The paper of Hans Diejenbacher and Ulrich Ratschstrats from the thesis that although the eighties have been a lost decade for the developing countries, the structures of the conflict between the North and the South have changed drastically. Those changes are exemplified by six different problern areas: the danger of an irreversible global climate change, the deterioration of the terms of trade for the developing countries, the impoverishment of the least development countries, the relationship between foreign debts and inflation, (...) the crisis of development policy, and the effects of the changing east-west-conflict. The description of those conflict areas Ieads to the question how it could be possible to overcome the discrepancy between the knowledge about these problems on the one hand and the willingness to initiate political change on the other band. (shrink)

Section 1 proposes a new philosophical account of melancholy. Section 2 examines the reasons why one might think that pornography and melancholy are incompatible. Section 3 discusses some successful examples of melancholic pornography and makes the case that feminist pornographers are particularly well-placed to produce such material.

A selection from the correspondence of the logician Wilhelm Ackermann (1896?1962) is presented in this article. The most significant letters were exchanged with Bernays, Scholz and Lorenzen, from which extensive passages are transcribed. Some remarks from other letters, with quotations, are also included.

This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind and the plural kind are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, (...) attitudes of the form “we intend” are subjective in the same way. The self-knowledge at work here is plural rather than singular. This supports a plural subject account of collective intentionality. It is argued that the worries sometimes raised in the literature against the metaphysical “spookiness” of plural subjects are due to a fundamental misconception of the way in which attitudes of either kind –singular and plural – are subjective. (shrink)

In 1890 C. S. Peirce wrote a review of A. C. Fraser’s recent book on Locke, published to coincide with the bicentennial of Locke’s Essay. Peirce remarked that “Locke’s grand work was substantially this: Men must think for themselves, and genuine thought is an act of perception…. We cannot fail to acknowledge a superior element of truth in the practicality of Locke’s thought, which on the whole should place him nearly upon a level with Descartes.” This estimate of Locke was (...) not the common opinion in England during the nineteenth century. This opinion was reflected in Fraser’s book which, Peirce remarked, could not “be said to be a sympathetic account of [Locke]. The biographer seems to see no charm in his hero, and is perpetually speaking of his want of imagination; which only means he was not given to unpractical dreaming.” Locke had his knowledgeable critics and defenders—for instance Dugald Stewart and John Stuart Mill—but the common opinion ranged from extreme hostility and contempt to condescending criticism of isolated minor points. His style was deplored, his philosophy was called unoriginal and a mere unacknowledged plagiarism of Gassendi and Hobbes; he was said to have so thoroughly misunderstood Descartes that he had merely repeated him with new errors; he was said to owe his philosophical reputation entirely to his advocacy of the popular argument for political freedom or merely to the intellectual circumstances of his time; he was held accountable for Condillac’s rejection of reflection and reason; he was knocked down with a few bare sentences loosely drawn from Leibniz; he was said to have made the mind a puny, passive, mechanical thing. He was called a sensualist, a materialist, a sceptic, an atheist, and a utilitarian though at the same time—and not without contradiction—he was generally, especially by his critics, styled a “great lover of truth,” a plain and simple, well-meaning and religious man. To the nineteenth century Locke meant the Essay, and the history of the Essay was in large measure the history of modern thought, of the eighteenth century. Precisely for this reason there was something nearly sinister about him, in spite of his good personal character. “Locke, himself a clear, humble-minded, patient, reverent, nay, religious man,” said Carlyle, “had paved the way for banishing religion from the world.”. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Fragment of an Intellectual Autobiography:- BY HANS J. MORGENTHAU h My first political memories go back to the Tripolitan War M of between Italy and Turkey ...

The aim of this essay is to ask whether what it calls the "presence" of things, including things of the past, can be rendered in language, including the language of historians. In Part I the essay adumbrates what it means by presence . It also proposes two ideal types: meaning-cultures , and presence-cultures . In the modern period, linguistic utterance has typically come to be used for, and to be interpreted as, the way by which meaning rather than presence is (...) expressed, thereby creating a gap between language and presence. Thus, in Part II the essay explores ways that this gap might be bridged, examining seven instances in which presence can be "amalgamated" with language. These range from instances in which the physical dimensions of language itself are made manifest, to those through which the physicality of the things to which language refers is supposed to be made evident. Of particular note for theorists of history are those instances in which things can be made present by employing the deictic, poetic, and incantatory potential of linguistic expression. The essay concludes in Part III with a reflection on Heidegger's idea that language is the "house of being," now interpreted as the idea that language can be the medium through which the separation of humans and the things of their environment may be overcome. The hope of achieving presence in language is no less than a reconciliation of humans with their world, including—and of most interest to historians—the things and events of their past. (shrink)

An idea going back to Plato’s Meno is that knowledge is stable. Recently, a seemingly stronger and more exciting thesis has been advanced, namely that rational belief is stable. I sketch two stability theories of knowledge and rational belief, and present an example intended to show that knowledge need not be stable and rational belief need not be stable either. The second claim does not follow from the first, even if we take knowledge to be a special kind of rational (...) belief. ‘Stability’ is an ambiguous term that has an internally conditional structure. (shrink)

In recent years the mushrooming power, functionality and ubiquity of computers and the Internet have outstripped early forecasts about technology's rate of advancement and usefulness in everyday life. Alert pundits now foresee a world saturated with powerful computer chips, which will increasingly insinuate themselves into our gadgets, dwellings, apparel and even our bodies.

Inhalts: Vorwort. A. SCHRIFTEN FICHTES. I. Gesammelte Werke. II. Einzelausgaben. III. Fremdsprachige Ausgaben. B. LITERATUR ZU FICHTE. I. Publikationen zu Leben und Werk im allgemeinen. II. Untersuchungen zu einzelnen Sachgebieten. III. Fichte und andere Denker. C. REGISTER. ZEITSCHRIFTENVERZEICHNIS. NACHTRAG.

I. Über den Stil des Poems des Matthaios und seinen Inhalt Wir sind nicht die ersten, die sich mit dem Poem des „minderwertigen Priesters Matthaios“ über die Stadt Theodoro beschäftigen. Silvio Mercati gab es bereits im Jahr 1927 heraus, nachdem er zunächst die in ihm beschriebene Stadt fälschlich mit Theodosia (Kaffa) identifiziert hatte, den Fehler aber schon in einer Zusatzbemerkung im selben Band der „Studi bizantini“ verbesserte, in welchem er das Poem publizierte. Mercati unterzog das Gedicht einer strengen literarhistorischen Kritik. (...) Doch seine Bewertung erweist sich nicht in jedem Punkt als stichhaltig, wenn er behauptet: „das vorgegebene Thema ist abgesehen vom Wunder die Klage und die Zerknirschung“. Eine Begeisterung des Autors für das, was er mit Sinnen wahrnimmt, ist durchaus zu verspüren. Er hat eine positive Einstellung zu dem, was er sieht, und stellt es in den Rahmen der göttlichen Schöpfung. Klage und Lobpreis der mönchischen Lebensweise treten dabei in den Hintergrund. Der Dichter schöpft diese Themen nicht aus. Nachdem er am Schluss des Poems der Eitelkeit des Lebens im Sinne des Predigers Salomo vier Verse (143–146) gewidmet hat, kehrt er zur Verherrlichung des Schöpfers zurück und beendet seine Unterweisung mit christlicher Tröstung durch die Liebe ( Vers 147–150). (shrink)

Wittgenstein übernimmt im Tractatus das Zusammenhangsprinzip von Frege und formuliert die Doktrin von der Priorität des Satzes vor seinen Teilen, den Wörtern. Dies ist die frühste Formulierung kontextualistischen Denkens bei Wittgenstein. In der Spätphilosophie wird das "Sprachspiel" zur sinnkonstituierenden Einheit sprachlicher Kommunikation und damit zum Inbegriff kontextualistischen Denkens beim späten Wittgenstein. Eine Untersuchung der zentralen Begriffe von Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie offenbart starke Verwandtschaft zu Schapps Begriff der "Geschichten". G. Bateson führt den Terminus "Geschichte" in jenem Schappschen Sinne als Prinzip des geistigen (...) Prozesses der Informationsgewinnung bzw. Sinnkonstitution ein. Damit läßt sich über Schapps Phänomenologie der Geschichten eine Brücke von Wittgenstein zu Bateson schlagen und eine bislang unbemerkte Affinität zwischen beiden Denkern aufzeigen. Umgekehrt werden mit dem von Bateson geprägten Begriff der Transkontextualität Phänomene beschreibbar, die Wittgenstein bei der Diskussion mathematischer bzw. logischer Paradoxien behandelt. Demnach sind solche Paradoxien transkontextuelle Phänomene, die in ihrem Sinn unterbestimmt sind, ähnlich dem transkontextuellen Verhalten, das sinnbestimmende Kontexte (Sprachspiele) transzendiert und außerhalb solcher Kontexte als verrückt erscheint. (shrink)

Because of their elementary significance in almost all fields of science, measures of association between two variables or traits are abundant and multiform. One aspect of association that is of considerable interest, especially in population genetics and ecology, seems to be widely ignored. This aspect concerns association between complex traits that show variable and arbitrarily defined state differences. Among such traits are genetic characters controlled by many and potentially polyploid loci, species characteristics, and environmental variables, all of which may be (...) mutually and asymmetrically associated. A concept of directed association of one trait with another is developed here that relies solely on difference measures between the states of a trait. Associations are considered at three levels: between individual states of two variables, between an individual state of one variable and the totality of the other variable, and between two variables. Relations to known concepts of association are identified. In particular, measures at the latter two levels turn out to be interpretable as measures of differentiation. Examples are given for areas of application (search for functional relationships, distribution of variation over populations, genomic associations, spatiogenetic structure). (shrink)