Geroscience and philosophy of aging have tended to focus their analyses on the biological and chronological dimensions of aging. Namely, one ages with the passage of time and by experiencing the cellular-molecular deterioration that accompanies this process. However, our concept of aging depends decisively on the social valuations held about it. In this article, we will argue that, if we study social aging in the contemporary world, a novel phenomenon can be identified: the paradox of aging in the digital era. (...) If the social understanding of aging today is linked to unproductivity and obsolescence; then there is a possibility that, given the pace of change of digital technologies, we become obsolete at an early chronological and biological age, and therefore, feel old at a younger age. First, we will present the social dimension of aging based on Rowe and Kahn's model of successful aging. We will also show that their notion of social aging hardly considers structural aspects and weakens their approach. Second, departing from social aging in its structural sense, we will develop the paradox of aging in the digital era. On the one hand, we will explain how the institutionalization of aging has occurred in modern societies and how it is anchored in the concepts of obsolescence and productivity. On the other hand, we will state the kind of obsolescence that digitalization produces and argue that it can make cohorts of biologically and chronologically young individuals obsolete, and thus they would be personally and socially perceived as old. (shrink)

The inquiry into the moral status of artificial intelligence (AI) is leading to prolific theoretical discussions. A new entity that does not share the material substrate of human beings begins to show signs of a number of properties that are nuclear to the understanding of moral agency. It makes us wonder whether the properties we associate with moral status need to be revised or whether the new artificial entities deserve to enter within the circle of moral consideration. This raises the (...) foreboding that we are at the gates of an anthropological crisis: the properties bound to moral agency have been exclusively possessed in the past by human beings and have shaped the very definition of being human. In this article, I will argue that AI does not lead us to an anthropological crisis and that, if we adhere to the history and philosophy of technology, we will notice that the debate on the moral status of AI uncritically starts from an anthropology of properties and loses sight of the relational dimension of technology. First, I will articulate three criteria for analyzing different anthropological views in philosophy of technology. Second, I will propose six anthropological models: traditional, industrial, phenomenological, postphenomenological, symmetrical, and cyborg. Third, I will show how the emergence of AI breaks with the dynamics of increased relationality in the history and philosophy of technology. I will argue that this aspect is central to debates about the moral status of AI, since it sheds light on an aspect of moral consideration that has been obscured. Finally, I will reject entirely relational approaches to moral status and propose two hybrid possibilities for rethinking it. (shrink)

The emergence of AI is posing serious challenges to standard conceptions of moral status. New non-biological entities are able to act and make decisions rationally. The question arises, in this regard, as to whether AI systems possess or can possess the necessary properties to be morally considerable. In this chapter, we have undertaken a systematic analysis of the various debates that are taking place about the moral status of AI. First, we have discussed the possibility that AI systems, by virtue (...) of its new agential capabilities, can be understood as a moral agent. Discussions between those defending mentalist and anti-mentalist positions have revealed many nuances and particularly relevant theoretical aspects. Second, given that an AI system can hardly be an entity qualified to be responsible, we have delved into the responsibility gap and the different ways of understanding and addressing it. Third, we have provided an overview of the current and potential patientist capabilities that AI systems possess. This has led us to analyze the possibilities of AI possessing moral patiency. In addition, we have addressed the question of the moral and legal rights of AI. Finally, we have introduced the two most relevant authors of the relational turn on the moral status of AI, Mark Coeckelbergh and David Gunkel, who have been led to defend a relational approach to moral life as a result of the problems associated with the ontological understanding of moral status. (shrink)

Although the map of technology ethics is expanding, the growing subdomains within it may raise misgivings. In a recent and very interesting article, Sætra and Danaher have argued that the current dynamic of sub-specialization is harmful to the ethics of technology. In this commentary, we offer three reasons to diminish their concern about ethical proliferation. We argue first that the problem of demarcation is weakened if we attend to other sub-disciplines of technology ethics not mentioned by these authors. We claim (...) secondly that the logic of sub-specializations is less problematic if one does adopt mixed models (combining internalist and externalist approaches) in applied ethics. We finally reject that clarity and distinction are necessary conditions for defining sub-fields within ethics of technology, defending the porosity and constructive nature of ethical disciplines. (shrink)

Numerous and diverse discussions about moral status have taken place over the years. However, this concept was not born until the moral weight of non-human entities was raised. Animal ethics, for i...

Susan B. Levin argues that the human confidence that an ageless body would be better is irrational. She offers a Kantian-inspired argument to show that human understanding cannot rationally access the experiences of a post-human and ageless existence. We challenge this rationale with a three-step argument: first, an ageless body does not have to be post-human. One should distinguish between the transhumanist projects of life extension and accounts focused on enhancing well-being and quality of life. An existence without aging does (...) not require a radical change in one's temporal intuitions, which makes rational discussion possible. Second, we defend that biological aging does not entail any valuable goods. These goods refer to the chronological dimension of aging. Finally, we argue that biological aging is indeed negative and one may need biotechnological interventions in aging to achieve internal transcendence. Thus, we rationally argue that an ageless body would be better. (shrink)

We have recently stated the reasons why we claim that biological ageing is undesirable. Räsänen has responded to our article by arguing that this process has certain desirable aspects and, therefore, our position is inconsistent. Räsänen develops two arguments to defend his position. We will call the first the argument from the totality of the ageing process and the second the argument from the reduced goods of the ageing process. In this reply, we will give reasons to show that both (...) arguments fail. The first, on the one hand, starts from a dubious conception of ageing and, on the other hand, even accepting this conception, its reformulation is morally empty. The second incurs in an absurd conclusion. (shrink)

El mundo digital pone en cuestión los conceptos y las categorías fundamentales de la antropología filosófica. Los aspectos definitorios y exclusivos de los seres humanos pierden su vigencia con la aparición de entidades sintéticas que comparten dichas características. En este artículo nos hemos propuesto realizar un análisis filosófico de la antropología digital. Primero, hemos examinado las cuatro estrategias seguidas hasta el momento para dar cuenta de las continuidades ontológicas entre seres humanos y tecnologías. Defendemos que ninguna de ellas resulta convincente (...) por dos razones: las tres primeras reducen la antropología a ontología y la última descarta completamente la dimensión ontológica. Por ello, nos hemos ocupado, en segundo lugar, de desarrollar un nuevo enfoque antropológico que dé cuenta de forma más exitosa del mundo digital, a saber, una concepción estructurista que entienda al ser humano como un ser biopsicosocial abierto a entablar relaciones con otras entidades. Esto nos ha llevado, en tercer lugar, a desarrollar los aspectos relacionales del mundo digital a través del concepto de mediación tecnológica. La noción de información que introducen las nuevas tecnologías media de un modo cualitativamente novedoso nuestra acción y percepción: produce entornos digitales cerrados, inclina a la igualdad informacional e induce dinámicas de descontextualización. Por último, hemos desarrollado las implicaciones epistémicas, la posverdad, y éticas, los cambios tecnomorales, de la mediación tecnológica digital. (shrink)

Among the many applications of artificial intelligence (AI), virtual assistants are one of the tools most likely to grow in the future. The development of these systems may play an increasingly important role in many facets of our lives. Therefore, given their potential importance and present and future weight, it is worthwhile to analyze what kind of challenges they entail. In this chapter, we will provide an overview of the ethical aspects of artificial virtual assistants. First, we provide a conceptual (...) clarification of the term ‘virtual assistant’, including different types of interfaces and recommender systems. Second, we address three ethical issues related to the deployment of these systems: their effects on human agency and autonomy and the subsequent cognitive dependence they would generate; the human obsolescence that may cause a generalized extension of the dependence problem; and the invasions of privacy that virtual assistants may cause. Finally, we outline the debates about the use of virtual assistants to improve human moral decisions and some areas in which these systems can be applied. (shrink)

The technical possibilities of biomedicine open up the opportunity to intervene in ageing itself with the aim of mitigating, reducing or eliminating it. However, before undertaking these changes or rejecting them outright, it is necessary to ask ourselves if what would be lost by doing so really has much value. This article will analyse the desirability of ageing from an individual point of view, without circumscribing this question to the desirability or undesirability of death. First, we will present the three (...) most widely used arguments to reject biomedical interventions against ageing. We will argue that only the last of these arguments provides a consistent answer to the question of the desirability of ageing. Second, we will show that the third argument falls prey to a conceptual confusion that we will call the paradox of ageing: although ageing entails negative health effects, it leads to a life stage with valuable goods. Both valuations, one positive and the other negative, refer to two different dimensions of ageing: the chronological and the biological. We will defend that, by not adequately distinguishing these two types of ageing, it does not become apparent that all the valuable goods exclusive to ageing derive only from its chronological dimension. Third, we will argue that, if we just conceive ageing biologically, it is undesirable. We will elaborate on the two kinds of undesirable effects biological ageing has: direct and indirect. Finally, we will respond to potential objections by adducing that these are insufficient to weaken our argument. (shrink)

Among the many applications of artificial intelligence (AI), virtual assistants are one of the tools most likely to grow in the future. The development of these systems may play an increasingly important role in many facets of our lives. Therefore, given their potential importance and present and future weight, it is worthwhile to analyze what kind of challenges they entail. In this chapter, we will provide an overview of the ethical aspects of artificial virtual assistants. First, we provide a conceptual (...) clarification of the term ‘virtual assistant’, including different types of interfaces and recommender systems. Second, we address three ethical issues related to the deployment of these systems: their effects on human agency and autonomy and the subsequent cognitive dependence they would generate; the human obsolescence that may cause a generalized extension of the dependence problem; and the invasions of privacy that virtual assistants may cause. Finally, we outline the debates about the use of virtual assistants to improve human moral decisions and some areas in which these systems can be applied. (shrink)

Contemporary ethics is currently ramifying into different sub-ethics specific to each type of technology. Although this trend has been very timely and rightly called into question by Sætra and Danaher, both these authors and their critics Llorca Albareda and Rueda leave the matter unsolved from a discipline point of view. In this commentary, we clarify the statute of the ethics of technology, which corresponds to that of a subsidiary applied ethics, and show how it is precisely that, what (...) renders the creation of an ethics for each technology inappropriate. We thus provide a disciplinary reason to support Sætra and Danaher’s concern on tech ethics proliferation and to refute Llorca Albareda and Rueda’s relativization of it. In turn, we conclude by drawing some guidelines for tech ethics in practice. (shrink)

The HOD Dichotomy Theorem states that if there is an extendible cardinal, δ, then either HOD is “close” to V or HOD is “far” from V. The question is whether the future will lead to the first or the second side of the dichotomy. Is HOD “close” to V, or “far” from V? There is a program aimed at establishing the first alternative—the “close” side of the HOD Dichotomy. This is the program of inner model theory. In recent years the (...) third author has provided evidence that there is an ultimate inner model—Ultimate-L—and he has isolated a natural conjecture associated with the model—the Ultimate-L Conjecture. This conjecture implies that that the first alternative holds—HOD is “close” to V. This is the future in which pattern prevails. In this paper we introduce a very different program, one aimed at establishing the second alternative—the “far” side of the HOD Dichotomy. This is the program of large cardinals beyond choice. Kunen famously showed that if AC holds then there cannot be a Reinhardt cardinal. It has remained open whether Reinhardt cardinals are consistent in ZF alone. It turns out that there is an entire hierarchy of choiceless large cardinals of which Reinhardt cardinals are only the beginning, and, surprisingly, this hierarchy appears to be highly ordered and amenable to systematic investigation, as we shall show in this paper. The point is that if these choiceless large cardinals are consistent then the Ultimate-L Conjecture must fail. This is the future where chaos prevails. (shrink)

We study some large cardinals in terms of reflection, establishing new connections between the model-theoretic and the set-theoretic approaches.

We explore the consistency strength of Σ 3 1 and Σ 4 1 absoluteness, for a variety of forcing notions.

We give a sharper version of a theorem of Rosický, Trnková and Adámek [13], and a new proof of a theorem of Rosický [12], both about colimits in categories of structures. Unlike the original proofs, which use category-theoretic methods, we use set-theoretic arguments involving elementary embeddings given by large cardinals such as $\alpha$-strongly compact and $C^{(n)}$-extendible cardinals.

This paper begins by examining Erich Fromm’s “Manifesto and Program” written for the Socialist Party in 1959 or 1960, and addresses a simple question: Why would Fromm speak of something so apparently arcane as “prophetic messianism,” in his socialist program? When he insists that we have forgotten thatsocialism is “rooted in the spiritual tradition which came to us from prophetic messianism, the gospels, humanism, and from the enlightenment philosophers,” is this simply a literary flourish, a concession to liberalism, or religious (...) sentimentality? Part I, written by Nick Braune, answers the question by examining Fromm’ssocialist organizing commitments in the context of the late 1950s. Part II, written by Joan Braune, offers further defense of the term “prophetic messianism,” distinguishes two types of messianism, and suggests that Fromm may be attempting to address a problem in the Frankfurt School. (shrink)

La cuestión que se quiere resolver en este artículo es si, pese a que la política queda fuera del sistema filosófico que plantea Descartes, hay espacio aún para ella en la reflexión filosófica derivada de dicho sistema. Para ello, se analizarán los siguientes textos cartesianos: la carta-prefacio de la edición francesa de Los principios de la filosofía, con el fin de aclarar la estructuración y la finalidad del sistema; Las pasiones del alma, para elucidar en qué consiste la moral que (...) ocupa el lugar más alto en el árbol de la filosofía, y plantear en consecuencia la dimensión social de la moral; la correspondencia con Elisabeth de Bohemia permitirá analizar la posición de Descartes hacia la política. La conclusión pasa por considerar una doble dimensión del fenómeno político, una ligada a la vida social y otra a la estructuración del poder político y a las acciones de los gobernantes. (shrink)

In the best literature on unilateral secession, for instance, Buchanan, it is usual to distinguish between remedial theories, which require a just cause for conceding a right to secession for the inhabitants of a territory, part of a State; and primary theories, plebiscitary theories and adscriptivist or nationalist theories. In accordance to this view, only the first are capable of justifying a unilateral right to secession. Well then, in this paper, an argument is elaborated in order to show that the (...) remedial strategy is not applicable to Catalonia and, also to show that even if primary theories are applicable to the case of Catalonia —the plebiscitary strategy has given rise to the so-called right to decide—, they are not able to justify a unilateral right to secession. (shrink)

La Economía del Bien Común (EBC) representa un modelo que, sin llegar a poner en cuestión la libertad de mercado, propone una visión más humana de la economía a través del bien común y la cooperación. Se trata de un modelo global e integral que se está desarrollando especialmente en el campo de la microeconomía. El objetivo de este trabajo es, una vez identificadas las características básicas del modelo del EBC, justificar sus fundamentos teóricos desde el punto de vista organizativo, (...) en particular, desde la teoría de los stakeholders. El Balance del Bien Común, como herramienta que sirve para implementar el modelo de la EBC, utilitza una matriz de doble entrada, que sirve para medir la aportación de las empresas en la consecución de los principios de los derechos humanos a través de su relación con los stakeholders.The Economy of the Common Good ecb represents a model that, without questioning market freedom, proposes a more humane vision of the economy, through the common good and cooperation. It is a global and comprehensive model that is being developed above all in the field of microeconomics. The objective of the work is, after identifying the basic characteristics of the ecb model, to justify its theoretical foundations from the organizational point of view, in particular, from Stakeholders’ Theory. The Balance of the Common Good, as a tool that serves to implement the ecb model, uses a double entry matrix, which serves to measure the contribution of companies to the achievement of human rights principles through their relationship with the stakeholders. (shrink)

If A ⊆ ω1, then there exists a cardinal preserving generic extension [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][A ][x ] of [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][A ] by a real x such that1) A ∈ [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][x ] and A is Δ1HC in [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][x ];2) x is minimal over [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][A ], that is, if a set Y belongs to [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][x ], then either x ∈ [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][A, Y ] or Y (...) ∈ [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL L][A ].The forcing we use implicitly provides reshaping of the given set A. (shrink)

After discussing the limitations inherent to all set-theoretic reflection principles akin to those studied by A. Lévy et. al. in the 1960s, we introduce new principles of reflection based on the general notion of Structural Reflection and argue that they are in strong agreement with the conception of reflection implicit in Cantor’s original idea of the unknowability of the Absolute, which was subsequently developed in the works of Ackermann, Lévy, Gödel, Reinhardt, and others. We then present a comprehensive survey of (...) results showing that different forms of the new principle of Structural Reflection are equivalent to well-known large cardinal axioms covering all regions of the large-cardinal hierarchy, thereby justifying the naturalness of the latter. (shrink)

We address Steel’s Programme to identify a ‘preferred’ universe of set theory and the best axioms extending $\mathsf {ZFC}$ by using his multiverse axioms $\mathsf {MV}$ and the ‘core hypothesis’. In the first part, we examine the evidential framework for $\mathsf {MV}$, in particular the use of large cardinals and of ‘worlds’ obtained through forcing to ‘represent’ alternative extensions of $\mathsf {ZFC}$. In the second part, we address the existence and the possible features of the core of $\mathsf {MV}_T$ (where (...) T is $\mathsf {ZFC}$ +Large Cardinals). In the last part, we discuss the hypothesis that the core is Ultimate-L, and examine whether and how, based on this fact, the Core Universist can justify V=Ultimate-L as the best (and ultimate) extension of $\mathsf {ZFC}$. To this end, we take into account several strategies, and assess their prospects in the light of $\mathsf {MV}$ ’s evidential framework. (shrink)

The ethical theories employed in health care today assume, in the main, a modern Western philosophical framework. Yet the diversity of cultural and religious assumptions regarding human nature, health and illness, life and death, and the status of the individual suggest that a cross-cultural study of health care ethics is needed. A Cross-Cultural Dialogue on Health Care Ethics provides this study. It shows that ethical questions can be resolved by examining the ethical principles present in each culture, critically assessing each (...) value, and identifying common values found within all traditions, It encourages the development of global awareness and sensitivity to and respect for the diversity of peoples and their values and will advance understanding as well as help to foster a greater balance and a fuller truth in consideration of the human condition and what makes for health and wholeness. (shrink)

Our commentary outlines a number of arguments questioning an autonomous model of word recognition without feedback. Arguments are presented against the need for a phonemic decision stage and in support of a featural level in a model including feedback.

Inside Notes From the Outside wrestles with issues that have loomed over anyone who has had to come to terms with concrete, pragmatic questions regarding identity within the interacting spheres of race, gender, class, and power. Based on the premise that discourse regarding these issues tend to be cast into a relationship of powerful vs. powerless, the author contends that power is not a fixed thing, but a subtle, complex matrix that shifts over time. A thoughtful approach toward issues of (...) cultural difference, Inside Notes From the Outside provides a sincere and uniquely interior perspective on identity formation. (shrink)

Imagining is something we use everyday in our lives and in a wide variety of ways. In spite of the amount of works devoted to its study from both psychology and philosophy, there are only a few formal systems capable of modelling it; besides, almost all of those systems are static, in the sense that their models are initially predefined, and they fail to capture the dynamic process behind the creation of new imaginary scenarios. In this work, we review some (...) influential theories of imagination and use their insights to distil an algorithm describing such process. Then, we use this algorithm to define a dynamic logical system built upon on a single-agent epistemic logic that provides the necessary tools to capture how the agent voluntarily creates new imaginary worlds; in other words, our system allows the model to be expanded dynamically at any time as a result of the agent performing an act of imagination. Furthermore, we provide an axiomatization and prove that the system is sound and complete. (shrink)

NOTES: Based on the book Socrates on trial written by Andrew Irvine and published by the University of Toronto Press. Performed at the Chan Centre for the Performing Arts, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, May 31-June 7, 2008. CONTENTS: Trailer, Who was Socrates?, Selected scenes, The production, Credits. UBC Library Catalogue Permanent URL: http://resolve.library.ubc.ca/cgi-bin/catsearch?bid=3956307.

Le texte que nous avons choisi de traduire pour ce numéro de Théorèmes constitue une réponse à une recension de William Herbert Sheldon, parue dans The Journal of Philosophy en 1945 et dans laquelle Sheldon critiquait le volume collectif Naturalism and the Human Spirit [Krikorian, 1944], auquel John Dewey, Sidney Hook et Ernst Nagel avaient tous les trois contribué. Le poids des empreintes respectives de Dewey, Hook et Nagel dans l’écriture de « Are Naturalists Materialists? » n’est pas très...