The term ontology of cognition is introduced to promote a neo-Kantian approach to epistemological questions. Following the discussion of some aspects of philosophy of cognitive subject authors claim that the most appropriate approach requires turning attention to a whole human species as a governed by the evolution rules collective, cognitive subject rather than individual one.

Kearns (2021) reconstructs Berkeley’s (1713) Master Argument as a formally valid argument against the Materialist Thesis, with the key premise the Distinct Conceivability Thesis, namely the thesis that truths about sensible objects having or lacking thinkable qualities are (distinctly) conceivable and as its conclusion that all sensible objects are conceived. It will be shown that Distinct Conceivability Thesis entails the Reduction Thesis, which states that de dicto propositional (ordinary or distinct) conceivability reduces to de re propositional (ordinary or distinct) conceivability. (...) While Kearns (2021) set out to avoid the confusion of a de re claim with a de dicto claim, which Prior (1955) accused Berkeley of, Kearns can be accused of making a similar conceptual confusion. (shrink)

Autor rozprawia się z mitami na temat Cieszkowskiego: po pierwsze z opinią, że Cieszkowski był wielkim filozofem, który nie tylko wpłynął na polskie, ale także na europejskie myślenie filozoficzne. Po drugie z mitem, że Cieszkowski jako krytyk Hegla doprowadził do rozpadu szkoły heglowskiej.

This paper concerns exchangeable analogical predictions based on similarity relations between predicates, and deals with a restricted class of such relations. It describes a system of Carnapian λγ rules on underlying predicate families to model the analogical predictions for this restricted class. Instead of the usual axiomatic definition, the system is characterized with a Bayesian model that employs certain statistical hypotheses. Finally the paper argues that the Bayesian model can be generalized to cover cases outside the restricted class of similarity (...) relations. (shrink)

Background and aim Healthcare professionals are regularly exposed to moral challenges in patient care potentially compromising quality of care and safety of patients. Preventive clinical ethics support aims to identify and address moral problems in patient care at an early stage of their development. This study investigates the occurrence, risk factors, early indicators, decision parameters, consequences and preventive measures of moral problems. Method Semi-structured expert interviews were conducted with 20 interprofessional healthcare professionals from 2 university hospitals in Basel, Switzerland. A (...) Likert scale questionnaire was completed by the interviewees and analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Results Healthcare professionals are frequently exposed to a variety of moral problems, such as end-of-life decisions, resource allocation and assessing the patient's will or decisional capacity. Thirty-four different risk factors for moral problems are identified, e.g. patient vulnerability, divergent values or world views, inadequate resources or poor ethical climate. Twenty-one early indicators are recognised such as disagreement between healthcare professionals, patients and relatives, emotional disturbances, gut feeling or conflict of conscience. A variety of preventive measures are suggested and presented in a preventive clinical ethics support process model. The most helpful measures are early ethical conversations with colleagues, early team-internal ethical case discussions and an ethics-trained contact person on the ward. Ethics training, kerbside consultations, proactive ethics consultations, ethics screening and rounds are also considered helpful. Conclusions Clinical ethics support services should not only offer reactive and complex, but also proactive and low-threshold support for healthcare professionals, patients and relatives. (shrink)

We study Kim-independence over arbitrary sets. Assuming that forking satisfies existence, we establish Kim's lemma for Kim-dividing over arbitrary sets in an NSOP1 theory. We deduce symmetry of Kim-independence and the independence theorem for Lascar strong types.

Philosophers, particularly moral philosophers, are increasingly being involved in public decision‐making in areas which are seen to raise ethical issues. For example, Dame Mary Warnock chaired the ‘Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology’ in the UK in 1982–4; the Philosophy Department at Auckland was commissioned by the Auckland Regional Authority to report on the ethical aspects of fluoridating the public water supply in 1990; and many of us are serving on ethics committees of various sorts. Not only are (...) philosophers actually being called on or consulted, but many of us would argue that a philosophical contribution in such areas is essential.The involvement of moral philosophers in public policy decisions raises a question of professional ethics, viz, what role should a philosopher's own moral perspective or judgements play in the advice s/he gives, or contribution s/he makes, to public decision‐making on ethical issues. Like most problems in professional ethics, this prompts reflection on the nature of the profession, and in particular on the expertise we take moral philosophy to offer. It also prompts reflection on how processes of public decision making in ethically problematic areas should be understood. I explore these issues in this paper. (shrink)

Among others, the term problem plays a major role in the various attempts to characterize interdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity, as used synonymously in this paper. Interdisciplinarity is regarded as problem solving among science, technology and society and as problem orientation beyond disciplinary constraints. The point of departure of this paper is that the discourse and practice of ID have problems with the problem. The objective here is to shed some light on the vague notion of problem in order to advocate a (...) specific type of interdisciplinarity: problem-oriented interdisciplinarity. The outline is as follows: Taking an ex negativo approach, I will show what problem-oriented ID does not mean. Using references to well-established distinctions in philosophy of science, I will show three other types of ID that should not be placed under the umbrella term problem-oriented ID : object-oriented ID, theory-oriented ID, and method-oriented ID. Different philosophical thought traditions can be related to these distinguishable meanings. I will then clarify the notion of problem by looking at three systematic elements: an undesired state, a desired state, and the barriers in getting from the one to the other. These three elements include three related kinds of knowledge: systems, target, and transformation knowledge. This paper elaborates further methodological and epistemological elements of problem-oriented ID. It concludes by stressing that problem-oriented ID is the most needed as well as the most challenging type of ID. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore links between the phenomenology-inspired philosophy of emotion, especially discussions of affective intentionality and situated affectivity, and those strands of work in the field of cultural affect studies that take their inspiration fromSpinoza and Deleuze. As bridges between these fields, I propose the concepts ‘disclosive posture’ and ‘affective arrangement’. ‘Disclosive posture’ condenses insights from phenomenological work on affectivity, especially those pertaining to what Heidegger calls Befindlichkeit. ‘Affective arrangement’ is a descendant of Deleuze and Guattari’s term agencement. (...) It refers to heterogeneous ensembles of elements coalescing into a sphere of heightened affective intensity in a local setting. I develop this notion into a tool for analyzing situated affectivity. As it does not yet figure prominently within debates in the philosophy of emotion, I will outline what is meant by ‘affective arrangement’ in some detail. Throughout, I discuss a productive tension between these two conceptual strands. (shrink)

Research on expert‐novice differences has mainly focused on how experts solve familiar problems. We know far less about the skills and knowledge used by experts when they are confronted with novel problems within their area of expertise. This article discusses a study in which verbal protocols were taken from subjects of various expertise designing an experiment in an area with which they were unfamiliar. The results showed that even when domain knowledge is lacking, experts solve a novel problem within their (...) area of expertise by dividing the problem into a number of subproblems that are solved in a specified order. The lack of domain knowledge is compensated for by using abstract knowledge structures and domain‐specific heuristic strategies. However, the quality of their solutions is considerably lower than the quality attained by experts who were familiar with the type of problem to be solved. The results suggest that when experts are confronted with novel problems as compared with familiar problems, their form of reasoning remains intact, but the content of their reasoning suffers due to lack of domain knowledge. (shrink)

Antirealists who hold the knowability thesis, namely that all truths are knowable, have been put on the defensive by the Church-Fitch paradox of knowability. Rejecting the non-factivity of the concept of knowability used in that paradox, Edgington has adopted a factive notion of knowability, according to which only actual truths are knowable. She has used this new notion to reformulate the knowability thesis. The result has been argued to be immune against the Church-Fitch paradox, but it has encountered several other (...) triviality objections. Schlöder in a forthcoming paper defends the general approach taken by Edgington, but amends it to save it in turn from the triviality objections. In this paper I will argue, first, that Schlöder's justification for the factivity of his version of the concept of knowability is vulnerable to criticism, but I will also offer an improved justification that is in the same spirit as his. To the extent that some philosophers are right about our intuitive concept of knowability being a factive one, it is important to explore factive concepts of knowability that are made formally precise. I will subsequently argue that Schlöder's version of the knowability thesis overgenerates knowledge or, in other words, it leads to attributions of knowledge where there is ignorance. This fits a general pattern for the research programme initiated by Edgington. This paper also contains preliminary investigations into the internal and logical structure of lines of inquiries, which raise interesting research questions. (shrink)

Chapter One Moral Issues and Moral Theory The Subject Matter of This Inquiry Until about thirty years ago, courses in ethics were devoted almost exclusively ...

This paper discusses the presentation of the Epicurean virtues offered in the Letter to Menoeceus and in Cicero’s On Ends. It evaluates the proposals advanced by Phillip Mitsis and Pierre-Marie Morel. Against Morel, it is argued that Torquatus’ presentation of the virtues in On Ends is not part of an elaborate dialectical strategy. Instead, the paper sides with Mitsis’ more modest proposal: while Torquatus, like any good speaker, with high likelihood adapts his presentation to his audience, his ideas also have (...) a strong foundation in Epicureanism. Given the extant state of textual evidence, it is difficult to determine precisely, however, to what degree his presentation of the virtues (1) directly draws on ideas already present in the founder of the Garden himself, (2) reflects a later development in the Epicurean school, or (3) falsifies Epicurean ideas to make them more palatable for a Roman audience. (shrink)

This article conceptualizes power in the context of long-term process of structural change. First, it discusses the field of transition studies, which deals with processes of structural change in societal systems on the basis of certain presumptions about power relations, but still lacks an explicit conceptualization of power. Then the article discusses some prevailing points of contestation in debates on power. It is argued that for the context of transition studies, it is necessary to develop an interdisciplinary framework in which (...) power is explicitly conceptualized in relation to change. Subsequently, such a framework is presented, with reference to existing literature on power. Starting with a philosophical and operational definition of power, a typology is developed of the different ways in which power can be exercised, explicitly including innovative power and transformative power. Finally, the presented power framework is applied to transition studies, redefining pivotal transition concepts in terms of power and formulating hypotheses on the role of power in transitions. By doing so, the article not only offers an interdisciplinary framework to study power in the context of transition studies, but also contributes to power debates more generally by including innovation and transformation as acts of power, and thereby proposes a re-conceptualization of the relation between power and structural change. (shrink)

According to a prominent suggestion in the ethics of transcranial neurostimulation the effects of such devices can be treated as ethically on par with established, pre-neurotechnological alterations of the mind. This parity allegedly is supported by situated cognition theories showing how external devices can be part of a cognitive system. This article will evaluate this suggestion. It will reject the claim, that situated cognition theories support ethical parity. It will however point out another reason, why external carriers or modifications of (...) the mental might come to be considered ethically on par with internal carriers. Section “Why Could There Be Ethical Parity between Neural Tissue and External Tools?” presents the ethical parity theses between external and internal carriers of the mind as well as neurotechnological alterations and established alterations. Section “Extended, Embodied, Embedded: Situated Cognition as a Relational Thesis” will elaborate the different situated cognition approaches and their relevance for ethics. It will evaluate, whether transcranial stimulation technologies are plausible candidates for situated cognition theses. Section “On the Ethical Relevance of Situated Cognition Theses” will discuss criteria for evaluating whether a cognitive tool is deeply embedded with a cognitive system and apply these criteria to transcranial brain stimulation technologies. Finally it will discuss the role diverse versions of situated cognition theory can play in the ethics of altering mental states, especially the ethics of transcranial brain stimulation technologies. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungMedizinethische Forschung wird häufig unter Verwendung sozialempirischer Methoden durchgeführt. Insbesondere die Anwendung von Methoden der qualitativen Sozialforschung hat eine breite Akzeptanz gefunden. Nach Kenntnis der Autoren fehlen allerdings bislang Untersuchungen, die den spezifischen Beitrag qualitativer Sozialforschung für medizinethische Untersuchungen unter Bezugnahme auf die Merkmale qualitativer Methoden darlegen. Ausgehend von einem handlungsorientierenden medizinethischen Forschungsvorhaben zur Unterstützung der Entscheidungsfindung in der Onkologie wird der Beitrag der verwendeten qualitativen Methoden für das Forschungsvorhaben unter Bezugnahme auf zwei Kennzeichen qualitativer Sozialforschung – Rekonstruktion der sozialen (...) Praxis und Explikation von informellem Wissen – ausgeführt. Den Abschluss bilden eine Analyse von Limitationen der Verwendung qualitativer Forschungsmethoden in medizinethischen Forschungsvorhaben sowie die Identifizierung offener Forschungsfragen. (shrink)

We introduce a family of local ranks $D_Q$ depending on a finite set Q of pairs of the form $(\varphi (x,y),q(y)),$ where $\varphi (x,y)$ is a formula and $q(y)$ is a global type. We prove that in any NSOP $_1$ theory these ranks satisfy some desirable properties; in particular, $D_Q(x=x)<\omega $ for any finite tuple of variables x and any Q, if $q\supseteq p$ is a Kim-forking extension of types, then $D_Q(q) (...) Kim-non-forking extension, then $D_Q(q)=D_Q(p)$ for every Q that involves only invariant types whose Morley powers are -stationary. We give natural examples of families of invariant types satisfying this property in some NSOP $_1$ theories.We also answer a question of Granger about equivalence of dividing and dividing finitely in the theory $T_\infty $ of vector spaces with a generic bilinear form. We conclude that forking equals dividing in $T_\infty $, strengthening an earlier observation that $T_\infty $ satisfies the existence axiom for forking independence.Finally, we slightly modify our definitions and go beyond NSOP $_1$ to find out that our local ranks are bounded by the well-known ranks: the inp-rank (burden), and hence, in particular, by the dp-rank. Therefore, our local ranks are finite provided that the dp-rank is finite, for example, if T is dp-minimal. Hence, our notion of rank identifies a non-trivial class of theories containing all NSOP $_1$ and NTP $_2$ theories. (shrink)

C. B. Martin's finkish cases raise one of the most serious objections to conditional analyses of dispositions. David Lewis's reformed analysis is widely considered the most promising response to the objection. Despite its sophistication, however, the reformed analysis still provokes questions concerning its ability to handle finkish cases. They focus on the applicability of the analysis to 'baseless' dispositions. After sketching Martin's objection and the reformed analysis, I argue that all dispositions have causal bases which the analysis can unproblematically invoke.

How do states build a security apparatus after violent resistance against state rule? This article argues that in early periods of state building two main factors shape the process: the macro-strategic goals of the state and administrative challenges of personnel management. These dynamics are studied in the context of the establishment of police forces in the settler colony of German Southwest Africa, present-day Namibia. The empirical analysis relies on information about the location of police stations and a near full census (...) of police forces, compiled from the German Federal Archives. A mismatch is found between the allocation of police presence and the allocation of police personnel. The first was driven by the strategic value of locations in terms of extractive potential, political importance, and the presence of critical infrastructure, whereas the allocation of individual officers was likely affected by adverse selection, which led to the assignment of low-quality recruits to strategically important locations. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION This study arose from involvement with the works of Thomas Aquinas (/5-) that was not only intensive, but also extensive in the time devoted to ...

We prove the NTP1 property of a geometric theory T is inherited by theories of lovely pairs and H‐structures associated to T. We also provide a class of examples of nonsimple geometric NTP1 theories.

One can often encounter an opinion that Polish scientific philosophy deserves to be much better known than actually is. This book is thought as a response to such a claim. The papers collected in this volume are divided into two parts: Background and Influence and History and Systematics. However, there is no sharp borderline between themes which are touched in both parts. Generally speaking, all papers of the first part relate the Lvov-Warsaw School to some philosophical movements external to it (...) whereas the papers collected in the second one focus on internal issues connected with the school . Since the Polish school of mathematical logic is much better known than the Polish analytic philosophy we decided to omit here any treatment of the former. Thus, this collection centers on purely philosophical matters. We projected this volume not as an exhaustive panorama of Polish analytic philosophy but rather as a series of essays on particular persons or topic. As a result one can find here papers on Twardowski. Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbinski, Tarski and Lukasiewicz as well as on ethics on science, nominalism, and the methodology of psychology. We hope that this book will contribute to a better knowledge and evaluation of Polish achievements in analytic philosophy. We would like to express our gratitude to Professor Leszek Nowak, the editor-in-chief of Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, who initiated the idea of the collection and helped in its preparation. (shrink)

A study in the best tradition of classical scholarship, showing mastery of commentary and scholarship in eight languages, this book argues that the Ethics is integral to a series of politically oriented philosophical addresses aimed at morally mature political leaders. Bodeus's critical review of the major approaches to Aristotle's texts is an excellent introduction to the subject.

In this paper we present a dynamic assignment language which extends the dynamic predicate logic of Groenendijk and Stokhof [1991: 39–100] with assignment and with generalized quantifiers. The use of this dynamic assignment language for natural language analysis, along the lines of o.c. and [Barwise, 1987: 1–29], is demonstrated by examples. We show that our representation language permits us to treat a wide variety of donkey sentences: conditionals with a donkey pronoun in their consequent and quantified sentences with donkey pronouns (...) anywhere in the scope of the quantifier. It is also demonstrated that our account does not suffer from the so-called proportion problem.Discussions about the correctness or incorrectness of proposals for dynamic interpretation of language have been hampered in the past by the difficulty of seeing through the ramifications of the dynamic semantic clauses (phrased in terms of input-output behaviour) in non-trivial cases. To remedy this, we supplement the dynamic semantics of our representation language with an axiom system in the style of Hoare. While the representation languages of barwise and Groenendijk and Stokhof were not axiomatized, the rules we propose form a deduction system for the dynamic assignment language which is proved correct and complete with respect to the semantics. (shrink)

We give a model for iterated belief change in multi-agent systems. The formal tool we use for this is a combination of modal and dynamic logic. Two core notions in our model are the expansion of the knowledge and beliefs of an agent, and the processing of new information. An expansion is defined as the change in the knowledge and beliefs of an agent when it decides to believe an incoming formula while holding on to its current propositional beliefs. To (...) prevent our agents from forming inconsistent beliefs they do not expand with every piece of information they receive. Instead, our agents remember their original beliefs and every piece of information they receive. After every receipt of information they decide which subset of the received information should be incorporated into their original beliefs. This procedure is called the processing of new information. We show that our model of belief update behaves in an intuitive way and that it is not sensitive to criticism on comparable models. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper argues that the New Science, which was seen as essentially a public enterprise, was moreover a major constituent of the public sphere in early modern era. In seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Western Europe the sphere of public experimentation, testing, and discussion related to the new science, manifested, itself as a highly diversified, contested, and complex social field.Two general problems arose in constructing this cultural public sphere: the selection of participants in the debate and the inclusion of a heterogenous public (...) in the experimental scene. National authorities employed diverse policies but none denied the necessity of public debate for testing the validity of experimentations. The public sphere had to create its own conditions of existence by imposing manifold regulations in order to make these public meetings possible and enjoyable. These regulations emphasized common interest and the moral code as the most basic condition for rhe sustenance of the public sphere, thus enhancing self-restraint, tolerance, and politeness on the part of both discussants and participants. The more inclusive and heterogenous the public sphere, the more these norms were required. Thus the sphere of public debate constituted by early modern science implied a civilizing process, quite different from and more encompassing than the one analyzed by Norbert Elias. (shrink)

The numbers problem concerns the question of what is the right thing to do in trade-off cases where one can save different non-overlapping groups of persons, but not everyone. Proponents of mixed solutions argue that both saving the many and holding a lottery to determine whom to save can each be morally right in such cases, depending on the relative sizes of the groups involved. In his book The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson presents an ingenious version of such an (...) approach that avoids a commitment to interpersonal value aggregation, which is highly controversial and rejected by many philosophers for a number of reasons. I criticise Peterson’s proposal by first arguing that it cannot account for the idea that holding a lottery is morally wrong if differences in numbers are very large, and by second pointing out that it relies on implausible assumptions about what is good for an individual. Given the shortcomings of Peterson’s non-aggregationist version of a mixed solution, I next address the issue of how problematic a commitment to interpersonal aggregation really is. To this end, I present an aggregationist version of a mixed solution that is reason-based and bypasses most standard objections to interpersonal value aggregation. I conclude that although there is reason to be optimistic, it remains to be seen whether a mixed solution can be worked out in a fully satisfying way. (shrink)

Cílem článku je prozkoumat otázku po epistemickém statusu morálních intuic. Empirické výzkumy na poli morální psychologie ukazují, že intuice hojně využíváme při morálním hodnocení. Spoléháme se na ně však i jako morální filosofové při testování našich teorií – má-li některá normativní teorie proti-intuitivní důsledky, chápeme to jako její vadu a vice versa. V článku se snažím zodpovědět otázku, zda je taková praxe odvolávání se na morální intuice jako na evidenci ospravedlnitelná – je morální intuice spolehlivým epistemickým kanálem? Nejprve se budu (...) opírat o příbuznou debatu zaměřenou na epistemické intuice, představím tzv. restrikcionistickou výzvu a vysvětlím, z jakého důvodu se zaměřuji na morální intuice. V následující sekci předložím dle mého názoru nejsilnější linii útoku na epistemickou spolehlivost morálních intuic – argument z intuitivní nestability. Dříve jsme nevycházeli z úžasu nad zprávami o masivních rozdílech mezi námi Zápaďany a obyvateli exotických krajin, kterými nás ze svých terénních výzkumů zásobovali etnografové a antropologové. Dnes to jsou především morální psychologové a experimentální filosofové, kteří nás udivují ještě více odhalováním značné variability v intuicích – tentokrát však nejen mezi civilizovanými a domorodými lidmi, nýbrž i v srdci naší vlastní kultury. V další části tak předložím jednoduchou typologii intuitivní nestability a představím v současnosti již značně rozsáhlý soubor dat, který dokumentuje právě tuto neblahou vlastnost morálních intuic. Na jejich základě pak ve finální sekci dospěji k závěru, že morální intuice nejsou schopné dostát epistemickým nárokům, které klademe na jiné informační zdroje (např. smyslové vnímání), a jako takové nemohou sehrávat svou domnělou evidenční roli. V úplném závěru předložím předběžné poznámky týkající se možnosti využívat morálních intuic spíše jako zdroje motivace a za tím účelem navrhnu obrátit filosofickou praxi testování normativních teorií naruby. (shrink)

A review of the English translation of Merleau-Ponty's course notes from the Collège de France, The Sensible World and the World of Expression, 1953.