It is shown that it is impossible for an observer to distinguish all present states of a system in which he or she is contained, irrespective of whether this system is a classical or a quantum mechanical one and irrespective of whether the time evolution is deterministic or stochastic. As a corollary, this implies that it is impossible for an observer to measure the EPR-correlations between himself or herself and an outside system. Implications of the main result are discussed for (...) how we have to conceive of universally valid theories. (shrink)

This article inquires firstly into the descriptive and affective function of images as examples and exemplars in both Cassirer’s and Husserl’s conceptions of perception and aesthetics in order to disclose their respective relationship to reality, that is, mimesis. In view of the correlation between symbolic comportment and symbolic forms at Cassirer, it will secondly show that the ensuing hermeneutical circle can be overcome by taking recourse on Husserl’s genetic analyses on passive sense constitution. It will thus set the basis for (...) a “hermeneutics of expression” that should, thirdly, shed light on the possibility of establishing an aesthetical knowledge. For this purpose, it will disclose an excess of sensuous expression that is determined by a pre-categorial limit-concept within the process of sense-formation. This inquiry shows that, while images as examples are characterized by their ideal arbitrariness, aesthetic images as singular and categorially determined exemplars can be understood as the affective expression of reality. (shrink)

This paper deals with the problem of the origin of sense and meaning. For Husserl, the determination of the ideal identity of something new can only take place retroactively in the totality of the preceding series by stepping back towards the original foundation of sense. In this regard, J. Derrida questions the ideality of the same as presence and the possibility of retrieving any arché of sense in his writings Speech and Phenomena and Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry. Phenomenology is (...) not oblivious to these difficulties, as results from a closer reading of the correlation between idealities and sensory experience: It will show that there are at least four interrelated gaps in the Husserlian phenomenology which testify the difficulty in grasping a retraceable arché of sense. First, the gap between the ideality of sense and its representation. Second, the gap between sensory and categorial intuitions, whereby both exceed one another. Third, the gap between the ideality of sense and the sense which exceeds our expectations. Fourth, the gap between the experience of the new that overcomes us and its apprehension by consciousness. Hence, there is a fundamental gap between the conceptual idealities and the essential indeterminacy of our phenomenological sensory experience, which is correlative to an excess of one in respect to the other. In this sense, Derrida’s concepts of « différance » and “invention” allow us to conceive of this self-givenness of sense as the expression of its constant self-renewal. This expression takes the form of a trace, which, neither present nor absent, suspends meaning and full presence, leaving the narrative “open” for the reinvention of sense. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether managerial rhetoric in the Management Discussion and Analysis section of 10-K filings can help gauge the level of managerial opportunism in a firm. We find that the use of trust-related words is connected to inefficient investment decisions and poor operating performance. Furthermore, firms making more frequent use of trust-related words are subject to less monitoring by institutional investors or analysts. Their accounting also relies more heavily on discretionary accruals. These results are consistent with the notion that (...) managerial rhetoric to advertise trustworthiness points towards agency problems plaguing the firm. (shrink)

Die Phänomenologie Husserls ist nicht nur als ein metaphysikkritisches Unternehmen, sondern als eine kritische Wiederaufnahme aristotelischer Themen aufzufassen. Denn die Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins führt Husserl anfänglich dazu, eine transzendentale Phänomenologie als eidetische Wissenschaft zu entwerfen, welche die aristotelische Ontologie auf formale und materiale Regionen erweitert. Später aber führt sie Husserl nicht nur zu einer Revision der Beziehungen zwischen Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, sondern zu einer Erweiterung des phänomenologischen Bereiches auf Fragen der letzten absolut gegebenen Urtatsachen, die eine phänomenologische (...) Metaphysik ausmachen. Dabei unternimmt Husserl eine kritische Rehabilitierung der aristotelischen Ontologie, indem er die materiale Ontologie sowohl mit einem ‚Unterbau‘ als auch mit einer ‚Krönung‘ versieht: Sie gründet auf einer apodiktischen Urfaktizität, die eine affektive Lebendigkeit aufweist, und gipfelt in einer Gottesauffassung, welche die erste Philosophie Aristoteles in einer praktischen Wende wieder aufnimmt. Die anfängliche Trennung beider Disziplinen wird somit in Richtung einer Phänomenologie überwunden, die eine phänomenologische Metaphysik miteinschließt und dadurch ihre Spannbreite neu definiert. (shrink)

“De jure naturae multa fabulamur” — after 450 years, Luther's statement has lost none of its original validity. After a brief pseudo-renaissance following WWII, one now hears far less in legal theory about natural law, which appears finally to have fallen victim to what Weber early in the century characterized as “a progressive decomposition and relativization of all meta-legal axioms” — a destruction resulting partly “from legal rationalism itself,” and partly “from the skepticism which characterizes modern intellectual life generally.” Law (...) today, wrote Weber, “is all too tangibly (in the great majority of its determinations, and especially in many which are particularly important in terms of principle) revealed to be both the product and the technical medium of a compromise of interests,”. (shrink)

Uncertainty about the actual orientation of the measurement device has been claimed to open a loophole for hidden variable models of quantum mechanics. In this paper I describe the statistics of inaccurate spin measurements by unsharp spin observables. A no‐go theorem for hidden variable models of the inaccurate measurement statistics follows: There is a finite set of directions for which not all results of inaccurate spin measurements can be predetermined in a non‐contextual way. In contrast to an earlier theorem ( (...) class='Hi'>Breuer 2002) this result does not rely on the assigment of approximate truth values, and it holds under weaker assumptions on the measurement inaccuracy. (shrink)

85 Jahre nach Erscheinen des religionsphilosophischen Romans Der Neue Kusari als Gesamtwerk (1934) wird das opus magnum des Frankfurter jüdischen Philosophen Isaac Breuer (1883 - 1946) hier erneut vorgelegt - in einer kritischen Ausgabe (mit dem Nachweis der Varianten der Erstveröffentlichung des ersten Teils in den Jahren 1930 - 1933), bereinigt von Druckfehlern, mit dem Nachweis von Anspielungen und Zitaten aus der jüdischen und außerjüdischen Literatur und weiteren Sachinformationen sowie mit einem Nachwort zum Verhältnis von Isaac Breuer und (...) Gershom Scholem. Besonderes Augenmerk liegt dabei auf den mystischen Traditionen des Judentums (Kabbala), die Breuer als einer der ersten Autoren der deutsch-jüdischen Orthodoxie verarbeitet. (shrink)

La confrontación entre Heidegger y Husserl que ha dominado hasta fecha reciente la interpretación filosófica debe ser revisada a la luz de las indagaciones de Husserl sobre la protofacticidad: Ella concierne a una ontología del mundo de la vida que es afín a la mundaneidad heideggeriana: Los protohechos constituyen un horizonte de sentido ya instaurado, que el yo debe reconfigurar en su praxis. Esta protofacticidad inmodalizable alberga un núcleo de protocontingencia que da cuenta no sólo de la contingencia fáctica de (...) las categorías experienciales, sino también la del mundo, del ego y de los entes finitos: En tanto procesos o sujetos a cambios cualitativos en sus características esenciales su modo de ser se caracteriza por una permanente apertura esencial. Ambos pensadores sostienen la contingencia esencial del mundo, de la que sólo puede dar cuenta la experiencia fáctica hic et nunc de un ego encarnado y mundano.The confrontation between Heidegger and Husserl, ever present in philosophical debates, should be reviewed in the light of Hus-serl’s late inquiries into protofacticity. Concerning the ontology of the lifeworld, it addresses some of the issues of Heidegger’s characterization of Dasein as being-in-the-world: Protofacts constitute an already given sense-horizon, which the ego must re-configurate in its praxis. This unmodalizable primal facts host a core of protocontingency that accounts for the factual contingency not only of the categories of experience, but of the world, the ego and of finite beings: Understood as processes or subjected to qualitative changes in their essential structures, their mode of being is characterized by an essential openness. Both thinkers sustain the contingency of the world, for which only the hic et nunc factual experience of a mundane, incarnated ego can account. (shrink)

This paper concerns both Aristotle's notion of right feelings and Husserl's account of intentional feelings and emotions as developed in their ethical writings and it discusses these approaches in relation to each other. It addresses the question of motivation and justification or evidence for moral feelings and actions. In particular, it focuses on the emotional states of Philia and love as well as the inherent relationship between affectivity and reason. The paper concludes with some reflections on the requirements for the (...) constitution of a moral self. (shrink)

Anniversary commemorations are ambivalent events, particularly when they celebrate philosophers. Such commemorations focus on a life's work and occasionally contribute to its elucidation. However, they frequently do violence to those they intend to honor, by emphasizing primarily those aspects of a thinker's work which make him acceptable to the spirit of the age. And such was the fate of Theodor Adorno, whose eightieth birthday was observed in 1983 at a major conference, held in Frankfurt, West Germany. There his interpreters, embarked (...) on the task of rediscovering, brought out important aspects and opened up new perspectives. But die heart of Adorno's work, the negative dialectic, encountered outright resistance. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The current article deals with the correlation between virtual and physical reality as they concern the body. The thesis of this article is that the lived body transposed into virtual reality becomes a body without organs in Deleuze’s terms, i.e. the lived body, a sensitive field of sensorial events immersed in a lived space, becomes a virtual body made up of intensities, of pure forces or magnitudes within a vector space, thereby losing its affective qualities. Furthermore, lived and virtual (...) bodies build up a correlation bridged not by intentionality, as phenomenology would maintain, but by sensation. Virtuality is thus characterised by both the loss of corporeality and the simulation of the lifeworld. But how can the split between the real and the virtual body be bridged? On the one hand, in Deleuze’s conception of sensation, real and virtual collapse into one another so that the real world ‘resonates’ with its virtual double. On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of form relates both realities in terms of a correlation of signification between the physical and the existential realms. With recourse to the notion of structure or form, I will argue that the phenomenal and the virtual do not represent different modes of being, but are bound by a correlation ruled by sensation as a system of intensive forces. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt verfügt heute über eine so breite und stets wachsende internationale Leserschaft wie kein anderer deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer des vergangenen Jahrhunderts. Sein Werk wird dabei freilich meist isoliert betrachtet und allenfalls auf den staatsrechtlichen Kontext bezogen. Im Mittelpunkt dieses Buches steht dagegen der politische Intellektuelle, der weit über die Grenzen seines Faches hinauswirkte. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit gilt dabei den Anfangs- und den Endjahren der Weimarer Republik. Während Schmitt in München Strategien zur Zähmung der Revolution entwickelte, setzte er sich in seinen Berliner (...) Jahren für eine autoritäre Transformation der Verfassung ein, die neben der äußersten Linken auch die äußerste Rechte von der Macht fernhalten sollte. Das geschah nicht nur in der Form der verfassungsrechtlichen Expertise für Regierungskreise, sondern auch durch publizistische Interventionen, bei denen der in Bonn gebildete Schülerkreis Schmitts eine tragende Rolle spielte. Zeitschriften wie Der Ring und das Deutsche Volkstum standen in der Endkrise der Weimarer Republik zeitweise vollständig unter dem Einfluß Schmittscher Ideen, und auch im breiteren Umfeld waren sie präsent, etwa in den Organen der Bündischen Jugend oder in der vielgelesenen Tat. Selbst Kritiker Schmitts konnten sich diesem Einfluß nicht entziehen, wie am Beispiel Otto Kirchheimers, Franz Neumanns, Ernst Fraenkels, Waldemar Gurians und anderer gezeigt wird. Gestützt auf nachgelassene Korrespondenzen und eine umfassende Auswertung der zeitgenössischen Publizistik gibt das Buch Aufschluß über Schmitts Netzwerk und seine politischen Strategien. (shrink)

This paper enquires into a paradigmatic change concerning the concept of motion: from a phenomenological conception of motion understood as a continuous and finite process of translation, to a physical conception of motion as rectilinear, uniform and continuous, that is, as an inertial state that if unhindered, can extend infinitely – the former held by Aristotle, the latter by Koyré, a shift that is evidenced by their contrasting treatment of Zeno’s paradoxes. I argue that both ontologies of motion can be (...) understood in phenomenological terms: Motion is accomplished by the real itself. However, while Aristotle’s continuous motion as actualization of the form of a given body involves its formal determination and constitution of sense, Koyré’s conceives of motion and rest as kinds of being and motion itself as exemplifcation of the mathematization of nature that Husserl described in the Crisis. Taken together, these changes presuppose a transformation of metaphysical and epistemic frameworks. (shrink)

In dem Beitrag wird der Frage nachgegangen, wie der Widerstreit zwischen mimesis und methexis eine – so die These – ›atopische Differenz‹ hervorbringt, die den Sinn des Gegenstandes zu einer fortwährenden Bildung zwingt, einen Sinn, der sich weder vollständig erhellen noch in bestehenden Begrifflichkeiten erfassen lässt, sondern sich eher in sinnlichen Erfahrung ausdrückt. Der Begriff der Atopie bedeutet nach Franco Rella , außerhalb unseres Platzes bzw. der Grenzen unserer wahrnehmungsmäßigen und kognitiven Gewohnheiten zu sein. Die hier vorgeschlagene atopische Differenz – (...) eine Differenz, die sich in keinem eigenen Ort bzw. topos idios im Sinne Aristoteles verankern lässt – wandert zwischen dem Abbild und dem Trugbild und entzieht sich unseren Gewohnheiten und übernommenen Begriffen. Um die Voraussetzungen der Repräsentation, wie sie von Platon benannt werden, aufzudecken, soll in einem ersten Schritt das Verhältnis zwischen Urbild und Abbild im Denken Platons vorgestellt werden. Anschließend wird auf Gilles Deleuze’ Schriften Differenz und Wiederholung und Logik des Sinns eingegangen, die die Grundbausteine für eine moderne Aufwertung der mimetischen Praktiken liefern. Der französische Philosoph hebt die Produktion von Trugbildern als eine »Umkehrung des Platonismus« hervor, denn diese reproduzieren nicht mehr das Urbild. In einem dritten Schritt werden die Eigenschaften der Trugbilder anhand der Gemälde des englischen Malers Francis Bacon näher bestimmt. Zum Schluss wird die ›atopische Differenz‹ in ihrer Entstehungsmöglichkeit und ihrer Tragweite näher beleuchtet. Es wird sich herausstellen, dass die Umkehrung des Platonismus nicht nur eine Produktion des Trugbildes ist, sondern auch einen sinnlichen Überschuss verursacht, der sich jeder wesentlichen Bestimmung widersetzt, unlokalisierbar bleibt und die Betrachter affiziert. (shrink)

Using an event-study framework, we examine the stock market reaction to the announcement of firm withdrawal from countries designated as “State Sponsors of Terrorism” by the U.S. Department of State. We find that such announcements are, on average, linked to a statistically significant increase in firm value—an effect which already kicks in a few days before the announcement date. The observed abnormal returns are positively associated with the U.S. domicile, the intensity of a firm’s hitherto existing engagement in a designated (...) country, the number of countries that it withdraws from, as well as with a withdrawal from Iran compared to a withdrawal from other countries. Evidence suggests an increase in demand for stocks of withdrawing firms as a plausible cause of the positive stock price reaction. Pension and endowment funds are significantly less likely to own strategic stakes in firms with intensive involvements in countries designated as “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” We find some statistical evidence that firms remaining active in such countries have abnormally positive returns in the long run. (shrink)

In her article “Die Irrealität des Kunstwerkes,” first published in 1938, Hedwig Conrad-Martius delves into the question of the artistic representation of the real reality of the world, which basically concerns the classical distinction between art and nature. It is in this context that Conrad-Martius rejects idealism and the concomitant assumption that an artwork imitates the “living reality” of Nature. She clearly distinguishes between the task of phenomenology and that of art: while phenomenology should surpass the sphere of mere sensuous (...) appearances and inquire into the “real reality” (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) of the world, phenomenological aesthetics should conversely deal with the expressive character of appearances and assume their inherent “irreality” (Irrealität), such that phenomenological ontology and aesthetics involve distinctive ontological realms that vary according to the subject-matter. However, while she clearly distances herself from Husserl’s phenomenology in her search for the consciousness-independent facticity of the world, she concurs with him in her eidetic enquiries and in the assertion of the creative potential of art, which lies in the creation of a new, even “irreal,” world. For this purpose, I will explore confluences and divergences between their respective conceptions. (shrink)

Der Beitrag widmet sich der Entwicklung der Untersuchungen Husserls und Merleau-Pontys in Bezug auf die Wechselverhältnisse zwischen Welt, Raum und Leib. Die These besagt, dass die ›genetische‹ Einsicht, die leiblich aff ektive Erfahrung verleihe der Welt einen subjekt-relativen Sinn, anfänglich zu einer Umkehrung des Fundierungsverhältnisses und schließlich zur Ausarbeitung der Urhyle als sinnliches Prinzip bei Husserl geführt hat, während sie Merleau-Ponty dazu verleitet hat, die Unterscheidung ›Bewusstsein-Objekt‹ zu revidieren und eine Ontologie des Fleisches zu entwickeln. Aus dieser Initialthese wird sich (...) zeigen, dass die durch pathische Empfindungen, Gefühle und Stimmungen hervorgebrachte Verschränkung von Leib und Ort die existenzielle Dimension der Raumerfahrung, das ›Hier-in-einem-Ort-zu-sein‹, ausmacht. Der Begriff der Atmosphäre verbindet diese Einsichten mit der Architekturerfahrung: Insofern eine Atmosphäre alle unsere Sinne durch optische und haptische Empfindungen simultan ergreift, gleicht sie einer intensiven Gefühlskraft und stellt die Dauer und die affektive Dimension eines Seins-in-Situation hervor. Sie veranschaulicht somit das Erklärungspotential der genetischen Phänomenologie für die Architektur. (shrink)

Summary This paper deals with the development of Husserl’s and Merleau-Pontys analyses of the affective lived experience of body and space. Both the concept of „flesh“ (Merleau-Ponty) and „Hyle“ (Husserl) stand for a sensuous principle that underlies the original givenness and solidarity of body and world and I claim that this interaction and the concomitant intertwining of body and place make up the existential dimension of architecture, i.e. the, being-here-in-a-place’. In this connection, I argue that the fact that bodily affective (...) experience endows the world with sense has led to a double break: On the one hand with representation and on the other with perspectivity and compossibility of the realms of being in Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s respective approaches. Finally, I will exemplify this break and the development of genetic insights – from an anthropocentric, organic and harmonious space conception to a topologic space made up of incompossibilities expressing an ambiguous sense – with paradigmatic works of architecture, so as to make evident the explanatory potential of phenomenology for architecture. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the Argentine philosopher Eugenio Pucciarelli (1907–1995) and his critical reception of phenomenology. It introduces to his contribution to phenomenology in the context of its early reception in Argentina and addresses the following issues: 1) the mission of philosophy, the various ways of accessing its essence, in particular those of Scheler, Dilthey and Husserl, 2) his reception of Husserl as far as the ideals of science and reason are concerned, 3) the crisis of reason 4) his pluralistic (...) conception of reason and time, and finally, to 5) his humanistic stance. I argue that his conception of philosophy, which emphasizes the personal dimension and the social commitment of philosophical practice as well as the relentless search for unshakeable foundations of knowledge as carried out by Husserl, is underpinned by a pluralistic conception of reason, time and culture that confers Pucciarelli’s philosophizing a humanistic bias. Phenomenology as conceived by Pucciarelli becomes thus an active force by embracing multiple perspectives, such that its methodology can be applied to varying contexts and circumstances. Pucciarelli’s commitment to social justice and Latin American culture responds to the attempt to rescue the virtues and freedom of the individual, which ground human dignity. In short, Pucciarelli’s stance reveals a profound pluralistic humanism that does not neglect its militant and critical function, thus evidencing its relevance to the current sociopolitical situation in Latin America. (shrink)

This paper aims to pay tribute to Figal’s comprehensive and innovative analysis of the artwork and beauty, while challenging both his realist position on the immediacy of meaning and his monist stance that reduces sublimity to beauty. To enquire into the origin of aesthetic feelings and sense, and thus, to break the hermeneutic circle, we first trace the origin of this reduction to the reception of Burke’s concept of the sublime by Mendelssohn and Kant. We then recur to Husserl and (...) Dufrenne to trace the origin of the sense of the feeling of sublimity in the realm of affectivity or sensuousness. This genesis takes place in passive experience, where we identify an excess of sensuous sense over categorial meaning that is constitutive of the affective sense that our bodily sensations give to hyletic material. It is argued that this sensuous excess evokes a sublime experience in the phenomenological sense, involving an affective and disruptive bodily experience and an endless process of sense formation. Affective or sensuous sense is thus an event that irreversibly affects the bodily surface. To elucidate this phenomenon, we draw on the theoretical framework of Breton and Bataille, positing it as a form-transgressive ‘convulsive’ sublime, which we then illustrate in the architectural works of Tschumi and Eisenman. In short, we have retrieved the origin of aesthetic experience and redefined the feeling of the sublime as a phenomenological ‘convulsive’ sublimity. (shrink)

The author of 'Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen' (1918) is usually regarded as one of the founding fathers of the so-called 'Conservative Revolution'. But Thomas Mann's understanding of this concept does not at all coincide with the definition established by Armin Mohler, mainly in that it is not Nietzschean. Nor do the ties with the George circle furnish grounds for assigning Mann to the 'Conservative Revol ution', any more than to the 'aesthetic fundamentalism' which was cul tivated there. Moreover, it can be (...) shown that Mann's political views differ significantly from the 'new nationalism' propagated in the circle around Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, and that they have more affini ties to old liberalism than to a 'Conservative Revolution'. (shrink)

In his early writings, dealing mainly with problems of agricultural policy, Max Weber at times differentiates between “class” and “estate”, but in general he treats them as synonyms. Only after 1909, when he started to work on Economy and Society and Economic Ethic of the World Religions, he felt the necessity to use these concepts in a more clear-cut manner. “Classes” are only placed within the economic order, while “estates” belong to the social order and take shape through the partition (...) of «social prestige» or «honor», which in turn derives from different sources, including the religious ones. This essay explores the forms of religious stratification which arise from the knowledge of rituals and precedents, from the knowledge of the Sacred Scriptures, or from a specific knowledge of the conditions of possibility of redemption. (shrink)

Kann und soll die katholische Kirche auf die Christliche Sozialethik verzichten, auf eine Disziplin, die sich an den theologischen Ausbildungsorten des deutschsprachigen Raums fast überall etabliert hat und gleichsam als Bindeglied zwischen Kirche und Welt dient? Kann ihr Feld von den Moraltheologen "mitbetreut" werden? Eine Frage, die der Autor letztlich verneint, wenn es auch Bereiche gibt, in denen sich der individualethische Ansatz der Moraltheologie vom sozialethischen nicht völlig trennen lässt. Ein historischer Überblick zeigt, dass die Geschichte der Christlichen Sozialethik nicht (...) erst mit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts und dem Erscheinen der 1. Sozialenzyklika "Rerum novarum" 1891 beginnt, sondern in die Anfänge der Kirche zurückgeht, und zwar dort, wo es um die soziale Frage (Armut, Reichtum und Sklaverei), um die Wirtschaftsfrage (Eigentum, Zins und Wucher) sowie um die politische Frage (Krieg und Frieden, Verhältnis Kirche und Staat) gegangen ist. Das heutige Selbstverständnis der Christlichen Sozialethik steht sodann im Mittelpunkt. Anhand der ("neuen") Politischen Theologie und der Wirtschaftsethik werden zwei Themenkreise aufgegriffen, an denen sich zeigt, wie hochaktuell und bedeutsam dieses theologische Fach als "Disziplin in der Welt" ist. (shrink)

The Sublime in a phenomenological sense: The Affective Bodily Experience of Space The aim of the following paper is to redefine the sublime in phenomenological terms, a task long overdue. Departing from Kant, it claims that the phenomenological sublime is an emotion aroused neither by the power of our reason transcending the inadequacy of imagination as it concerns nature, nor by the overwhelming powers of imagination as it concerns an artwork, but by the excess of sensuousness over conceptuality, which is (...) bodily felt. This shift into bodily apprehensions, though advanced by empirical psychologists, took place in the twentieth century resulting from Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's reformulation of the affective sphere of the body and of its concomitant experience of space. Their criticism of compossibility and harmony lead to a disruption of the bodily metaphoric order inherent to artistic representation. This becomes evident in the conception of present architecture, as the works of Tschumi and Eisenman show. The phenomenological emotion of sublimity expresses thus the affective bodily experience of space. (shrink)

In the last years, there has been an increasing interest in the Christian poet Prudentius and his literary technique. This article wants to show that Propertius’s elegy 4.11, the so-called regina elegiarum, is a crucial intertext for Prudentius, Peristephanon 13. Numerous lexical and motivic references to the Propertian text regarding the matrone Cornelia render it plausible that Prudentius wanted his recipients to read his poem about the Carthagian martyr bishop Cyprian while bearing in mind the Propertian intertext. Furthermore, by choosing (...) a rare metre, Prudentius might also allude to a specific Horatian poem (carm. 1.4) as another important intertext. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the tensions that the rise of “Nordic racism” associated with Hans F. K. Günther triggered within the völkisch movement in the 1920s. Using the examples of the “Deutschbund,” the völkisch wing of the German youth movement “Bündische Jugend” and the German Aristocrats' Association “Deutsche Adelsgenossenschaft,” this essay shows that the reception of the Nordic idea was partially based on misunderstandings and distortions but was also met with open disagreement.

In his book Welt und Unendlichkeit, László Tengelyi has enquired into the possibility of a phenomenological metaphysics. Among the many issues addressed in his book, he thematized a real necessity of a non-apriori kind at Aristotle and Husserl, a necessity which he called „a necessity of the fact“. His research settled the basis for the present enquiry, which will examine the relationship between the absolute and the conditional necessity of a fact as well as the contingent or accidental features involved (...) therein at Aristotle and Husserl, insofar as facticity is concerned. I intend to show that although both authors share the view that worldly beings are characterized by their contingency, they differ as to their necessity: Aristotle attributes a contingent necessity to the factual being i.e. to reality, a necessity characterized by its being temporarily conditioned by actuality and which can therefore be defined as the ,conditional necessity of a fact‘. As to Husserl, transcendental phenomenology must, upon the basis of the eidetic method, determine the possibilities out of which the ego constitutes the factual world. He states the necessity of the fact as an eidetic necessity, which has to be grounded on eidetic laws. Later on, enquiries into a „metaphysics in new sense“ lead to a revision of the meaning of „fact“ and to an inversion of the order of foundation as well: the original givenness of the world, the primal I, intersubjectivity and historicity as primal and absolute facts carry the eidetic necessities. Accidental causes, on the other hand, account not only for the contingency of the real but, at Husserl, for the ego‘s ,essential openness‘ and its core of primal contingency. In this context, I shall argue that facticity paired with the accidental allows for the irruption of something new that overwhelms us – an event as Ereignis. (shrink)

Einleitung -- Charismatische Herrschaft -- Traditionale Herrschaft -- Traditionale und charismatische Herrschaft im vorrationalen Okzident: Antike -- Traditionale und charismatische Herrschaft im vorrationalen Okzident: Mittelalter -- Legale Herrschaft.

In den folgenden Überlegungen wird der Frage nachgegangen, welchen Status die Unterscheidung zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Begriff in der Philosophie Husserls hat und inwiefern sie für die Herausarbeitung eines ästhetischen Wissens fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Husserl formuliert in den Ideen I das „Prinzip aller Prinzipien“ für die Philosophie, „daß jede originär gebende Anschauung eine Rechtsquelle der Erkenntnis sei, daß alles, was sich uns in der ‚Intuition’ originär (sozusagen in seiner leibhaften Wirklichkeit) darbietet, einfach hinzunehmen sei, als was es sich gibt, aber (...) auch nur in den Schranken, in denen es sich da gibt[...].“1 Eine Anschauung ist also die subjektive Erscheinungsweise eines Gegenstandes: Etwas erscheint mir „als“ etwas, d.h. das Selbstsein der Sache ist nicht ein ‚ansich’ Sein, sondern eine „subjektive[], situationsgebundene[] Gegebenheitsweise.“2 Es gibt eine Korrespondenz zwischen der Gegebenheitsweise – dem ‚Wie’ des Erscheinens – und dem Gegenstandsart bzw. dem Gegenstandssinn – dem ‚als Was’ der Gegenstand vermeint ist. Sinnliche und kategoriale Anschauungen konstituieren die Form der Gegenständlichkeit: die sinnliche aus den „Auffassungsstoffen“, die kategoriale aus den „Auffassungsformen“. Sie sind nicht getrennte Bereiche in der husserlschen Phänomenologie, sondern sind durch ein Fundierungsverhältnis3 aufeinander bezogen: Laut den Logischen Untersuchungen ist eine kategoriale Anschauung4 ein durch eine sinnliche Wahrnehmung fundierter intentionaler Akt;in der kategorialen Anschauung erfüllen sich die „kategorial geformten Bedeutungen“.5 Im Unterschied zur sinnlichen Anschauung ist die kategoriale Anschauung durch einen „Überschuss in der Bedeutung“ charakterisiert, denn „nur die in []einem ‚Begriff‘ vereinten Merkmalbedeutungen terminieren in der Wahrnehmung“.6 In seinen späteren Überlegungen erkennt Husserl aber, dass das Kategoriale auf das Nichtkategoriale, auf das Vorprädikative bzw. die passive Synthesis hinweist. Im Folgenden wird daher die These vertreten, dass diese Anerkennung einer passiven, vorkategorialen, ursprünglichen Sinnstiftung und die darauf aufbauende sich stets fortbildende Sinnbildung des identischen Gegenstandes im kontinuierlichen Wahrnehmungsverlauf dem Gegenstand einen sinnlichen Überschuss aufprägt, den die kategoriale Wahrnehmung nicht einzulösen vermag. Diesem Überschuss liegen spezifische Wissensformen zugrunde, die nicht mehr ganz im Sinne Husserl, sondern in Anknüpfung an Platons Politeia als eikasía (Vermutung: den Bildern, eikones, entsprechend) und pístis (Hinnahme, Überzeugung) bestimmt werden können. Im letzten Teil des Vortrages wird schließlich ein auf dem Boden der Lebenswelt aufbauendes Fundierungsverhältnis zwischen ästhetischem und wissenschaftlichem Wissen vorgeschlagen. (shrink)

I will discuss two opposed conceptions of the nature of the self and indicate the shortcomings of each approach, in order to go on to show something about self-involvement and singularity that is often overlooked. The two opposed conceptions deal with the self in different ways because they also deal differently with the relation between consciousness and the self as such. In the first conception, this relation remains external: reflection is not of the same order as the self and, conversely, (...) the self is something that always falls outside of reflection, something against which a position can be occupied and a (critical) distance taken. Here, the self is an object whose nature does not in the least affect the nature of reflection. To the contrary, the ego must explicitly identify with that object if there is to be any trace of a connection with it at all. I will refer to this position as that of individualism. (shrink)

It is shown that for an inside observer it is impossible to distinguish all states in which a system was at some past time. This holds for classical and quantum systems, but an assumption of determinism is essential in the proof.

La tesis principal sostiene que Descartes, mucho antes que Nietzsche, sentó las bases para la aserción de la fenomenalidad del mundo interno, el cual posee los atributos de certeza e indubitalidad de las que carecen los fenómenos externos de la percepción. Después de un primer analisis del alcance del cógito de las Meditaciones, de la crítica al mismo de Nietzsche y finalmente de la crítica de Heidegger a ambos, se analizan los problemas inherentes a sus respectivos planteos. Mientras que el (...) cógito de las Meditaciones sólo prueba la existencia del ser sustancial inmaterial, el Tratado de las pasiones y ciertas cartas de Descartes permiten la postulación de un �yo� sustrato del compuesto alma-cuerpo que no sólo es sede de las pasiones y acciones, sino que alberga emociones ciertas e indudables que permiten la constitutición de un sujeto de la experiencia afectiva. El análisis de la subjetividad en Nietzsche revelará que, aunque el sujeto es sólo una ficción útil, comparte ciertos rasgos con la subjetividad afectiva postulada: las emociones remiten al mundo exterior en cuanto éste es sentido y, en cuanto le advienen al alma y la afectan irremisiblemente, no pueden ser puestas en duda. (shrink)

El artículo se centra en el filósofo argentino Eugenio Pucciarelli (1907-1995) y su recepción de la fenomenología, a la que confiere un sesgo humanista. Se procederá a una introducción a su contribución a la fenomenología en América Latina y se abordarán los siguientes temas: 1) la misión de la filosofía, las diversas vías de acceso a su esencia, en particular aquellas de Scheler, Dilthey y Husserl, 2) su recepción de Husserl en cuanto concierne a los ideales de ciencia y de (...) razón, 3) la crisis de la razón y de la evidencia, 4) su concepción pluralista de la razón, del tiempo y de la cultura, 5) humanismo y libertad. La tesis sostiene que su concepción de la filosofía, que enfatiza la dimensión personal y el compromiso social de la práctica filosófica, revela un profundo humanismo pluralista que no descuida su función militante y crítica, evidenciado así la actualidad de su mensaje. (shrink)