Results for 'Ingmar Person'

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  1.  49
    The universal basis of egoism.Ingmar Person - 1985 - Theoria 51 (3):137-158.
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  2. Equality, priority and person-affecting value.Ingmar Persson - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (1):23-39.
    Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be (...)
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  3.  83
    The indeterminacy and insignificance of personal identity.Ingmar Persson - 1992 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):271 – 283.
    (1992). The indeterminacy and insignificance of personal identity. Inquiry: Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 271-283.
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  4.  27
    Genetic Therapy, Person‐regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity — A Reply to Robert Elliot.Ingmar Persson - 1997 - Bioethics 11 (2):161-169.
    I have outlined two ways of defending the claim that there are so‐called person‐regarding reasons for practising gene therapy on human conceptuses. One is metaphysical and concerns our nature and identity. The upshot of it is that, in cases of most interest, this therapy does not affect our identity, by bringing into existence anyone of our kind who would not otherwise have existed. The other defence is value theoretical and claims that even if genetic therapy were to affect the (...)
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  5.  53
    Is Agar biased against 'post-persons'?Ingmar Persson - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):77-78.
    I shall discuss only one of Nicholas Agar's main claims,1 namely ‘that the bad consequences/of moral status enhancement/are, in moral terms, so bad that a moderate probability of their occurrence makes it wrong not to seek to prevent them’. His other main claim, which I grant, is that moral status enhancement to the effect of creating beings with a moral status higher than that of persons—post-persons—is possible. My chief objection to Agar's argument is that it is biased in favour of (...)
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  6. Parfit on Personal Identity: Its Analysis and (Un)importance.Ingmar Persson - 2016 - Theoria 82 (2):148-165.
    This article examines Derek Parfit's claim in Reasons and Persons that personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity with the right kind of cause. It argues that such psychological accounts of our identity fail, but that their main rivals, biological or animalist accounts do not fare better. Instead it proposes an error-theory to the effect that common sense takes us to be identical to our bodies on the erroneous assumption that our minds belong non-derivatively to them, whereas they in fact (...)
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  7. Peter Singer on Why Persons are Irreplaceable.Ingmar Persson - 1995 - Utilitas 7 (1):55.
    In the preface to the second edition of his deservedly popular Practical Ethics, Peter Singer notes that one of the ‘two significant changes” of his ‘underlying ethical views” consists in dropping the tentative suggestion that ‘one might try to combine both the “total” and the “prior existence” versions of utilitarianism, applying the former to sentient beings who are not self-conscious and the latter to those who are”. On the total view our aim is ‘to increase the total amount of pleasure (...)
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  8. Ambiguities in Feldman's Desert-adjusted Values.Ingmar Persson - 1997 - Utilitas 9 (3):319.
    Fred Feldman has argued that consequentialists can answer the well-known by replacing the utilitarian axiology with one that makes the value of receiving pleasures and pains depend on how deserved it is. It is shown that this proposal is open to three interpretations: the Fit-idea, which operates with the degree of fit between what recipients get and what they deserve; the Merit-idea, which operates with the magnitude of the recipients' desert or merit; and the Fit-Merit idea which is a combination (...)
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  9. Our Identity and the Separability of Persons and Organisms.Ingmar Persson - 1999 - Dialogue 38 (3):519-.
    RésuméLes philosophes appartenant à la tradition lockienne considèrent qu'en tant que personnes ou sujets de pensée et d'expérience, nous sommes distincts de nos organismes humains. Cela conduirait, selon des théoriciens qui veulent plutôt nous identifier à ces organismes, à un dédoublement paradoxal des sujets en question. Les objectifs principaux de cet article sont, premièrement, de soutenir à l'encontre de cet argument que la séparabilité des personnes par rapport à leurs organismes peut être comprise d'une manière non paradoxale; et deuxièmement, de (...)
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  10.  50
    Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person‐Regarding Reasons.Ingmar Persson - 1995 - Bioethics 9 (1):16-31.
    It has been argued that there can be no person‐regarding reasons for practising genetic therapy, since it affects identity and causes to exist an individual who would not otherwise have existed. And there can be no such reasons for causing somebody to exist because existing cannot be better for an individual than never existing. In the present paper, both of these claims are denied. It is contended, first, that in practically all significant cases genetic therapy will not affect the (...)
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  11.  71
    The Involvement of Our Identity in Experiential Memory.Ingmar Persson - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):447 - 465.
    On many accounts, the criterion of our diachronic identity or persistence consists in or comprises some psychological conditions. As on Locke's account, these conditions often include one's appealing to the relation of remembering having an experience of. Contemporary theorists are unlikely to claim simply that a necessary condition for Pm at tm being the same person as Pn at a later time, tn, is that Pn remembers having experiences had by Pm at tm. They are more likely to appeal, (...)
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  12. Rights and the asymmetry between creating good and bad lives.Ingmar Persson - 2009 - In David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. Springer. pp. 29--47.
  13.  48
    Morality From Compassion.Ingmar Persson - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    According to Arthur Schopenhauer, compassion is the basis of morality. He sees concern for justice as a negative form of compassion, directed at not harming anyone, as opposed to the more far-reaching, positive form of benefiting. He thinks a higher degree of compassion involves realizing that the spatio-temporal separation of individuals is illusory and that in reality they are all identical. Such compassion is impartial and all-encompassing. Compassion is suited to be the centre of morality because its object are negative (...)
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  14. The Fundamental Problem of Philosophy: Its Point.Ingmar Persson - 2018 - Journal of Practical Ethics 6 (1):52-68.
    The fundamental problem of philosophy is whether doing it has any point, since if it does not have any point, there is no reason to do it. It is suggested that the intrinsic point of doing philosophy is to establish a rational consensus about what the answers to its main questions are. But it seems that this cannot be accomplished because philosophical arguments are bound to be inconclusive. Still, philosophical research generates an increasing number of finer grained distinctions in terms (...)
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  15.  26
    Project DECIDE, part II: decision-making places for people with dementia in Alzheimer’s disease: supporting advance decision-making by improving person-environment fit.Julia Haberstroh, Heiko Ullrich, Anna Theile-Schürholz, Irene Schmidtmann, Andreas Reif, Aoife Poth, David Prvulovic, Nathalie Pfeiffer, Frank Oswald, Tanja Müller, Gregor Lindl, Boris Knopf, Jonas Karneboge, Tarik Karakaya, Ingmar Hornke, Martin Grond, Daniel Garmann, Simon Forstmeier, Stefanie Baisch, Christina Abele & Janina Florack - 2023 - BMC Medical Ethics 24 (1):1-11.
    BackgroundThe UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the reformed guardianship law in Germany, require that persons with a disability, including people with dementia in Alzheimer’s disease (PwAD), are supported in making self-determined decisions. This support is achieved through communication. While content-related communication is a deficit of PwAD, relational aspects of communication are a resource. Research in supported decision-making (SDM) has investigated the effectiveness of different content-related support strategies for PwAD but has only succeeded in improving understanding, (...)
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  16.  36
    Project DECIDE, part 1: increasing the amount of valid advance directives in people with Alzheimer’s disease by offering advance care planning—a prospective double-arm intervention study.Stefanie Baisch, Christina Abele, Anna Theile-Schürholz, Irene Schmidtmann, Frank Oswald, Tarik Karakaya, Tanja Müller, Janina Florack, Daniel Garmann, Jonas Karneboge, Gregor Lindl, Nathalie Pfeiffer, Aoife Poth, Bogdan Alin Caba, Martin Grond, Ingmar Hornke, David Prvulovic, Andreas Reif, Heiko Ullrich & Julia Haberstroh - 2022 - BMC Medical Ethics 23 (1):1-12.
    BackgroundEverybody has the right to decide whether to receive specific medical treatment or not and to provide their free, prior and informed consent to do so. As dementia progresses, people with Alzheimer’s dementia (PwAD) can lose their capacity to provide informed consent to complex medical treatment. When the capacity to consent is lost, the autonomy of the affected person can only be guaranteed when an interpretable and valid advance directive exists. Advance directives are not yet common in Germany, and (...)
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  17. ‟Le Rite” (1969) D’Ingmar Bergman: L’Acteur-Comme-Acteur Entre L’‟Anagnorisis” Et la Fragilité de L’Identification.Alexandra Noemina Câmpean - 2017 - Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai Philosophia:115-125.
    Ingmar Bergman’s The Rite (1969): the Actor-as-Actor between Anagnorisis and Fragility of Identification. The present paper analyses the strange identification experienced by the Bergmanian actor-as-actor, due to a perpetual memory of the body. We will examine the manner in which the actor who plays the role of the actor passes through a painful and disarticulated identification, originated in August Strindberg’s radiations of the ego (Ausstrahlungen des Ichs). Accordingly, the radiations are not only writings in the first person, but (...)
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  18. Persons as proper parts of organisms.David B. Hershenov - 2005 - Theoria 71 (1):29-37.
    Defenders of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity (PAPI) insist that the possession of some kind of mind is essential to us. We are essentially thinking beings, not living creatures. We would cease to exist if our capacity for thought was irreversibly lost due to a coma or permanent vegetative state. However, the onset of such conditions would not mean the death of an organism. It would survive in a mindless state. But this would appear to mean that before the (...)
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  19.  49
    Persson's Merely Possible Persons.Krister Bykvist & Tim Campbell - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (4):479-487.
    All else being equal, creating a miserable person makes the world worse, and creating an ecstatic person makes it better. Such claims are easily justified if it can be better, or worse, for a person to exist than not to exist. But that seems to require that things can be better, or worse, for a person even in a world in which she does not exist. Ingmar Persson defends this seemingly paradoxical claim in his latest (...)
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  20.  36
    Genetic Therapy, Person‐regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity.Robert Elliot - 1997 - Bioethics 11 (2):151–160.
    It has been argued for example by Ingmar Persson, that genetic therapy performed on a conceptus does not alter the identity of the person that develops from it, even if we are essentially persons. If this claim is true then there can be person-regarding reasons for performing genetic therapy on a conceptus. Here it is argued that such person-regarding reasons obtain only if we are not essentially persons but essentially animals. This conclusion requires the defeat of (...)
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  21. Review essay of contingent future persons, Jan C. Heller and Nick Fotion, eds. [REVIEW]Stuart Rachels - - 1999 - Bioethics 13:160-167.
    This essay critically comments on Contingent Future Persons (1997), an anthology of thirteen papers on the same topic as Obligations to Future Generations (1978), namely, the morality of decisions affecting the existence, number and identity of future persons. In my discussion, I identify the basic point of dispute between R. M. Hare and Michael Lockwood on potentiality; I criticize Nick Fotion's thesis that the Repugnant Conclusion is too far-fetched to be philosophically valuable; I object to Clark Wolf's "Impure Consequentialist Theory (...)
     
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  22.  9
    Reality and Experience: Four Philosophical Essays.Eino Kaila & R. S. Cohen - 1978 - Springer.
    Philosophically, there is a book which was a tremendous experience for me: Eino Kaila's hychology of the Person ality _ His thesis that man lives strictly according to his needs - negative and positive - was shattering to me, but terribly true. And I built on this ground. Ingmar Bergman J 1. This introductory essay is neither intended to be a full presentation nor to be a critical evaluation of the contributions to philosophy made by Eino Kaila. Kaila's (...)
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  23. The Morality of Moral Neuroenhancement.Thomas Douglas - 2014 - In Levy Neil & Clausen Jens (eds.), Handbook on Neuroethics. Springer.
    This chapter reviews recent philosophical and neuroethical literature on the morality of moral neuroenhancements. It first briefly outlines the main moral arguments that have been made concerning moral status neuroenhancements. These are neurointerventions that would augment the moral status of human persons. It then surveys recent debate regarding moral desirability neuroenhancements: neurointerventions that augment that the moral desirability of human character traits, motives or conduct. This debate has contested, among other claims (i) Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu’s contention that (...)
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  24.  14
    Personas en peligro.Guillermo Hurtado - 2021 - Dianoia 66 (86):79-91.
    Resumen Describo tres caminos de personalización: el de la autenticidad, el del reconocimiento y el de la compenetración. En cada uno de ellos se corre el riesgo de caer en “vértigos existenciales” como los descritos por Sören Kierkegaard y Carlos Pereda. Con base en lo anterior, ofrezco una interpretación de la película de Ingmar Bergman Persona y propongo algunas estrategias para el cuidado de la persona.I distinguish between three paths of becoming a person: the path of authenticity, the (...)
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  25.  77
    Freedom and moral enhancement.Michael J. Selgelid - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (4):215-216.
    This issue of Journal of Medical Ethics includes a pair of papers debating the implications of moral bioenhancement for human freedom–and, especially, the question of whether moral enhancement should potentially be compulsory. In earlier writings Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that compulsory moral bioenhancement may be necessary to prevent against catastrophic harms that might result from immoral behaviour.1 In “Voluntary moral enhancement and the survival-at-any-cost bias” Vojin Rakic agrees with P&S that moral bioenhancement is important, but he argues (...)
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  26. (1 other version)The Self.Galen Strawson & Marya Schechtman - 2005 - Wiley-Blackwell.
    This collection of philosophical papers reflects on the existence and nature of the self. A collection of philosophical papers devoted to the subject of the self. Reflects on key questions about the existence and nature of the self. Comprises contributions from leading authorities in the field: Barry Dainton, Ingmar Persson, Marya Schechtman, Galen Strawson, Bas van Fraassen, and Peter van Inwagen.
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  27.  69
    From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons, and Responsibility.Ingmar Persson - 2013 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    Many philosophers think that if you're morally responsible for a state of affairs, you must be a cause of it. Ingmar Persson argues that this strand of common sense morality is asymmetrical, in that it features the act-omission doctrine, according to which there are stronger reasons against performing some harmful actions than in favour of performing any beneficial actions. He analyses the act-omission doctrine as consisting in a theory of negative rights, according to which there are rights not to (...)
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  28.  38
    Psychedelic Harm Reduction and Integration: A Transtheoretical Model for Clinical Practice.Ingmar Gorman, Elizabeth M. Nielson, Aja Molinar, Ksenia Cassidy & Jonathan Sabbagh - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12:645246.
    Psychedelic Harm Reduction and Integration (PHRI) is a transtheoretical and transdiagnostic clinical approach to working with patients who are using or considering using psychedelics in any context. The ongoing discussion of psychedelics in academic research and mainstream media, coupled with recent law enforcement deprioritization of psychedelics and compassionate use approvals for psychedelic-assisted therapy, make this model exceedingly timely. Given the prevalence of psychedelic use, the therapeutic potential of psychedelics, and the unique cultural and historical context in which psychedelics are placed, (...)
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  29.  9
    Failing the market, failing deliberative democracy: How scaling up corporate carbon reporting proliferates information asymmetries.Ingmar Lippert - 2016 - Big Data and Society 3 (2).
    Corporate carbon footprint data has become ubiquitous. This data is also highly promissory. But as this paper argues, such data fails both consumers and citizens. The governance of climate change seemingly requires a strong foundation of data on emission sources. Economists approach climate change as a market failure, where the optimisation of the atmosphere is to be evidence based and data driven. Citizens or consumers, state or private agents of control, all require deep access to information to judge emission realities. (...)
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  30. Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Julian Savulescu.
    Unfit for the Future argues that the future of our species depends on radical enhancement of the moral aspects of our nature. Population growth and technological advances are threatening to undermine the conditions of worthwhile life on earth forever. We need to modify the biological bases of human motivation to deal with this challenge.
  31. The perils of cognitive enhancement and the urgent imperative to enhance the moral character of humanity.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2008 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (3):162-177.
    abstract As history shows, some human beings are capable of acting very immorally. 1 Technological advance and consequent exponential growth in cognitive power means that even rare evil individuals can act with catastrophic effect. The advance of science makes biological, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction easier and easier to fabricate and, thus, increases the probability that they will come into the hands of small terrorist groups and deranged individuals. Cognitive enhancement by means of drugs, implants and biological (including (...)
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  32.  38
    On the prospects of longtermism.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2024 - Bioethics 38 (8):709-712.
    This article objects to two arguments that William MacAskill gives in What We Owe the Future in support of optimism about the prospects of longtermism, that is, the prospects of positively influencing the longterm future. First, it grants that he is right that, whereas humans sometimes benefit others as an end, they rarely harm them as an end, but argues that this bias towards positive motivation is counteracted by the fact that it is practically easier to harm than to benefit. (...)
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  33.  96
    Should moral bioenhancement be compulsory? Reply to Vojin Rakic.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (4):251-252.
    In his challenging paper,1 Vojin Rakic argues against our claim that ‘there are strong reasons to believe’ that moral bioenhancement should be obligatory or compulsory if it can be made safe and effective.2 Rakic starts by criticising an argument that we employed against John Harris.3 ,4 In this argument we maintain, among other things, that moral bioenhancement cannot be wholly effective if our will is free in what is called an ‘indeterministic’ or ‘contra-causal sense’; that is, if our choices are (...)
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  34.  16
    Multiple Legitimitäten

    Zur Systematik des Legitimitätsbegriffs.
    Ingmar Ingold & Axel T. Paul - 2014 - Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 100 (2):243-262.
    The thesis of the article is that processes of structural political change can be adequately understood only on the basis of a multi-dimensional concept of political legitimacy. It is argued that the most prominent account of the idea, namely Max Weber's typology of legitimate authority, is misleading because of both its incompleteness and its incoherence (II). Drawing on David Beetham, we instead propose to analytically differentiate between three universal, genetically linked dimensions of legitimacy: (1) a basically pragmatic one, (2) a (...)
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  35. Ansvar och missförstånd.Ingmar Persson - 1990 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 11 (3):25.
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  36. Hårdnackade missförstånd.Ingmar Persson - 1984 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 5 (3):43.
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  37. Why Levelling Down could be Worse for Prioritarianism than for Egalitarianism.Ingmar Persson - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):295-303.
    Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, and (...)
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  38.  65
    The retreat of reason: a dilemma in the philosophy of life.Ingmar Persson - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    The Retreat of Reason brings back to philosophy the ambition of offering a broad vision of the human condition. One of the main original aims of philosophy was to give people guidance about how to live their lives. Ingmar Persson resumes this practical project, which has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, but his conclusions are very different from those of the ancient Greeks. They typically argued that a life led in accordance with reason, a rational life, would also (...)
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  39. Moral Transhumanism.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2010 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 35 (6):656-669.
    In its basic sense, the term "human" is a term of biological classification: an individual is human just in case it is a member of the species Homo sapiens . Its opposite is "nonhuman": nonhuman animals being animals that belong to other species than H. sapiens . In another sense of human, its opposite is "inhuman," that is cruel and heartless (cf. "humane" and "inhumane"); being human in this sense is having morally good qualities. This paper argues that biomedical research (...)
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  40.  38
    Material Beings.Ingmar Persson - 1993 - Noûs 27 (4):512-518.
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  41.  53
    The Moral Importance of Reflective Empathy.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2017 - Neuroethics 11 (2):183-193.
    This is a reply to Jesse Prinz and Paul Bloom’s skepticism about the moral importance of empathy. It concedes that empathy is spontaneously biased to individuals who are spatio-temporally close, as well as discriminatory in other ways, and incapable of accommodating large numbers of individuals. But it is argued that we could partly correct these shortcomings of empathy by a guidance of reason because empathy for others consists in imagining what they feel, and, importantly, such acts of imagination can be (...)
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  42.  38
    An equilibrium model of health.Ingmar Pörn - 1984 - In Lennart Nordenfelt & B. Ingemar B. Lindahl (eds.), Health, Disease, and Causal Explanations in Medicine. Reidel. pp. 3--9.
  43. Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and the God Machine.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2012 - The Monist 95 (3):399-421.
  44. Moral Bioenhancement, Freedom and Reason.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (3):263-268.
    In this paper we reply to the most important objections to our advocacy of moral enhancement by biomedical means – moral bioenhancement – that John Harris advances in his new book How to be Good. These objections are to effect that such moral enhancement undercuts both moral reasoning and freedom. The latter objection is directed more specifically at what we have called the God Machine, a super-duper computer which predicts our decisions and prevents decisions to perpertrate morally atrocious acts. In (...)
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  45.  51
    Rationality and maximization of satisfaction.Ingmar Persson - 1988 - Noûs 22 (4):537-554.
  46.  20
    Compassion for Possible Beings.Ingmar Persson - 2024 - Topoi 43 (1):17-27.
    This paper argues that causing beings to exist can benefit them. It is sketched how this view avoids Derek Parfit’s repugnant conclusion by rejecting the transitivity of the relation better/worse than. It handles Jeff McMahan’s asymmetry consisting in that reasons against letting beings with bad lives exist are significantly stronger than reasons for letting beings with good lives exist by putting it down to the conditions making lives bad being more potent than those making them good. The latter asymmetry is (...)
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  47. Getting moral enhancement right: The desirability of moral bioenhancement.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2011 - Bioethics 27 (3):124-131.
    We respond to a number of objections raised by John Harris in this journal to our argument that we should pursue genetic and other biological means of morally enhancing human beings (moral bioenhancement). We claim that human beings now have at their disposal means of wiping out life on Earth and that traditional methods of moral education are probably insufficient to achieve the moral enhancement required to ensure that this will not happen. Hence, we argue, moral bioenhancement should be sought (...)
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  48.  37
    The Impossibility of a Moral Right to Privacy.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2022 - Neuroethics 15 (2):1-5.
    This paper clarifies and defends against criticism our argument in _Unfit for the Future_ that there is no moral right to privacy. A right to privacy is conceived as a right that others do not acquire information about us that we reserve for ourselves and selected others. Information acquisition itself is distinguished from the means used to acquire it and the uses to which the information is put. To acquire information is not an action; it is to be caused to (...)
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  49. Actualizable Potential, Reproduction, and Embryo Research: Bringing Embryos into Existence for Different Purposes or Not at All.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2010 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (1):51.
    i) it is morally permissible to engage in reproduction, whether natural or artificial, despite knowledge that a large number of embryos will fail to implant and quickly die, then ii) it is morally permissible to produce embryos for other purposes that involve killing them, for instance, to harvest stem cells that may be used to save lives.
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  50.  13
    Humanistische Politik zwischen Reformation und Gegenreformation: der Fürstenspiegel des Jakob Omphalius.Ingmar Ahl - 2004 - Stuttgart: Steiner.
    Eines der weitgehend unbestellten Felder der Geschichtswissenschaften stellt die reiche Furstenspiegelliteratur des Alten Reiches dar.
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