A large body of research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience draws on Bayesian statistics to model information processing within the brain. Many theorists have noted that this research seems to be in tension with a large body of experimental results purportedly documenting systematic deviations from Bayesian updating in human belief formation. In response, proponents of the Bayesian brain hypothesis contend that Bayesian models can accommodate such results by making suitable assumptions about model parameters. To make progress in this (...) debate, I argue that it is fruitful to focus not on specific experimental results but rather on what I call the ‘sources of epistemic irrationality’ in human cognition. I identify four such sources and I explore whether and, if so, how Bayesian models can be reconciled with them: processing costs, evolutionary suboptimality, motivated cognition, and error management. 1 Introduction 2 The Bayesian Brain 3 The Problem of Epistemic Irrationality 3.1 Bayesian inference and rationality 3.2 Intuitive Bayesian inference 4 Sources of Epistemic Irrationality 4.1 Processing costs 4.2 Evolutionary suboptimality 4.3 Motivational influences 4.4 Error management 5 Conclusion. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIlya Somin's Democracy and Political Ignorance uses a by-now familiar rational-choice lens with which to explain and analyze Americans’ widespread political ignorance. Unlike some scholars who tout rational choice on purely predictive or heuristic grounds, Somin claims that it also offers a more accurate description of reality, in this case better explaining the findings of empirical public-opinion research. In this essay, I compare Somin's central concept of rational ignorance and the related concept of “rational irrationality” with the earlier (...) explanatory approach taken by Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter in his classic study, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. While Schumpeter developed his description of the mass democratic citizenry over 70 years ago—prior to any of the significant empirical studies of American public opinion—its broad approach remains at least as persuasive as Somin's. (shrink)

By synthesizing the argumentation theory of new rhetoric with research on heuristics and motivated reasoning, we develop a conceptual view of argumentation based on reasoning motivations that sheds new light on the morality of decision-making. Accordingly, we propose that reasoning in eristic argumentation is motivated by psychological (e.g., anxiety reduction) or material (e.g., vested interests) gains that do not depend on resolving the problem in question truthfully. Contrary to heuristic argumentation, in which disputants genuinely argue to reach a practically (...) rational solution, eristic argumentation aims to defeat the counterparty rather than seeking a reasonable solution. Eristic argumentation is susceptible to arbitrariness and power abuses; therefore, it is inappropriate for making moral judgments with the exception of judgments concerning moral taboos, which are closed to argumentation by their nature. Eristic argumentation is also problematic for strategic and entrepreneurial decision-making because it impedes the search for the right heuristic under uncertainty as an ecologically rational choice. However, our theoretical view emphasizes that under extreme uncertainty, where heuristic solutions are as fallible as any guesses, pretense reasoning by eristic argumentation may be instrumental for its adaptive benefits. Expanding the concept of eristic argumentation based on reasoning motivations opens a new path for studying the psychology of reasoning in connection to morality and decision-making under uncertainty. We discuss the implications of our theoretical view to relevant research streams, including ethical, strategic and entrepreneurial decision-making. (shrink)

When an agent A depends on an agent B to promote one of A's epistemic goals, this will often involve B's forming and sharing of true beliefs. However, as is well documented in research on cognitive irrationality, agents are disposed to form and share false-but-useful beliefs in a lot of circumstances. The dependence relation is thus at risk of becoming negative: A might adopt false beliefs from B and thus be unable to promote their epistemic goal. I propose (...) that we can employ the notion of an epistemic conflict of interest [ECOI] to capture the kinds of problems that epistemically interdependent agents face. Much like familiar cases of conflict of interests—e.g., related to government officials—in ECOI an agent is subject to a normatively primary interest—roughly to form and share true beliefs—that stands in conflict with normatively secondary interests. I focus on secondary interests documented in the aforementioned research on cognitive irrationality. The resulting framework addresses an explanatory gap in the literature on social epistemic norms by making explicit why there’s a need for these norms to regulate our epistemic lives. Lastly, I show how the ECOI-framework furthermore allows us to make sense of and amend norm regulation failures. (shrink)

We talk about irrationality when behaviour defies explanation or prediction, when decisions are driven by emotions or instinct rather than by reflection, when reasoning fails to conform to basic principles of logic and probability, and when beliefs lack coherence or empirical support. Depending on the context, agents exhibiting irrational behaviour may be described as foolish, ignorant, unwise or even insane. -/- In this clear and engaging introduction to current debates on irrationality, Lisa Bortolotti presents the many facets of (...) the concept and offers an original account of the importance of judgements of irrationality as value judgements. The book examines the standards against which we measure human behaviour, and reviews the often serious implications of judgements of irrationality for ethics and policy. Bortolotti argues that we should adopt a more critical stance towards accepted standards of rationality in the light of the often surprising outcomes of philosophical inquiry and cognitive science research into decision making. -/- Irrationality is an accessible guide to the concept and will be essential reading for students and scholars interested in the limitations of human cognition and human agency. (shrink)

I characterize a notion of internal irrationality which is central to hard cases of self-deception. I argue that if we aim to locate such internal irrationality in the _process of self-deception, we must fail. The process of self-deception, I claim, is a wholly arational affair. If we are to make a place for internal irrationality we must turn our attention to the _state of self-deception. I go on to argue that we are able to offer an account (...) of this peculiar form of irrationality only if we recognize the role the self-deceiver's own efforts at self-explanation play in the generation of internal irrationality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rationality, Irrationality, and Depathologizing OCDBrent Kious, MD, PhD (bio)Pablo Hubacher argues that some persons with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) do not, in virtue of OCD itself, exhibit what he calls “epistemic irrationality,” which is a matter of violating rational norms related to belief and inquiry (Hubacher, 2023). The argument is complex and meticulous, but ultimately not persuasive. I outline the argument, show how it is unsound, and articulate (...) its most troubling consequences. I end by inquiring about the goal of projects like this, which, I believe, is to examine the rationality of mental illnesses in order to show that they are or are not illnesses.Hubacher starts by noting that (some) persons with OCD appear “doxastically irrational”: when they exhibit obsessions, they err in how they form beliefs. Specifically, they seem to “jump to conclusions,” inferring that a feared outcome is probable or certain from scant evidence. However, psychological research shows that persons with OCD are not more likely to jump to conclusions than others. Hubacher also observes that jumping to conclusions involves the inference, “possibly P, therefore definitely P.” This inference is irrational but not specific to people with OCD, because many of us do it, and an account of the irrationality of OCD should identify OCD-specific deviations. Hubacher concludes that persons with OCD are not doxastically irrational. He next considers whether they exhibit “zetetic” irrationality, which involves violating epistemic norms of inquiry. This might identify the irrationality of OCD, since compulsions like repeatedly checking the stove are basically ways of getting evidence. But Hubacher introduces the phenomenon of sexually focused OCD, or S-OCD. Persons with S-OCD worry about whether they have sexual desires they regard as inappropriate—for instance, incestuous desires or homosexual desires. Hubacher does not think people with S-OCD are zetetically irrational, however. Their endless doubts are actually reasonable, since it is possible—even common—for people to have repressed sexual desires when those desires are stigmatized. If a person with S-OCD worries about having incestuous desires, the bare fact that he does not feel those desires in the usual way should not be reassuring to him: those desires could simply be repressed. Hubacher adds that [End Page 151] people with OCD have high intolerance of uncertainty, which he takes to mean that they approach inquiries with high standards for confirmation; they are not satisfied with evidence others would see as compelling. He concludes that people with S-OCD are neither zetetically nor doxastically irrational, and so not epistemically irrational.This is a surprising conclusion, but it results from an unsound argument. An initial problem is his assumption that the only way persons with OCD can be doxastically irrational is by jumping to conclusions. This ignores other possible ways of being doxastically irrational. For instance, it would be irrational to retain beliefs that have been disconfirmed by evidence (Hubacher might call this zetetic irrationality, but surely, my beliefs can be disconfirmed without active inquiry). Irrationally retaining disconfirmed beliefs might even capture what happens in OCD: the person with OCD thinks something awful is likely to be true, even though she gets copious disconfirming evidence.A second problem is in Hubacher’s interpretation of the psychological evidence about whether persons with OCD jump to conclusions. He cites two studies involving a very specific psychological test, the bead task, wherein a subject is asked to determine whether a random sequence of colored beads have been drawn from a jar with a preponderance of one color or another. A “jumping to conclusions bias” is taken to be an inclination to guess the jar after no more than two beads are revealed (Huq & Garety et al., 1988). Although a few studies have shown that persons with OCD do not have this jumping to conclusions bias, we cannot conclude that they do not often jump to conclusions in real life. One might imagine, for instance, that people with OCD are still quite likely to jump to conclusions with respect to their obsessions (i.e., things that are highly anxiety-provoking, where the anxiety affects the conclusions drawn). And most people with OCD are not obsessed about the colors of beads.A third... (shrink)

The specific type of irrationality known as akrasia or weakness of the will has been a subject of vigorous debate ever since Plato in his Protagoras had Socrates defend the thesis that "no one willingly does wrong." Against Socrates and many contemporary thinkers on the subject, Mele attempts to vindicate akrasia as a genuine possibility. As he explores the theoretical labyrinth, his view emerges as rich in philosophic insight and experimental data from psychological research, the latter of which (...) he uses effectively in showing the way out of a number of paradoxes. (shrink)

This article is dedicated to investigating rationality as one of the key characteristics of Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality and to related contradictions inside and outside Foucauldian theory. Using risk theory, the author explores the possibility of the existence of multiple rationalities in governmentalities and offers a solution to the contradiction within Foucauldian theory. The article focuses on the question of how it is possible to resolve both methodological, practical, as well as theoretical, contradictions in the theory of governmentality, keeping (...) its main characteristics, such as population-centeredness, intact. The author concludes that diversification is more effective within the framework of multiple rationalities, which is most consistent with the understanding of the governmentality of the population as a goal, as a mechanism of risk management. The article makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the relationship between rationality and irrationality in the theory of governmentality, putting forward new ideas for the research and development of effective forms of public administration. The author also suggests ways to solve the paradox of regulated freedom, which has practical implications for modern methods of governance and regulation in society. This more detailed analysis clarifies how Foucault's concept of governmentality can be applied in a contemporary context, and how the limitations of rationality can be overcome to achieve more flexible and adaptive forms of governance. (shrink)

The target article's finding of stable and general individual differences in solving of problems in heuristics-and-biases experiments is fundamentally subversive to the Meliorist research program's attention-getting claim that human thought is “systematically irrational.” Since some people get these problems right, studies of heuristics and biases may reduce to repeated demonstrations that difficult questions are hard to solve.

Tieu, Matthew When we speak of rationality we generally speak of logic and reason in an abstract sense. However, one can also think of rationality in a practical sense. Practical rationality is our capacity to use reason and logic to form beliefs, arrive at decisions, and act in accordance with those beliefs and decisions. If we believe that we ought to do X then, all things being equal, we will do X. If we believe that we ought to refrain from (...) smoking, or drinking or having that extra serving of dessert, then all things being equal, the rational outcome from our subjective point of view is that we are moved to act in accordance with those beliefs. This is what defines humankind as rational agents. (shrink)

This paper critically explores the ethical dimensions of Behavioral Public Policy (BPP), a domain grounded in the understanding that human rationality is bounded and that this limitation often leads to behaviors deemed irrational. By applying the behavioral lens, which posits that people operate under bounded rationality, BPP aims to craft interventions that safeguard individuals against their biases. However, this approach raises significant ethical concerns, both in the scientific underpinnings of BPP and its application through policy interventions. Accordingly, this paper examines (...) two distinct ethical dimensions of BPP, both as a scientific discipline and through its intervention methodologies. The analysis of the first dimension argues that, viewing bounded rationality as only instrumental in decision-making processes, risks oversimplifying ethical complexities. Such simplification may ignore the moral and value-based rationalities underlying decisions, potentially misattributing instances of immorality and akrasia (the failure to act according to one's judgment) to mere deficiencies in rational thinking. Secondly, the paper examines the impact of BPP on moral behavior and character development, addressing ethical concerns like the evidentiary basis of BPP research, the bounded rationality of choice architects themselves, and the morality of behavior changes induced by policy. Overall, this article provides a much-needed examination of the moral considerations associated with behavioral strategies in public policy and its epistemological foundations, contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of their ethical implications . (shrink)

As Jonathan Haidt explains in The Righteous Mind, it is often our moral intuitions that come first, rapidly or even automatically, with ethical reasoning coming later. Haidt's book is one of many that have come out in recent years highlighting the relevance of psychology (and its close cousin, neuroscience) for understanding human morality. As a behavioral scientist, I have devoured many of these books. I am fascinated by human nature and love trying to understand why all of us behave and (...) think the way we do. But as a physician ethicist, I often find myself reading these books with a parallel agenda: not just to understand human nature, but also to see whether this line of research has relevance for my work as an ethicist. My bottom line: Understanding moral psychology ought to be a required component of ethics training, not because the science will help us to differentiate between right and wrong, but because it will better equip us to teach ethics in a way that promotes moral behavior in our students. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to show why recent research in the psychology of deductive and probabilistic reasoning does not have.

The essay is an exposition and critical analysis of Peter Unger's book Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford, 1975). In the introductory chapter my main object, in addition to defining terms, is to distinguish the two forms of scepticism Unger defends in Ignorance, which he calls, respectively, scepticism about knowledge and scepticism about rationality. Chapter II is devoted to an exposition, analysis, and evaluation of the latter and Chapter III of the former. In Chapter IV I consider a second-order argument (...) that informs Unger's case throughout the book, his "ancestor language" hypothesis. In the final chapter I assess his scepticism as a whole and attempt to develop some of its implications concerning both the possibility and actuality of knowledge. (shrink)

Much research in the last two decades has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision making and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) (...) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experimenter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance errors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations underlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Unexpected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate. Key Words: biases; descriptive models; heuristics; individual differences; normative models; rationality; reasoning. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Aufsatz widmet sich der Charakterisierung von Methoden als Bezugspunkt der Designforschung aus einer rationalitätstheoretischen Perspektive. Im Fokus steht dabei zum einen die Überlegung, wie der Einsatz von kreativen und wissenschaftlichen Methoden den Gestaltungsprozess systematisiert und rationalisiert. Zum anderen geht es darum, wie die spezifischen Qualitäten von Designprozessen etablierte Verständnisse sowohl von Wissenschaft und Forschung als auch von Rationalität als solcher herausfordern. Mit Bezug auf konkrete Beispiele für Forschungsprojekte wird die Möglichkeit erkundet, inwieweit die pragmatisch formende Verhandlung eines methodischen (...) Vorgehens Designforschung mit der Kapazität ausstattet, einen Maßstab für selbstkritische Forschungspraxis zu aktualisieren. Es wird gezeigt, dass dieser Maßstab Implikationen für die philosophische Bestimmung gestalterischer und wissenschaftlicher Rationalität bereithält. Eine zentrale Rolle kommt dabei den externen und internen Grenzgebieten von Vernünftigkeit zu. (shrink)

This article traces the roots of the author’s doctoral work to his pre-doctoral experiences in varied realms of professional practice. The research choices made are thus inevitably influenced by these experiences. These include the selection of an interdisciplinary domain to locate his doctoral work, the choice of a “boundary object” as the unit of analysis and the formulation of a methodological mix that reflected the multidimensionality of the research topic. These choices also reflect the researcher’s quest for personal (...) meaningfulness and consequently, a certain degree of irrationality that is characteristic of any human endeavor. The idea of creative research as negotiating the boundary of acceptability is explored and the importance of freedom and tolerance for experimentation to aid this enterprise is highlighted. (shrink)

In this article, we attempt to synthesize the findings of the branch of behavioral economics known as “picoeconomics” with insights from Foucauldian thought in order to demonstrate that a richer and more nuanced understanding of strategies for self-managing human irrationality can be achieved when both approaches are mobilized. Picoeconomic games can be modeled as an intrapsychic exercise of the disciplinary power thereby suggesting an important contributing factor to the formation of effective Ainslean will. On the other hand, picoenomic descriptions (...) of the functioning of mind do not only align with Foucault’s concept of the “techniques of the self” but also point to the possibility of the transformation of disciplinary practices into modes of subjectivation once the former are fully internalized. On the basis of these findings, we propose an empirically testable hypothesis about the biographical correlates of strong Ainslean will and a prospective area of subjectivity research in the vein of Foucauldian studies. (shrink)

Economists typically assume that preferences are fixed-that people know what they like and how much they like it relative to all other things, and that this rank-ordering is stable over time. But this assumption has never been accepted by any other discipline. Economists are increasingly having difficulty arguing that the assumption is true enough to generate useful predictions and explanations. Indeed, law and economics scholars increasingly acknowledge that preferences are constructed, and that the law itself can help construct preferences. Still, (...) fixed preferences are often treated as a normative ideal: Even if people don't have fixed preferences, they should. Behavioral law and economics scholars offer approaches to deal with this normative shortcoming. My article argues that preference construction, properly understood, is not normatively undesirable. Having fixed preferences means having a complete and stable rank ordering of what we want that dictates our choices. But we often do not have such an ordering, and rationally so. My article argues instead for an alternative process-based, account of preference construction. Rather than having a complete rank ordering, we have ways of making choices. We construct narratives, using evaluative criteria against a backdrop of wants, desires and inclinations, some of which we rank order and some of which we do not. The evaluative criteria embed a consideration of transaction costs: critically, where a decision is not very consequential, a formulaic decision rule that permits a ready choice among roughly comparable alternatives may serve our purposes better than a more considered alternative-by-alternative assessment. Our wants, desires and inclinations are for both traditional objects of choice and higher order values and desires; they are both previously constructed and constructed and elicited in the choice-making process. My article makes the case for such an account's potential explanatory power, as well as its tractability. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 38.3 (2004) 73-90 [Access article in PDF] Intellectual Friendship in Architectural Education Yonca Hurol Introduction Limits are causes of repression, and it is usually accepted that repression affects creativity. There are two different approaches to the effects of limits on creativity. According to the first approach, creativity increases parallel to the increase of limits and repression. According to the second approach, any artificial increase (...) of limits produces passionate "locked in" mechanisms. A decrease of limits is necessary for an increase in creativity. Since it is never possible to eliminate some "natural" limits, it is not necessary to create some other "artificial" ones by introducing authoritarian attitudes. Creativity should be directed only toward the natural problems and limits.The aim of this essay is to develop a theoretical base for the following philosophical statement: "Decreasing authoritarian limits causes an increase in creativity in architectural design education." The concepts in such a philosophical statement must be operationalized in order to be applied to the practice of architectural education. The concepts of "limits" and "creativity" should be replaced with some other concepts (variables) which are observable so that they can be applied to the cases in practice.The essay is based on the poststructuralist philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, specifically their understanding of the relation betweenthe body and the mind;1 even though other thinkers have related emotion and rationality, for example, Fredrich Nietzsche's nomadic thought, Gaston Bachelard's "childhood dreams," and Antonin Artaud's "theatre of cruelty."2 In this essay, Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy is used more intensively over that of others, because of the clarity of the concepts it contains.The concept of creativity is operationalized by replacing it with the variable of the "design psychology of the student" which can, in turn, be replaced by the constants of "passionate mechanism" and "desire machine." [End Page 73] These psychological states and the their architectural indications are analyzed in the first section. The concept of limits is replaced by the "limiting role of the studio teacher," instead of the natural limits in architecture such aseconomy and technology. This role has two constants: the "role of the authority figure" and the "role of the intellectual friend."In architectural design courses students design buildings which combine the demands of strength, usefulness, and aesthetics. This process relates rationality (mind) to irrationality (body/feelings). Students learn about the rational aspects of architecture in their own ways, while designing the irrational aspects of their projects. They make contact with the studio teachers whenever they need advice or supportive criticism. This is a one-on-one relationship. The early approaches to design education depend on authoritarian "correction," while the new models propose "objective criticism."However, none of these concepts cover the existing power relations between teachers and students. Some teachers believe in the positive role of authority, while others do not. A conflict arises between the authority figures, and the friendly teachers.The formation of an intellectual friendship between students and teachers of architecture is not new. It has existed since postmodernism was first founded in architecture with the differing viewpoints about architecture. Sinan Omacan, was a student of architecture when he described the changing demands of education as follows: School is not simply a structure that is abstract. It is not only an institution of discipline that programs, deals with quantities, and evaluates. The name of it, the building of it, and the people in it, always give it a certain personality, and the strongest part of this story can only start with the relationship between these personalities. While this medium of personal relationships forms an unpredictable and unavoidable situation for the institution, it becomes exactly the right thing that students are looking for, because the most important aspect for students in a school is the possibility created by unprogrammed time and unplanned space.3This essay provides a theoretical explanation of these existing categories for the first time. The concepts which are analyzed in the first two parts are used as variables for comparative research. The third part contains comparative... (shrink)

In a wide-ranging inquiry Richard W. Miller provides new resources for coping with the most troubling types of moral conflict: disagreements in moral conviction, conflicting interests, and the tension between conscience and desires. Drawing on most fields in philosophy and the social sciences, including his previous work in the philosophy of science, he presents an account of our access to moral truth, and, within this framework, develops a theory of justice and an assessment of the role of morality in rational (...) choice. In Miller's view, we are often in a position to claim that our moral judgments are true descriptions of moral facts. But others, relying on contrary ways of moral learning, would reject truths that we are in a position to assert, in dissent that does not depend on irrationality or ignorance of relevant evidence or arguments. With this mixed verdict on "moral realism," Miller challenges many received views of rationality, scientific method, and the relation between moral belief and moral choice. In his discussion of justice, Miller defends the adequacy, for modern political choices, of a widely shared demand that institutions be freely and rationally acceptable to all. Drawing on social research and economic theories, he argues that this demand has dramatically egalitarian consequences, even though it is a premise of liberals and conservatives alike. In the final chapters, Miller investigates the role and limits of morality in the choice of conduct, arguing for new perspectives on reason and impartiality. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:110 DAVID HUME'S INVISIBLE HAND IN THE WEALTH OF NATIONS THE PUBLIC CHOICE OF MORAL INFORMATION Introduction The thesis I shall defend is that there are systematic aspects of Adam Smith's economics which make little sense when read in isolation from a literature in which David Hume provides the signal contributions. Consequently, parts of Hume's own work are stripped of meaning, isolated as they are from later developments. The (...) puzzles about Smith's analysis which I find illuminated by Hume's are the following: 1. Why does Smith both defend the importance of economic growth for the material of well-being of the working class and claim that property originates as spoil, impoverishing the working class? After all, in the classical system the existence of property is one requisite for economic growth. 2. Why does Smith exalt the assumption of self-interested behavior in private activity but claim that irrationality dominates the political process? 3. Why does Smith deny the importance of benevolence in Wealth of Nations and insist on the importance of morality Sentiment morality in Theory of Moral its?3 The three questions have a common feature: they are related to the question of how public goods are provided. The particular public good in question is the institution of private property. As with all true I am obligated to the Center for Study of Public Choice for generous support of my research. Suzanne Levy gets the credit for the extent to which this approaches English. I have benefited from acute comments from Charles Rowley and Charles Griswold. The errors and obscurities which remain are solely my responsibility. Ill public goods, society considered as a whole benefits from having such an institution, but each individual considered separately can gain by anti-social behavior.4 Public goods provide a considerable difficulty for any social institution; neither competition in the market nor government requests that individuals reveal how much they wish to be taxed are certain to be efficient. There are aspects of the classical economic analysis which stress the importance of moral information as a partial solution to the public goods problem. By "moral information" I only require that the theory is employed as a guide and that if an individual acts contrary to the theory, this choice is not cited as "falsifying" the theory. Rather, something is said to be "wrong" or "wicked" about the choice.6 Much of modern economic analysis assumes that individuals have perfect information; this postulate rules out any significant role for moral information in the provision of the public goods. To avoid assuming away such a role for morality, we will drop the perfect information assumption and then examine if we can make sense of the classics' attack on the public goods problem. Of course, the specification that individuals see their own interests very poorly is consistent with Smith's general approach. The technique employed below is to look at the issue which Hume and Smith addressed as a problem in modern economics. The key difficulty is to determine under what conditions moral information could guide individuals with very imperfect perceptions to maximize their utility. In particular, suppose we find that moral guidance tells an individual how efficiently to produce. Is this morality self-enforcing or are resources required to persuade people to act in accord with these teachings? If resources are required, we will not pay much attention to just how this persuasion 112 is provided, e.g., whether we tell people that theft is "evil" or whether we hang a few thieves. General production theory tells us we probably will do both, but this is a separate issue. The argument to be advanced is that moral information has self-enforcement properties in private activities but these properties are missing in public activities. In this account, then, real resources will be required for implementing the morality. This consideration in turn raises an interesting issue. If the government expends these resources, what reason is there to believe that they will be provided to serve the public interest and not the interest of the government? Is it possible that the government can prosper by keeping people ignorant or by giving them advice... (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by an “infodemic” of misinformation and conspiracy theory. This article points to three explanatory factors: the challenge of forming accurate beliefs when overwhelmed with information, an implausibly individualistic conception of epistemic virtue, and an adversarial information environment that suborns epistemic dependence. Normally we cope with the problems of informational excess by relying on other people, including sociotechnical systems that mediate testimony and evidence. But when we attempt to engage in epistemic “superheroics” - withholding trust (...) from others and trying to figure it all out for ourselves – these can malfunction in ways that make us vulnerable to forming irrational beliefs. Some epistemic systems are prone to coalescing audiences around false conspiracy theories. This analysis affords a new perspective on philosophical efforts to understand conspiracy theories and other epistemic projects prone to collective irrationality. (shrink)

The meeting of rationalities is the core of the psychoanalytic treatment of madness. We see madness as a field of research in the area of historical, political and natural disasters where the social bond disintegrates, language slips away, the unimaginable happens and tried and tested rationalities fail. Faced with the irrationality of a behaviour or delusional episode, we need to find the ‘reason for this unreason’. The patient is a searcher in a disaster area, looking for someone to (...) share the craziness of what is discovered. An analysis of madness more often than not consists of discovering excised – not repressed – truths that are revealed during a heuristic journey taking place over often turbulent sessions. It is the end result of a continually surprising encounter with the rationalities carried by the analyst emerging from similar areas of disturbance, bringing to light common points of view, or transcultural invariants. Based on a brief clinical exchange with an African patient, in which the man who discovered the equations of quantum mechanics had a role, the author draws on the work of Schrödinger with its warnings not to give in to objectivization when we are struggling for meaning. (shrink)

History and literature provide striking examples of people who are morally admirable, in part, because of their profound faith in people’s decency. But moral philosophers have largely ignored this trait, and I suspect that many philosophers would view such faith with suspicion, dismissing it as a form of naïvete or as some other objectionable form of irrationality. I argue that such suspicion is misplaced, and that having a certain kind of faith in people’s decency, which I call faith in (...) humanity, is a centrally important moral virtue. In order to make this view intuitively more plausible, I discuss two moral exemplars – one historical and the other literary – whose lives vividly exhibit such faith. Then I provide a rationale for the view that having such faith is morally admirable. Finally, I discuss cases in which someone’s faith in humanity can lead her to make judgments that are, to some degree, epistemically irrational. I argue that the existence of such cases does not pose a serious objection to the view that having faith in humanity is a moral virtue. Rather, it makes salient important limits on the role that epistemic, as opposed to practical, rationality should occupy in our ideals of how to live. (shrink)

The core argument in favor of the view that immorality is a natural defect for human beings, which has been developed by Foot, assumes that if justice and compassion have important functions in human survival and reproduction, then injustice and cruelty are natural defects in human beings. But this ignores possibilities and results that cannot reasonably be ignored. Multiple and mixed naturally sound types can and do occur in nature. Moreover, research in the life sciences suggests that at least (...) some bad human behaviors, traits, or strategies are selected for and continue to have important survival-and-reproduction-related functions in human life. All this fits poorly with the position that immorality is a natural defect for human beings. Emerging as much more plausible is the competing view that, for human beings, natural soundness sometimes supports behaviors, traits, or strategies that conflict with (any ideal that can plausibly be called) moral goodness. (shrink)

The practitioner of the shamanic system among the Bugis-Makassar people in Indonesia is known as dukun or sanro, a person believed has a supranatural power, using their power either to help others or bringing harm, such as disease”. This is an interpretative-descriptive anthropological research. We made observations by directly observing, listening, and recording events related to the problem. We also conducted in-depth interviews with dukun and customers using interview guides and other tools such as recorders. We found that there (...) are several types and characteristics of dukun in Makassar, such as dukun penolong (helpers), traditional healers, and dukun using black magic. In Bugis-Makassar social structure, dukun does not have a clear position even with some of the stigma. However, dukun nowadays is becoming more open and increasingly strengthening their position in society, especially in the political arena. Dukun, along with several people believing them cannot be assessed from the rational point of view since they have their own reasoning and logic (rationality behind irrationality). They still function in the socio-political life of Indonesian society. The mysticism practiced by politicians in Indonesia, especially in Makassar, is shown when politicians such as several regional head candidates used the services of dukun to boost their success in winning the regional election. For example, dukun can help candidates to create an aura of authority, protect the candidates from black magic, create illusions to the voters, influence the voters, and other supranatural things. The customers, such as politicians, tend to have their own motivation based on rationality when deciding to have a relationship with a dukun. Motivation for seeking spiritual and political supports by utilizing the network of dukun for political purposes has a reciprocal effect which benefits both parties. (shrink)

En años recientes se han diseñado múltiples experimentos que muestran cómo el razonamiento humano tiende a quebrantar lo que usualmente se consideran los principios normativos de razonamiento, a saber, los principios de la teoría estándar de la probabilidad y de la lógica clásica. Estos supuestos quebrantos han sido interpretados como muestra de la irracionalidad humana. Una noción de norma del razonamiento diferente de la subyacente en dicha interpretación me permite afirmar que razonar correctamente implica razonar de acuerdo con reglas diseñadas (...) para resolver una clase limitada de problemas en el marco de un dominio especifico y que pueden no ser formulados en términos de principios generales. Esta idea me lleva a sostener que la estructura heurística de nuestro razonamiento apunta a la manera como somos racionales. /// Much research in the last decades has demonstrated that khuman reasoning tends to violate what have usually been regarded as the normative principles of reasoning -- e.g. the principles of standard theory of probability or classical logic. These supposed violations have been interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. A notion of a reasoning norm different from that underlying such an interpretation allows me to assert that correct reasoning implies reasoning in accordance with rules designed to solve a limited class of problems in a specific domain of knowledge and which are not susceptible to being formulated in terms of general principies. This contention leads me to sustain that the heuristic structure of our reasoning signáis the way in which we are rational. (shrink)

This paper is the product of an interdisciplinary, interreligious dialogue aiming to outline some of the possibilities and rational limits of supernatural religious belief, in the light of a critique of David Hume’s familiar sceptical arguments -- including a rejection of his famous Maxim on miracles -- combined with a range of striking recent empirical research. The Humean nexus leads us to the formulation of a new ”Common-Core/Diversity Dilemma’, which suggests that the contradictions between different religious belief systems, in (...) conjunction with new understandings of the cognitive forces that shape their common features, persuasively challenge the rationality of most kinds of supernatural belief. In support of this conclusion, we survey empirical research concerning intercessory prayer, religious experience, near-death experience, and various cognitive biases. But we then go on to consider evidence that supernaturalism -- even when rationally unwarranted -- has significant beneficial individual and social effects, despite others that are far less desirable. This prompts the formulation of a ”Normal/Objective Dilemma’, identifying important trade-offs to be found in the choice between our humanly evolved ”normal’ outlook on the world, and one that is more rational and ”objective’. Can we retain the pragmatic benefits of supernatural belief while avoiding irrationality and intergroup conflict? It may well seem that rationality is incompatible with any wilful sacrifice of objectivity. But in a situation of uncertainty, an attractive compromise may be available by moving from the competing factions and mutual contradictions of ”first-order’ supernaturalism to a more abstract and tolerant ”second-order’ view, which itself can be given some distinctive intellectual support through the increasingly popular Fine Tuning Argument. We end by proposing a ”Maxim of the Moon’ to express the undogmatic spirit of this second-order religiosity, providing a cautionary metaphor to counter the pervasive bias endemic to the human condition, and offering a more cooperation- and humility-enhancing understanding of religious diversity in a tense and precarious globalised age. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is a special personage in the history of Enlightenment philosophy and European thought in general. This is so, because, on the one hand, he propounded ideas that were typical for the Enlightenment and greatly influenced his contemporaries—after all, it was he who inspired Kant with the idea of the autonomy of the will as a source of moral and juridical law, a conception which became the foundation of Kantian practical philosophy—but on the other criticised many popular ideas of (...) his day, which from our contemporary perspective appear to have been the superstitions of the Enlightenment period. Rousseau rejected the uncritical apology of (universalistically understood) reason together with the “ethical universalism” professed by rationalists since Socrates. In his claim that human history ran in a circle (from nature in its primeval purity to nature as the expression of civilisational decay), he contested the Enlightenment’s widespread belief that it was a linear, continuous, cumulative and by nature unchangeably progressive process. Because of his transgression of the Enlightenment paradigm, Rousseau is sometimes considered to have been the first modern philosopher. And, in my opinion, rightly so, because his thought stood ahead of its time, and in many ways anticipated contemporary philosophy. I believe that especially the Frankfurt School owes a lot to his achievements. Rousseau’s thought already carried the main seeds of critical theory: the intertwinement of progress and regression over human history, emphasis on the mastering of nature and the destruction of the human element in the course of civilisational evolution, a social-historical (and not purely theoretical, as in Kant’s case) critique of reason for the sake of reason and not from the position of irrationality. Long before Max Horkheimer and his associates at the Institute of Social Research, and even ahead of Sigmund Freud, he saw reasons to ambivalently evaluate the results of human self-creation and to highlight the regressive tendencies present in human history. (shrink)

Doctoral programs at U.S. universities play a critical role in the development of human resources both in the United States and abroad. This volume reports the results of an extensive study of U.S. research-doctorate programs in five broad fields: physical sciences and mathematics, engineering, social and behavioral sciences, biological sciences, and the humanities. Research-Doctorate Programs in the United States documents changes that have taken place in the size, structure, and quality of doctoral education since the widely used 1982 (...) editions. This update provides selected information on nearly 4,000 doctoral programs in 41 subdisciplines at 274 doctorate-granting institutions. This volume also reports the results of the National Survey of Graduate Faculty, which polled a sample of faculty for their views on the scholarly quality of program faculty and the effectiveness of doctoral programs in preparing research scholars/scientists. This much-anticipated update of such an essential reference will be useful to education administrators, university faculty, and students seeking authoritative information on doctoral programs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Though This Be Madness, Yet There Is Method in ’T”A Positive Account of MadnessValentina Cardella, PhD (bio)What does it mean to be mad? How can we define mental disorder? The question is still widely discussed among psychiatrists and philosophers, and what exactly distinguishes sanity and insanity remains unclear. Despite this lack of clarity, the common conceptualization of madness is that mental disorders are impairments in rationality: people with mental (...) disorders are generally believed to have impairments in reasoning and logic (Bermúdez, 2001; Edwards, 1981; Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004).Yet, the result of this conception is that we fail to understand madness. We do not understand how, for example, schizophrenic patients can be more logical than healthy people in some reasoning tasks (Mellet et al., 2006; Owen, Cutting, & David, 2007), or delusional patients can be perfectly rational in defending their ideas (Cardella, 2020), or depressive people can be more realistic than non-clinical subjects (Moore & Fresco, 2012). In contrast, if we consider rationality as the core feature of sanity, we fail to understand sanity, too, because normal people exhibit many kinds of biases and heuristics, and thus irrationality is widespread in the general population (Bortolotti, 2020; Johnson-Laird, 2006; Evans, 2002; Kahneman, Tversky, & Slovic, 1982).In his paper, Garson focuses on Late Modern theorists of madness (Locke, Kant, Wigan, and Heinroth) to reframe the problem and provide a positive account of mental disorder. These authors contrast madness to idiocy, rather than sanity, and therefore their conception of madness is very different: “while idiocy is marked by the diminished, or even abolished, functioning of the reasoning power, madness is marked by its perverse functioning. The mad person “has” reason, but deploys it in a perverse, improper, or unseemly manner” (Garson, 2023, p. 286).In his reading of Late Modern authors, Garson provides a new ontology of mental disorder, that goes beyond an absence of reason, and has also political and social implications. Furthermore, he reminds us that every scientific discipline has its philosophical assumptions. In defining madness, [End Page 305] we cannot help but choose a contrasting class, and each choice will have very different consequences. Even if psychiatry is a medical discipline, which aims to endorse a neutral view of mental disorder, it is impossible for it to be unbiased and impartial. All the more so, for it has to deal with human suffering and fragility.But, in this article, there is one crucial question that remains unanswered. In his analysis of Late Modern theorization of madness, Garson comes to the conclusion that madness is marked by a perverse deployment of reason. Yet, who decides when reason is deployed in a perverse manner? While the lack of rationality is something that we can detect easily enough, the task of defining precisely what is an ‘improper’ or ‘perverse’ use of reason is much harder. In other words, it seems to me that, in replacing the ‘lack of rationality’ paradigm with ‘the perverse rationality paradigm,’ the question of what is madness still remains open, and, most important, some normative aspects remain necessary. To recognize when rationality is improperly used, we have to adopt an evaluative stance, which defines what a proper use of reason would be.Valentina [email protected] University of MessinaValentina Cardella Valentina Cardella is Associate Professor of Philosophy of Language at the University of Messina, Italy. Her research interests encompass cognitive sciences, philosophy of language, and psychopathology.The author reports no conflicts of interest.Commentary submitted on June 13, 2023Accepted on June 13, 2023ReferencesBermúdez, J. L. (2001). Normativity and rationality in delusional psychiatric disorders. Mind and Language 16, 457–93. Google ScholarBortolotti, L. (2020). The epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Google ScholarCardella, V. (2020). Rationality in mental disorders: too little or too much? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2), 13–36. Google ScholarEdwards, R. B. (1997). Mental health as rational autonomy. In Edwards, R. B. (ed.), Ethics of psychiatry: Insanity, rational autonomy, and mental health care. New York: Prometheus Books. Google ScholarEvans, J. (2002). Logic and human reasoning: an assessment of the deduction paradigm. Psychological Bulletin 128... (shrink)

An influential tradition in moral philosophy attempts to explain an immoral action by reference to the defect in reasoning on the part of an immoral agent. On this view, the requirements of morality are not only sanctioned by the more general requirements of rationality, but the violations of the moral requirements would be indicative of a rational failure. In this article I argue that ascription of irrationality to amoral individuals (e.g., psychopaths) is either empirically false, or else, conceptually problematic. (...) An interpretation of irrationality in its instrumental sense fails to do justice to the results of the research concerning the intelligence of some amoralists, whereas the suggestion that the alleged cognitive deficiency lies at the level of final ends and ultimate values faces serious theoretical difficulties. All attempts to construe the notion of an external reason for action without reference to the agent's actual goals and values bespeak an objectivist's bias, rest on controversial assumptions, and tend to alienate the agent from the proposed set of reasons. The argument is partly based on the analysis of reasoning of Ted Bundy, a notorious serial murderer, who presents a rather sophisticated justification for his criminal behavior. (shrink)

Standard definitions of procrastination underscore the irrational nature of this habit, a critical criterion being that the procrastinating individual delays despite expecting to be worse off for the delay. However, an examination of more than 175 items in 18 procrastination scales reveals that they do not address such a forward-looking criterion. Consequently, scales run the risk of not separating maladaptive and irrational delays from other forms of delay. We propose that forward-looking considerations may not be the best way of operationalizing (...) the irrationality involved in procrastination and argue that scales should instead focus on past negative consequences of unnecessary delay. We suggest a new scale to measure such procrastination-related negative consequences and demonstrate that this scale, used separately or combined with established procrastination scales, performs better in predicting negative states and correlates to procrastination than established scales. The new scale seems to be helpful in separating trivial forms of unnecessary delay from maladaptive forms and hence represents a potentially valuable tool in research and clinical/applied efforts. (shrink)

Peter Millican and Branden Thornhill-Miller have recently argued that contradictions between different religious belief systems, in conjunction with the host of defeaters based on empirical research concerning alleged sources of evidence for ‘perceived supernatural agency’, render all ‘first-order’, that is actual, religious traditions positively irrational, and a source of discord on a global scale. However, since the authors recognise that the ‘secularisation thesis’ appears to be incorrect, and that empirical research provides evidence that religious belief also has beneficial (...) individual and social effects, they put forward a hypothesis of a ‘second-order religious belief ’, with Universalist overtones and thus free of intergroup conflict, and free of irrationality, since supported (solely) by the Fine-Tuning Argument. While granting most of their arguments based on empirical research and embracing the new paradigm of the atheism/religion debate implicit in their paper, I contend that Millican’s and Thornhill-Miller’s proposal is unlikely to appeal to religious believers, because it misconstrues the nature and grounds of religious belief. I suggest that their hypothesis may be refined by taking into account a view of axiologically grounded religious belief that I refer to as ‘agatheism’, since it identifies God or the Ultimate Reality with the ultimate good (to agathon). (shrink)

Global challenge-led research seeks to contribute to solution-generation for complex problems. Multicultural, multidisciplinary, and multisectoral teams must be capable of operating in highly demanding contexts. This brings with it a swathe of ethical conflicts that require quick and effective solutions that respect both international conventions and cultural diversity. The objective of this article is to describe the process of creating a toolkit designed to support global researchers in navigating these ethical challenges. The process of creating the toolkit embodied the (...) model of ethical research practice that it advocates. Specifically, at the heart of ethical decision-making is consideration of the following: Place, solutions must be relevant to the context in which they are to be used; People, those impacted by the outcomes must be partners in co-creation; Principles, ethical projects must be guided by clear values; and Precedent, the existing evidence-base should guide the project and, in turn, the project should extend the evidence-base. It is the thesis underlying the toolkit that consideration of these 4Ps provides a strong basis for understanding ethical conflicts and allows for the generation of potential solutions. This toolkit has been designed in two phases of collaborative work. More than 200 researchers participated from more than 30 countries and more than 60 different disciplines. This allowed us to develop a model for contextual, dynamic analysis of ethical conflicts in global research that is complementary to traditional codes of ethics. It emphasizes the need to consider ethical analysis as an iterative, reflective, process relevant at all stages of the research journey, including, ultimately, in evaluating the legacy of a project. The toolkit is presented as an open access website to promote universal access. A downloadable “pocket guide” version is also now available in 11 languages. (shrink)

Researchers and others involved in the research enterprise from 12 African countries met with those working in ethics and oversight in the United States as part of an effort to develop research ethics capacity. Drawing on a wealth of experience among participants, discussions at the meeting revealed five categories of issues that warrant careful attention by those engaged in similar efforts as well as international policymakers and those charged with oversight of research. (1) Principal investigators should build (...) ‘true research teams’ where members of the team are meaningfully involved in decisions regarding the protocol and its implementation. (2)There should be explicit discussion about the ‘standard of care’ at the outset of project planning that includes clarification of the terminology that is being used. (3) While internationally collaborative research may involve populations that have inherent vulnerabilities, it is important to recognize the limitations of host country solutions (such as elaborated consent processes) and look for means to negotiate appropriate protections for those willing to participate. (4) In conducting research involving biological materials it would be prudent to develop material transfer agreements at the outset of the study to clarify expectations and to minimize the likelihood of harm. (5) Those engaged in internationally collaborative research need to be alert to the potential conflicts of interests of host country ethics committees during the approval process and to take measures to manage them if they indeed exist. (shrink)

Several philosophers and psychologists have characterized belief in conspiracy theories as a product of irrational reasoning. Proponents of conspiracy theories apparently resist revising their beliefs given disconfirming evidence and tend to believe in more than one conspiracy, even when the relevant beliefs are mutually inconsistent. In this paper, we bring leading views on conspiracy theoretic beliefs closer together by exploring their rationality under a probabilistic framework. We question the claim that the irrationality of conspiracy theoretic beliefs stems from an (...) inadequate response to disconfirming evidence and internal incoherence. Drawing analogies to Lakatosian research programs, we argue that maintaining a core conspiracy belief can be Bayes-rational when it is embedded in a network of auxiliary beliefs, which can be revised to protect the more central belief from disconfirmation. We propose that the irrationality associated with conspiracy belief lies not in a flawed updating method, but in a failure to converge toward wellconfirmed, stable belief networks in the long run. This approach not only reconciles previously disjointed views, but also points toward more specific descriptions of why agents may be prone to adopting beliefs in conspiracy theories. (shrink)

The purpose of this text is to analyze the social representations of feminism in divinatory practices. Our research in a few Moldavian counties has identified two main types of social representations of the relationship between magic/divination and feminism. Therefore, there are some dual representations of the feminine divinatory agents versus the masculine ones. Even though women are well represented among clairvoyants, clients, and spectators, these valorizations function as negative stereotypes and do not serve the women. Another representation of feminism (...) in divinatory practices that does not necessarily imply negativism and damnation is a more recent one. Old stereotypes are tamed and attenuated. The results of our research have shown that women continue to be associated with the survival of these practices. This is proof that old myths and representations are still alive. They are discretely present in social expressions. Finally, they will dominate us completely. (shrink)

Purpose Responsible research and innovation is taking a role in assisting all types of stakeholders, including industry members, in moving their research and innovation initiatives to tackle grand challenges. The literature on RRI, however, focuses little on how industry can implement RRI principles. To solve this gap, the purpose of this study is to construct a conceptual framework for managing and assessing RRI principles in the industry. Design/methodology/approach Qualitative research was used to build the RRI key performance (...) indicator list; 30 interviews were conducted to design a framework which was pilot tested in a company to identify how to align technology outcomes to the values, needs and expectations of the society. Findings This study depicts five successive RRI implementation levels and exhibits RRI key performance indicators. Drawing on extant models, this study develops RRI levels and indicators to discuss why industry should become engaged in RRI, how it can embed RRI principles into R&I processes and how RRI indicators can be managed systematically. Originality/value The connection between RRI key performance indicators and RRI levels determines how industry can integrate principles and methodologies of RRI into R&I processes. The model in the study shows how companies move from one RRI stage to another and this study aims to exhibit an ideal stage of RRI for industry. (shrink)

Engagement in health research is increasingly practised worldwide. Yet many questions remain under debate in the ethics field about its contribution to health research and these debates have largely not been informed by those who have been engaged in health research. This paper addresses the following key questions: what should the ethical goals of engagement in health research be and how should it be performed? Qualitative data were generated by interviewing 22 people with lived experience, members (...) of the public, and engagement managers about power sharing in health research. Thematic analysis of study data identified the following five themes: the value of engagement in research, ideal engagement, tokenistic engagement, terms to describe those engaged, and engagement roles in research. The paper presents that data and then considers what insights it offers for what engagement should look like—its ethical goals and approach—according to those being engaged. (shrink)

Summary In this paper some claims of Professor Ricoeur are challenged. It is pointed out on historical grounds that counter to Professor Ricoeur's claim, most past philosophies are displaced, or ignored. The surviving canon is small and very selective. There is, therefore, substantial agreement on the large corpus which is rejected. It is also argued that Professor Ricoeur's contrast between philosophy and the sciences is too sharp since in the history of modern sciences there are always conflicting theories existing in (...) parallel. However, it is the case that in philosophy standards of “acceptability” are looser and not the rigorous ones of science. A philosophical theory may be appreciated for the problems it discloses, the richness and subtlety of its arguments, its strategies and the like despite acknowledged failings. Appreciation of incompatible theories is not irrational. The claim is rejected that the seeming irrationality is resolved by viewing each system as wholly autonomous. The apparent restriction of philosophy by Professor Ricoeur to global systems is also questioned.RésuméL'auteur conteste quelques affirmations du prof. Ricoeur. Elle montre, sur des bases historiques, que beaucoup de philosophies passées sont écartées ou ignorées. Le canon retenu est petit et très sélectif. Il y a donc un accord substantiel quant au vaste corpus qui est rejeté. Elle montre aussi que le contraste que le professeur Ricoeur établit entre philosophie et sciences est trop abrupt, puisqu'il y a toujours eu, dans l'histoire de la science moderne, des théories opposées qui coexistaient. Toutefois, il est vrai qu'en philosophie, les standards d' »acceptabilité« sont plus lǎches et diffèrent de ceux, plus rigoureux, de la science. Une philosophie peut ětre appréciée pour les problèmes qu'elle pose, pour la richesse et la subtilité de ses arguments, ses stratégies ou d'autres choses semblables et ceci en dépit de ses insuffisances notoires. Il n'est pas irrationnel d'apprécier des théories incompatibles. Elle rejette la thèse selon laquelle le fait de considérer chaque système comme totalement autonome supprime l'irrationalité. Elle conteste enfin la restriction — apparemment faite par le professeur Ricoeur — de la philosophie à des systèmes globaux.ZusammenfassungEs werden einige Behauptungen von Professor Ricoeur in Frage gestellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass aus historischen Gründen entgegen Ricoeurs Behauptung die meisten vergangenen Philosophien tatsächlich verdrängt oder ignoriert werden. Der überlebende Kanon ist gering und selektiv. Deshalb gibt es eine wichtige Übereinstimmung hinsichtlich des grossen Korpus', der verworfen wird. Es wird argumentiert, dass Ricoeur den Kontrast zwischen der Philosophie und den Wissenschaften zu extrem sieht, da in der Geschichte der modernen Wissenschaften immer rivalisierende Theorien nebeneinander existiert haben. Es stimmt allerdings, dass die Massstäbe für Akzeptierbarkeit in der Philosophie lockerer sind als die strengen der Wisschenschaft. Eine philosophische Theorie mag wegen der Probleme, die sie entwickelt, wegen des Reichtums und der Subtilität ihrer Argumente, ihrer Strategien etc. gewürdigt werden, obschon sie anerkanntermassen versagt hat. Die Würdigung unvereinbarer Theorien ist nicht irrational. Die scheinbare Irrationalität kann nicht dadurch aufgelöst werden, dass jedes System als völlig autonom betrachtet wird. Es wird ebenfalls Ricoeurs Einschränkung der Philosophie auf globale Systeme in Frage gestellt. (shrink)

To make Adorno’s difficult notion of “identity thinking” more amendable to sociological research, this project brings his Negative Dialectics into conversation with Schutz’s theory of typification. When revised with Adorno’s attention to political economy and the pathologies of reification, Schutz’s framework allows for an analysis of identity thinking in everyday life. Both theorists argue that categories of thought: automatically subsume objects for pragmatic yet socially conditioned reasons, are socially formed, transferred, and selected, and suppress particularizing characteristics of objects. Their (...) overlapping arguments are cross-fertilized to propose a critical approach to cognitive sociology that can engage in a form of ideology critique that illuminates forms of thinking that conceal social contradictions. This approach is useful for explaining the “mundane dialectic of enlightenment”: the daily reproduction of unreflective rationalization that breeds irrationality in the form of social domination and environmental harm, a contradiction which finds its ultimate expression in climate change inaction. (shrink)

Summary The question of rationality and irrationality — conceived as characteristics of human behaviour — can be discussed either in empirical or in transcendental terms. In empirical terms political behaviour is called “irrational” when it is predictably counterproductive, i.e. when the agents are able, but fail to calculate the outcome of their actions. This is a “Machiavellian” concept of rationality and it involves no moral judgement. In transcendental terms rationality or irrationality are measured by standards of the “rational (...) human nature” as defined in Platonic, Kantian or Husserlian manner. These two perspectives are mutually exclusive and irreducible, as they involve philosophical options.RésuméRationalité ou irrationalité — considérées comme des caractéristiques du comportement humain — peuvent ětre discutées soit en termes empiriques, soit en termes transcendentaux. En termes empiriques, une conduite politique est qualifiée d'irrationnelle lorsqu'on peut prévoir qu'elle n'atteindra pas ses buts, c'est‐à‐dire lorsque les agents pourraient calculer l'effet de leurs actions, mais omettent de le faire. Il s'agit là d'un concept “machiavellien” de rationalité, qui n'implique pas de jugement moral. En termes transcendentaux, la rationalité ou l'irrationalité sont mesurées à l'aune de la “nature humaine rationnelle” telle qu'elle a été définie à la manière de Platon, de Kant ou de Husserl. Ces deux perspectives s'excluent mutuellement et sont irréductibles l'une à l'autre, car elles reposent sur des options philosophiques.ZusammenfassungDie Frage der Rationalität und Irrationalität — betrachtet als charakteristische Züge des menschlichen Verhaltens — kann auf entweder empirische oder transzendentale Art diskutiert werden. Empirisch wird politisches Verhalten »irrational« genannt, wenn es voraussagbar unzweckmässig ist, d.h. wenn die Handelnden zwar fähig sind, die Folgen ihrer Handlungen zu berechnen, es aber unterlassen. Das ist ein Machiavellischer Begriff von Rationalität, der kein moralisches Urteil involviert. Im transzendentalen Sinne werden Rationalität oder Irrationalität am Massstab »der rationalen menschlichen Natur« gemessen, wie dieser etwa durch Platon, Kant oder Husserl bestimmt worden ist. Diese zwei Perspektiven schliessen sich gegenseitig aus, da sie auf verschiedenen philosophischen Standpunkten beruhen. (shrink)

While robotics has benefited from inspiration gained from biology, the opposite is not the case: there are few if any cases in which robotic models have lead to genuine insight into biology. We analyze the reasons why biorobotics has been essentially a one-way street. We argue that the development of better tools is essential for progress in this field.