Machine learning-based AI algorithms lack transparency. In this article, I offer an interpretation of AI’s explainability problem and highlight its ethical saliency. I try to make the case for the legal enforcement of a strong explainability requirement: human organizations which decide to automate decision-making should be legally obliged to demonstrate the capacity to explain and justify the algorithmic decisions that have an impact on the wellbeing, rights, and opportunities of those affected by the decisions. This legal duty can be derived (...) from the demands of Rawlsian public reason. In the second part of the paper, I try to show that the argument from the limitations of human cognition fails to get AI off the hook of public reason. Against a growing trend in AI ethics, my main argument is that the analogy between human minds and artificial neural networks fails because it suffers from an atomistic bias which makes it blind to the social and institutional dimension of human reasoning processes. I suggest that developing interpretive AI algorithms is not the only possible answer to the explainability problem; social and institutional answers are also available and in many cases more trustworthy than techno-scientific ones. (shrink)

Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor provide a clearly reasoned, articulate account of the two main principles of secularism—equal respect, and freedom of conscience—and argue that in our religiously diverse, politically interconnected world, secularism, properly understood, may offer the only path to religious and philosophical freedom.

Jocelyn Maclure | : Alan Patten’s Equal Recognition is a major contribution to the normative literature on minority rights. I nonetheless suggest that liberal culturalism as a normative theory, even in Patten’s sophisticated version, is ill suited to deal with the challenges related to the status of religion in the public sphere that are so prevalent in contemporary democracies. In addition, I submit that Patten did not supply a fully convincing answer to the argument that liberal egalitarianism, well understood, is (...) capacious enough to secure fair terms of social cooperation for members of cultural minorities, making the language of “cultural rights” and “cultural recognition” superfluous. | : Le livre Equal Recognition d’Alan Patten contribue de façon majeure aux travaux de philosophie politique sur les droits des minorités culturelles. Je suggère néanmoins que la théorie normative qu’est le « culturalisme libéral », y compris dans la version sophistiquée défendue par Patten, n’est pas outillée pour penser les omniprésents défis concernant le statut de la religion dans l’espace public. De plus, j’avance que Patten n’a pas été en mesure d’offrir une réponse pleinement satisfaisante à ceux qui soutiennent que l’égalitarisme libéral bien compris est en mesure d’offrir des termes de coopération sociale justes aux membres des minorités culturelles, sans devoir être complété par des « droits culturels » ou par le langage de la « reconnaissance » des cultures. (shrink)

La Décennie des Nations unies pour les femmes (1975‑1985) a coïncidé avec une brève période d’ouverture au cours de la guerre froide, lorsque les nations nouvellement décolonisées semblèrent avoir le dessus, ayant pris le contrôle de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies et de plusieurs agences de l’ONU, où elles promouvaient l’idée d’un nouvel ordre économique international. Cet article examine brièvement deux réseaux d’intellectuelles activistes basées dans le Sud qui ont émergé à la fin de cette décennie. L’Association des femmes africaines (...) pour la recherche et le développement (AFARD/ AAWORD), créée en 1977, a démontré qu’il était possible de réorienter radicalement les programmes de développement vers le bienêtre et la durabilité plutôt que vers la productivité et la croissance. L’association Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), fondée en 1984, partageait les objectifs de l’AFARD et en incluait quelques-unes des membres, mais elle reflétait un nouveau contexte de la guerre froide où le développement s’est réorienté vers des solutions néolibérales. (shrink)

Cet article s'ajoute à la liste déjà longue de ceux qui traitent des rapports entre la théorie russellienne des descriptions définies et la théorie ramifiée des types. Seule la prétention d'aborder cette question dans une perspective nouvelle justifie ici sa présence: d'une part, la théorie des descriptions définies sera resituée dans le contexte initial et souvent méconnu de la théorie des expressions dénotantes et d'autre part, c'est à la logique intensionnelle de Russell, objet d'une méconnaissance au moins égale, que nous (...) nous intéresserons. De plus, c'est du point de vue de la théorie de la signification et non pas du point de vue ontologique, génético-historique ou logico-mathematique que nous nous proposons de traiter de ces rapports. (shrink)

Most of the commentaries on Greek authors which circulated in the towns of Egypt during the late Ptolemaic and early Imperial periods ignored the critical and colometrical problems which had engaged the attention of the great Alexandrian grammarians. A few, however, based themselves on texts equipped with signs, included the signs in their lemmata and offered explanations. Such commentaries must be the source of the scattered references to signs in the older marginal scholia in Byzantine manuscripts of Homer, Hesiod, Pindar (...) and the Attic dramatists. The only Byzantine manuscript to transmit a pagan text still equipped with a large number and a variety of signs, namely cod. Venice, Bibl. Marc. gr. 454, is also the only one to transmit scholia with lemmata retaining prefixed signs. Just as texts and scholium-lemmata lost their signs in the course of transmission, so too did references to signs within scholia either disappear or become garbled. At best, a statement about the reasons for affixing a sign would turn into one about the content or style of the verse in question. The few mentions made of the great Alexandrians give no cause for thinking that we ever have a verbatim quotation of an πόμνημα written by one of them in order to explain his own signs. Time and again it is demonstrable that an explanation of a sign's presence against a particular verse goes back to some writer like Aristonicus. What survives of the ancient discussion of Latin literature is exiguous in comparison with the Greek material. (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying has received considerable attention from many in the field of bioethics. Philosophers, theologians, lawyers, and clinicians of all sorts have engaged with many challenging aspects of this issue. Public debate, public policy, and the law have been enhanced by the varied disciplinary analyses. With the legalization of MAiD in Canada, some attention is now being turned to issues that have historically been overshadowed by the debate about whether to permit MAiD. One such issue is voluntary stopping (...) eating and drinking as an alternative to MAiD. In this paper, I will apply a legal lens to the issue. An understanding of whether VSED is legal provides a foundation for ethical reflection on whether it ought to be permitted. Is it permitted for those who prefer VSED to MAiD? Is it permitted for those who do not qualify for MAiD under our current legislation – for those who do not have a grievous and irremediable medical condition, for mature minors, for individuals whose sole underlying medical condition is a mental disorder and who do not otherwise meet the eligibility criteria, and for individuals who have lost capacity but had completed an advance directive? (shrink)

This work argues for a moral consideration of animal work relations. Paying special attention to the livestock industry, the author challenges the zootechnical denigration of animals for increased productivity awhile championing the collaborative nature of work. For Porcher, work is not merely a means to production but a means of living together unity. This unique reconsideration of work envisions animals as co-laborers with humans, rather than overwrought tools for exploitative, and often lethal, employment. Readers will learn about the disjunction between (...) those focused on productivity and profit and those who favor a more ethical work environment for animals. Porcher's text also engages environmental and political debates concerning animal-human relations. (shrink)

Dans notre monde radicalement artificialisé, seuls les animaux, en nous rappelant ce qu'a été la nature, nous permettront peut-être de nous souvenir de notre propre humanité. Mais saurons-nous vivre avec eux? Le voulons-nous encore? Car l'abattage de masse des animaux, considérés comme simples éléments des " productions animales ", leur inflige une terreur et une souffrance insoutenables, tout en désespérant les éleveurs. Et l'élevage, après 10 000 ans d'existence, est aujourd'hui souvent décrit comme une nuisance, pour l'environnement comme pour notre (...) santé. Une condamnation reposant sur une confusion entre " élevage " et " production animale ", dont il nous faut comprendre les enjeux. Qu'est-ce que l'élevage? Quelles différences entre " élevage " et " productions animales "? Quelle est la place de la mort clans le travail avec les animaux? Peut-on améliorer leur sort dans les systèmes industriels? Faut-il " libérer les animaux " comme le proposent certains philosophes? En répondant ici a ces questions, Jocelyne Porcher explique en quoi la capacité des hommes à coexister pacifiquement dépend de leur capacité à vivre en paix et dignement avec les animaux. Et pourquoi, dès lors, sauver l'élevage en évitant son assujettissement au système d'exploitation et de mise à mort industrielle pourrait être une des plus belles utopies du XXIe siècle. (shrink)

Animal production, especially pork production, is facing growing international criticism. The greatest concerns relate to the environment, the animals’ living conditions, and the occupational diseases. But human and animal conditions are rarely considered together. Yet the living conditions at work and the emotional bond that inevitably forms bring the farm workers and the animals to live very close, which leads to shared suffering. Suffering does spread from animals to human beings and can cause workers physical, mental, and also moral suffering, (...) which is all the more harmful due to the fact that it is concealed. The conceptual tools used to conceal suffering ( animal welfare, stress, pain) suggest that the industrial system can be improved, whereas for farmers it is by definition incompatible with animal husbandry. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a personal and professional narrative of how Canada went from prohibition to permission for medical assistance in dying. I describe the legal developments to date and flag what might be coming in the near future. I also offer some personal observations and reflections on the role and impact of bioethics and bioethicists, on what it was like to be a participant in Canada's law reform process, and on lessons that readers in other jurisdictions might take (...) from Canada's experience. (shrink)

Neuroimaging has provided insight into numerous neurological disorders in children, such as epilepsy and cerebral palsy. Many clinicians and investigators believe that neuroimaging holds great promise, especially in the areas of behavioral and cognitive disorders. However, concerns about the risks of various neuroimaging modalities and the potential for misinterpretation of imaging results are mounting. Imaging evaluations also raise questions about stigmatization, allocation of resources, and confidentiality. Children are particularly vulnerable in this milieu and require special attention with regards to safety (...) guidelines and modality adaptations. This article examines pediatric neuroimaging practice through an ethics lens. Most authors in the field of neuroethics focus on the future concerns of neuroimaging. In contrast, our paper examines ethical matters surrounding current clinical applications in the pediatric population. We first provide a brief overview of the neuroimaging technologies most commonly used in a pediatric clinical context and then discuss a variety of ethical issues arising from the use of these technologies. (shrink)

Esteemed philosopher Jocelyn Benoist argues for a renewed realism that takes seriously the context in which intention occurs. "What there is"-the traditional subject of metaphysics-can be determined only in context, Benoist contends, carving out a new path that rejects acontextual ontologies and approaches to the mind.

The question of whether problems with the social determinants of health that might impact decision-making justify denying eligibility for assisted dying has recently come to the fore in debates about the legalisation of assisted dying. For example, it was central to critiques of the 2021 amendments made to Canada’s assisted dying law. The question of whether changes to a country’s assisted dying legislation lead to descents down slippery slopes has also come to the fore—as it does any time a jurisdiction (...) changes its laws. We explore these two questions through the lens of Canada’s experience both to inform Canada’s ongoing discussions and because other countries will confront the same questions if they contemplate changing their assisted dying law. Canada’s Medical Assistance in Dying law has evolved through a journey from the courts to Parliament, back to the courts, and then back to Parliament. Along this journey the eligibility criteria, the procedural safeguards, and the monitoring regime have changed. In this article, we focus on the eligibility criteria. First, we explain the evolution of the law and what the eligibility criteria were at the various stops along the way. We then explore the ethical justifications for Canada’s new criteria by looking at two elements of the often-corrosive debate. First, we ask whether problems with the social determinants of health that might impact decision-making justify denying eligibility for assisted dying of decisionally capable people with mental illnesses and people with disabilities as their sole underlying medical conditions. Second, we ask whether Canada’s journey supports slippery slope arguments against permitting assisted dying. All data relevant to the study are included in the article. (shrink)

How can a partial, revisable utopia of ‘decent society’ be used as a yardstick for assessing today’s impersonal forms of social integration? In economic life — this essay’s focus — Polanyi’s hopes that the ‘economic system’ might cease ‘to lay down the law to society’ is a start. Recently, financial firms sold commodified promises and obligations on the allure of democratizing credit and providing financial ‘choice’ to millions. Yet these ‘civilities’ exploited people’s hopes for a dignified life. Any new, partial (...) utopia is yet to be devised. Maria Markus’s concept is useful to ask whether the instrumental-ism of macro-economic concepts is a distortion of the institutions of money or intrinsic to them. Could solidaristic compromises through civil society minimize disrespectful relationships embedded in money to create decent institutions? (shrink)

This paper reconciles an inconsistency between the benefits of mind wandering and a prominent conception of attention in philosophy and cognitive psychology, namely, the prioritization view. Since we prioritize the information in a task less if we are doing it while mind wandering compared to solely concentrating on it, why does our performance in the task sometimes improve when we are mind wandering? To explain this, we offer a conception of diffuse attention that generalizes from external to internal forms of (...) attention and captures deep commonalities between the two (Chun et al. 2011). We conceptualize mind wandering as an instance of internal diffuse attention that also induces diffuse attention in other concurrent tasks. Moreover, pace the prioritization view, certain tasks are in fact better performed with diffuse attention, which prioritizes information less than focused attention. Our account of mind wandering as an instance of the more general category of diffuse attention improves upon current leading philosophical views of mind wandering (such as Irving 2016) by better explaining the interaction between mind wandering and other tasks. (shrink)

The the question whether the generality of thinking precludes mtentions drrected to smgular objects as such. After characterizing in what teirns thinking is. shows that this generality does not prevent us of having singular thoughts, i.e.,.intentions that are not only directed, but apprehend the singular in its own singularity.

A study of how public service has changed in this new era of interconnectedness.

In “Slowing the slide down the slippery slope of Medical Assistance in Dying: Mutual Learnings for Canada and the US,” Daryl Pullman (2023) gets a variety of empirical, logical and legal things wro...

This study uses a sample of 242 European professional purchasers to examine the six characteristics of the decision-making process developed by Jones. The illustration mobilizes six original scenarios reproducing typical purchasing situations. Two versions of each scenario were used, one representing low moral intensity and the other showing high moral intensity. Two populations were sampled: one of 120 purchasers responding to the first version of the questionnaire and a second of 122 different purchasers responding to version two. Each version contained (...) three low-moral-intensity scenarios and three high-moral-intensity scenarios. The research also investigates two concepts suggested by Hannah et al. :663–685, 2011): examining the complexity of ethical decision-making through scenarios and microsocial professional ethical contexts. The findings reveal that neither traditional individual characteristics nor standard company characteristics have a real impact on two stages of Rest’s model. They also show that internal locus of control and a high microsocial ethical environment have a positive impact on purchaser awareness and intention to act ethically for four of the six dimensions: magnitude of consequences, social consensus, temporal immediacy, and concentration of effect. Moral intensity factors also have a positive impact on these four dimensions. The two other dimensions are not related to the independent variables. (shrink)

L'idée d'une origine commune de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie analytique commence à être bien admise. On essaie ici de lui donner quelque consistance en la mettant à l'épreuve d'une question, qui fut décisive pour les auteurs à la source de ces deux traditions, à la fin du XIXème siècle et au début du XXème : celle de la référence manquante ou des " objets inexistants ". On montre comment ce problème a pu orienter d'un côté les débats internes (...) à l'école brentanienne (Brentano lui-même, Twardowski, Meinong, le jeune Husserl), et de l'autre les réflexions des auteurs sources de la tradition dite analytique (Bolzano, Frege, Russell). Par opposition à d'autres études plus " syncrétiques ", il s'agit avant tout, dans la démarche adoptée, de mettre en avant des différences. D'abord au sein de l'école intentionaliste, beaucoup plus diversifiée et traversée de tensions qu'on ne le croit souvent. Puis, aussi et surtout, entre cette école et les auteurs qui ont choisi délibérément une autre voie : Frege et Russell, bien sûr, mais aussi déjà Bolzano. Il s'agit par là même de mesurer un écart qui devait s'avérer déterminant pour toute la philosophie du XXème siècle et de mieux définir le champ propre de cette philosophie. (shrink)

Abolitionist theory combines both ideas and struggle into a vision for a better world. This review of Tommie Shelby’s book “The Idea of Prison Abolition” argues that Shelby’s critique of prison abolition separates out philosophical ideas from those born of struggle, and by doing so, necessarily sells the idea of prison abolition short. Using two examples of abolitionist on-the-ground practices connected to the work of Angela Davis--community bail funds and collective defense campaigns--this review argues that the collective work of experimenting (...) with and prefiguring a world without prisons is part of what gives prison abolition its moral and empirical content. (shrink)

In a thought-provoking paper, Schuklenk and Smalling argue that no right to conscientious objection should be granted to medical professionals. First, they hold that it is impossible to assess either the truth of conscience-based claims or the sincerity of the objectors. Second, even a fettered right to conscientious refusal inevitably has adverse effects on the rights of patients. We argue that the main problem with their position is that it is not derived from a broader reflection on the meaning and (...) implications of freedom of conscience and reasonable accommodation. We point out that they collapse two related but distinct questions, that is, the subjective conception of freedom of conscience and the sincerity test. We note that they do not successfully show that the standard norm according to which exemption claims should not impose undue hardship on others is unworkable. We suggest that the main reason why arguments such as no one is forced to be a medical professional are flawed is that public norms should not constrain citizens to choose between two of their basic rights unless it is necessary. In fine, Schuklenk and Smalling, who see conscience claims as arbitrary dislikes, sell freedom of conscience short and forego any attempts at balancing the competing rights involved. We maintain the authors neglect that most of legal reasoning is contextual and that the blanket restriction of healthcare professionals' freedom of conscience is disproportionate. (shrink)

Except for some eliminativists, the notion of intentionality is considered to be oneof the common goods of 20th century philosophy of mind. However, this rather general label may hide deeper differences. In his 'Husserl Memorial Lecture' Jocelyn Benoist investigates the different possible conceptions of intentionality and the problem of its nature. To examine this question he concurs with Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell by positing an alternative between two conceptions of intentionality, taken either as a relation or not. From this (...) point of view he shows how Franz Brentano, who at the threshold of contemporary philosophy regained this notion, maintains a non-relational understanding of intentionality, whereas Husserl and McDowell up to a certain point adopt a relational conception — even though the formalism of relation might in fact not be the most appropriate to render the whole flavor of Husserl's position. The author wants to demonstrate that inside the conception, which rightly or wrongly is called relational, a new choice has to be made, depending on the moment actually assigned to this formalism of 'relations' and to the extent in which the 'relation' is taken for granted. Eventually, he intends to contrast philosophies of two kinds: those which in the last resort rely ona concept of acquaintance, itself undiscussed, and those which convert intentionality into a means for describing the perpetual 'presence' while defining its problem. La notion d'intentionalité semble constituer un bien commun de la philosophie de l'esprit du XXe siècle, à l'exception de certains éliminativistes. Pourtant ce label quelque peu général peut recouvrir des differences assez profondes. Dans sa “Husserl Memorial Lecture”, Jocelyn Benoist revient sur les différentes conceptions possibles de l'intentionalité et le problème de la nature de l'intentionalité. Pour poser cette question, il suit Wilfrid Sellars et John McDowell dans la formulation d'une alternative entre une conception pour laquelle l'intentionalité serait une relation et une autre pour laquelle elle n'en serait pas une. Il montre comment, de ce point de vue, le réinventeur de la notion à l'orée de la philosophie contemporaine, Franz Brentano, soutient en fait une conception non relationnelle de l'intentionalité, et comment au contraire, en un certain sens, Husserl et McDowell adoptent une conception relationnelle (même si le formalisme des relations n'est peut-être pas le meilleur en fait pour exprimer tout le suc de la position de Husserl). Son objectif est de démontrer que, au sein de cette conceptiondite, à tort ou à raison, relationnelle, il y a de nouveau un choix à faire, suivant lavaleur qu'on accorde, précisément, à ce formalisme des ‘relations’, et jusqu'à quel point on tient la ‘relation’ pour acquise ou non. En dernière instance, son propos est d'opposer les philosophies qui, en dernier ressort, s'appuient sur un concept d'acquaintance ininterrogé comme tel, et celles qui font de l'intentionalité un moyen de problématisation et de description de cette ‘présence’ perceptuelle. (shrink)

Democracy is the very rationale for many nationalist movements aspiring to form a state of their own. In their view, political sovereignty is a necessary condition for a people to secure in its own culture, language and traditions, first, to control its internal affairs and second, to gain a voice in the concert of nations. The latter is increasingly important, so goes the argument, in a context in which the shaping of a new global world order is at issue. The (...) same argument is currently made by citizens of existing liberal countries who urge their state to keep, within new economic or political larger unions, the control of the national economy, culture and institutions. (shrink)

Les sciences sociales ont longtemps appréhendé le concept d'événement avec méfiance en évitant d'accorder sa juste place à leur capacité de rupture. Dès lors qu'il est question d'événements médiatiques, la perspective constructiviste fait des événements le produit d'une construction déformante de la réalité. Or, un événement est différent d'un fait ou d'une simple occurrence parce qu'il comporte une capacité de rupture qui déborde largement le travail des médias. Celui-ci s'articule en amont à l'activité d'une multitude d'acteurs et en aval au (...) regard d'un public. La question est alors de savoir de quelle façon les événements internationaux affectent un large public. Or, il semble que la médiatisation de ces événements imbrique des normes et des valeurs universelles à des contextes d'interprétation culturellement situés. Parce qu'ils se déploient sur des scènes publiques internationales et convoquent des acteurs transnationaux, parce qu'ils sont retransmis en direct par des chaînes de télévision transnationales, les événements internationaux ont pris la forme « d'événements globaux» et suscitent des émotions qui traduisent l'émergence d'une sensibilité mondiale.The social sciences have long grasped the concept of the event with suspicion by not granting its rightful place in their ability to rupture. When it comes to media events, the constructivist perspective of events is the product of a construction distorting reality. However, an event is different from a simple fact or occurrence because it has a breaking capacity far beyond the work of the media. It is divided into upstream activity of a multitude of actors and downstream with respect to a public. The question then is how international events affect a wide audience. However, it seems that the media coverage of these events overlaps standards and universal values ​​of culturally situated contexts of interpretation. Because they are deployed on public stages and convene international transnational actors, because they are broadcast live by television channels transnational, international events took the form of "global events" and raise emotions reflect the emergence of a global sensibility. (shrink)

L'auteur analyse les deux figures du dépassement de la métaphysique qui ont existé au XXe siècle : la phénoménologie, après être partie d'une vigoureuse critique de la métaphysique, d'inspiration positiviste, a tendu à devenir une nouvelle sorte de métaphysique, puis, comme telle, a subi la critique de la philosophie analytique naissante. La question est posée de savoir ce qui pourrait être conservé aujourd'hui des deux traditions, phénoménologique et analytique, en termes de critique de la métaphysique. The author analyses both the (...) figures of the overcoming of metaphysics that existed in the XXth century : after starting from a strong criticism against metaphysics, of a positivist inspiration, phenomenology has tended to become a new kind of metaphysics, and then, as such, suffered the criticism of the newborn Analytic philosophy. The question is : what can be preserved now from both traditions, i.e. the phenomenological and the Analytic, in terms of a criticism of metaphysics ? (shrink)