Before now, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the multiple relations between A. Comte’s and J.S. Mill’s positive philosophy and Franz Brentano’s work. The present volume aims to fill this gap and to identify Brentano’s position in the context of the positive philosophy of the 19th century by analyzing the following themes: the concept of positive knowledge; philosophy and empirical, genetic and descriptive psychology as sciences in Brentano, Comte and Mill; the strategies for the rebirth of philosophy in these (...) three authors; the theory of the ascending stages of thought, of their decline, of the intentionality in Comte and Brentano; the reception of Comte’s positivism in Whewell and Mill; induction and phenomenalism in Brentano, Mill and Bain; the problem of the "I" in Hume and Brentano; mathematics as a foundational science in Brentano, Kant and Mill; Brentano’s critique of Mach’s positivism; the concept of positive science in Brentano’s metaphysics and in Husserl’s early phenomenology; the reception of Brentano’s psychology in Twardowski; The Brentano Institute at Oxford. The volume also contains the translation of the most significant writings of Brentano regarding philosophy as science. I. Tănăsescu, Romanian Academy; A. Bejinariu, Romanian Society of Phenomenology; S. Krantz Gabriel, Saint Anselm College; C. Stoenescu, University of Bucharest. (shrink)

Descartes is considered to be the founder of modern rationalism. This is a clear statement which, however, does not show the manner in which rationalism as such appeared in the history of science, taking into account the turmoil of the Renaissance centuries, the significance of the Reform and the birth of modern science. As a founder of a new metaphysics, Descartes, through his work, remains par excellence the case in which the scholastic and Renaissance aftermaths as well as the Reform (...) mutations are mixed in a new synthesis that will be called modernity. This study focuses on reinterpreting Cartesianism from this perspective in the vast context of modernity’s metaphysical significance – it is a hypothesis that will need to be developed not only by means of hermeneutical instruments but, especially, by means of those instruments belonging to the history of culture and anthropology. (shrink)

Ion Soteropoulos reconciles the contradiction between the finite and infinite and transforms this reconciliation into the founding principle of motion. This book will appeal to readers interested in the logical mechanics of the physical universe, the hidden powers of our finite brain, and the utility of robots in the future.

This paper tries to show that the naturalistic view of addiction is mired in contradictions that stem from reducing the addict to a weak-willed subject who loses control over his or her body. From a phenomenological perspective, addiction reveals itself to be a habit which eventually becomes harmful, but has its primary sources in the embodied needs of a worldly subject. The aim of this paper is to uncover the dimensions of the lived addiction that are neglected in the contemporary (...) naturalistic discourse: the lived-body and the worldly context of the addict. Firstly, we try to do justice to the variety of addictions by underlying that their new and surprising forms are determined by the intersubjective tissue wherein the subject operates. Secondly, the loss of control in addiction, how the subject deals with the tendency to satisfy a need, is experienced as powerlessness, as expressed in the accounts of ecstasy addicts regarding altered states of mind. The last section of this paper will argue that this sense of powerlessness cannot be equated with a weakness of the will because a strong, forceful will engenders the same vertigo of being prey to strange powers. The embodied aspect of addiction and the spontaneous, bodily need it saturates will clarify further this claim. (shrink)

My paper tackles the generic relationship between philosophy and law, the necessity of applying philosophy to law, the legitimacy and range of such an approach, the configuration of the way in which philosophy has left its mark in the juridical sphere. It surveys, in a chronological order, as well as in terms of their co-existence, the various stages of the relationship between philosophy and law. 1. Although both have been “within the walls”, law secludes itself, relatively speaking, in “the world (...) taken as a whole”, to shape its own identity, to survive as a self-sufficient, distinct technique (F. Geny), or it does it in a doctrinary way (positivism). 2. The representatives of philosophy in the juridical sphere are doing their best to uphold law’s struggle for knowledge, to have it gain recognition as a “science”, renounce its one-sidedness and harmonize with the others. 3. Juridical norms are not untouchable in relation with philosophy. Philosophy may work within juridical norms if it has an affinity with the content of juridical normativeness and respects its specificity. 4. The conclusion I reach is that we must try to cultivate a joint area bringing together philosophy and law, an area wherein the specific features of the two distinct fields reach a consensus for the sake of the human condition – hic et nunc. Philosophy bestows coherence and casts light on “law for man’s sake”, while the philosophically founded law appears to be the “normative project of the human”, a human practice inextricably connected with other types of practice, with man as a whole. The practical way to fulfil this goal, like the goal itself, will always be liable to criticism and improvement, open to debates and various options in a concrete socio-historical context. (shrink)

The two works this paper focuses on (Anastasios Yannopoulos, Orthodoxy and the Problems of Contemporary World and Georgios Mantzaridis, Globalization and Universality. Phantom and Truth) represent a thorough analysis of contemporary history, in which globalization is the direction and purpose of the new vision in human relations and community. The lost of the individuality of these relations is considered to be a disease which has very strong religious and anthropological effects. The common feature is the reaffirmation of community in the (...) perspective of Eastern anthropology. (shrink)

(Introduction) The question of heterogeneity does not appear at first glance to be a genuinely phenomenological problem and not even a problem in general. It seems to go without saying that there is “coupling” (Paarung), association, fusion, synthesis or in general any form connection between different data of consciousness, all as it seems obvious (at least from Husserl) that there must be objectities so that we can talk about knowledge and truth. After Kant we got so used to synthetic formations (...) that we hardly think of their possibilities in principle and the problems that these are called upon to resolve. Phenomenology does nothing else but describing the synthetic process, starting with its most elementary (pre-reflective) levels, aiming thus to completely elucidate the constitution of the objectity and, by that, the functioning and the rights of reason. Now, such elucidation does not only involve an approach aimed at the how, but also, the why of this process. In other words, our attention and our theoretical interest must be directed not only towards the course of the constitutive synthesis, but also on what motivates her intrinsically. Questions like "why should he be there in general an objectity? " or "is it principally possible to associate in one form or another data belonging to to the same class or to different classes? ”, questions which are de jure and which therefore refer rather to the legality of the constitution than its more or less contingent functioning, cannot in any way be excluded from the scope of the phenomenological questioning. As much as the epistemological ideal of phenomenological description required above all that it avoid any form of abstraction and idealization, this class of questions is, if not excluded, at least left in shadow. (shrink)

As an artist I admittedly scrutinize all of the theories related to the arts closely. I do this for a number of reasons. The obvious one is that I have a deeply felt personal relationship with the subject matter. Less obvious is my experience in general. My early research was motivated by a desire to discover the historical circumstances that led to the difficulty in fitting visual art into the discussions I encountered. Generally, it seemed that the dominant framework trivialized (...) what I considered the most important aspects of the creative process. Over time I concluded that developing an interdisciplinary approach offered the best option for expanding views, although it is not an easy task. Establishing areas of commonality across a range of disciplines must somehow accommodate the ways in which each has developed a research agenda that seems to serve its core needs. In consciousness studies, for example, we have a field that relies heavily on scientific research and humanistic methodologies when building the philosophical models scholars use to structure theories. This methodology is not only removed from the nuts and bolts of art, it is also easily manipulated in discourse on art due to the ease with which we can fit aspects of art into the philosophical framework. Clearly this approach fits nicely with philosophically defined concepts such as meaning, emotion, and other elusive modes. In addition, using the well-honed categories aids in bracketing themes such as metaphor, interpretation, subjectivity, language and history. Nonetheless, in reading through the studies, I repeatedly conclude that the voices of practitioners need to be included to a greater degree. (shrink)