This article is the editors’ introduction to the transcript of a lecture that Harold Garfinkel delivered to a seminar in 1993. Garfinkel extensively discusses the relevance of Aron Gurwitsch’s phenomenological treatment of Gestalt theory for ethnomethodology. Garfinkel uses the term “misreading” to signal a respecification of Gurwitsch’s phenomenological investigations, and particularly his conceptions of contextures, functional significations, and phenomenal fields, so that they become compatible with detailed observations and descriptions of social actions and interactions performed in situ. Garfinkel begins with (...) Gurwitsch’s demonstrations with line drawings and other abstract examples, and suggests how they can be used to suggest original procedures for investigating the vicissitudes of embodied practical actions in the lifeworld. This introduction to the lecture aims to provide some background on the scope of Gurwitsch’s phenomenological critique and elaboration of Gestalt theory and Garfinkel’s “misreading” of it in terms of his own conceptions of indexicality and accountability, and ethnomethodological investigations of the production of social order. (shrink)

Islamic moderateness is said to be one of the key factors that contribute to the promotion of peace in Muslim societies. We present an empirical study conducted in Indonesia ( N = 299) that assessed Islamic political moderateness and examined its role in explaining Muslims’ tolerance towards non-Muslims, as well as the first group’s support for making reconciliation with the latter group. We found as hypothesised that Islamic political moderateness was a positive predictor of outgroup tolerance, because of the role (...) it had in positively predicting the sense of national identity as a higher order identity vis-à-vis Islamic identity (i.e. higher order nested identity). Outgroup tolerance positively predicted and, in turn, fully mediated the positive association between Islamic political moderateness and Muslims’ reconciliatory tendencies, including feelings of collective guilt and shame, intergroup trust and perspective-taking, intergroup cooperation, willingness to apologise, as well as support for intergroup empowerment and reparative actions. These findings suggest the benefit of Islamic political moderateness to drive Muslims to appreciate the existence of non-Muslims. We discuss these empirical findings in terms of theoretical implications, research limitations and practical implications. (shrink)

The life, works, and philosophy of rabbi Hasdai Crescas.

The current investigations examine how globalization signifying either identity threat or realistic threat has a differential role in mediating the effect of competitive victim-hood on Muslims’ religious fundamentalism. Study 1 revealed that identity globalization threat and not realistic globalization threat significantly mediated the effect of competitive victimhood on Muslims’ religious fundamentalism. Study 2 successfully replicated the finding in Study 1. Moreover, Study 2 also revealed that such mediating role of identity globalization threat was stronger among participants perceiving Muslims as having (...) high than low group entitativity, which refers to the extent to which Muslims as a group are considered to be a one, homogenous collective rather than an aggregation of individuals. Theoretical implications for understanding situational or social factors of Muslims’ religious fundamentalism are discussed, as are strategies to reduce competitive victimhood among members of this religious group. (shrink)

In lectures and writings in the decades following the publication of Studies in Ethnomethodology [1967], Harold Garfinkel, the founder of ethnomethodology, developed what he called a “misreading” of the phenomenological writings of Aron Gurwitsch, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and others. Garfinkel’s “misreading” included a selective and creative treatment of themes that Gurwitsch drew from Gestalt psychology, such as figure-ground, Gestalt contexture, and the phenomenal field. Rather than identifying these themes with visual perception demonstrated with picture-puzzles (for example, of animals hidden in foliage) (...) and line drawings of reversible figures, Garfinkel used them to demonstrate praxeological and interactional phenomena: organizations of embodied activity that constitute fields of collective action. Phenomenal fields, for Garfinkel, are formed through embodied work performed in concert with the actions of others. Although Harvey Sacks, the founder of Conversation Analysis, did not explicitly mention Gurwitsch, phenomenology or Gestalt psychology in his writings and transcribed lectures, some of his writings on the sequential organization of conversation seem informed, if only indirectly through his relationship with Garfinkel, by Gurwitsch’s treatment of visual and auditory phenomena. Both Garfinkel and Sacks devised innovative ways to transpose Gestalt phenomena from perceptual psychology to social formations. (shrink)

On Javanese philosophy and ethics as reflected in Javanese culture based on Wedhatama, a Javanese classical literature written by K.G.P.A.A. Mangkunegara IV; includes the original text of Wedhatama in Javanese.

On Javanese philosophy and ethics as reflected in Javanese culture based on Wulang reh, a Javanese classical literature written by Paku Buwana IV; includes the original text of Wulang reh in Javanese and its Indonesian translation.

This paper examines Harold Garfinkel’s work with ELIZA and a related program LYRIC from 1967 to 1969. AI researchers have tended to treat successful human–machine interaction as if it relied primarily on non-human machine characteristics, and thus the often-reported attribution of human-like qualities to communication with computers has been criticized as a misperception—and humans who make such reports referred to as “deluded.” By contrast Garfinkel, building on two decades of prior research on information and communication, argued that the ELIZA and (...) the LYRIC “chatbots” were achieving interactions that felt human to many users by exploiting human sense-making practices. In keeping with his long-term practice of using “trouble” as a way of discovering the taken-for-granted practices of human sense-making, Garfinkel designed scripts for ELIZA and LYRIC that he could disrupt in order to reveal how their success depended on human social practices. Hence, the announcement “Machine Down” by the chatbot was a desired result of Garfinkel’s interactions with it. This early (but largely unknown) research has implications not only for understanding contemporary AI chatbots, but also opens possibilities for respecifying current information systems design and computational practices to provide for the design of more flexible information objects. (shrink)

This article describes two heuristic strategies for problem solving: the use of false assumption strategy and the use of double false assumption strategy. Both of these strategies have their roots deep in history. In this article, we define these two strategies and illustrate their use in a problem developed by Frances Pellos. The article provides an overview of occurrences of these two strategies in various mathematical and educational texts. The texts show clearly that both of these strategies played a significant (...) role in mathematics education in the past. We present some examples from concrete historical documents, which we use later for the preparation of a teaching experiment. We also present the conclusions of an experiment conducted on three lower secondary schools in the Czech Republic, the goal of which was to test the applicability of the use of false assumption strategy as a propaedeutic to solving word problems using equations. (shrink)

The difficult phrase ὅ ποτε ὄν ἐστι (hereafter ‘OPO’), which occurs in key passages in Aristotle’s discussions of blood and of time, has long vexed interpreters of Aristotle. This paper proposes a new interpretation of OPO, which resolves some textual and interpretative problems about Aristotle’s theories of blood and of time. My interpretation will also shed light on more general issues in Aristotle’s metaphysics. In the passages I will discuss, Aristotle takes both blood and time to be examples of his (...) peculiar ‘coupled entities’. He then uses OPO to provide explanations which differ from what we might call his ‘standard’ metaphysical explanations. On the ‘standard’ approach, Aristotle explains derivative entities—non-substances—by describing their relationship to substances. By contrast to this standard form of explanation, when Aristotle uses OPO he explains blood and time by describing their relationship to non-substances. This paper thus identifies a new species of metaphysical dependence in Aristotle. In addition, it provides detailed examination of evidence concerning whether Aristotle himself used coupled entities in his own physical and metaphysical theories. (shrink)

The Posterior Analytics has long been considered to raise and to go part of the way toward answering important philosophical questions concerning existence and essence. In the recent literature, however, scholars have been taking the view that the existence-essence distinction is not captured.

The absence of grammatical subject and object in Parmenides' "it is/it is not" allows the reading of the verbal forms not as copulas but as names, with no implicit subject nor elided predicate. Once there are two only alternatives, contrary and excluding each other, sustaining that a 'no-name' does not grant knowledge implies identifying its opposite – "it is" – as the only name conducive to knowledge in itself, denouncing the 'inconceivability of a knowledge that does not know. If "it (...) is" is the only [name] "which can be thought/known", and "what is" is the way in which 'thought/knowledge' can be accomplished, there is no need to postulate the existence of 'anything' that is, nor of anything that can be said of "what is". Being the only name which "can be thought of/known", the unifying synthesis of "knowledge, knowing and known" in one infallible cognitive state, it is unthinkable that "what is" does not exist. (shrink)

While historical cultural materials inform users of the past, they may also contain language that perpetuates long-entrenched patterns of discrimination. In organizing and providing access to such materials, cultural heritage institutions must negotiate historical language and context with the comprehension and perspectives of modern audiences. Excerpted from a larger project exploring representation and access around historical terminology and personal identity, the present work offers insight into how knowl­edge organization systems may be used to help modern users confront and make sense (...) of past, discriminatory language in the archive. Using keywords drawn from the titles of 19th and 20th sideshow performer photographs, this work details the construction of a mapping dictionary that brings together corresponding terminology from several vocabulary sources along with annotations designed to explain historical terms to modern audiences. The development of this dictionary revealed several major types of problematic and potentially discriminatory language including historical euphemisms, misnomers, outdated terms, and sensationalist monikers. The finished dictionary offers opportunities to address these through explanatory annotations and to provide a richer, multi-perspective approach to subject analysis for these and other historical materials. (shrink)

이 논문에서 나는 소크라테스의 엘렌코스가 검증의 역할을 수행하는 진리탐구의 한 방법이며, 비단 윤리의 영역에서 뿐만 아니라 지식을 획득할 수 있는 모든 영역에 있어서 사용되는 탐구방법임을 주장한다. 소크라테스의 엘렌코스에 대한 논의는 대부분 플라톤의 초기 대화편에 한정하여 이루어지지만, 나는 『필레보스』를 통해 엘렌코스의 목적을 밝혀야만 한다고 주장한다. 엘렌코스를 진지한 탐구방법으로 보지 않는 해석은 엘렌코스가 탐구에 성공하지 못하고 아포리아에 빠져버리는 대화상황만을 고려했기 때문인데, 『필레보스』에서는 인간에게 좋은 것이 무엇인지에 대한 탐구가 성공한 경우에 엘렌코스가 쓰인 것을 볼 수 있기 때문이다. 엘렌코스는 언제나 ‘ti esti 물음’에서 (...) 시작하는 탐구와 동시에 작동하며, 소크라테스는 상대방을 논박하는 데에 관심이 있는 것이 아니라 프로타르코스라는 좋은 대화상대자와 함께 대화를 잘 이어나가 탐구를 수행하기를 원한다는 점, 그리고 실제로 이들이 변증술을 통해 성공적으로 탐구를 이행하게 된다는 점을 들어 나는 이 방법이 진리탐구를 목적으로 한다고 주장한다. (shrink)

Charles Eisenmann, dans un compte-rendu critique de la Pensée juridique, publié dans la Revue de droit public en 1961, écrivait : " On voudrait proclamer d'abord sans réserves, les rares qualités de l'ouvrage, qui en rendent la lecture très recommandable, en particulier pour ceux qui, jeunes ou juristes déjà formés, n'ont pas encore ou n'ont plus commerce très assidu avec la théorie ou la philosophie du droit. Ils prendront contact avec une pensée vivante et chaude, qui cherche avec ardeur, (...) souplesse et agilité." Les qualités qui ont conduit la Pensée juridique à être un des ouvrages de base de la formation théorique de toute une génération de juristes, celle des décennies 60-70, demeurent encore aujourd'hui intactes. C'est pourquoi il nous a paru souhaitable d'ouvrir la nouvelle collection des introuvables des éditions Panthéon- Assas par une réédition de l'ouvrage de Michel Virally. (shrink)

This book has been ably reviewed by others. I am taking a second look at it now on the occasion of the publication of its sequel, a review of which I also provide in this volume. I have had the distinct pleasure of being a student and colleague of Vasilis Politis (VP) since the initiation of the project that led to these monographs, and the great privilege of witnessing the development of the project for more than a decade. VP’s Plato (...) is in a way the only one I have known. When I hear the terms ‘aporia’, ‘whether-or-not’, and ‘ti esti’, they ring in my ears like bells. In this double review, I hope to impress upon the reader the unique importance of this interpretation of Plato, both for the history of philosophy and philosophy more broadly, and thereby to give a sense of its melody and resonance. (shrink)

In this book, VP builds upon his previous study by shifting focus from the motivation for the ti esti question, to the motivation for the commitment to what is designated by an adequate and true answer to such questions. VP’s aim in this study is to show that what are usually called ‘Forms’ (eidē), rather than being things that have essences, simply are those essences designated by adequate and true answers to ti esti questions. This book is highly (...) recommended for scholars, students, and anyone wishing to understand the core of Plato’s philosophy and its motivations from the ground upwards. (shrink)

In the work of interpreting Parmenides we have witnessed in the ’sixties and ’seventies, in English language scholarship, that rarest of phenomena in the study of ancient philosophy, the emergence of a consensus. Four interpretive theses now seem quite widely shared: Parmenides deliberately suppresses the subject of esti, “is,” or einai, “to be,” in his statement of the two “routes” in B2, his intention being to allow the subject to become gradually specified as the argument unfolds. The negative route, (...) ouk esti, “is not,” or mē einai, “not to be,” is banned because sentences that adhere to it fail to refer to actual entities—the latter to be understood broadly, as will shortly be stated in thesis. The argument does not depend on a confusion between the “is” of predication and the “is” of existence. In the relevant contexts, esti and einai involve a “fused” or “veridical” use of the verb “to be”; in other words, esti or einai have the force of “is actual” or “obtains,” or “is the case,” envisaging a variable subject x that ranges over states-of-affairs. (shrink)

The last twenty years have seen remarkable developments in our understanding of how the ancient Greek thinkers handled the general concept of being and its several varieties. The most general examination of the meaning of the Greek verb 'esti'/'einai'/'on' both in common usage and in the philosophical literature has been presented by Charles H. Kahn, most extensively in his 1973 book The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek. These discussions are summarized in Kahn's contribution to this volume. By and large, (...) they show that conceptual schemes by means of which philosophers have recently approached Greek thought have not been very well suited to the way the concept of being was actually used by the ancients. For one thing, being in the sense of existence played a very small role in Greek thinking according to Kahn. Even more importantly, Kahn has argued that Frege and Russell's thesis that verbs for being, such as 'esti', are multiply ambiguous is ill suited for the purpose of appreciating the actual conceptual assumptions of the Greek thinkers. Frege and Russell claimed that a verb like 'is' or'esti' is ambiguous between the 'is' of identity, the 'is' of existence, the copulative 'is', and the generic 'is' (the 'is' of class-inclusion). At least a couple of generations of scholars have relied on this thesis and fre quently criticized sundry ancients for confusing these different senses of 'esti' with each other. (shrink)

A diagnostic judgment of a teacher can be seen as an inference from manifest observable evidence on a student’s behavior to his or her latent traits. This can be described by a Bayesian model of in-ference: The teacher starts from a set of assumptions on the student (hypotheses), with subjective probabilities for each hypothesis (priors). Subsequently, he or she uses observed evidence (stu-dents’ responses to tasks) and knowledge on conditional probabilities of this evidence (likelihoods) to revise these assumptions. Many systematic (...) deviations from this model (biases, e.g. base-rate neglect, inverse fallacy) are reported in literature on Bayesian reasoning. In a teacher’s situation the information (hypotheses, priors, likelihoods) is usually not explicitly represented numerically (as in most research on Bayesian reasoning), but only by qualitative esti-mations in the mind of the teacher. In our study, we ask to which extent individuals (approximately) apply a rational Bayesian strategy or resort on other biased strategies of processing information for their diagnostic judgments. We explicitly pose this question with respect to non-numerical settings. To investigate this question, we developed a scenario that visually displays all relevant information (hypotheses, priors, likelihoods) in a graphically displayed hypothesis space (called “hypothegon”) – without recurring to numerical representations or mathematical procedures. 42 pre-service teach-ers were asked to judge the plausibility of different misconceptions of six students based on their responses to decimal comparison tasks (e.g. 3.39 > 3.4). Applying a Bayesian classification proce-dure, we identified three updating strategies: A Bayesian update strategy (BUS, processing all probabilities), a combined evidence strategy (CES, ignoring the prior probabilities but including all likelihoods), and a single evidence strategy (SES, only using the likelihood of the most probable hypothesis). In study 1, an instruction on the relevance of using all probabilities (priors and likelihoods) only weakly increased the processing of more information. In study 2, we found strong evidence that a visual explication of the prior-likelihood interaction led to an increase of processing the interaction of all relevant information. These results show that the phenomena found in general research on Bayesian reasoning in numerical settings extend to diagnostic judgments in non-numerical settings. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: In antiquity we encounter a distinction of two types of hypothetical syllogisms. One type are the ‘mixed hypothetical syllogisms’. The other type is the one to which the present paper is devoted. These arguments went by the name of ‘wholly hypothetical syllogisms’. They were thought to make up a self-contained system of valid arguments. Their paradigm case consists of two conditionals as premisses, and a third as conclusion. Their presentation, either schematically or by example, varies in different authors. For (...) instance, we find ‘If (it is) A, (it is) B; if (it is) B, (it is) C; therefore, if (it is) A, (it is) C’. The main contentious point about these arguments is what the ancients thought their logical form was. Are A, B, C schematic letters for terms or propositions? Is ‘is’, where it occurs, predicative, existential, or veridical? That is, should ‘A esti’ be translated as ‘it is an A’, ‘A exists’, ‘As exist’ or ‘It is true/the case that A’? If A, B, C are term letters, and ‘is’ is predicative, are the conditionals quantified propositions or do they contain designators? If one cannot answer these questions, one can hardly claim to know what sort of arguments the wholly hypothetical syllogisms were. In fact, all the above-mentioned possibilities have been taken to describe them correctly. In this paper I argue that it would be mistaken to assume that in antiquity there was one prevalent understanding of the logical form of these arguments - even if the ancients thought they were all talking about the same kind of argument. Rather, there was a complex development in their understanding, starting from a term-logical conception and leading to a propositional-logical one. I trace this development from Aristotle to Philoponus and set out the deductive system on which the logic of the wholly hypothetical syllogisms was grounded. (shrink)

‘uester, de uno, per indignationem’ says Achilles Statius at the first of these two places, and again ‘uester, de uno’ at the second. Muretus on the other hand explains ‘uestrae saeuitiae, ferocitatis illius, uobis omnibus, qui formosi estis, innatae.’ Most commentators have taken part with Muretus, and deny that uester in these two passages means tuus; nor is the usage recognised in the lexicons. But when it comes to explaining what, if not tuus, uester does mean, the interpreters are not (...) agreed: they contradict one another, and they even contradict themselves. (shrink)

Plato’s Sophist and Statesman stand out from many other Platonic dialogues by at least two features. First, they do not raise a ti esti question about a single virtue or feature of something, but raise the questions what sophist, statesman, and philosopher are, how they differ from each other, and what worth each should be accorded. Second, a visitor from Elea, rather than Socrates, seeks to addressed these questions and does so by employing what is commonly referred to as (...) the method of collection and division. Some scholars have argued that this so-called method is value neutral and therefore unable to address the question how philosophy differs from sophistry and statesmanship according to worth. This article contends that the procedures of collection and division does not preclude the visitor from taking considerations of worth into account, but rather helps establish an objective basis for settling the main questions of the dialogue. (shrink)

The most famous Socratic question—ti esti touto?—is often pre- ceded by a far less famous, but more fundamental question—esti touto ti? Though this question is posed in many dialogues with re- spect to myriad topics, in every instance it receives but one answer: it is something, namely something that is. The dialogue devoted to why this question always meets with an affirmative answer would appear to be the Parmenides, for there Parmenides throws into question whether the eidē are, (...) only to establish that, if we have opinions that there is some unity in being, such unity must be. Nevertheless, the dramatic setting of the Parmenides is the quarreling of the Pre-Socratic schools, and the popular dismissal of philosophy that their quarreling engendered. For a dialogue that establishes that the object of inquiry is simply because we have opinions about it, we must, as I hope to show, turn to the Euthyphro. (shrink)

This paper aims at exploring a particular dimension of the affinity between Gilles Deleuze and pragmatism: his ontology of the virtual, which results in a metaphysics of power. In Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, the essence of an entity is identical to its power: what can it do? substitutes the Socratic ti esti? as the leading philosophical question. This shift, operated by Spinoza and given a new and adequate ontology by Deleuze, is very close to Peirce’s pragmatic revolution: if Deleuze’s (...) virtual ideas are identical to the range of variations in power and affects that a body may go through, Peirce defines meaning in terms of the whole range of possible effects that an idea would produce if taken to be true. Contradictory as it may sound, the concept of the virtual entails something like a pragmaticism of the singular, which informs every aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy: his doctrine of faculties and his theory of praxis will be used as instances of this pervasiveness. This pragmatist reading of Deleuze could possibly shape an alternative path for contemporary pragmatism: instead of valorising its “edifying” (linguistic, historicistic, humanistic) tendency, Deleuze allows to highlight the vitality of the second vein of pragmatism, the “constructive,” empiricist, speculative, even metaphysical one. (shrink)

En este artículo se aborda el estudio de un fragmento manuscrito andalusí que con-tiene una crítica dirigida a la doctrina záltirí de Ibn Hazm. En primer lugar, se intenta determinar el título de la obra y la identidad del autor. Posteriormente, se ofrece una esti-mación aproximada de la fecha y el lugar de composición del libro. Por último, se pro-porciona información relevante en torno a la figura de Ibn Hazm, sus obras, sus adver-sarios, sus protectores, al igual que sobre (...) el autor del fragmento. El valor histórico del manuscrito es realmente considerable, por lo que aprovecho estas lineas para expresar mi deseo de que en el futuro otros investigadores puedan loca-lizar otro ejemplar de este fragmento que, de algún modo, permita completar la informa-ción proporcionada por el deteriorado manuscrito, actualmente preservado en la Biblioteca de al-Qarawiyyin de Fez, y cuyo microfilm se halla en la Biblioteca General de Rabat. ABSTRACT This article presents an unpublished fragment of an Andalusí manuscript of a text criticizing Ibn Hazm. Identifications are offered of the title of the work and its author, as well as suggestions as to where it was composed. The text also provides valuable information about Ibn Hazm, his writings, his opponents and those who protected him as well as about the author of the text itself. The historical value of the manuscript is great, but the manuscript is incomplete. It is to be hoped that this article will make it possible to discover another manuscript whose contents complement and perhaps complete those of this manuscript, in poor condition, preserved in Fez and, in microfilm, in the Bibliothéque Genérale de Rabat. (shrink)

Hans KELSEN, le plus célèbre philosophe du droit issu du rang des juristes, est surtout connu pour avoir fondé une école juridique (l'Ecole de Vienne) qui radicalise la doctrine du positivisme juridique. Il a défendu, sa vie durant, une conception normativiste du droit et la thèse d'une stricte séparation entre le droit et la science du droit. Si l'on connaît bien en France son ouvrage programmatique sur la Théorie pure du droit, dans sa deuxième édition traduite par Charles Eisenmann, (...) on sait au moins que cette seconde édition, publiée en 1960, n'est pas l'expression définitive de sa pensée. La traduction de la Théorie générale des normes, qui est un ouvrage posthume et inachevé, donne au lecteur français l'occasion de découvrir cette pensée dans ses derniers développements qui rompent en partie avec ceux de l'œuvre précédente. Le Maître viennois y poursuit l'analyse de la norme juridique, entamée dans la Théorie pure du droit, mais il l'approfondit sur certains points et l'infléchit sur d'autres. Il introduit ainsi de nouvelles réflexions sur la signification de la norme et sur ses fonctions, sur l'application et l'interprétation de la norme et également sur le rapport entre la norme et le langage, insistant notamment sur la distinction entre la norme et l'énoncé sur la norme. Par ailleurs, il considère la religion et le droit comme deux ordres normatifs similaires, ce qui le conduit à proposer une théorie vraiment " générale " des normes et non pas seulement une théorie juridique des normes. Il avance une nouvelle interprétation de la norme fondamentale en recourant à l'idée de fiction juridique. Enfin, dans la dernière partie du livre, Kelsen donne le dernier état de sa pensée sur le problème majeur de l'application de la logique au droit. Rompant avec son logicisme antérieur, il nie l'existence d'une logique spécifique au droit et conteste l'application de la logique syllogistique au processus d'application du droit, renouant ainsi avec un volontarisme juridique qu'il avait rejeté au début de son œuvre. Dans cet ouvrage, sous couvert de bâtir une théorie générale des normes, Kelsen construit une théorie de l'interprétation des normes. Il propose donc une herméneutique juridique originale qui intéressera tous ceux qui étudient les sciences normatives (juristes, mais aussi théologiens et spécialistes de l'éthique). Il engage un dialogue avec les représentants anglo-américains de la philosophie du droit, de l'éthique ou de la logique, et il renoue le dialogue avec les auteurs influents à Vienne au début du siècle. (shrink)

"œLa disoluci�n de la obra de arte"El llamado arte de vanguardia realiz� un cuestionamiento radical del concepto tradicional de arte, en particular, del concepto de obra de arte, de las relaciones de �sta con la verdad, de la instituci�n del "œarte" concebida como una esfera separada y destacada del mundo de la vida, del sentido en que deb��a entenderse la autonom��a del arte, etc. Se ha hablado en este sentido de la disoluci�n de las fronteras entre el arte y la (...) realidad, entre el arte y la vida, entre la ficci�n y la praxis, de una "œestetizaci�n de la realidad" , de una "œestetizaci�n del mundo de la vida" . Una de las consecuencias extremas de esta ruptura radica en "œhacer de la obra de arte un lugar vac��o, un mero horizonte de expectativas". Sin embargo, se advierte hoy que el arte surgido con posterioridad al arte de vanguardia de la primera mitad de este siglo ha restaurado y ampliado la categor��a de obra de arte. La reflexi�n est�tica se ve as�� en la necesidad de reintroducir un concepto ampliado no solamente de la obra de arte, sino del fen�meno est�tico en su conjunto en el que se sit�e la producci�n, la cr��tica y la recepci�n, la obra de arte y la experiencia est�tica, el arte y el mundo de la vida en su diferencia y, a la vez, en el juego de sus relaciones rec��procas."œThe dissolution of the work of art"The so-called avant-garde art made a radical question about the traditional concept of art, particularly, about the concept "œwork of art", about its relation to the "œtruth", about the institution of "œart" considered as an outstanding and different sphere from the "œlife world", about the way in which "œart autonomy" should be understood. In this sense, much has been said about the disappearance of the border between fiction and practice, about the "œestetization of reality" , about the "œestetization of the life world" . One of the extreme consequences of this divorce is the transformation of the work of art into an empty place, a mere horizon of expectations. Nevertheless, today it is known that art created after the avant-garde art from the beginning of this century has restored and broadened the concept of work of art. Thus, aesthetic thinking needs to reestablish an extended concept not only of the work of art, but also of the whole aesthetic phenomena, in which production, critics, reception, work of art and its aesthetic experience, art and the life world are found, and in which their reciprocal relations are shown. (shrink)

David Bostock has produced a translation that admirably fulfills the Clarendon Aristotle Series’ goal of making Aristotle’s texts accessible to the Greekless philosophical reader. It is accurate without being overly literal and is probably the best available in English. Despite Bostock’s inelegant rendering of to ti en einai as "a what-being-is", and to ti esti as "a what-it-is", the translation is, on the whole, highly readable and brings out perspicuously the structure of Aristotle’s arguments.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Plautus vs. Terence: Audience and Popularity Re-ExaminedHolt N. Parker Ich seh’, die Philologen, sie haben dich, so wie sich selbst betrogen.—Goethe, Faust II, 7426–27The cliché that Plautus was boffo at the box office while Terence was an aesthetic snob kept alive only through a series of NEA grants seems ineradicable. Since the most recent book on Plautus once again bases much of its argument on this old chestnut, it (...) seems necessary to correct the widespread myth. 1 The ancient testimonia are unambiguous and will, I trust, put an end once and for all to this false picture.I. PlautusThere is exactly one piece of direct evidence about Plautus’ popularity during his lifetime. The prologue for the revival of Casina 2 states that this is a play (14): quam vos probastis qui estis in senioribus and (17): haec cum primum acta est, vicit omnis fabulas. 3 Admittedly, this is not necessarily first-person testimony, but it certainly implies that Casina, at least, had been a hit at its original performance. That is it. The endlessly repeated statements calling Plautus “the most successful comic writer of antiquity” 4 rest on nothing else. [End Page 585]Career and BackersOther than this single passage, the following have been used as evidence of Plautus’ success:Plautus wrote at least twenty-one plays, almost certainly those we now have, which were held to be his consensu omnium (Gell. 3.3.3). 5 There were probably some others which we do not have. 6 This implies a career with some degree of popularity, although over how long a period we do not know. 7 However, applying the same criterion (number of plays) with the same uncertainty (length of time), we have thirty-four titles of comedies for Naevius, forty-two for Caecilius, the same number of fabulae togatae from Afranius, and forty-three mimes from Laberius.Plautus was associated with T. Publilius Pellio for Stichus (didasc.; 200 B.C.), Menaechmi (404), 8 Epidicus (Bacch. 214–15), and probably Bacchides itself. 9 Though we have no idea how long the association lasted, Pellio’s presence in at least three plays seems to imply some form of standing relation. This in turn implies that Pellio had faith in Plautus’ popularity and that, if Pellio stuck with him for a while, his faith was justified. This association, however, allows us to infer no more about his popularity from play to play than does the steady backing of L. Ambivius Turpio for Caecilius and Terence (Hec. 14–27; see below).The only other didascalic notice for Plautus says that Pseudolus was presented at the Ludi Megalenses in 191 B.C. under M. Junius Brutus (cos. 178, RE 48), the city praetor. These were the games at which the temple of the Magna Mater was dedicated. 10 E. Fraenkel argues that [End Page 586] Plautus’ selection for such an event means that he, “a quell’epoca era considerato da giudici competenti il migliore commediografo di Roma.” 11 Rather, it means that Plautus was considered one of the best. 12 Plautus was not the only playwright presented. 13Revivals and ReputationThere is also evidence from the period after Plautus: Great stress has been laid on the fact that Plautus’ plays were given revivals. The problem lies in the word “revival,” which is used anachronistically to invoke an image of modern long runs, usually assumed to have taken place during the poet’s lifetime. 14 The best evidence for these revivals is Cas. 5–22. 15 Careful reading, however, reveals several things (11–15):nos postquam populi rumore intelleximus studiose expetere vos Plautinas fabulas, antiquam eius edimus comoediam, quam vos probastis qui estis in senioribus; nam iuniorum qui sunt non norunt, scio.After we learned from the talk of the people that you were eagerly longing for plays by Plautus, we have produced an old play of his, [End Page 587] which you approved, you who are in the older generation, for those who are younger don’t know it, I’m sure.Not only is there no evidence for any repetition during the poet’s lifetime, the passage states explicitly that Plautus, far from having... (shrink)