Patočka’s text from 1946, right after World War II and before the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, analyzes the important historical events he was living through from a philosophical perspective. Patočka describes the crisis in Enlightenment-based social humanism, which even though having won the war, was left battered and distrusted for not preventing the disaster. With this branch of social humanism being discredited, people turned towards its Eastern manifestation, i.e., Socialism or Communism. Patočka distinguishes the various aspects of Socialism that exist (...) undifferentiated within the term: the concept of Man, ideology, and the Idea. The liberation of the Idea is twisted when combined with a material concept of Man as just one force among other forces, which the ideology then uses and abuses for an external aim. (shrink)

In this essay, Domenico Jervolino summarizes twenty years of Ricoeur’s reading of Patočka’s work, up to the Neapolitan conference of 1997. Nowhere is Ricoeur closer to Patočka’s a-subjective phenomenology. Both thinkers belong, together with authors like Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, to a third phase of the phenomenological movement, marked by the search for a new approach to the relation between human beings and world, beyond Husserl and Heidegger. In the search for this approach, Patočka strongly underlines the relation between body, temporality (...) and sociality. Central to this new encounter of Patočka and Ricoeur is the discovery of an idea of inter-human community based on a a-subjective conception of existence. (shrink)

In What Is Thought? Eric Baum proposes a computational explanation of thought.

In this response I take issue with Professor Ausland’s use of the account of the soul in Republic 4 as a basis for reading Republic 8-9. I believe that the method and assumptions of Republic 4 are pre-dialectical and that Books 8-9 should be read in light of the digressive Books 5-7. By placing greater emphasis on the asymmetry between Book 4 and Books 8-9, the basic assumptions governing the decline of regimes will show themselves to tell a different story (...) of moral experience and moral decomposition than we find in Professor Ausland’s instructive and insightful reading of the dialogue. (shrink)

Wheatland intends in this work to demythologize the "Frankfurt school" and answer a lacuna by providing a detailed social history of its American exile and reception. He undertakes the first task by distinguishing the "Horkheimer circle" from later portrayals of the continuity and homogeneity of their thought, the mystique of theorizing in the "splendid isolation" of alienated exile, and their significance for the radical politics of the 1960s. Although it is doubtful that many philosophers and theorists believe these myths, and (...) the book can be unsatisfying due to its overly generalizing and partial treatment of philosophical positions and arguments, it is helpful to understanding the Frankfurt exiles' social contexts and the impact of their connections with colleagues, critics, and interpreters in American academic, Jewish, and leftist circles.Part 1 portrays the complicated efforts to re-establish the Institute for Social Research in New York and Columbia University's interest in Horkheimer and his associates. Since they offered expertise in and a model for interdisciplinary empirical research integrating sociology, psychology, and theory, they were a solution to the decline of Columbia's sociology program, which was interested in expanding empirical social research in a situation of intense competition for funding. While fears of their Marxist connections persisted, the exiles' ever. (shrink)

I address two seemingly unrelated topics: the first is the subject and formulation of the hypotheses and the second is the number of hypotheses. On the topic of the subject of the hypotheses, my position is that we are initially given an indefinite monad, a “one”, which is in no case “the one”, “the one itself”, or the form of unity. We are meant to read the hypotheses with the question in mind, “what one is this?” If we do so, (...) we are confronted with strikingly different answers, which, when taken together, point us toward key insights into the nature of intelligibility. On the topic of the number of hypotheses: we are led to expect four, but we are given eight. My position is that we are meant to disarm apparent contradictions between paired hypotheses, especially H1-H2 but also H3-4, 5-6, and 7-8, because doing so will help us further determine the different types of monad Parmenides has in view. In the end, two primary types of monad emerge from the process of disambiguation, namely, form and sensible particular, and we, having differentiated these types of “one”, will have gathered resources for understanding how sensible particulars are grounded in forms. (shrink)

Papers presented to various conferences, 2003-2006.

Starting from a clear, experimentally verified, example of a flexible biological system -- an ant colony --, it is hypothesized that adaptability is enhanced at the "edge of chaos ", that is, in the vicinity of a point of instability. An ant colony exhibiting an appropriate combination of group and mass recruitment can adaptively switch to a newly introduced food source if it is richer: this is precisely the case of some species, such as Tetramorium caespitum, whose behavioral parameters are (...) argued to be those characterizing the edge of chaos. Several simple models of foraging show the robustness of the argument. (shrink)

Human rights law does not appear to enjoy as high a level of compliance as the laws of war, yet is institutionalized to a greater degree. This Article argues that the reason for this difference is related to the strategic structure of international law. The laws of war are governed by a regime of reciprocity, which can produce selfenforcing patterns of behavior, whereas the human rights regime attempts to produce public goods and is thus subject to collective action problems. The (...) more elaborate human rights institutions are designed to overcome these problems but fall prey to second-order collective action problems. The simple laws of war institutions have been successful because they can exploit the logic of reciprocity. The Article also suggests that limits on military reprisals are in tension with self-enforcement of the laws of war. The U.S. conflict with Al Qaeda is discussed. (shrink)

An attempt to construct a broad, interdisciplinary framework for thinking about ethical issues, and acting on them, from a leading researcher in the field.

This article deals with the concept of infinity in classical American philosophy. It focuses on the philosophical and technical developments of infinity in the 19th Century American thinkers Royce and Peirce.

Much recent work on the masculinities enacted by early Christians has focused upon Christian texts and claims about their heroes and practices among elite Christians. Lucian’s Passing of Peregrinus offers another avenue for thinking about early Christian masculinity. Lucian denies Peregrinus’ claim to masculinity on the basis of his over-concern for honour, especially from the masses, his inability to control his appetites regarding food and sex, his being a parricide, his enacting ‘strange’ ascetic practices and his lack of courage in (...) the face of death. By tying Peregrinus to a Christian community in Judea, Lucian both demonstrates the lack of manliness in the Christian movement, which he suggests is populated mostly by gullible women and children, and further ‘unmans’ Peregrinus by linking him to a community of easily duped people whose praise is not worthy of a philosopher. By presenting this Christian community as a group that not only accepts Peregrinus as a member but also quickly establishes him as their leader, almost at par with Jesus himself, according to Lucian’s account, these early Christians show their lack of self-control by being deceived by a charlatan. Early Christian writers who claimed that their heroes were manly, even more manly than the Greek or Roman heroes, were writing in part to rebut the types of claims made by writers like Lucian. (shrink)

The view that belief is a dyadic relation between a believer and some other object, e.g., a proposition, appears to receive support from the fact that we can infer ‘There is something that Jones believes' from ordinary belief ascriptions such as ‘Jones believes that the tallest man is wise’. On consideration, however, it turns out that even a crude nonrelational view of belief can accommodate this inference. In order to permit the inference the nonrelationalist must read‘ There is something that (...) Jones believes' as equivalent to‘ Jones has a belief. (shrink)

Though hippocampal volume reduction is a pathological hallmark of schizophrenia, the molecular pathway responsible for this degeneration remains unknown. Recent reports have suggested the potential role of impaired blood-brain barrier function in schizophrenia pathogenesis. However, direct evidence demonstrating an impaired BBB function is missing. In this preliminary study, we used immunohistochemistry and serum immunoglobulin G antibodies to investigate the state of BBB function in formalin-fixed postmortem samples from the hippocampus and surrounding temporal cortex of patients with schizophrenia and controls without (...) schizophrenia matched for age, sex, and race. Since a functional BBB prevents the extravasation of IgGs, detection of IgGs in the parenchyma is used as direct evidence of BBB breakdown. We also developed a semi-quantitative approach to quantify the extent of IgG leak and therein BBB breach. Analysis of our immunohistochemistry data demonstrated a significantly higher incidence of IgG leak in patients with schizophrenia compared to controls. Further, BBB permeability was significantly higher in advanced-age patients with schizophrenia than both advanced-age controls and middle-aged patients with schizophrenia. Male patients with schizophrenia also demonstrated a significant increase in IgG permeability compared to control males. Interestingly, the extravasated IgGs also demonstrated selective immunoreactivity for neurons. Based on these observations, we suggest that BBB dysfunction and IgG autoantibodies could be two key missing pathoetiological links underwriting schizophrenia hippocampal damage. (shrink)

Several accounts of logical truth are compared and shown to define distinct concepts. Nevertheless, conditions are given under which they happen to declare exactly the same sentences logically true. These conditions involve the variety of objects in the domain, the richness of the language, and the logical resources available. It is argued that the class of sentences declared logically true by each of the accounts depends on particularities of the actual world.

The Jeffreys–Lindley paradox exposes a rift between Bayesian and frequentist hypothesis testing that strikes at the heart of statistical inference. Contrary to what most current literature suggests, the paradox was central to the Bayesian testing methodology developed by Sir Harold Jeffreys in the late 1930s. Jeffreys showed that the evidence for a point-null hypothesis $${\mathcal {H}}_0$$ H 0 scales with $$\sqrt{n}$$ n and repeatedly argued that it would, therefore, be mistaken to set a threshold for rejecting $${\mathcal {H}}_0$$ H 0 (...) at a constant multiple of the standard error. Here, we summarize Jeffreys’s early work on the paradox and clarify his reasons for including the $$\sqrt{n}$$ n term. The prior distribution is seen to play a crucial role; by implicitly correcting for selection, small parameter values are identified as relatively surprising under $${\mathcal {H}}_1$$ H 1. We highlight the general nature of the paradox by presenting both a fully frequentist and a fully Bayesian version. We also demonstrate that the paradox does not depend on assigning prior mass to a point hypothesis, as is commonly believed. (shrink)

Translated Felicia McCarren. Stanford: Stanford UP and Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995 (Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics series). Pages: xxiii + 161. Pb: 0 8047 2385 0; 10.95. Hb: 0 8047 2376 I; 25.00. Originally published in French as Musica Ficta (Figures de Wagner). Paris: Christian Bourgois, 1991.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 12.1 (2002) 95-102 [Access article in PDF] Bioethics Inside the Beltway Some Initial Reflections on NBAC Eric M. Meslin and Harold T. Shapiro On 3 October 2001, Executive Order 12975 expired, and with it so too did the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC). Established by President Bill Clinton in 1995, NBAC was the fifth national committee since 1974 created to advise the U.S. (...) government on bioethics policy. In the long political tradition in this country that national bioethics policy advice should use temporary rather than permanent bodies, NBAC followed in the footsteps of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1974-78); the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1980-83); the Ethics Advisory Board (1978-80); and the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee (1988-89). Arguably, other distinguished panels could lay claim to recognition as a "national bioethics committee" including the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) (1994-95); the Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research Panel (1988); the Human Embryo Research Panel (1994); and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC), which continues to function.These committees and commissions form a kind of a continuum, albeit occasionally interrupted by periods during which no such bodies existed. Each arose from a particular confluence of events and circumstances. NBAC was no different; its history can be traced both to a series of discussions within the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy beginning in 1993 (NBAC 1998a, p. 3), and to a specific recommendation from ACHRE that called for a national committee to address ethical issues in human subjects research (ACHRE 1995, p. 817). Nbac's Impact In his useful comparison of the accomplishments of the National Commission and the President's Commission, Brad Gray concluded that seven lessons were learned, the sixth of which was that "nothing substitutes for having a perceptible impact on either policy or practice" (Gray 1995, p. 304). Assessing NBAC's [End Page 95] impact on "policy or practice" is difficult, particularly given the fact that it so recently completed its work. More time may be needed before a full assessment can be undertaken of the impact of its six reports (and their total of 120 recommendations). Instead, in this essay we offer some reflections on NBAC's initial impact, using some specific examples of how bioethics gets done Inside the Beltway. Eliciting Reaction If immediate reaction by the White House is any measure of impact, then Cloning Human Beings (NBAC 1997) had a significant one. The day after he received this report in a Rose Garden ceremony, President Clinton submitted a bill to Congress that would have extended the moratorium on federal funding to create a child using somatic cell nuclear transfer. This bill never passed, nor has any other bill emerged that has enjoyed the support of the House and the Senate. Five states have enacted legislation to date, but these vary in their permissibility from bans on all forms of cloning to bans similar to the one proposed by NBAC, which recommended a time-limited prohibition only on somatic cell transfer to create a child (reproductive cloning).If the Cloning report elicited speedy action from the White House, this paled in comparison to the reaction that led to and, in turn, was created by Ethical Issues in Human Stem Cell Research (NBAC 1999a). Those who believe that government moves slowly need only be reminded of the events of 8-14 November 1998 (and, as we shall mention below, the further events of 14 July 1999). Some will recall that early in the second week of November 1998, James Thomson and his colleagues published in Nature and John Gearhart and his colleagues published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences that they had isolated and cultured human primordial stem cells and germ cells respectively. Within days of these remarkable reports, Advanced Cell Technology (ACT) announced via an article written by Nicholas Wade in the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Is Literature Self-Referential?Eric MillerIIs literary language necessarily self-referential? And does this put paradox at the heart of literature? For at least two decades now, affirmative answers to both questions have been articles of faith among critics in the structuralist and poststructuralist mainstream. Literature’s ineluctable paradoxicality attracts us so because a paradox suggests that there are limits to human rationality, and thus strikes a blow for literature and against (...) science. Paradox ensures literature its own special realm, safe from the culturally imperialistic inroads of science’s orderly, rational-empirical constructions. Literature thus gets to be seen as “bigger” than reason, because only literature can live with paradox, and thus only literature reveals those “deeper” truths of contradiction-ridden human existence, whereas science can never penetrate beyond rational manipulations of phenomenal surfaces. Indeed, for anyone who holds all human existence to be fundamentally paradoxical, this special capacity makes literature the only genuine, demystified species of human knowledge. In the war between C. P. Snow’s Two Cultures, a war humanists are now losing badly, we like to regard paradox as our ultimate weapon.Belief in the paradoxicality of literature may also be found among the New Critics, 1 and in fact goes back at least to the Romantics, 2 but they did not derive this belief from a necessary self-referentiality of literary language. This newer way of deriving paradox appears to offer several competitive advantages. Self-reference seems to be the ultimate version of “art for art’s sake”: if all literary language is necessarily self-referential, then literature must be something totally self-contained, and is thus legitimized solely in and through itself. In addition, deriving [End Page 475] literature’s paradoxicality from self-reference seems to ground it in the same conceptual realm as mathematical logic, and thus tempts us to claim for literature a “rigor” normally conceded only to logic, mathematics, and theoretical physics. Self-referentiality would thus seem both to protect literature’s autonomy and to raise its cultural status into the company of mathematics and science.But it is a trap. For behind this new strategy lurks a capitulation to the underlying conceptual scheme of natural science, and literature thus comes to be conceived, in effect, as a science. Self-reference is, after all, still a kind of reference; paradox is still a kind of truth-relational construction;—and truth-relations built around reference constitute the correspondence theory of truth. From such a foundational commitment to reference and correspondence-truth, flows the rest of the scientific worldview: the dualism of referring expression and referent, word and object, sentence and fact, theory and data, language and world, culture and nature. The presentation of literature as a quasi-negation of this ontology changes nothing. The dualism of reference still functions as literature’s conceptual starting point, as its arche. We only appear to be defining a peculiar and radically distinct sphere for literature when we insist on its self-referentiality, on the (recursive) identity, for it, of referring expression and referent. For, this is still to treat the conceptual distinction between the two as foundational, and literature thereby tacitly assimilates science’s fundamental categorial division: the referential language-world duality of correspondence truth. Indeed, literature thus comes to live even more completely in the margins of science: it will have no essence of its own; it will differ at most in being a photo-negative image of science’s positiv(istic) project. In Snow’s war, self-reference is a Trojan horse.With self-reference as the essence of literature, we are thus staking our reputations on literature’s being a special field of formalizable “knowledge about...,” rather than, say, a quality or kind or realm of possible experience—which is to adopt science’s understanding of what is important. Matters are only made worse by that other attempt to define literary studies as a negation of the theory-data dualism of natural science: the poststructuralist denial of the distinction between criticism and literature. For the institutional need professional critics have to be seen as a discipline with a method and a subject, as a form of “knowledge about,” hardly disappears with... (shrink)