In this article, we discuss Beauchamp and Childress’s treatment of the issue of moral status. In particular, we introduce the five different perspectives on moral status that Beauchamp and Childress consider in Principles of Biomedical Ethics and explain their alternative to those perspectives, raise some critical questions about their approach, and offer a different way to think about one of the five theories of moral status that is more in line with what we believe some of its leading advocates affirm.

I argue for the principle of Anonymity, according to which two populations are equally good whenever they have the same anonymous distribution of wellbeing. I first show that, given transitivity of the at-least-as-good-as relation, Anonymity is entailed by the ``Non-Identity Principle'', according to which the consequence of bringing better rather than worse lives into existence is, all else equal, better. I then argue for the Non-Identity Principle on the basis that if it were false, it would follow that we fail (...) to improve the world when we make existing people better off, while at the same time replacing worse-off future people with different better-off future people. Since this is implausible, we should accept the Non-Identity Principle, and therefore Anonymity as well. (shrink)

This 1991 book is about the continuing influence of Hume's ideas on moral and political philosophy. In part, it is a critical exegesis of Hume's most impressive and challenging doctrines in Book III of the Treatise of Human Nature on such topics as morals, motivation, justice, and social institutions. However, the main thrust of the argument is to throw into relief the importance of that discussion for contemporary philosophy. While the author subjects most contemporary defences of Humean doctrines to intense (...) criticism, he also seeks to discover what versions of Hume's theories might still be defensible and viable. (shrink)

Adolph Grünbaum has argued that Duhem's conventionalism is false for the case of Euclidean geometry. According to Duhem, any portion of a physical theory can be preserved from falsifiability by providing suitable modifications elsewhere in the theory. Grünbaum argues that physical theory is composed of two parts: A geometrical part H, and a physical part A. For his test case—Euclidean geometry—he contends that by a suitable specification of A, a falsification of H is possible; i.e., H can be rendered “accessible (...) to experimental ascertainment in isolation from other physical regularities.”. (shrink)

Against the position of professor rex martin ("the review of metaphysics," xxv, December 1971) it is argued that there is a conceptual link between disobedience and destruction of authority, As socrates argues; that socrates does not take obedience to law to be an absolute principle of action; that socrates in the two dialogues about his trial does not contradict himself on the question of obedience to the court; that socrates' argument from piety does not undermine his arguments from injury and (...) agreement. (shrink)

COMMUNICATION 1. Every philosophy presupposes a theory of communication and conversely every theory of communication implies a philosophy. ...

Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality argues that human socio-political inequality is product of human activity and not a function of natural processes. Recent studies have begun to address the role of natural history in the Discourse and have argued that Rousseau anticipated modern developments in evolutionist theory, sociobiology, ethology, and primatology. I take issue with this trend in Rousseau scholarship. In this work I demonstrate that Rousseau should not be counted as a forerunner of either Darwin or more recent attempts at (...) integrating politics and the life sciences; that, on the contrary, Rousseau's Discourse is best understood as a call to resist this approach to political inquiry. ;I begin my discussion by examining the structure and political implications of the dominant eighteenth-century theory of natural history--the "chain of being". I demonstrate that this view of nature held that inequality was both natural and just, and that in order for Rousseau to sustain his egalitarian commitments he needed to refute this claim. ;Next, I begin to reconstruct Rousseau's understanding of natural history in order to demonstrate that Rousseau should not be included as a forerunner of Darwin. I demonstrate that on issues central to natural history he shows a marked willingness to accept key presuppositions of the chain of being. I then examine how he is nonetheless able to escape the inegalitarian implications of this theory of natural history by making the issue of objectivity central to his investigation of the origin and foundation of human inequality. ;I demonstrate how Rousseau argues that competing conceptions of human nature and the natural condition of the human species should be rejected as insufficiently objective. I discuss Rousseau's solution to the problem of objectivity and its effect on his own description of human beings in the state of nature. I conclude by arguing that the main relevance of the Second Discourse to contemporary biopolitics is the extent to which it anticipates the concerns of its critics. (shrink)

This title was first published in 2002: Kolnai's later work in moral philosophy is well-known, and interest in it continues to grow, but his dissertation, Ethical Value and Reality, has received little attention - although Kolnai himself said that it contains the germs of nearly all his subsequent thought. This first English translation of the dissertation and of two related papers from the same period will enable the English-speaking reader to explore Kolnai's ethical work as a whole. In Ethical Value (...) and Reality Kolnai proposes a 'completion' of phenomenological value-ethics which takes account of 'the embeddedness of ethical values in reality'. Kolnai explores moral psychology and offers important perspectives on political activity in its moral dimensions, on the relation between morality and religion, and on the relation between the moral point of view and the psycho-therapeutic. Dunlop's comprehensive introduction to the translation provides the reader with assistance in understanding the text, setting it in its contemporary context, and relating it to Kolnai's subsequent writings. (shrink)

Some have questioned why religion should be singled out for special treatment in our legal instruments, such as the US Constitution, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Why, for example, do these documents afford protection to citizens who engage in an activity religiously, while not affording the same protection for citizens who engage in what appears to be the same activity non-religiously? To answer this question, the author explains why religion, as with other associations and practices, has been justly singled out. (...) However, he goes on to show how so-called non-religious beliefs and practices can be afforded the same protection under the law without diminishing the historical reason for religion’s specialness: the two sovereigns account. (shrink)

Attitudes toward mission agencies in general, and toward the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in particular, were assessed using two 10-item scales completed by 833 recently ordained Anglican clergy from the UK. Clergy were generally positive toward mission agencies and willing for their churches to engage with them, but more reluctant to form personal links. Most clergy felt agencies should give priority to the relief of poverty and to development needs, rather than to spreading specifically Christian beliefs. (...) Results for the USPG indicated more uncertain responses than for mission agencies generally, which probably indicated a lower visibility for this agency among some clergy, especially evangelicals. (shrink)