The present paper unravels ontological and normative conditions of personhood for the purpose of critiquing ‘Cognitivist Views’. Such views have attracted much attention and affirmation by presenting the ontology of personhood in terms of higher-order cognition on the basis of which normative practices are explained and justified. However, these normative conditions are invoked to establish the alleged ontology in the first place. When we want to know what kind of entity has full moral status, it is tempting to establish an (...) ontology that fits our moral intuitions about who should qualify for such unique normative standing. But this approach conflates personhood’s ontology and normativity insofar as it stresses the primacy of the former while implicitly presupposing the latter; it thereby suffers from a ‘Normative Fallacy’ by inferring from ‘ought’ to ‘is’. Following my critique of Cognitivism, I sketch an alternative conception, contending that, whereas the Cognitivist ontology of personhood presupposes the normative, a social ontology is constituted by it. In due consideration of evidence from developmental psychology, the social embeddedness of persons—manifested in the ability of taking a ‘second-person stance’—is identified as a key feature of personhood that precedes higher-order cognition, and is directly linked to basic normative concerns. (shrink)

Why and how do norms emerge? Which norms emerge and why these ones in particular? Such questions belong to the ‘problem of the emergence of norms’, which consists of an inquiry into the production of norms in social collectives. I address this question through the ethnographic study of the emergence of ‘norms against violence’ in the political collective Occupy Geneva. I do this, first, empirically, with the analysis of my field observations; and, second, theoretically, by discussing my findings. In consequence (...) of two episodes categorized as sexual assaults that occurred in their camp, the members of Occupy Geneva decided to tackle those issues in a general assembly. Their goal was to amend their first charter of good conduct in order to reform its norms and complete it with norms aiming to regulate ‘facts’ of ‘unjustified violence’. During a collective deliberation, new norms were devised, debated and consensually adopted. The writing of the new charter took place in a second general assembly during which the wording of the written norms was collectively decided. I show that indignation over the sexual assaults was the main motive that led to the collective deliberation, and that the entire process of the making of these norms was characterized by different collective emotions. Indeed, indignation, contempt and fear played major roles in the emergence of norms prohibiting violence, allowing punishment and exclusion of wrongdoers, and prescribing collective intervention against an aggressor to neutralize the threat represented. These findings prompt me to hypothesize that social norms emerge from emotions thanks to the latters’ internal structure; and that emotions provide causal and grounding explanations for this emergence. Thus, emotions allow us to answer the questions: ‘Why do norms emerge?’ and ‘Why do they have their specific forms?’ In short, I argue that social norms have emotional foundations. (shrink)

From epileptic seizures to depressive symptoms, predictive neurotechnologies are used for a large range of applications. In this article we focus on advisory devices; namely, predictive neurotechnology programmed to detect specific neural events (e.g., epileptic seizure) and advise users to take necessary steps to reduce or avoid the impact of the forecasted neuroevent. Receiving advise from a predictive device is not without ethical concerns. The problem with predictive neural devices, in particular advisory ones, is the risk of seeing one’s autonomous (...) choice supplanted by the predictions instead of being supplemented by it. For users, there is a potential shift from being assisted by the system to being over-dependent on the technology. In other terms, it introduces ethical issues associated with epistemic dependency. In this article, we examine the notion of epistemic authority in relation to predictive neurotechnologies. Section 1 of our article explores and defines the concept of epistemic authority. In section 2, we illustrate how predictive devices are best conceived of as epistemic authorities and we explore the subject-device epistemic relationship. In section 3, we spell out the risk of harms interconnected with epistemic deferral. We conclude by stressing a set of preliminary measures to prepare users for the authoritative nature of predictive devices. (shrink)

Nikolai Lossky is key to the history of the Husserl-Rezeption in Russia. He was the first to publish a review of the Russian translation of Husserl’s first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen that appeared in 1909. He also published a presentation and criticism of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in 1939. An English translation of both of Lossky’s publications is offered in this volume for the first time. The present paper, which is intended as an introduction to these documents, situates Lossky within (...) the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl in Russia and explains why he is central to it. It also explains what Lossky principally found in Husserl: he saw in the latter’s critique of psychologism support for his own ontology, epistemology, and axiology. Lossky characterizes his ontology as an ideal-realism. According to ideal-realism, both the realm of ideal beings and the realm of real beings are mind-independent. Per his epistemology, which he calls “intuitivism,” real beings are intuited by sensual intuition and ideal beings by intellectual intuition. The realm of ideal beings includes the subrealm of values, which is intuited by axiological intuition. This thoroughly realist conception contrasted sharply with the subjectivist tendencies of the time. So, when Lossky took cognizance of Husserl’s critique of psychologism, he thereupon found an ally in his battle against the various subjectivisms. But, when Husserl took the transcendental idealist turn, Lossky was at the forefront of the backlash against the new direction Husserl wanted to give to phenomenology. (shrink)

Thought experiments that concoct bizarre possible world modalities are standard fare in debates on personal identity. Appealing to intuitions raised by such evocations is often taken to settle differences between conflicting theoretical views that, albeit, have practical implications for ethical controversies of personal identity in health care. Employing thought experiments that way is inadequate, I argue, since personhood is intrinsically linked to constraining facts about the actual world. I defend a moderate modal skepticism according to which intuiting across conceptually incongruent (...) worlds constitutes ‘invalid intuitioninferences’—i.e., carrying over intuitions gathered from facts about possible worlds that are at odds with facts about the actual world, for the purpose of making claims about real-life persons and their identity, leads to conceptual incongruences. Such a methodological fallout precludes accurate, informative judgments about personal identity in the actual world, calling into question the adequacy of thought experimental considerations for potential real world applications in medical ethics. (shrink)

The complexity of the physiological phenotype currently prevents us from identifying an integrative measure to assess how the internal state and environmental conditions modify life‐history strategies. In this article, it is proposed that shorter telomeres should lead to a faster pace‐of‐life where investment in self‐maintenance is decreased as a means of saving energy for reproduction, but at the cost of somatic durability. Inversely, longer telomeres would favor an increased investment in soma maintenance and thus a longer reproductive lifespan (i.e., slower (...) pace‐of‐life). Under this hypothesis, telomere dynamics could be such an integrative mediator, which will assemble the information about oxidative stress levels, inflammation status and stress reactivity, and relate this information to the potential lifespan of the organism and its pace‐of‐life strategy. The signaling function of telomere dynamics can also reach over generations, a phenomenon in which the telomere lengths of gametes would provide a channel through which offspring would receive information about their environment early in their development, hence increasing the possibilities for developmental plasticity. -/- . (shrink)

Les concepts scientifiques, même usés, même désuets, ne sont jamais définitivement périmés. Ils peuvent toujours faire retour dans les conjonctures théoriques ultérieures. Cela tient à la nature très particulière du concept, irréductible aux descriptions positivistes : issus de l’expérience et ayant vocation à en rendre raison, les concepts représentent autant d’arrachements à l’expérience et de survols explicatifs de l’expérience. Des épistémologues antipositivistes du xxe siècle ont été attentifs à de telles caractéristiques philosophiques. On expose ici leur modèle de la conceptualisation (...) scientifique et on le met au travail sur un cas, le concept de tendance, dont on montre il survit à la période de sa première formulation et il mérite de revenir dans les débats psychophysiologiques contemporains. (shrink)

Industrial agriculture led to a worldwide homogenization of crops and modes of cultures, but also of landscapes and relationships to the land, threatening at the same time biodiversity and cultural diversity. Developing alternatives to the agro-industrial system inherited from the twentieth century is therefore one of the greatest challenges facing humankind today. This article advocates for the promotion of the French concept of “terroir” as a foundational framework for preserving biocultural diversity, illustrating an ethical way of relating to the land. (...) Already enshrined in European law for three decades and under study at the UNESCO and the FAO, it encourages farmers to adopt ecologically virtuous practices, while ensuring greater economic incomes. Moreover, it enhances the value of their work and their specific relationship with their environment in the long run. It also epitomizes broader worldwide initiatives, which propose basing agriculture not against the environment (both human and natural) but in symbiosis with it. (shrink)

Dans le courant du XVII e siècle se multiplient en Chine les discours sur l’amitié. En partie liés à la déliquescence des structures traditionnelles et notamment familiales qui servaient de base au fonctionnement social de l’empire, ils proposent de réévaluer le lien amical dans l’organisation politique. He Xinyin (1517-1579) est à cet égard l’un des penseurs les plus innovants et radicaux. À travers la lecture de quelques essais majeurs recueillis dans le recueil de ses œuvres complètes, l’article entend expliciter la (...) réévaluation de l’amitié et sa dimension subversive chez cet auteur et montrer comment une telle redéfinition a pu instiller dans la culture chinoise du XVII e siècle et au-delà de nouveaux rapports subjectifs où l’individu émerge comme une entité cardinale dans les rapports sociaux ainsi que les idées de liberté d’expression. (shrink)

Collingwood's theory of presuppositions has never been taken very seriously. But critics have completely overlooked its significance as a theory or model of inquiry intimately tied to certain aspects of discourse in a context of investigation. Viewed this way, Collingwood's theory is on very strong ground, especially when it is reconstructed with the aid of a formal language. The reconstruction shows what is essential to the theory and what is not, allowing us to disregard those of Collingwood's extravagant claims which (...) have frustrated an understanding of his theory's real strength. The reconstruction also provides a general framework within which recent discussion of presuppositions can be unified. (shrink)

On se propose d’étudier ici l’unité, la diversité et l’évolution de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty à travers ses deux principaux recueils d’essais, Signes publié en 1960, et Sens et non-sens, paru en 1948, dont l’un annonce l’ouvrage posthume sur Le visible et l’invisible (1964), et l’autre prolonge de l’intérieur la Phénoménologie de la perception (1945). On est ainsi conduit à comprendre comment le problème fondamental de la pensée de Merleau-Ponty autorise la diversité de son œuvre, entre philosophie, sciences humaines et (...) politique, sans espoir de synthèse ou de système, mais conjurant aussi toute dispersion et toute résignation. L’évolution même de cette pensée d’une étape à l’autre en confirme le double héritage, autour d’une intuition centrale et d’une variété irréductible d’expériences. (shrink)

L’article a pour objet l’analyse des interactions verbales entre des adolescents polyhandicapés et des adultes ayant soins. L’objectif de l’étude est de montrer comment le phénomène de répétition qui se distribue nécessairement sur le plan interlocutoire engendre ou facilite le processus d’intercompréhension. Les résultats montrent que la répétition fonctionne comme un processus dialogique dont la dynamique intersubjective contribue à la construction et à l’accomplissement réussi de l’échange conversationnel. Nous comparons et discutons ces résultats relativement à un corpus d’interactions verbales entre (...) des adultes et des enfants au développement typique. (shrink)

Résumé — Le but de cet article est de montrer que le cœur de la pensée de Simone Weil réside moins dans une philosophie de la nécessité comme telle que dans une philosophie de la rencontre de la nécessité et de l’âme humaine, et de ses effets, du malheur à l’amour, en passant par la vérité. Présente d’emblée, cette pensée connaît cependant deux étapes, comme si l’accent passait de la nécessité à ses effets, étapes que l’on étudie à travers deux (...) textes précis commentés comme les classiques qu’ils devraient être dans la philosophie du XXe siècle en France. C’est aussi par là que Simone Weil rejoint les principaux de ses contemporains, parmi lesquels Camus et Cavaillès, et ainsi le cœur du moment de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, en philosophie comme ailleurs.— This paper intends to show how the core of Simone Weil’s thought is to be found less in a philosophy of necessity as such, than in a philosophy of the encounter between necessity and human soul, and the effects of that encounter, from woe to love, and including truth. However constant, this thought evolves through a difference of accent, as if the stress went from necessity to its effect ; this difference is here studied through the reading of two major writings, which deserve to be considered as XXth Century philosophical classics. It is also through this central thought that Simone Weil meets with such major contemporary philosophical figures as Camus and Cavaillès, and thus with what should be called the moment of the Second World War, in philosophy as elsewhere. (shrink)

Un passage biffé d’une lettre à Antoine Arnauld du 14 janvier 1688 rappelle un projet ancien chez Leibniz, celui d’augmenter l’extension de la logique démonstrative. Il écrit : « votre Art de penser contient déjà de belles méditations, qu’on peut augmenter et pousser plus avant ». Le compliment est évidemment fort ambigu, et rappelle la fonction que Leibniz donne parfois à des auteurs appartenant grosso modo au même espace intellectuel que Descartes ou Pascal, c’est-à-dire celle d’avoir comme...

We present an age-structured model for erythropoiesis in which the mortality of mature cells is described empirically by a physiologically realistic probability distribution of survival times. Under some assumptions, the model can be transformed into a system of delay differential equations with both constant and distributed delays. The stability of the equilibrium of this system and possible Hopf bifurcations are described for a number of probability distributions. Physiological motivation and interpretation of our results are provided.