Response to commentaries on keynote article.

What Is a Person: Untapped Insights from Africa, a new book by Nancy Jecker and Caesar Atuire, offers an appealing and fresh perspective into ongoing debates surrounding personhood.1 The bioethics literature has, largely, drawn from Western/global North thought or (as arguably with the case of principlism) amalgamations of those traditions.2 3 This leaves substantial room for enriching current debates through insights from and engagement with understudied traditions. Just such an approach is taken by Jecker and Atuire, who in particular bring (...) African philosophical theories of personhood into dialogue with Western ones. Their critical appraisal ably identifies flaws with a range of theories across different traditions, and their book attempts to put forward a new theory of personhood that aims to draw from the best and discard the worst of those theories: Emergent Personhood. The book’s early sections indeed are very useful in terms of critical comparative analysis, resulting in insights such as the finding that both traditional African and traditional Western (or more specifically, Greco-Roman) thought actually overlap in terms of how personhood is conceptualised: extrinsic, earned, scalar and changing. Modern Western thought, though, eschewed those concepts first through the introduction of Christian moral equality, then Enlightenment systematic secular theories like deontology and utilitarianism that claim non-theological basis for such moral personhood. By contrast, the contemporary African theories Jecker and Atuire cite largely align with the traditional, relational accounts. So does their theory of Emergent Personhood succeed where African and Western thought have fallen short? While the theory’s contours are promising, several aspects are in need of further development. In this brief commentary, I will highlight three somewhat inter-related issues: (1) The criteria by which theories of personhood are evaluated are never given firm normative justification; (2) The normative force of Emergent Personhood’s relational foundations are not explicated; …. (shrink)

Written over the last 18 months of his life and inspired by his interest in G. E. Moore's defence of common sense, this much discussed volume collects Wittgenstein's reflections on knowledge and certainty, on what it is to know a proposition for sure.

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

Levesque et al. have defined a programming language, Golog, in order to reason about complex actions within the framework of the situation calculus. We build on previous work of ours and show how to translate Golog into linear logic, suitably augmented.

In REG 73 and 75 I discussed various points connected with the Peace of Philocrates, a number of which have been assailed by M. M. Markle in CQ N.S. 24 in an article entitled ‘The Strategy of Philip in 346 B.C.’. Time passes, and, although de Ste. Croix in his Origins of the Peloponnesian War , p.105, felt able to declare that ‘a book shortly to be published by M. M. Markle makes a valuable and original contribution to our understanding (...) of the Peace of Philocrates’, and Markle himself confirms that a book is indeed forthcoming, some comment on his preliminary comments may be permitted. (shrink)

Molly Farneth’s Hegel’s Social Ethics hearkens back to the tradition of Josiah Royce, which has continued in the work of Richard Bernstein and Jeffrey Stout. At the same time, it reflects the impact of three decades of interpretive work which has offered an alternative to the 19th and early 20th century reading of Hegel as a metaphysical systematizer. In this new reading he was from the beginning a social critic and political theorist who looked to lay the groundwork for post‐Enlightenment (...) vision of the social world as evolving toward one of social cooperation based on mutual recognition. Farneth has developed this reading of Hegel into one of powerful resources for democratic pluralism. (shrink)

There is frequently an appearance of conflict between medicine and economics. This arises first because the nature of health and health care requires the doctor to make decisions on behalf of the patient and thus serves to explain why medical ethics exist. But secondly it is due to the relative lack of acceptance of the ethics of the common good within medical ethics. As a result while economics in the field of health has as an objective the maximisation of the (...) health of the community, subject to resource constraints, medical ethics pushes individual doctors to try to maximise the health of their patients. There is no reason to believe that the latter will sum to the former. To make the maximisation of health of the community the goal of the medical profession requires institutional changes, particularly with regard to budgeting, which will cajole and if necessary coerce doctors to adopt the good of the community as their objective. (shrink)