Die irreführende technologische Metapher der Informationsübertragung impliziert paradoxerweise uninformative Information. Dem steht jener Informationsbegriff gegenüber, der mit Wissen und Verstehen assoziiert ist. Informativ wird etwas nicht wegen etwas Übertragenem, sondern in Relation zu Interessen und Befähigungen verstehender Wesen. Jakob Krebs zeigt, dass ein aufgeklärtes Selbstverständnis der Informationsgesellschaft somit einer genaueren Bestimmung von Informativität bedarf. Die ist nicht nur philosophisch aufschlussreich, sondern auch für alle Praktiken des Kommunizierens, Lernens und Lehrens. Denn Information lässt sich genauso wenig übertragen wie sich (...) eine Grippe ausschwitzen lässt. (shrink)

The phenomenology of agency and perception is probably underpinned by a common cognitive system based on generative models and predictive coding. I defend the hypothesis that this cognitive system explains core aspects of the sense of having a self in agency and perception. In particular, this cognitive model explains the phenomenological notion of a minimal self as well as a notion of the narrative self. The proposal is related to some influential studies of overall brain function, and to psychopathology. These (...) elusive notions of the self are shown to be the natural upshots of general cognitive mechanisms whose fundamental purpose is to enable agents to represent the world and act in it. (shrink)

Organisations increasingly use automated decision-making systems (ADMS) to inform decisions that affect humans and their environment. While the use of ADMS can improve the accuracy and efficiency of decision-making processes, it is also coupled with ethical challenges. Unfortunately, the governance mechanisms currently used to oversee human decision-making often fail when applied to ADMS. In previous work, we proposed that ethics-based auditing (EBA)—that is, a structured process by which ADMS are assessed for consistency with relevant principles or norms—can (a) help organisations (...) verify claims about their ADMS and (b) provide decision-subjects with justifications for the outputs produced by ADMS. In this article, we outline the conditions under which EBA procedures can be feasible and effective in practice. First, we argue that EBA is best understood as a ‘soft’ yet ‘formal’ governance mechanism. This implies that the main responsibility of auditors should be to spark ethical deliberation at key intervention points throughout the software development process and ensure that there is sufficient documentation to respond to potential inquiries. Second, we frame AMDS as parts of larger sociotechnical systems to demonstrate that to be feasible and effective, EBA procedures must link to intervention points that span all levels of organisational governance and all phases of the software lifecycle. The main function of EBA should, therefore, be to inform, formalise, assess, and interlink existing governance structures. Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our findings. To support the emergence of feasible and effective EBA procedures, policymakers and regulators could provide standardised reporting formats, facilitate knowledge exchange, provide guidance on how to resolve normative tensions, and create an independent body to oversee EBA of ADMS. (shrink)

A new theory is taking hold in neuroscience. It is the theory that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism, one that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about the sensory input it receives from the world. It is an attractive theory because powerful theoretical arguments support it, and yet it is at heart stunningly simple. Jakob Hohwy explains and explores this theory from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophy. The key argument throughout The Predictive Mind (...) is that the mechanism explains the rich, deep, and multifaceted character of our conscious perception. It also gives a unified account of how perception is sculpted by attention, and how it depends on action. The mind is revealed as having a fragile and indirect relation to the world. Though we are deeply in tune with the world we are also strangely distanced from it. (shrink)

Refinements in Darwin’s theory of the origin of a moral sense create a framework equipped to organize and integrate contemporary theory and research on morality. Morality originated in deferential, cooperative, and altruistic ‘‘social instincts,’’ or decision-making strategies, that enabled early humans to maximize their gains from social living and resolve their conflicts of interest in adaptive ways. Moral judgments, moral norms, and conscience originated from strategic interactions among members of groups who experienced confluences and conflicts of interest. Moral argumentation buttressed (...) by moral reasoning is equipped to generate universal and impartial moral standards. Moral beliefs and standards are products of automatic and controlled information-processing and decision making mechanisms. To understand how people make moral decisions, we must understand how early evolved mechanisms in the old brain and recently evolved mechanisms in the new brain are activated and how they interact. Understanding what a sense of morality is for helps us understand what it is. (shrink)

Implications of algorithmic mediation can be studied through the artefact itself, peoples’ practices, and the social/political/economical arrangements that affect and are affected by such interactions. Most studies in Academic social media (ASM) focus on one of these elements at a time, either examining design elements or the users’ behaviour on and perceptions of such platforms. We take a multi-faceted approach using affordances as a lens to analyze practices and arrangements traversed by algorithmic mediation. Following our earlier studies that examined the (...) artefact, this study’s aim is to understand how algorithmic mediation in ASM may shape researchers’ perceptions. We conducted online in-depth interviews with show and tell (n = 11) with ASM users from four countries, about their use of ASM. Data were analyzed using thematic analysis, and the codes were clustered in themes and validated via peer debriefing process. Four themes—related to exposure to content, visibility, ethical or legal infringements, and engagement—are discussed considering implications of datafication and findability. We conclude that algorithmic mediation constructs a narration of the relevant other in ASM, configuring the other as participatory and productive. (shrink)

Those who invoke the word self-deception to represent one phenomenon often argue that those who use it to represent another are misusing the construct. Better to recognize that self-deception is a fuzzy concept that may be used to represent a variety of mental processes and states, and to direct our energy toward distinguishing empirically among its forms and functions.

This paper reconstructs Van Parijs’ core argument for an unconditional basic income and presents three objections against it. The first and most theoretical objection attacks the egalitarian basis of Van Parijs’ argument and suggests an alternative, humanitarian theory of justice. The second and third more concrete objections accuse Van Parijs of selling-out the right to work as well as the right to recognition of work, for example of family work. The conclusion drawn from these three objections, however, is not that (...) an unconditional basic income cannot be defended. Instead the paper ends by indicating an alternative, humanitarian argument for an unconditional basic income. (shrink)

Delusions are unhinged hinge certainties. Delusions are defined as strongly anchored beliefs that do not change in the face of adverse evidence. The same goes for Wittgensteinian certainties. My paper refines the so-called framework views of delusion, presenting an argument that epistemically speaking, considering them to be certainties best accounts for delusions’ doxastic profile. Until now there has been little argument in favour of this position and the original proposals made too extreme predictions about the belief systems of delusional patients. (...) I show that my account fares better with the diverse objections that have been raised against older framework views of delusion (Campbell 2001, Gipps and Rhodes 2008). Finally, I examine what makes a harmless hinge into a pathological delusion. (shrink)

Climate change mitigation has become a paradigm case both for externalities in general and for the game-theoretic model of the Tragedy of the Commons (ToC) in particular. This situation is worrying, as we have reasons to suspect that some models in the social sciences are apt to be performative to the extent that they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Framing climate change mitigation as a hardly solvable coordination problem may force us into a worse situation, by changing real-world behaviour to fit (...) our model, rather than the other way around. But while this problem of the performativity of the ToC has been noted in a recent paper in this journal by Matthew Kopec, his proposed strategies for dealing with their self-fulfilling nature fall short of providing an adequate solution. Instead of relying on the idea that modelling assumptions are always strictly speaking false, this paper shows that the problem may be better framed as a problem of underdetermination between competing explanations. Our goal here is to provide a framework for choosing between this set of competing models that allows us to avoid a ‘Russian Roulette’-like situation in which we gamble with existential risk. (shrink)

Epistemic entitlement is a species of internalist warrant that can be had without any evidential support. Unfortunately, for this kind of warrant the so-called problem of demarcation arises, a form of epistemic relativism. I first present entitlement theory and examine what the problem of demarcation is exactly, rejecting that it is either based on bizarreness or disagreement in favour of the thesis that the problem of demarcation is based on epistemic arbitrariness. Second, I argue that arbitrariness generates a problem for (...) entitlement because it undermines epistemic warrant. Third, I draw out some of the consequences that arbitrariness has for an entitlement epistemology, notably that it threatens to generalise to all our beliefs. Finally, I examine how different solutions to the problem of demarcation fare with respect to the danger of arbitrariness. I argue that none of the considered options succeeds in dealing with the risks of arbitrariness. (shrink)

Predictive processing (PP) is now a prominent theoretical framework in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This review focuses on PP research with a relatively philosophical focus, taking stock of the framework and discussing new directions. The review contains an introduction that describes the full PP toolbox; an exploration of areas where PP has advanced understanding of perceptual and cognitive phenomena; a discussion of PP's impact on foundational issues in cognitive science; and a consideration of the philosophy of science (...) of PP. The overall picture is that PP is a fruitful framework, with exciting new directions awaiting exploration. (shrink)

Some monothematic types of delusions may arise because subjects have unusual experiences. The role of this experiential component in the pathogenesis of delusion is still not understood. Focussing on delusions of alien control, we outline a model for reality testing competence on unusual experiences. We propose that nascent delusions arise when there are local failures of reality testing performance, and that monothematic delusions arise as normal responses to these. In the course of this we address questions concerning the tenacity with (...) which delusions are maintained, their often bizarre content, the patients' inability to dismiss them, and their often circumscribed character. (shrink)

In a companion review1 we discussed the data supporting the conclusion that at least two subtypes of spectrin exist in mammalian brain. One form is found in the cell bodies, dendrites, and post‐synaptic terminals of neurons (brain spectrin(240/235E)) and the other subtype is located in the axons and presynaptic terminals (brain spectrin(240/235)). Our recent understanding of brain spectrin subtype localization suggests a possible explanation for a conundrum concerning brain 4.1 localization. Amelin, an immunoreactive analogue of red blood cell (rbc) cytoskeletal (...) protein 4.1, is localized in neuronal cell bodies and dendrites when brain sections are stained with antibody against rbc protein 4.1. However, it has recently been suggested that synapsin I, a neuron‐specific phosphoprotein associated with the cytoplasmic surface of small synaptic vesicles, is related to erythrocyte 4.1. In this review we hypothesize that there are at least two forms of brain 4.1: a cell body/dendritic form (amelin) which is detected with rbc protein 4.1 antibody, and a unique form found exclusively in the presynaptic terminal (synapsin I). The binding of synapsin I to brain spectrin(240/235), and its ability to stimulate the spectrin/F‐actin interaction in a phosphorylation‐dependent manner suggests a model for the regulation of synaptic transmission mediated by the neuronal cytoskeleton. (shrink)

Ist die Natur nur für den Menschen da, oder kommt ihr auch ein eigener Wert zu? Das ist die Grundfrage der Natur- und Umweltethik. Man kann diese Frage auch anders formulieren: Ist Naturschutz nur etwas, was wir den von der Natur abhängigen, der Natur bedürftigen Menschen schulden, oder schulden wir den Schutz der Natur auch der Natur selbst? Haben wir – kantisch gesprochen – nur Pflichten in Ansehung der Natur oder auch Pflichten gegenüber der Natur? Hat nur der Mensch eine (...) Würde, oder gebührt auch der Erde, den Meeren, den Wäldern, den Flüssen, den Pflanzen und den Tieren Ehrfurcht? Ist die traditionelle anthropozentrische Ethik angesichts ökologischer Krisenerfahrungen heute noch zu rechtfertigen oder muss sie einer neuen physiozentrischen Ethik weichen? (shrink)

I have been trying to understand the moral aspect of human nature for several decades. Several years ago, after publishing The Origins of Morality, an editor from Oxford Press suggested that I write up the theory and research I reviewed in this academic book in a manner that would be accessible to people with relatively little background knowledge in the area. A few years later, I launched this project, which ended up in this book. In it, I trace the grown (...) of my understanding of morality. (shrink)

The ways in which the sciences have been delineated and categorized throughout history provide insights into the formation, stabilization, and establishment of scientific systems of knowledge. The Dresdener school’s approach for explaining and categorizing the genesis of the engineering disciplines is still valid, but needs to be complemented by further-reaching methodological and theoretical reflections. Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social practice is applied to the question of how individual agents succeed in influencing decisively a discipline’s changing object orientation, institutionalisation and self-reproduction. (...) Through the accumulation of social, cultural and economic capital, they succeed in realising their own organisational ideas and scientific programs. Key concepts for the analysis include the struggle for power and resources, monopolies of interpretation, and the degree of autonomy. A case study from the Aachener Technische Hochschule shows that the consolidation of ferrous metallurgy can be conceived as a symbolical struggle between Fritz Wüst, professor for ferrous metallurgy, and the German Iron and Steel Institute, leading to a construction of a system of differences in which scientists accepted being scientists rather than entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs accepted becoming entrepreneurs and renounced science. (shrink)

The personal computer has become the primary research tool in many scientific and engineering disciplines. The role of the computer has been extended to be an experimental and modelling tool both for convenience and sometimes necessity. In this paper some of the relationships between real models and virtual models, i.e. models that exist only as programs and data structures, areexplored. It is argued that the shift from experimenting with real objects to experimentation with computer models and simulations may also require (...) a new approach for evaluating scientific theories derived from these models. Accepting the additional sets of assumptions that are associated with computer models and simulations requires ‘leaps of faith’, which we may not want to make in order to preserve scientific rigor. There are problems in providing acceptable arguments and explanations as to why a particular computer model or simulation should be judged scientifically sound, plausible, or even probable. These problems not only emerge from models that are particularly complex, but also in models that suffer from being too simplistic. (shrink)

This chapter seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and developmental disorder demonstrates its relevance to consciousness. The resulting view is discussed in relation to a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely the idea that conscious perception depends on Bayesian metacognition; this theory is also supported by considerations of psychopathology. This Bayesian theory is first disconnected from the higher-order thought theory, and (...) then, via a prediction error conception of action, connected instead to the global neuronal workspace theory. Considerations of mental and developmental disorder therefore show that a very general theory of brain function is relevant to explaining the structure of conscious perception; furthermore, this theory can subsume and unify two contemporary approaches to consciousness, in a move that seeks to elucidate the fundamental mechanism for selection of representational content into consciousness. (shrink)

An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization. This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain (...) and its environment. This boundary defines the mind-world relation, opens the door to skepticism, and makes the mind transpire as more inferentially secluded and neurocentrically skull-bound than many would nowadays think. Therefore, PEM somewhat deflates contemporary hypotheses that cognition is extended, embodied and enactive; however, it can nevertheless accommodate the kinds of cases that fuel these hypotheses. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Volume 45, Issue 1-2, Page 87-111, June 2022.

Shaun Gallagher calls for a radical rethinking of the concept of nature and he resists reduction of phenomenology to computational-neural science. However, classic, reductionist science, at least in contemporary computational guise, has the resources to accommodate insights from transcendental phenomenology. Reductionism should be embraced, not feared.

A diferencia de todos los demás sistemas de imputación, Jakobs ubica el acento de la relevancia jurídico-penal del hecho en su significado normativo, como algo que trasciende la mera causalidad exterior y la finalidad del autor, de manera que lo decisivo para la imputación jurídico-penal no es ni lo psíquicoreal querido por el autor, ni la causalidad desplegada por su conducta, sino el significado normativo de esa conducta como la expresión de un sentido objetivo de desautorización de la vigencia de (...) la norma en un determinado contexto social. (shrink)

This article examines the financial technology of derivatives. Derivatives are financial products whose values are based on possible fluctuations in the values of underlying assets. Hence derivatives markets are markets that trade in the risks of other markets. In order for derivatives markets to function, forms of prognostication that can assess the possible future fluctuations of the underlying markets are necessary. What such prognostications do, the article argues, is to create information out of future possibilities. Building upon a notion of (...) virtuality derived from Gilles Deleuze, Ulrich Beck and Niklas Luhmann, the article shows how market risks and uncertainties, by means of prognostications, cease to be mere possibilities and instead come to have virtual existence. Through the technology of derivatives, uncertainty and risk can be rendered virtual and be traded. The article suggests that this technology is an example of a new way in which capitalism is now expanding self-referentially as it creates markets out of markets; and of how it is colonizing the future by developing new technologies for ‘hyper-speculation’, that is, speculation not in the possible developments of a given asset but simply in the risk of such speculation. (shrink)

It appears that consciousness science is progressing soundly, in particular in its search for the neural correlates of consciousness. There are two main approaches to this search, one is content-based (focusing on the contrast between conscious perception of, e.g., faces vs. houses), the other is state-based (focusing on overall conscious states, e.g., the contrast between dreamless sleep vs. the awake state). Methodological and conceptual considerations of a number of concrete studies show that both approaches are problematic: the content-based approach seems (...) to set aside crucial aspects of consciousness; and the state-based approach seems over-inclusive in a way that is hard to rectify without losing sight of the crucial conscious-unconscious contrast. Consequently, the search for the neural correlates of consciousness is in need of new experimental paradigms. (shrink)

In February 54b.c. Cicero concludes a missive to his brother with a passing and – for us – tantalizing remark:Lucreti poemata ut scribis ita sunt, multis luminibus ingeni, multae tamen artis. sed cum veneris. virum te putabo si Sallusti Empedoclea legeris; hominem non putabo. Quintus had, it seems, readDe rerum natura, or at least parts thereof, just before he left Rome for an undisclosed location nearby, and he shared his enthusiasm with his brotherper codicillos. Meanwhile, he was corresponding with Julius (...) Caesar, whose staff in Gaul he was about to join. When, a few months later, he was stationed with Caesar, he was involved in another literary affair, this time concerning his brother who wrote to him, inquiring about his autobiographicalDe temporibus suis:quo modo nam, mi frater, de nostris versibus Caesar? nam primum librum se legisse scripsit ad me ante, et prima sic ut neget se ne Graeca quidem meliora legisse; reliqua ad quendam locum ῥᾳθυμότερα (hoc enim utitur verbo). dic mihi verum: num aut res eum aut χαρακτὴρ non delectat?(Q.fr.2.15.5). (shrink)

Certainly the question of meaning has been a perennial one, but it has never before quite dominated philosophical minds as it has in the twentieth century. Positivism, phenomenology, analytic philosophy, pragmatism and structuralism have all made the concern for meaning central to their respective reflections. If we are, as Ricoeur says, “condemned to meaning,” then for some reason this imprisonment has struck home more forcefully than ever before. It is its pervasiveness that has allowed a discipline such as semiotics to (...) capture the imagination of our era where, as in the late Greek and Medieval period, it had lain barren after so many false starts. (shrink)

Krebs (philosophy, U. of Frankfurt, Germany) provides a systematic study of whether nature has intrinsic value or is only valuable for human beings, with an ...