular democratic state and the universality of international law. It examines the tension between the plurality of democratic states and the universal principles of internationallaw, e.g. human rights, which direct us toward a cosmopolitan legal order. It further asserts that universally valid international law is above any positive law of any state, including a democratic state, and provides a regulative principle for external normative critique with regard to human rights. The paper examines important insights provided by discourse ethics theory. The transcendental-pragmatic principle of discourse ethics gives a moral foundation for human rights and thus for the law of a liberaldemocratic state as well as for international law. As Karl-Otto Apel notes, the idea of democracy is not identical to that of universally valid law, and the universal concept of law cannot be reduced to the legislative autonomy of any state. Jürgen Habermas argues for an “egalitarian universalism” and emphasizes the paramount role of international law as a medium for the advancement of human rights. The analysis shows that the universal concept of human rights cannot be adequately realized either by individual democratic states or by a “world republic” as a hegemonic superpower. Rather, its realization requires strengthened international law and institutions such as a properly reformed UN. The contemporary period is viewed as a transitional phase from an international to a cosmopolitan order. (shrink)

Must the state handle the adjudication of disputes? Researchers of different perspectives, from heterodox scholars of law who advocate legal pluralism to libertarian economists who advocate the privatization of law, have increasingly questioned the idea that the state is, or should be, the only source of law. Both groups point out that government law has problems and that non-state alternatives exist. This Article discusses some problems with the public judicial system and several for-profit alternatives. Public courts lack both incentives to (...) embrace customer orientation and pricing mechanisms, plus they face problems associated with the bureaucratic provision of services. When parties are able to choose their tribunals, in contrast, those tribunals must provide service to customers and be mindful about conserving resources. Competition between arbitrators also can allow for experimentation and the provision of customized services rather than a centrally planned, one-size-fits-all system. Contracts with arbitration clauses can easily stipulate the choice of tribunal, and we argue that if government courts simply refused to overrule binding arbitration agreements, de facto privatization could easily take place. This Article discusses how the private adjudication of disputes could enable the market to internalize externalities and provide services that customers desire. (shrink)

Michael Faraday’s laboratory experiments have dominated traditional histories of the electrical sciences in 1820s and 1830s Britain. However, as this article demonstrates, in the mining region of Cornwall, Robert Were Fox fashioned a very different approach to the study of electromagnetic phenomena. Here, it was the mine that provided the foremost site of scientific experimentation, with Fox employing these underground locations to measure the Earth’s heat and make claims over the existence of subterranean electrical currents. Yet securing philosophical claims cultivated (...) in mines proved challenging for Fox, with metropolitan audiences, including Faraday, loath to give credit to the results of these underground experiments. This article explores how Fox developed a way of modeling his mine experiments, using clay samples, to communicate knowledge from industrial Cornwall to urban centers of elite science. It argues that the mine was an epistemologically complex venue of scientific activity, at once seeming to provide a way of examining nature directly, without recourse to laboratory contrivance, while simultaneously being a place where knowledge claims were hard to verify without access to these physically challenging locations. In exploring Fox’s work, this study contributes to a growing literature of spatial investigation that takes the vertical as its unit of analysis. (shrink)

As of 2017, 65.6 million individuals have been displaced from their homes, fleeing their homelands in search of refuge from the violence, oppression, and chaos of civil war. The mass movement of people across internal and external borders only proves that there are certain aspects of the human condition that cannot be confined within the strict idea of territories and nation-states, that the political and legal approach in organising the interaction and relationships between people is deficient. I argue that there (...) is a need to recalibrate all existing ideologies in relation to the interactions and relationships between peoples coming from different parts of the world. In order to do this, I intend to examine the current legal norm and connect it to cosmopolitan ethics that are grounded on the idea of spatiality. Elucidating on the ideas presented by thinkers such as Seyla Benhabib, Anthony Kwame Appiah, Gloria Anzaldua, and Tetsuro Watsuji, I argue that to fully actualise cosmopolitan ethics we must investigate how space operates in the existence of man—a deterritorialised existence found in the borders. (shrink)

In his recent review of the Galileo affair, Pope John Paul II confidently proclaimed the intellectual autonomy of religion, comfortably affirming that the methods and ideas of religion are cleanly separable from those of the sciences. Unfortunately, a close review of the actual details of the Galilean controversy reveals that the lesson to be learned from that famous case is not one of sanitary intellectual compartmentalization, but one of entangling interdependencies among scientific, religious, and philosophical thought.

But how is is that thought (viz., sense, imagination, and thought proper) is sometimes followed by action, sometimes not; sometimes by movement, sometimes not? What happens seems parallel to the case of thinking and inferring about the immovable objects of science. There the end is the truth seen (for, when one conceives the two premises, one at once conceives and comprehends the conclusion), but here the two premises result in a conclusion which is an action…Now that the action is the (...) conclusion is clear. But the premises of action are of two kinds, of the good and of the possible. Aristotle, De Motu Animalium, 701a, 6–10, 23–25. (shrink)

In the varying perspectives of theological thought the contrasting ideas of transcendence and immanence must inevitably be looked at together. To whatever extent they are held to be mutually compatible or mutually exclusive, neither can be considered without at least some cognizance being taken of the other. Nevertheless, in the swinging of the pendulum from era to era, first one and then the other theme receives the greater weight of attention. Thus, nineteenth-century liberalism placed more emphasis on immanence, whereas the (...) twentieth-century revolt against liberalism has concentrated on transcendence. In this book the author studies the transcendent aspect of God as developed by five contemporary theologians. Two of the men whose work Dr. Farley examines, Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, are thoroughly familiar. The other three, Karl Heim, Charles Hartshorne, and Henry Nelson Wieman, have received less attention in recent studies. The five represent widely divergent traditions, but all of them agree in opposing immanentism. Moreover, they all deal with the tension between the philosophical and the Biblical affirmations of God's transcendence, and attempt to show, in their respective ways, how these types of ""beyondness"" are related. (shrink)

Kant’s attempts to formulate a conception of the harmony of nature and freedom have two logical presuppositions. The first presupposition is separation of ought and is, which provides a logical formulation of the separation of freedom and nature. Kant might well have settled on the view that the separation between nature and freedom cannot be bridged. Why did Kant attempt to overcome said separation? The second presupposition of Kant’s project to bridge nature and freedom involves an ought→can inference, stating that (...) moral obligation implies the possibility of its fulfillment. There are at least two ways this inference can be understood. There is a weak sense of the inference, stating that no one is obliged to do the impossible. There is also a very strong sense of the inference, stating that if a moral obligation is found to obtain, it must then be possible to fulfill it. Kant interprets the ought→can inference in this strong as well as in the weak sense. Nature, the law-governed totality of what exists, must be understood as able to provide a suitable field for moral realization. The isomorphism between the lawfulness of nature and that of moral freedom animate Kant’s account of moral judgment, and will provide the main focus of the current investigation. Kant conceives of nature and freedom as twin kingdoms, thus providing a theoretical model validating this ought→can inference. The weaker sense of this ought→can inference does justice to moral judgment without requiring the awesome task of bridging nature and freedom. Why, then, should we maintain the strong ought→can inference in our post-Kantian situation? I suggest that Kant’s insistence on the strong ought→can inference may yield an ethical approach to the ever more powerful ways in which human beings technologically transform nature, including human nature itself. (shrink)

Carl Henry devotes a few chapters directly (and a few indirectly) in volume 6 of his God, Revelation, and Authority [GRA] to the problem of evil [POE]. The author examines Henry’s contribution as a theologian, noting that GRA is a work of theology, not philosophy proper. However, Henry had a PhD in Philosophy (Boston, 1949), and one finds present several presuppositions and control beliefs that are philosophically motivated. Observation of the text reveals several of these. Chief here is Henry’s working (...) assumption that to understand and explain the nature of evil, one must first understand and explain the nature, origin and etiology of good. This point and its implications are developed at length in this article. Unsurprising is Henry’s contribution exhibiting an awareness of methods and theodical approaches traditionally used by philosophers of religion such as Rowe, Plantinga, and Hick. Surprising is the fact that Henry does not clearly take a side on the nature of human free will. What he does say seems to underdetermine his exact position. Finally, the importance of Kant vis a vis Henry’s theodicy and entire theological program is emphasized as well. (shrink)