My topic is the intelligent guidance of action. In this paper I offer an empirically grounded case for four ideas: that [a] cognitive processes of practical reasoning play a key role in the intelligent guidance of action, [b] these processes could not do so without significant enabling work done by both perception and the motor system, [c] the work done by perceptual and motor systems can be characterized as the generation of information specialized for action (...) guidance, which in turn suggests that [d] the cognitive processes of practical reasoning that play a key role in the guidance of intelligent action are not the abstract, syllogistic ones philosophers often treat as the paradigm of practical reasoning. Rather, these cognitive processes are constrained by, and work well with, the specialized concepts outputted by perception and the feedback outputted by sensorimotor processes. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle claimed that intelligent actions and activities are not merely the external signs of inner mental workings but rather that such actions and activities are the workings of the mind itself. In this thesis I propose an interpretation and defence of sich claim, against a common an, in my view, mistaken way of understanding Ryle's position. In chapter [1]. I introduce the argumentative thread of this thesis and a more detailed overview of the chapters. In chapter [2], I (...) criticise Stanley and Williamson's understanding of Ryle's argument and position. In chapters [3]-[5] I examine Ryle's position and provide a way of understanding his view against what I take his main opponent, INTELLECTUALISM, to be. Chapter [6] offers an argument against INTELLECTUALISM as a way of motivating a Rylean account intelligent actions and activities. I conclude in chapter [7] with a response to purported counter-examples to the view I propose. (shrink)

Although we usually identify our abilities to reason, to adapt to situations, and to solve problems with the mind, recent research has shown that we should not, in fact, detach these abilities from the body. This work provides an integrative framework for understanding how these abilities are affected by visceral reactions. Schulkin presents provocative neuroscientific research demonstrating that thought is not on one side and bodily sensibility on the other; from a biological point of view, they are integrated. Schulkin further (...) argues that this integration has important implications for judgements about art and music, moral sensibilities, attraction and revulsion, and our perpetual inclination to explain ourselves and our surroundings. (shrink)

Perceiving things to be a certain way may in some cases lead directly to action that is intelligent. This phenomenon has not often been discussed, though it is of broad philosophical interest. It also raises a difficult question: how can perception produce intelligent action? After clarifying the question—which I call the question of “practical perception”—and explaining what is required for an adequate answer, I critically examine two candidate answers drawn from work on related topics: the first, (...) inspired by Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenological analysis of absorbed coping, focuses on awareness of situational features; the other, suggested by Gilbert Ryle's classic treatment of knowledge-how, focuses on possession of behavioral dispositions. I argue that neither approach is adequate. Subsequently, I develop and defend an alternative answer that emphasizes the agent's conceptual understanding. (shrink)

This paper interprets facts about actions and responsibility in terms of Kant’s category of the ‘intelligible,’ but is also broadly naturalistic in its approach. It analyses intelligible facts in terms of two elements, the institutional and the normative. First, I draw on John Searle’s account of institutional facts. Searle emphasises that neither the meaning of a word nor my possession of something is a matter of empirical facts concerning the entity itself. Instead, to understand the nature of such facts, we (...) must take account of people’s shared beliefs. Kant’s account of property relations can, in part, be understood as an institution in Searle’s sense. Drawing on the work of Tamar Schapiro and Arthur Ripstein, I extend this idea to illuminate our ‘ownership’ of our deeds. Second, and more briefly, I present a normative element. Institutional facts need not, in themselves, be morally compelling. Under conditions of relative freedom and equality, however, I argue that practices of responsibility can be seen as a practical manifestation of critique. This generates a critical self-reflexivity that, I suggest, provides normative warrant to the practices of action and responsibility that we institute among ourselves. (shrink)

What occurs in the mind of an expert who is performing at their very best? In this paper, I survey the history of debate concerning this question. I suggest that expertise is neither solely a mastery of the automatic nor solely a mastery of intelligence in skilled action control. Experts are also capable of performing automatic actions intelligently. Following this, I argue that unconscious-thought theory (UTT) is a powerful tool in coming to understand the role of executive, intelligent (...) action control in the fluidly automatic performance of expertise. Relying on a body of empirical evidence concerning the cognitive structures and perceptual strategies employed by experts, I show that the realm of skilled action is an ideal environment within which the powers of unconscious cognitive processing can have positive effects on action. I conclude that experts rely upon unconscious thinking in the production of intelligently automatic skilled actions. (shrink)

The objective of this work is to explore the notion of “action” and “agency” in artificial intelligence (AI). It employs a metaphysical notion of action and agency as an epistemological tool in the critique of the notion of “action” and “agency” in artificial intelligence. Hence, both a metaphysical and cognitive analysis is employed in the investigation of the quiddity and nature of action and agency per se, and how they are, by extension employed in the language (...) and science of artificial intelligence. The advent of the science of artificial intelligence and cognitive science, and the technological applications of artificial intelligence in the production of agents such as driverless cars and expert systems, have raised the question of moral, ethical and/or legal responsibility in AI agents. This has re-emphasized the importance of the philosophical discourse on the notions of action and agency, which in contemporary intellectual discourse are now perceived to be phenomena within the epistemic competence of the natural sciences. This paper argues that AI systems do not and cannot possess free agency and autonomy, thus cannot be morally and ethically responsible, hence, it recommends a socio-political response to the question of responsibility in AI. It is then the duty of individual nations, or the global community to define and enact policies on who shoulders the responsibility of actions executed by AIs. (shrink)

In the development of governmental policy for artificial intelligence that is informed by ethics, one avenue currently pursued is that of drawing on “AI Ethics Principles”. However, these AI Ethics Principles often fail to be actioned in governmental policy. This paper proposes a novel framework for the development of ‘Actionable Principles for AI’. The approach acknowledges the relevance of AI Ethics Principles and homes in on methodological elements to increase their practical implementability in policy processes. As a case study, elements (...) are extracted from the development process of the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI of the European Commission’s “High Level Expert Group on AI”. Subsequently, these elements are expanded on and evaluated in light of their ability to contribute to a prototype framework for the development of 'Actionable Principles for AI'. The paper proposes the following three propositions for the formation of such a prototype framework: preliminary landscape assessments; multi-stakeholder participation and cross-sectoral feedback; and, mechanisms to support implementation and operationalizability. (shrink)

This commentary connects some of Glenberg's ideas to similar ideas from artificial intelligence. Second, it briefly discusses hidden assumptions relating to meaning, representations, and projectable properties. Finally, questions about mechanisms, mental imagery, and conceptualization in animals are posed.

Some legal theorists deny that states can conceivably act extra-legally, in the sense of acting contrary to domestic law. This position finds its most robust articulation in the writings of Hans Kelsen, and has more recently been taken up by David Dyzenhaus in the context of his work on emergencies and legality. This paper seeks to demystify their arguments and, ultimately, contend that we can intelligibly speak of the state as a legal wrongdoer or a legally unauthorized actor.

Various Value-Conscious Design frameworks have recently emerged to introduce moral and ethical intelligence into business and technical design contexts, with the goal of proactively influencing the design of technologies to account for moral and ethical values during the conception and design process. Two attempts to insert ethical intelligence into technical design communities to influence the design of technologies in ethical- and value-conscious ways are described, revealing discouraging results. Learning from these failed attempts, the article identifies three key challenges of pragmatic (...) engagement with technical design communities: confronting competing values; identifying the role of the values advocate; and the justification of a value framework. Addressing these challenges must become a priority if one is to be successful in pragmatically engaging with real-world business and design contexts to bring moral and ethical intelligence to bear in the design of emerging information and communication technologies. (shrink)

After discussing de Sousa's view of emotion in akrasia, I suggest that emotions be viewed as nonconceptual perceptions of value (see Tappolet 2000). It follows that they can render intelligible actions which are contrary to one's better judgment. An emotion can make one's action intelligible even when that action is opposed by one's all-things-considered judgment. Moreover, an akratic action prompted by an emotion may be more rational than following one's better judgement, for it may be the judgement (...) and not the perception which is in error. By contrast, "cool" akrasia is genuinely puzzling; it is not clear whether it exists. (shrink)

Some of our actions manifest states or qualities of intelligence, such as skill or cleverness. But what are these states or qualities, and how are they manifested in action? We articulate and examine general intellectualist and anti-intellectualist answers to such questions. We show how these answers — two distinct philosophical theories of intelligence and intelligent action — reflect quite different conceptions of mind and action. One of our principal aims is to illuminate some of the main (...) issues and arguments in the contemporary debate over knowledge how. A second aim is to highlight the broader theoretical significance of knowledge how, which (we argue) may serve as a hinge on which our general understanding of mind and action turns. The role of knowledge how in various debates in ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science is also discussed. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of nursing as a knowledgeable discipline. We examined ways in which knowledge operates in the practice of home care nursing and explored how knowledge might be fruitfully understood within the ambiguous spaces and competing temporalities characterizing contemporary healthcare services. Two popular metaphors of knowledge in nursing practice were identified and critically examined; evidence-based practice and the nurse as an intuitive worker. Pointing to faults in these conceptualizations, we suggest a different way of conceptualizing the relationship (...) between knowledge and practice, namely practice as being activated by contextualized knowledge. This conceptualization is captured in an understanding of the intelligent creation of context by the nurse for nursing practice to be ethical and effective. (shrink)

Janusz Czelakowski Elements of Formal Action Theory 1. Elementary Action Systems 1.1 Introductory Remarks. In contemporary literature one may distinguish ...

Sitting in the office of a distinguished philosopher of language recently, I watched him lean back (somewhat precariously) in his chair, look at the ceiling, and sigh: “Johan, we both write all this stuff about information, context, and communication – but is not the only time you really feel that you are making progress, when you resolutely close your eyes, and shut out the world and the others?” I appreciated his point, and indeed, in most spheres of life on this (...) planet, “l’Enfer” is most definitely “Les Autres”. (shrink)

The doctrine of agent-causation has been suggested by many interested in defending libertarian theories of free action to provide the conceptual apparatus necessary to make the notion of incompatibility freedom intelligible. In the present essay the conceptual viability of the doctrine of agent-causation will be assessed. It will be argued that agent-causation is, insofar as it is irreducible to event-causation, mysterious at best, totally unintelligible at worst. First, the arguments for agent-causation made by such eighteenth-century luminaries as Samuel Clarke (...) and Thomas Reid will be considered alongside the defenses of agent-causation proffered in this century by C.A. Campbell, Roderick Chisholm, and Richard Taylor. It will be shown that the case for agent-causation made by these figures is ultimately unconvincing. Two defenses of agent-causation made within the past ten years will then be taken up for examination and critique. First, Timothy O'Connor's attempt at advancing an unrefined and unrepentant doctrine of agent-causation will be shown to suffer from the same maladies as its predecessors. Next, Randolph Clarke's causal agent-causal theory of free action, which seeks a via media between agent-causal theories of free action and causal theories of action, is examined. Clarke's theory is an attempt at providing an account of how both events and agents qua substances can be the codeterminants of free actions. Despite the improvement of Clarke's theory over more conventional agent-causal theories of free action, it will be shown that agent-causation makes his theory more cumbersome than it needs to be. Clarke is able to get as much mileage out of a causal indeterminacy theory of action that does not require him to posit obscure agent-causes. Finally, a sketch of an alternative theory of free action will be offered. While it may suffer from its own conceptual deficiencies, it may not suffer from the same conceptual problems as agent-causal theories of free action. (shrink)

Malgré l'obscurité qui entoure encore l'étymologie du couple νόος-νοεῖν, il est possible, au niveau sémantique, d'établir une signification première non seulement en lien avec l’expérience directe, mais plus précisément dans le sens du νόος-organe/fonction de l'élaboration de « schémas d'action ». L'activité du νόος serait donc la création d' « images » qui n'auraient pas une valeur seulement « représentationnelle » mais, avant tout, « pragmatique-conative », capables d' « anticiper », sans pourtant être le fruit d'une réflexion élaborée, (...) la « forme » de l'action à accomplir par le sujet et le pousser à cet accomplissement. L'article se propose de développer cette conjecture, replaçant le νόος dans les spécificités de la culture orale homérique, au moyen de la confrontation avec : 1) les deux hypothèses étymologiques prédominantes, qui partagent l’idée d’un lien étroit entre l’activité du νόος et le registre de la vision : l'hypothèse *snu, radical indoeuropéen, qui vaut pour « flairer » une chose ou une situation (von Fritz, Heidegger, Gadamer et al.) et l'hypothèse *nes, autre radical qui sert à indiquer « le retour de la lumière » ou « l’évitement de la mort » (Frame et al.) ; 2) les positions de Kérenyi, Snell et Lesher sur le νόος, qui appuient leur réflexion critique sur le texte homérique, considéré source principale pour la détermination du sens du νόος-νοεῖν ; 3) le domaine des sciences cognitives et notamment la notion d' « action-oriented representation » développée par Andy Clark et l'hypothèse du νόος comme « le mouvement de retour de la conscience à elle-même », développée par Stefanelli avec l'utilisation des travaux de Damasio. Cette confrontation permettra de corroborer l'hypothèse initiale du νόος comme « schéma d'action » et de clarifier son caractère d’activité « productive » et de « construction » de la réalité. (shrink)

This essay attempts to render intelligible (you will pardon the pun) Kant's peculiar claims about the intelligible at A 539/B 567 – A 541/B 569 in the first Critique, in which he asserts that (1) ... [t]his acting subject would now, in conformity with his intelligible character, stand under no temporal conditions, because time is only a condition of appearances, but not of things in themselves. In him no action would begin or cease. Consequently it would not be subjected (...) to the law of all determination of everything alterable in time: everything which happens finds its causes in the appearances (of the previous state). In a word, his causality, in so far as it is intellectual, would not stand in the series of empirical conditions which the event in the world of sense makes necessary. (A 539/B 567 - A 540/B 568) ... in so far as it is noumenon, nothing happens in him, no alteration which requires dynamical determination in time .... One would quite rightly say of him, that it of itself begins his effects in the world of sense, without the action's beginning in him himself ... (A 541/B 569)2 What does Kant mean by claiming that intellectual causality is such that in one's intelligible character as noumenal agent, actions neither begin nor end, nor does anything happen in one? Do these claims have meaning merely by contrast to the familiar experience of empirical causality, in which actions have discrete durations and events occur? Is he merely inferring from this familiar sensible experience an ontologically and metaphysically independent, epistemically inaccessible "world," which can be conceptualized only through the negation of those terms and propositions that characterize this one? Or is he offering a.. (shrink)

Comprehensively improving the level of vocational education and teaching quality has become an important initiative to meet the new round of technological revolution and industrial change. The traditional teaching mode can no longer meet the needs of industries and enterprises for job competences, and all higher education institutions are actively thinking about how to carry out teaching reform. Virtual reality can effectively solve the above-mentioned drawbacks, but the hardware facilities of the existing VR systems are extremely expensive, making it impossible (...) to popularize it in teaching. In this context, this paper is based on VR for the design of an interactive teaching platform. This paper discusses the key technologies of virtual reality, introduces the relevant theoretical foundation, and describes the current virtual reality devices with high popularity and their advantages and disadvantages for systematic analysis. From the perspective of teaching design, the design of human-computer interaction teaching process using VR technology to develop learning scenes is studied, introducing 3D modeling techniques, model construction, the production of picture and text panels, the production of video materials, and the establishment of virtual tour guide 3D scenes. The principle of this paper is to build a 3D vision for building 3D views of educational needs to design high quality images and video animation using 3DMAX and unity 3D engines. Then, we introduce the use of VR glasses, smart phones, and Bluetooth wireless handle to build a simple interactive teaching platform; the platform is of low cost of construction and student coverage, to solve the teaching resources shortage, equipment conditions lagging behind, the curriculum content aging, teachers and students who cannot interact in real time, and a series of problems. (shrink)

In this paper, we delve into the significant impact of recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) on the future landscape of work. We discuss the looming possibility of mass unemployment triggered by AI and the societal repercussions of this transition. Despite the challenges this shift presents, we argue that it also unveils opportunities to mitigate social inequalities, combat global poverty, and empower individuals to follow their passions. Amidst this discussion, we also touch upon the existential question of the purpose of (...) human life in a world where machines predominantly perform work. Additionally, we explore the contentious issue of the moral status and rights of AI entities, contemplating the scenario where machines evolve to become sapient and sentient. The paper concludes with a call to action, emphasizing the necessity to acknowledge these potential outcomes and proactively seek solutions, as part of an inevitable journey through the evolution of human society shared with intelligent machines. (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between artificial general intelligence and the image of God. After identifying various models that Christian theologians use to classify or define the imago Dei, particular attention will be given to the ‘created co-creator’ model. Scholars have interpreted this model in different ways, based on the nature of human creative action. This action is seen as either subordinate to divine creation action or the human creative action is truly cooperative with divine creative (...) action. Whether AGI would be made in the image of God in these models is then explored, highlighting the differences between humans as sub-creators versus humans as cooperative co-creators. If human creative action is cooperative, then the question arises as to whether AGI can be made in ‘the image of humanity’. Some elements of this image are explored, and then the discussion turns to whether AGI would be made in ‘the image of humanity’, and if so, could AGI still be made in the image of God?Contribution: The argument concludes by pointing to future work using the various models of imago Dei to help inform the relationship between humans and AGI by briefly mentioning two examples. (shrink)

AU cœur de la vie politique des hommes gît un trésor, aujourd'hui perdu. Les révolutionnaires du XVIIIe siècle pouvaient encore le nommer. En Amérique on l'appelait " bonheur public ", dans la France des Lumières son nom était " liberté publique ". EN certaines circonstances, rares et précaires, ce trésor sans âge ressurgit dans l'action politique conduite à plusieurs, lorsqu'elle se crée un espace public où la liberté peut paraître. Alors un lien se noue, qui déploie entre les hommes (...) un monde commun. Tel est le bien public. En évoquant ce trésor perdu, la philosophie d'Hannah Arendt nous invite à retrouver, à l'écart de tout pragmatisme comme de tout moralisme, le sens instituant de l'action politique qui a le monde comme condition et comme fin. C'est dans la mesure où les actions sont politiques que le monde peut être partagé ; et dans la mesure où elles visent un monde commun que ces actions sont proprement politiques. Toute politique s'apprécie au regard du monde qu'elle est susceptible d'instaurer. N'est-ce pas pourtant à l'aliénation du monde que la politique moderne nous condamne au contraire? Le trésor serait-il pour nous définitivement perdu? Ce livre suggère que, loin de proposer une philosophie politique parmi d'autres, la réflexion arendtienne inaugure une intelligence de l'action politique qui redonne sens au " vivre-ensemble ". En son cœur se tient l'analyse originale et décisive de ce qu'on peut nommer l'acosmisme du monde moderne, cette perte du monde éprouvée aussi bien dans le système totalitaire que dans la prétention technoscientifique de nos sociétés à maîtriser les conditions de l'existence. (shrink)

Intelligent design begins with a seemingly innocuous question: Can objects, even if nothing is known about how they arose, exhibit features that reliably signal the action of an intelligent cause? To see what’s at stake, consider Mount Rushmore. The evidence for Mount Rushmore’s design is direct—eyewitnesses saw the sculptor Gutzon Borglum spend the better part of his life designing and building this structure. But what if there were no direct evidence for Mount Rushmore’s design? What if humans (...) went extinct and aliens, visiting the earth, discovered Mount Rushmore in substantially the same condition as it is now? (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence Applications in Higher Education offers direct examples of how artificial intelligence systems can be applied in today's higher education contexts. As use of AI rapidly advances within colleges and universities worldwide, there is a pressing need to showcase the challenges, opportunities, and ethical considerations inherent in deploying these advanced computational tools. This book highlights the multifaceted roles of AI across teaching and learning, institutional administration, student data management, and beyond. Its collected case studies furnish actionable insights into enhancing (...) academic institutions and addressing diverse learning priorities such as motivation, engagement, feedback, and achievement goals. This valuable reference for researchers, designers, administrators, teaching faculty, and graduate students across various university programs offers fresh perspectives on generative AI, adaptive learning, intelligent tutoring systems, chatbots, predictive technologies, remote learning, and more. (shrink)

Purpose The purpose of this paper is clearly illustrate this convergence and the prescriptive recommendations that such documents entail. There is a significant amount of research into the ethical consequences of artificial intelligence. This is reflected by many outputs across academia, policy and the media. Many of these outputs aim to provide guidance to particular stakeholder groups. It has recently been shown that there is a large degree of convergence in terms of the principles upon which these guidance documents are (...) based. Despite this convergence, it is not always clear how these principles are to be translated into practice. Design/methodology/approach In this paper, the authors move beyond the high-level ethical principles that are common across the AI ethics guidance literature and provide a description of the normative content that is covered by these principles. The outcome is a comprehensive compilation of normative requirements arising from existing guidance documents. This is not only required for a deeper theoretical understanding of AI ethics discussions but also for the creation of practical and implementable guidance for developers and users of AI. Findings In this paper, the authors therefore provide a detailed explanation of the normative implications of existing AI ethics guidelines but directed towards developers and organisational users of AI. The authors believe that the paper provides the most comprehensive account of ethical requirements in AI currently available, which is of interest not only to the research and policy communities engaged in the topic but also to the user communities that require guidance when developing or deploying AI systems. Originality/value The authors believe that they have managed to compile the most comprehensive document collecting existing guidance which can guide practical action but will hopefully also support the consolidation of the guidelines landscape. The authors’ findings should also be of academic interest and inspire philosophical research on the consistency and justification of the various normative statements that can be found in the literature. (shrink)

Emotional intelligence can be comprehensively redefined based on the componential emotion approach. The componential emotion approach defines emotions as processes that are elicited by goal-relevant situations and that consist of an interplay between appraisals, action tendencies, bodily reactions, expressions, and feelings. Within the componential emotion approach, emotional intelligence can be redefined as the ability (a) to identify emotions based on information from one or more of the five emotion components, (b) to understand emotions in terms of the likely appraisals, (...) action tendencies, bodily reactions, expressions, and feelings that are elicited by goal-relevant situations, and (c) to know how to regulate emotions by modifying one or more of these five components. (shrink)

The application of artificial intelligence (AI) in hospitals yields many advantages but also confronts healthcare with ethical questions and challenges. While various disciplines have conducted specific research on the ethical considerations of AI in hospitals, the literature still requires a holistic overview. By conducting a systematic discourse approach highlighted by expert interviews with healthcare specialists, we identified the status quo of interdisciplinary research in academia on ethical considerations and dimensions of AI in hospitals. We found 15 fundamental manuscripts by constructing (...) a citation network for the ethical discourse, and we extracted actionable principles and their relationships. We provide an agenda to guide academia, framed under the principles of biomedical ethics. We provide an understanding of the current ethical discourse of AI in clinical environments, identify where further research is pressingly needed, and discuss additional research questions that should be addressed. We also guide practitioners to acknowledge AI-related benefits in hospitals and to understand the related ethical concerns. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence research has foundered on the issue of representation. When intelligence is approached in an incremental manner, with strict reliance on interfacing to the real world through perception and action, reliance on representation disappears. In this paper we outline our approach to incrementally building complete intelligent Creatures. The fundamental decomposition of the intelligent system is not into independent information processing units which must interface with each other via representations. Instead, the intelligent system is decomposed into (...) independent and parallel activity producers which all interface directly to the world through perception and action, rather than interface to each other particularly much. The notions of central and peripheral systems evaporateeverything is both central and peripheral. Based on these principles we have built a very successful series of mobile robots which operate without supervision as Creatures in standard office environments. (shrink)

This monograph addresses the worlds of social science theory and artificial intelligence AI. The book examines the interaction of individual cognitive factors and social influence on human action and discusses the implications for developments in artificial intelligence.; This book is intended for graduate and research level artificial intelligence and social science theory including sociology, economics, psychology.

This paper discusses the problem of responsibility attribution raised by the use of artificial intelligence technologies. It is assumed that only humans can be responsible agents; yet this alone already raises many issues, which are discussed starting from two Aristotelian conditions for responsibility. Next to the well-known problem of many hands, the issue of “many things” is identified and the temporal dimension is emphasized when it comes to the control condition. Special attention is given to the epistemic condition, which draws (...) attention to the issues of transparency and explainability. In contrast to standard discussions, however, it is then argued that this knowledge problem regarding agents of responsibility is linked to the other side of the responsibility relation: the addressees or “patients” of responsibility, who may demand reasons for actions and decisions made by using AI. Inspired by a relational approach, responsibility as answerability thus offers an important additional, if not primary, justification for explainability based, not on agency, but on patiency. (shrink)

I want to try to do something rather more speculative than the rest of you have done. I have been thinking recently about how one might explain some features of human reflective consciousness that seem to me to be very much in need of an explanation. I'm trying to see if these features could be understood as solutions to design problems, solutions arrived at by evolution, but also, in the individual, as a result of a process of unconscious self-design. I've (...) been trying to think of this in the context of work in AI on the attempt to design intelligent robots – not "bed-ridden" expert systems, but systems that have to act in real time in the real world. If you want to think about something like this, you have to stray fairly far from experiments and hard empirical data; you have to get fairly speculative. Nevertheless the design efforts of people in AI do seem to bring home to conviction – if not to prove – various design constraints looming large and inescapable. If we can come to see why a system – or an organ or a behavior-pattern – must have certain features or a certain structure in order to do its task, this may help us ask the right questions, or at least keep us from dwelling on some of the wrong questions when we try to explain the machinery in the brain that is responsible for intelligent action. (shrink)

Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are stored, not as representations in (...) the mind, but as dispositions to respond to the solicitations of situations in the world. A phenomenology of skill acquisition confirms that, as one acquires expertise, the acquired know-how is experienced as finer and finer discriminations of situations paired with the appropriate response to each. Maximal grip names the body's tendency to refine its responses so as to bring the current situation closer to an optimal gestalt. Thus, successful learning and action do not require propositional mental representations. They do not require semantically interpretable brain representations either.Simulated neural networks exhibit crucial structural features of the intentional arc, and Walter Freeman's account of the brain dynamics underlying perception and action is structurally isomorphic with Merleau-Ponty's account of the way a skilled agent is led by the situation to move towards obtaining a maximal grip. (shrink)

The doctrine of the Intelligent Design offers an intuitive explanation of why the ordering in the Universe is authored by an intentional agency. Due to its appeal to common-sense perception, this doctrine is endorsed even by scientifically literate circles despite of its obvious contradiction with the discoveries of science. In this article, an attempt to apply the tools of the cognitive science of religion to the appraisal of the methodological and epistemic status of the ID doctrine is presented. It (...) is concluded that the ID doctrine may serve as means of the real-time metaphorical reassurance of the creative power of God while it cannot give grounds to any literal inferences on the nature of the Divine action. (shrink)

The article examines the problem of ensuring the political stability of a democratic social system with a shortage of a vital commodity (like vaccine against COVID-19). In such a system, members of society citizens assess the authorities. Thus, actions by the authorities to increase the supply of this commodity can contribute to citizens' approval and hence political stability. However, this supply is influenced by random factors, the actions of competitors, etc. Therefore, citizens do not have sufficient information about all the (...) possibilities of supplying, and it is difficult for them to make the right decisions. Such citizen unawareness can be exploited by unscrupulous politicians to achieve personal targets. Therefore, it is necessary to organize public control to motivate politicians to use all available opportunities in supplying. The goal of the paper is to build such a digital mechanism of public control of the politicians by citizens, which would best assess and stimulate the activities of the authorities to improve the supply of a vital commodity. In the age of artificial intelligence, such digital public control in the face of uncertainty can be based on digital machine learning. In addition, it is necessary to take into account and model the activities of politicians associated with the presence of their own targets that do not coincide with public ones. Such politicians can use the learning of citizens for their own targets. The objective of the article is to build an optimal digital mechanism of public control in a two-level model of a democratic social system—a digital society. At its top level, there is the Citizen, who gives an assessment for the Politico located at the lower level. In turn, the Politico can influence the supplying of a vital commodity. Political stability is guaranteed if the Citizen regularly approves of the Politico’s actions to increase this supply. However, the Politico may not use the opportunities available to him to offer a commodity to achieve a personal target. To avoid this, the Politico’s control mechanism is proposed. It includes the procedure for digital learning of the Citizen, as well as a procedure for assessing the Politico activity. Sufficient conditions have been found for the synthesis of such the Politico’s control mechanism, at which stochastic possibilities of increasing the supply of a vital commodity are used. The example of such the Politico’s control mechanism is considered on the case of supply of the COVID-19 vaccine in England. (shrink)

The explicit system for action selection integrates emotional information with the higher-order cognitive processes which culminate in the language system. Even the basic feels of emotion are what they are because they are integrated into the higher cognitive processes. The relation between emotion and intelligence would become increasingly important as the focus of brain science shifts to the integrative function of the prefrontal lobe.

The objective of this essay is to provide the beginning of a principled classification of some of the ways space is intelligently used. Studies of planning have typically focused on the temporal ordering of action, leaving as unaddressed questions of where to lay down instruments, ingredients, work-in-progress, and the like. But, in having a body, we are spatially located creatures: we must always be facing some direction, have only certain objects in view, be within reach of certain others. How (...) we manage the spatial arrangement of items around us is not an afterthought: it is an integral part of the way we think, plan, and behave. The proposed classification has three main categories: spatial arrangements that simplify choice; spatial arrangements that simplify perception; and spatial dynamics that simplify internal computation. The data for such a classification is drawn from videos of cooking, assembly and packing, everyday observations in supermarkets, workshops and playrooms, and experimental studies of subjects playing Tetris, the computer game. This study, therefore, focuses on interactive processes in the medium and short term: on how agents set up their workplace for particular tasks, and how they continuously manage that workplace. (shrink)

This paper examines narrative approaches to care within the context of dementia. It reviews the function of stories and explores some of the narrative genres that shape the cultural perceptions of dementia. We argue that narrative intelligence within healthcare is an important element in nurturing communal self‐identity for people living with dementia. Listening and responding to stories and the cultural framework that this encompasses is an embodied action that is not just related to cognitive recall but situates us within (...) a cultural community. People with dementia may have challenges in maintaining narrative legitimacy in the face of fractured stories and incoherent narratives. Health professionals can offer support in reframing and presenting counterstories that maintain identities that can potentially be marginalised, silenced and open to narrative foreclosure. This process requires health professionals to be attentive and responsive to how patients with dementia and their supporters construct and position the stories they tell and the meaning(s) they attach to them. (shrink)