In an inspirational act of faith and hope, nearly one hundred contributors--social activists, thinkers, artists and spiritual leaders--reflect with poignant candor on our shared human condition and attempt to define a core set of human values in our rapidly changing socity. Contributors include: * The Dalai Lama * Wilma Mankiller * Oscar Arias * Jimmy Carter * Cornel West * Jack Miles * Mother Teresa * Nancy Willard * Elie Wiesel * James Earl Jones * Joan Chittister * Mary Evelyn (...) Tucker * Vaclav Havel * Archbishop Desmund Tutu What Does It Mean To Be Human? is a vital meditation on the endless possibilities of our humanity. (shrink)

Organizations interested in employee ethics compliance face the problem of conflict between employee and organizational ethical standards. Socializing new employees is one way of assuring compliance. Important for longer term employees as well as new ones, however, is making those standards visible and then operable in the daily life of an organization. This study, conducted in one large organization, found that, depending on organizational level, awareness of an organization's ethical standards is predicted by managerial adherence to and organizational compliance with (...) those standards and/or discussions with peers. Regardless of level, organizational commitment was predicted most strongly by managerial adherence to organizational standards. These findings have theoretical implications for the fields of business ethics, organizational identity and organizational socialization and practical implications for the implementation of ethics policies. (shrink)

A specific variety of formal causation is dispositional essentialism. This chapter argues that dispositional essentialism is incompatible with any trope bundle theory committed to the primitive identity of tropes, such as Keith Campbell’s account and the authors’ own Strong Nuclear Theory. Dispositional essentialism would render at least some tropes identity-dependent on other tropes, while all tropes must be considered identity-independent existents in these trope theories. Furthermore, dispositional essentialism relies on the problematic notion of dispositional essence, and it remains unclear whether (...) dispositional essentialism gains any ontological economy in comparison with the views taking laws of nature as primitive. Finally, the chapter outlines an alternative view based on Deborah Smith’s non-recombinational quidditism. According to it, tropes as determinate particular natures necessarily play certain nomological roles. It is argued that this might be completed with a new conception of tropes as parts of causal processes, which further clarifies the necessary connection between tropes and certain nomological roles. (shrink)

A questionnaire was used to assess people's attitudes toward 33 species of animals on six dimensions . A cluster analysis resulted in five groups of animals with similar ratings on these dimensions. Respondents were also asked about their attitudes toward hunting, fishing, and medical, scientific and product-testing research using animals.

This article advances three claims about the bindingness of duties to oneself: (1) To defend duties to oneself, one had better show that they can bind, i.e., provide normative reason to comply. (2) To salvage the bindingness of duties to oneself, one had better construe them as owed to, and waivable by, one's present self. (3) Duties owed to, and waivable by, one's present self can nevertheless bind. In advancing these claims, I partly oppose views recently developed by Daniel Muñoz (...) and Paul Schofield. My arguments at least tentatively suggest three general lessons for moral theory: (a) Bindingness is an essential feature of duties in general. (b) The long sought-after explanation of supererogation is not to be found in waivable duties to oneself. (c) The bindingness of duties is a distinctive normative phenomenon which does not crucially depend on some physical, temporal, or psychological distance between the binding and the bound self. (shrink)

Formal ontology as a main branch of metaphysics investigates categories of being. In the formal ontological approach to metaphysics, these ontological categories are analysed by ontological forms. This analysis, which we illustrate by some category systems, provides a tool to assess the clarity, exactness and intelligibility of different category systems or formal ontologies. We discuss critically different accounts of ontological form in the literature. Of ontological form, we propose a character- neutral relational account. In this metatheory, ontological forms of entities (...) are their standings in internal relations whose holding is neutral on the character of their relata. These relations are “formal ontological relations”. Entities belong to ontological categories because they stand in the same formal ontological relations. We hold a nominalist relationalism about ontological categories and forms. We conclude by showing that our metatheory is useful for understanding categorial fundamentality/non- fundamentality, different formal ontologies, and for unifying metaphysical questions. (shrink)

This short thesis contains many philosophical and mystical views of Mulla Sadra. He has divided this book into forty chapters and presented the basis of his philosophical views in it. Among these views are Divine Essence and Attributes, the Reality of "being", creation and its stages, the spiritual journey and a discussion of the effects of love.In the first chapter, Mulla Sadra explicated the meaning and the definition of "being". He asserted that being is an external reality which has true (...) existence. All other things except for attributes and their relations do not have true existence. Mulla Sadra based this view on the "principality of being" and the "unity of being". Before reaching this conclusion, Mulla Sadra takes into account the views of Ibn Sina and Aristotle, but his true inspiration and teachings are rooted in the great gnostic, Ibn Arabi.Mulla Sadra agreed with the Peripatetic and the Illuminationist Philosophers on the order of creation and creation itself. He believed that God Almighty first created a divine "united essence" and out of it came "Intelligible substances" which are the cause for the celestial soul and the noble bodies. Sheikh al- Ishraq pays a lot of attention to the issue of celestial bodies and soul. The other mystical issue of this thesis is the spiritual journey. The thing that Mulla Sadra is most concerned with is the first of the four journeys in his celebrated book,AL-Asfar The journeys of the servant to the Creator and the journey of the devoted to the One who is worthy of love. (shrink)

The examination of the works and views of Muḥy al-Dīn al-’Arabī’s spiritual heir Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, due to the notorious terseness of his style, is an extremely difficult task. In addition, al-Qūnawī expected the reader to be acquainted with the entire corpus of his works, since many important ideas are mentioned in only one of them, without ever being repeated elsewhere in his writings. In many cases, he limits himself to a brief allusion or hint, without discussing the point at (...) issue in detail. Furthermore, not infrequently he warns the reader that, for certain reasons, one or more important aspects of the issue are not mentioned at all, since they must be kept secret. In his last will, he instructed his.. (shrink)

This essay discusses the aesthetics of looking in Rilke’s middle period. To that end, it inquires into scenes of visual perception as represented by texts from that period. After a review of pertinent critical positions and a few terminological clarifications, a certain letter, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, and Archaïscher Torso Apollos serve above all as representative objects of inquiry. The general hypothesis is that looking proceeds here according to a reciprocal exchange of »imprints,« at the same time as (...) a strangely displaced interplay of looks that destabilizes the scene. The main part unfolds this hypothesis by first considering the function of anxiety in this procedure, thus detailing the typical hierarchy of a Rilkean scene of looking. Subsequently, the focus lies on the Nachträglichkeit of looking in Archaïscher Torso, thus describing more closely the temporality of these scenes. All these aspects in fact invoke basic problems of both aesthetic theory and the philosophy of perception. Due to its design, however, the essay can address these theoretical problems only in an indirect and exemplary fashion. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to examine the responsible gambling (RG) disclosure strategies employed by four Nordic state‐owned gambling companies, each selling products with addictive potential. RG disclosures are used by the gambling industry to proclaim responsibility and interest in gambling harm. Data drawn from company annual reports underwent qualitative content analysis. The analysis based on categories established by Leung and Snell in 2021 revealed four disclosure strategies: assertive façade, defensive façade, disclaiming, and ethical reflexivity. All companies employed an (...) assertive strategy, offering detailed accounts of their RG measures, including initiatives such as care calls to customers. The companies often adopted a defensive strategy, characterized by vague and generalizing language in describing their RG activities. Three companies occasionally adopted a disclamation strategy, presenting RG as a cost. Ethical reflexivity, which involves acknowledging responsibility for gambling harm, was a disclosure strategy seldom chosen by the companies. Although variations exist in the disclosure strategies among the companies, overall, the companies strived to project a positive image. The conclusion suggests that endorsing RG as a legitimate harm prevention approach may mask the inherent conflicts of interest between gambling companies and advocates of harm prevention. (shrink)

When do people say that they are moved, and does this experience constitute a unique emotion? We review theory and empirical research on being moved across psychology and philosophy. We examine feeling labels, elicitors, valence, bodily sensations, and motivations. We find that the English lexeme being moved typically (but not always) refers to a distinct and potent emotion that results in social bonding; often includes tears, piloerection, chills, or a warm feeling in the chest; and is often described as pleasurable, (...) though sometimes as a mixed emotion. While we conclude that it is a distinct emotion, we also recommend studying it in a more comprehensive emotion framework, instead of using the ambiguous vernacular term being moved as a scientific term. (shrink)

ABSTRACT An influential argument against the possibility of obligations to oneself states that the very notion of such obligations is incoherent: If there were such obligations, we could release ourselves from them; yet releasing oneself from an obligation is impossible. I challenge this argument by arguing against the premise that it is impossible to release oneself from an obligation. I point out that this premise assumes that if it were possible to release oneself from an obligation, it would be impossible (...) to violate that obligation. I note that there are two interpretations of this assumption, one conceptual and one psychological. I argue that, on both interpretations, the assumption is false—at least according to independently plausible accounts of obligations to oneself and of what it means to waive an obligation. My arguments paint a picture of obligations to oneself that not only challenges the argument against their coherence, but also illuminates these obligations’ relationship to other parts of the moral domain. (shrink)

According to second‐personal approaches to moral obligation, the distinctive normative features of moral obligation can only be explained in terms of second‐personal relations, i.e. the distinctive way persons relate to each other as persons. But there are important disagreements between different groups of second‐personal approaches. Most notably, they disagree about the nature of second‐personal relations, which has consequences for the nature of the obligations that they purport to explain. This article aims to distinguish these groups from each other, highlight their (...) respective advantages and disadvantages, and thereby indicate avenues for future research. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2016 Heft: 212 Seiten: 199-217.

The contingency of biological regularities—and its implications for the existence of biological laws—has long puzzled biologists and philosophers. The best argument for the contingency of biological regularities is John Beatty’s evolutionary contingency thesis, which will be re-analyzed here. First, I argue that in Beatty’s thesis there are two versions of strong contingency used as arguments against biological laws that have gone unnoticed by his commentators. Second, Beatty’s two different versions of strong contingency are analyzed in terms of two different stabilities (...) of regularities. Third, I argue that Beatty and his commentators have focused on the more ineffective trajectory stability version of the argument, whereas the constancy stability version provides a more substantial and applicable argument against the existence of biological laws. Fourth, I develop a counterexample to Beatty’s thesis. Finally, I discuss the possibility of evolution producing repeatable and general non-lawlike regularities and patterns by utilizing the notion of generative entrenchment and by criticizing the thesis of multiple realizability of biological properties. (shrink)

According to standard trope nominalism, there are simple tropes that do not have parts or multiply distinct aspects. Douglas Ehring’s reductio ad absurdum against this standard view concludes that there are no simple tropes. In this paper, we provide a response to Ehring defending the standard view. Ehring’s argument may be refuted by (1) distinguishing the ontological form of tropes from their contribution to the ontological content of the world, and (2) construing tropes as having primitive identity. At the same (...) time, standard trope nominalism is elaborated on by distinguishing between ontological form and content, for which there are also independent reasons. (shrink)

Anna Jani interprets the relationship between phenomenology and ontology by redefining its goals, methodological focuses, and key figures. The common methodology of hermeneutical phenomenology originates from the question on being, which resembles religious experiences in certain ways.

In this article, a novel interpretation of one of the problems of Hume scholarship is defended: his view of Metaphysical Realism or the belief in an external world (that there are ontologically and causally perception-independent, absolutely external and continued, i.e. Real entities). According to this interpretation, Hume's attitude in the domain of philosophy should be distinguished from his view in the domain of everyday life: Hume the philosopher suspends his judgement on Realism, whereas Hume the common man firmly believes in (...) the existence of Real entities. The defended reading is thus a sceptical and Realist interpretation of Hume. As such, it belongs to the class of what can be called no-single-Hume interpretations (Richard H. Popkin, Robert J. Fogelin, Donald L. M. Baxter), by contrast to single-Hume readings, which include Realist (naturalist, New Humean) and the traditional Reid-Green interpretation (i.e. Hume believes that there are no Real entities). Hume's distinction between the domains of philosophy and everyday life, which is argued to be epistemological, is employed in order to reconcile his scepticism with his naturalism and constructive science of human nature. The article pays special attention to the too much neglected second profound argument against the senses in Part 1, Section 12 of Hume's first Enquiry and the corresponding argument in Section 4, Part 4, Book 1 of the Treatise. (shrink)

In his first paper on the special theory of relativity, Einstein indicated that the question of whether or not two spatially separated events were simultaneous did not necessarily have a definite answer, but instead depended on the adoption of a convention for its resolution. Some later writers have argued that Einstein's choice of a convention is, in fact, the only possible choice within the framework of special relativistic physics, while others have maintained that alternative choices, although perhaps less convenient, are (...) indeed possible. (shrink)

Although the historical‐causal picture of reference Kripke sketches in Naming and Necessity is highly influential, Kripke in fact says very little about what reference is and how it comes about. In this paper I point out that the possibility of asking WH‐questions (i.e. ‘what?’, ‘who?’, ‘which?’) about a sound or inscription pattern (e.g., what does that refer to?) shows that in case of names especially, their reference, if there is one, will be preserved by a causal‐historical chain constituted by transmissions (...) of the (physical) patterns themselves, even in absence of language users or any linguistic intentions. I sketch out a causal‐informational theory of reference, that holds that the causal aspect of refence transmission is due to two‐factors. On the other hand there are informational chains constituted by data transmissions, on the other, also communicational rules by which speakers can interpret the data as information of something are needed. In most part the causal‐informational theory sketched in the paper can be viewed as complementing Kripke’s original causal picture. However, I will argue that Kripke's account of fixing the reference of proper names in ‘initial baptisms’ is inadequate. I will argue that most cases of seemingly fixing the reference via use of a definite description (e.g., the naming of Neptune) in fact presuppose a prior causal‐informational connection to the named object, thus essentially fixing the reference in the same way as in cases of baptism by ostension. I will further argue that in the cases that do not fall into the previous category, the baptism by definite description simply fail to fix any reference. I thus conclude that there is no such thing as fixing the reference of a proper name by definite description. (shrink)

The main problem of this study is David Hume’s (1711-76) view on Metaphysical Realism (there are mind-independent, external, and continuous entities). This specific problem is part of two more general questions in Hume scholarship: his attitude to scepticism and the relation between naturalism and skepticism in his thinking. A novel interpretation of these problems is defended in this work. The chief thesis is that Hume is both a sceptic and a Metaphysical Realist. His philosophical attitude is to suspend his judgment (...) on Metaphysical Realism, whereas as a common man he firmly believes in the existence of mind-independent, external, and continuous entities. Therefore Hume does not have any one position; accordingly, a form of “no one Hume” interpretation (Richard Popkin, Robert J. Fogelin, Donald L.M. Baxter) is argued for in the book. The key point in this distinction is the temporal difference between Hume’s philosophical and everyday views. It is introduced in order to avoid attributing a conscious contradiction to him (a problem which has not attracted enough attention in the literature). The method of the work is modelled on Peter Millican’s work on Hume and induction. The approach to the main problem is to study the two “profound” arguments against the senses that Hume presents in the Section 12 of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748). These arguments are first reconstructed in detail resulting in Millican-type diagrams of them and then Hume’s endorsement of them is established on the basis of the diagrams. The first profound argument concludes that Metaphysical Realism and thus any Realistic theory of perception is unjustified as well as the existence of God and the soul. The second argument goes further having first conceptual conclusion: the very notions of Real entitity, material substance, and bodies are completely out of the reach of the faculty of understanding. Therefore they ought to be rejected according to Hume. This is a consequence of the consistent use of the Humean faculty of reason: idea-analysis and inductive inference. The second profound argument thus concludes that believing in Metaphysical Realism is inconsistent with the rational attitude that is to refrain from this belief. Hence, if we attributed both of them to Hume, we would end up with a great philosopher who embraces a manifest contradiction. The study is finished by arguing that this sceptical and Metaphysically Realistic interpretation concurs well with (1) Hume’s professed Academical philosophy and (2) project of the science of human nature. (1) According to Hume, Academical philosophy is in the first place diffidence, modesty, and uncertainty including suspension on certain issues. Secondly, it is restriction of the range of topics for which experience can provide a standard of truth. This kind of empiricist epistemological realism is coherent with the sceptical attitude on Metaphysical Realism because the latter does not rule out inter-subjective consensus on what we experience. (2) Suspension of judgment on Metaphysical Realism coheres with the mind-dependency of the objects of Hume’s science of human nature: the understanding, passions, morals, aesthetics, politics, and the human culture in all of its manifestations. Although the study takes the first Enquiry to be Hume’s authorised word on the understanding, his juvenile work A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) is argued to support this “no one Hume” interpretation. Hume’s other works are also discussed when needed. (shrink)

Evidence is limited on how elementary social studies preservice teachers make sense of museum settings and the use of museum artifacts for instruction, especially while consumed with learning how to teach. This study explored 81 elementary preservice teachers’ dispositional thinking toward museum pedagogy in a teacher education program. Objectives were to determine an overall dispositional thinking profile and also investigate possible distinct dimensions. The study employed descriptive and exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to establish systematically reliable factor solutions representing a profile (...) of preservice teachers’ dispositions. Results indicate preservice teachers’ museum pedagogy dispositional thinking can be measured with three dimensions and one overall generic form of dispositional thinking. Representing the dimensions are these factor structures: (a) willingness to use museum settings and their artifacts to support social studies teaching, (b) capacity to interact with museum artifacts for K-6 social studies teaching, and (c) recognizing the prospect of museum pedagogy as an approach to enhance K-6 social studies education. Based on the factor structures, we introduce a conceptual framework to represent elementary social studies preservice teachers’ dispositional thinking about museum pedagogy. Engaging in preliminary work to first understand preservice teachers’ thoughts and dispositions, before creating or adopting curricula, may deepen and strengthen their agentic growth in museum education for social studies teaching. (shrink)

: This article is a humble attempt at highlighting the controversiesregarding the legitimacy of popular resistance or revolutionary movement tobring down Muslim political regime that claimed to be despotic, unjust andeven un-Islamic. Having the fact on the existence of another view by majorityscholars that more inclined towards pacifist ideology which stressed onpolitical stability as a prerequisite to prosperity, the article emphasizes moreon the revolutionary school, while the second shall be highlighted when it isnecessary for comparison. Employing qualitative method of study, (...) the articleseeks to examine the arguments provided by both movements. This will bedone by analyzing their textual and rational grounds of evidences used bythe two schools to legitimize their political stance. Associating with what ishappening in Muslims nation nowadays, current study compelled to review theradical revolutionary movement from the perspective of moderate Islam schoolof thought. (shrink)

PurposeIn this paper, patient information is approached from a Heideggerian perspective with the intention to gather an understanding about the personal nature of the information. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the ownership of patient information and then present Datenherrschaft as a suitable model for patient ownership of patient information.Design/methodology/approachThis paper is theoretical in approach. It is based on arguments derived from Heidegger’s work in the Being and Time.FindingsBased on this Heideggerian approcah, a proposal for using the special (...) definition of ownership of patient information – Datenherrschaft – given to a patient is suggested. From a Heideggerian perspective, it can be stated that the patient has the strongest rights towards patient information because this information is crucial for a patient to have an understanding about their Dasein.Research limitations/implicationsDatenherrschaft is used as an example of an ethically justified way of regulating the patient information ownership and should be analysed further. Especially the practical implications of implementing Datenherrschaft need more research.Originality/valuePatient information ownership is an issue that is neither unambiguously solved in many countries, nor has it, in our view, been ethically justified. The potential solution – Datenherrschaft – presented in this paper is clear and has strong philosophical justifications. (shrink)

This volume, originally published as a special issue of Pragmatics and Society (issue 3:2, 2012), draws together complementary perspectives on the social and interactional life of evidentiality.

Evidentials in Pastaza Quichua, an Amazonian dialect of Ecuadorian Quechua, are examined and their uses in narratives compared. The novel contribution of this paper is to show, by comparing data from personal experience narratives, that evidentials are used to convey speaker subjectivity, rather than source of information, and that switches between different speaker subjectivities, which may be encoded as ‘selves’ or ‘others’, are particularly evident in passages where momentous, life-changing statuses or interpersonal upheavals are being articulated.

This volume addresses the issue of the human encounter with the Mystery of God and the purpose of human life. It explores major themes from diverse cultural and philosophical traditions, starting with questions about the possibility of belief in God, His transcendence as seen in both East and West, and ending with questions about ethics and about personhood, human dignity and human rights. Taking an eclectic approach, the chapters in this book each uniquely address aspects of the human encounter with (...) the Mystery of God, drawing from specific cultures and traditions, and using a particular philosophical and theological style. Together, the chapters provide a fresh approach and a synergy that ensures that each topic contributes something new to the dialogue between religion and culture. (shrink)

Zelo je utrujen – kaj naj zdaj počne s slavo? – dovolj je bilo. Dobro je spoznal sovražnike in prijatelje – domnevne prijatelje, kajti za občudovanjem in ljubeznijo so se skrivale njihove lastne koristi, njihove lastne sumljive sanje, pretkane in hkrati nedolžne.

This thesis provides a restatement of Kantian constructivism, with the aim of avoiding some of the objections and clearing up some of the ambiguities that have haunted previous versions of the view. I restate Kantian constructivism as the view that morality’s normativity has its source in the form of second-personal reasoning, a mode of practical reasoning in which we engage when we address demands person-to-person. By advancing a position about the source of moral normativity, Kantian constructivism addresses a metaethical question, (...) albeit one that is distinct from the questions that many traditional metaethical positions, such as moral realism, focus on. Kantian constructivism has an advantage over competing views of the source of moral normativity when it comes to answering the so-called Normative Question, which I interpret as the question of why we are rationally required to do what we take to be our moral obligation. Kantian constructivism can answer this question because, unlike its competitors, it does not conceive of practical reason as a receptive faculty that is determined by external inputs. Instead, it regards the very form of second-personal reasoning as grounding the fact that morality is normative, thus explaining morality’s rational authority. Although second-personal reasoning is fundamentally distinct from the merely first-personal mode of reasoning that we must engage in insofar as we are agents, all those agents whom we would ordinarily consider bound by moral obligations seem to engage in it. Indeed, although it involves irreducibly second-personal notions, such as accountability and the authority to address legitimate demands, second-personal reasoning is not to be mistaken for a social practice. Instead, it can be applied to purely self-regarding contexts, such as that of committing oneself to a personal project and thereby holding oneself accountable for pursuing it, as well as to interactions with others. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to develop ideas about robustness analyses. I introduce a form of robustness analysis that I call sufficient parameter robustness, which has been neglected in the literature. I claim that sufficient parameter robustness is different from derivational robustness, the focus of previous research. My purpose is not only to suggest a new taxonomy of robustness, but also to argue that previous authors have concentrated on a narrow sense of robustness analysis, which they have inadequately distinguished (...) from other investigations of models such as sensitivity analysis. (shrink)

On Chang's voluntarist account of commitments, when we commit to φ, we employ the 'normative powers' of our will to give ourselves a reason to φ that we would otherwise not have had. I argue that Chang's account, by itself, does not have sufficient conceptual resources to reconcile the normative significance of commitments with their alleged fundamentally volitional character. I suggest an alternative, second-personal account of commitment, which avoids this problem. On this account, the volitional act involved in committing is (...) one of holding ourselves accountable, thus putting us under to a pro tanto obligation to ourselves. The second-personal account implies that there is an interesting link between commitment and morality. (shrink)

I analyze here biological regression equations known in the literature as allometries and scaling laws. My focus is on the alleged lawlike status of these equations. In particular I argue against recent views that regard allometries and scaling laws as representing universal, non-continent, and/or strict biological laws. Although allometries and scaling laws appear to be generalizations applying to many taxa, they are neither universal nor exceptionless. In fact there appear to be exceptions to all of them. Nor are the constants (...) in allometries and scaling laws truly constant, stable, or universal in character, but vary in value across different taxa and background conditions. Moreover, these equations represent evolutionary, strongly contingent generalizations, which threatens their lawlike status. Lastly, allometries and scaling laws do not offer stable probabilities to which they hold in different backgrounds. I further suggest that many allometries and scaling laws function to elucidate explananda rather than explanantia or covering laws. (shrink)

In this paper, I resolve a potential contradiction between two of Hume's central tenets: that complex perceptions consist of simple perceptions and that distinct things are separable. The former implies that a complex perception is not separable from its constituent simple perceptions, as a change in its constituents destroys its identity. The latter entails that the complex perception is separable from these simple perceptions, since it is distinct from them. This is a contradiction. I resolve it by appealing to a (...) third kind of distinction in addition to the two kinds Hume mentions: real distinctions and distinctions of reason. This third distinction is a partial distinction. I argue that just as the separability principle does not apply to distinctions of reason, neither does it apply to perceptions that are only partially distinct from other perceptions. Hence, the apparent contradiction is resolved. (shrink)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyse the current status of ownership of patient information from a Lockean perspective and then present Datenherrschaft as a new model for patient ownership of patient information. Design/methodology/approach – This paper is theoretical in approach. It is based on arguments derived from Locke’s Two Treatises of Government. Legal examples of the current situation are derived from Finnish, UK and Swedish legislation. Findings – Current legislation concerning patient information is not clearly formulated (...) and so recognising a new right on the part of the patient, Datenherrschaft, would be an ethically justifiable way of remedying the issue. Research limitations/implications – The legal analysis was limited to Finland, the UK and Sweden, and so other legislation should be looked at in future research. Datenherrschaft is used as an example of an ethically justified way of regulating patient information ownership and should be analysed further. Originality/value – Patient information ownership is an issue that is not unambiguously solved in many countries, nor has it, in our view, been ethically justified. The potential solution presented in this paper is clear and has strong ethical justifications. (shrink)