The paper studies in detail a precise formal construction of spacetime from matter suggested by the logician John Burgess. We presuppose a continuous and perdurantistic matter ontology. The result is a systematic method to translate claims about the geometry of a flat relativistic, or classical, spacetime into claims about geometrical relations between matter points. The approach is extended to electric and magnetic fields by treating them as multifields defined on matter, rather than as fields in the vacuum. A few tentative (...) suggestions are made to adapt the method to general relativity and to quantum theories. (shrink)

Despite Spinoza’s prominence in Joyce’s Ulysses, almost nothing in the Joyce Industry’s hundred years has been written about him. My first section reviews three exceptions to this trend, which view the character Leopold Bloom as modeled on Spinoza’s (1) life, (2) redefinition of prophecy, and (3) the “attribute” of thought thinking thought. My second section follows a fourth Joycean to the Marxist Antonio Negri’s essay on Spinozist freedom and Joyce, from which I derive a fourth figure of Bloom as (4) (...) a liberating prosthesis for infinite democracy. And my final section applies my previous interpretation of Spinoza’s “intuition” as poetry to Ulysses, interpreted as an epic prose poem where Joyce as a Spinozist God poly-conjugationally persecutes a poly-subjugated Bloom, including with pervasive antisemitism, thus making Ulysses more satirical Inferno than happy Divine Comedy. However, strategically channeling Spinoza and his philosophy more powerfully into Bloom renders him an ethically-politically Stoic hero, defiantly prophesizing a democratization of Joycean conjugation, from persecuting poly-subjugated Others to joyful self-conjugating in search of radical democracy and just peace. (shrink)

This article presents a novel argument for the existence of God based on the metaphysical concept of grounding. Using the methodology of Inference to the Best Explanation, as conceptualised by Peter Lipton, it evaluates six foundationalist theories: Trope-Theoretic Theism, Monistic Substantivalism, Pure Stuff Theory, Mereological Bundle Theory, Extended Simples Theory, and Priority-Based Structural Realism-for their ability to explain the existence of grounding relations in reality. Through rigorous internal and external assessments focusing on coherence, simplicity, unification, and evidential virtues, the paper (...) argues that Trope-Theoretic Theism, which conceives of God as a maximal power trope, provides the most satisfactory explanation for grounding relations. This conclusion offers a new abductive argument for Theism and demonstrates the potential for productive dialogue between metaphysics and religion. (shrink)

Does an affirmation of theistic evolution make the task of theodicy impossible? In this article, I will review a number of ancient and contemporary responses to the problem of evil as it concerns animal suffering and suggest a possible way forward which employs the ancient Jewish insight that evil—as resistance to God's will that results in suffering and alienation from God's purposes—precedes the arrival of human beings and already has a firm foothold in the nonhuman animal world long before humans (...) are ever tempted to go astray. This theological intuition is conferred renewed relevance in light of the empirical reality of evolutionary gradualism and continuity and in view of the recent findings of cognitive ethology. Consequently, I suggest that taking biological evolution seriously entails understanding “moral evil” as a prehuman phenomenon that emerges gradually through the actions and intentions of “free creatures” which—as evolutionary history unfolded—increasingly possessed greater levels of freedom and degrees of moral culpability. (shrink)

I propose a new guide for assessing claims about what is possible. I offer examples of modal claims that are, in a certain intuitive respect, ?continuous? with one another. I then put forward a general, defeasible principle of modal continuity that can account for our intuitions about those examples. According to this principle, statements that differ by a mere quantitative term don't normally differ with respect to being possibly true. I offer a precise statement of the principle, and then I (...) consider exceptions in an effort to find a more nuanced continuity principle that is more reliable and still sufficiently general. Next, I offer a possible explanation of why modal continuity tends to hold and why exceptions occur where they do. Although my primary purpose is to introduce a new technique for modal reasoning, I showcase the power of the principle by applying it to a philosophical dispute concerning parts and wholes: the principle, if true, reveals a new cost of the thesis that composition is restricted. Furthermore, I point out examples of other philosophical inquiries (in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophical cosmology) that may benefit from a principle of modal continuity. The principle gives us a new tool for assessing a wide variety of modal claims. (shrink)

I present a new argument for the thesis that there is a necessarily existing, causally powerful entity—a necessary being. The outline of the argument is this: (i) necessarily, every beginning of a certain sort S (which I'll specify) can have a cause; (ii) a beginning to the existence of all non-necessarily existing things would be of sort S; (iii) such a beginning can obtain; (iv) such a beginning cannot be caused unless there is a necessary being; therefore, (v) there is (...) a necessary being. The argument uses a causal principle that is more modest than causal principles previously used in arguments for a necessary being. (shrink)

It is often argued that cosmopolitanism faces unique motivational constraints, asking more of individuals than they are able to give. This ‘motivational problem’ is held to pose a significant challenge to cosmopolitanism, as it appears unable to transform its moral demands into motivated political action. This article develops a novel response to the motivational problem facing cosmopolitanism, arguing that self-interest, alongside appeals to sentiment, can play a vital and neglected, transitional role in moving towards an expanded cosmopolitical condition. The article (...) explicates the ‘motivational problem’, analyses the relationship between self-interest and sentimental cosmopolitanism in addressing it, and develops a series of claims that self-interest can be one important component in what we label as ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’. In doing so, we argue that self-interested motivations can be compatible with sentiment-based approaches, rendering them more plausible. In addition, two expected critiques of self-interested ‘transitional cosmopolitanism’ are tackled: (A) That it cannot address feasibility constraints, and (B) That self-interested motivations cannot meet what an ‘authentic’ cosmopolitanism entails. We refute and challenge these critiques and outline three conditions in which self-interest can advance a transitional form of cosmopolitanism, while also being compatible with cosmopolitanism writ large. (shrink)

Learning more about philosophical cognition has yielded significant insights into the methods that we employ when doing philosophy, and has led some experimental philosophers to raise concerns about the role that intuitions play in philosophical practice. One popular response to these methodological concerns involves appeal to philosophical expertise, and has become known as the expertise defense because it aims to defend the use of at least some kinds of intuitional evidence in philosophy. The basic idea is that philosophical expertise consists (...) in having developed, through a process of critical reflection, increased conceptual competence and theoretical accuracy, as well as a special knack for reading and thinking about philosophical thought experiments that call upon us to exercise our conceptual competence and theoretical acumen. It turns out to be an open question whether this folk theory of philosophical expertise can restore hope in the value of intuitional evidence, and here we examine two ways of trying to answer that question: one that involves careful reflection on the supposed benefits of philosophical education, and one that involves careful empirical examination of “expert” philosophical intuitions. (shrink)

Wittgenstein, Korsgaard and the Publicity of Reasons. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2013.776297.

Paul Draper has expressed concerns regarding the current state of the philosophy of religion. Based on insights from Cornel West, in this article I will be giving a pragmatic response to Draper’s article “Partisanship and Inquiry in Philosophy of Religion”. More accurately, this article will be presenting what Draper calls “philosophy of theism” as a pragmatic tool for overcoming partisanship in the philosophy of religion. Ultimately, philosophy of theism is commendable insofar as it can overcome partisanship better than the alternative.

As big data techniques become widespread in journalism, both as the subject of reporting and as newsgathering tools, the ethics of data science must inform and be informed by media ethics. This article explores emerging problems in ethical research using big data techniques. It does so using the duty-based framework advanced by W.D. Ross, who has significantly influenced both research science and media ethics. A successful framework must provide stability and flexibility. Without stability, ethical precommitments will vanish as technology rapidly (...) shifts costs. Without flexibility, traditional approaches will rapidly become obsolete in the face of technological change. The article concludes that Ross's duty-based approach both provides stability in the face of rapid technological change and flexibility to innovate to achieve the original purpose of basic ethical principles. (shrink)

Systematizing Aquinas? : a paradigm in crisis -- Reconstructing Cajetan's question : the semantic intent of De nominum analogia -- Analogy, semantics, and the "concept vs. judgment" critique -- Some insufficient semantic rules for analogy -- Cajetan's semantic principles -- The semantics of analogy : inequality and attribution -- The semantics of proportionality: the proportional unity of concepts -- The semantics of proportionality : concept formation and judgment -- The semantics of proportionality : syllogism and dialectic.

Abstract:Why does it matter that every negative thought you have had about car salespeople, they have likely had about you? The answer to this question opens up the distinctive challenges, and opportunities, facing business ethics. Those challenges and opportunities emerge from the significant bearing organizational reality has upon individuals’ conduct. As we consider how to assign responsibility for misconduct; how to provide guidance to organizational actors about what they ought to do; and how to develop responsive ethical theory, we need (...) to take psychological and social forces into account. Organizations shape human behavior in ways that pose unavoidable questions about responsibility, practical guidance, and the enterprise of business ethics itself. Adopting the agents’ perspective suggests that business ethics can take a leading role in addressing these vexing questions that confront ethical inquiry and social science more broadly. (shrink)

The complexity and inefficiency of the U.S. health care system complicates the distribution of life-saving medical technologies. When the public health is at stake, however, there are alternatives. The proposal for a national PrEP program published in this issue of the Journal applies some of the lessons of the national COVID vaccine campaign to HIV prevention. In doing so, it draws on other examples of public health approaches to the financing of medical technology, from vaccines for children to hepatitis C (...) treatment. (shrink)

Healthcare systems produce significant greenhouse gas emissions, raising an important question: should healthcare be treated like any other polluter when it comes to reducing its emissions, or is healthcare special because of its essential societal role? On one hand, reducing emissions is critical to combat climate change. On the other, healthcare depends on emissions to deliver vital services. The resulting tension surrounds an idea of healthcare exceptionalism and leads to the question I consider in this paper: to what extent (if (...) any) should the valuable goals of healthcare form an exception to the burdens of reducing greenhouse gas emissions? The goals of this paper are twofold. One is to think about how to address the issue of healthcare exceptionalism. Second is to discuss the extent of healthcare’s climatic responsibilities. I examine two perspectives on healthcare exceptionalism. The first treats a responsibility to reduce emissions and the delivery of healthcare as separate issues, each governed by its own principle. I reject this view, proposing instead that we consider healthcare’s environmental responsibilities in conjunction with its essential functions. I defend an “inability to pay” principle, suggesting that while healthcare should indeed contribute to mitigating climate change, its obligations should be constrained by the necessity of maintaining its core goals like protecting health and preventing disease. Healthcare should be treated differently from other sectors, but not to the extent that it is entirely exempt from efforts to reduce emissions. (shrink)

Nonpharmaceutical interventions to minimize the transmission of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 are necessary because we currently lack a vaccine or specific treatments. Healthcare facilities have adopted visitor restrictions and masking requirements. These interventions should be evaluated as public health measures, focusing on their efficacy, the availability of less-restrictive alternatives, and the minimization of the burdens and their balance with the benefits. These interventions, as well as exceptions, can be justified by the same analysis. For example, visitor restrictions (...) are sound, as are exceptions for women in labor, adults with disabilities, minor children, and individuals who are dying. In implementing these policies, specific rules are preferable to general principles because they are more efficient and reduce possible bias. There should, however, be appeal mechanisms and retrospective review processes. Evaluating requests for medical exemptions to masking requirements is particularly difficult, given the prevalence of nonmedical objections, false claims of medical exemptions, and a lack of objective medical criteria. Requiring written statements by licensed healthcare providers that undergo subsequent substantive review may therefore be justified. (shrink)

1. Legal Positivism vs Natural Law -- An Overview -- 2. The Centrality of Normativity to the Concept of Law -- 3. The Gewirthian Solution -- 4. Defending the Necessary Connection -- 5. Reasons, Law and all that Raz -- 6. Accepting the Trojan Horse -- The Necessary Conclusion.

Maimonides's Guide of the Perplexed (pub. 1204 CE) is among the most important and elusive works in the history of Judaism. Among the greatest difficulties has been determining what genre of writing it belongs to. Leo Strauss challenged the contemporary consensus that it is a work of "Jewish philosophy." Rather, the Guide Is first and foremost a defense of the Law, or what his predecessor, whom he praised highly, Alfarabi identified as the art of kalam or dialectical theology. However, It (...) is an unusual sort of kalam, which Strauss dubbed "intelligent kalam." Since Shlomo Pines's 1979 article on the limits of knowledge in Maimonides (as well as Alfarabi and Ibn Bajja), much of Maimonides scholarship has centered on these limits. In his book on the Guide published in 2013, Josef Stern identified two extremes on the limits of knowledge, the dogmatic and the skeptical. He expanded on Pines's skeptical reading. We provide a middle ground between these two extremes. We argue that the limits are intentionally vague, making possible thereby not only a defense of the Law but also a defense of philosophy. The second part concerns the three great themes of the Guide: creation, prophecy, and providence. Maimonides's preferred position on prophecy is that God can will to prevent it. It is unlikely to be coincidental that obstacles, impediments, prevention are also crucial in his accounts of creation and providence. We show that obstacles or privation are a key to these themes and the Guide as a whole"-- Provided by publisher. (shrink)

V tem eseju digitalna hibridnost pomeni večno razpoložljivost življenja kot dela in dolga, za kapital, tako v resničnem življenju kot na spletu. V središču teh razmišljanj je spoznanje, da je digitalno tisti režim, v katerem finančni kapital verjame, da je končno osvobojen kakršne koli odvisnosti od družbene reprodukcije. S prehodom od vrednosti k ceni, od dela k dolgu, od revolucije k razdoru in od avantgarde k špekulacijam, se je digitalno razvilo kot materialno kapitala, na mesto totalnosti družbenega pa je stopila (...) totalnosti družbenega pa je stopila plimska likvidnost financ: nematerialno delo, dotikanje podob na zaslonu, rizomatski panoptikum interneta, šok-delo na družbenih medijih, kriptovalute, vse to so primeri načinov vzajemnega prikrivanja finančnega in digitalnega. Ta novi režim vključuje vrsto pretvorb, ki spreminjajo načine organiziranja pomena – od točke proizvodnje do točke realizacije, od stavk do nemirov, od delavskega razreda do presežnega prebivalstva, od solidarnosti do zarote in od organizacije do drobne suverenosti. (shrink)

Aristotle’s account of perceptual self-consciousness (‘perceiving that we perceive’) is typically approached as an attempt to explain how we know our own mental states. In particular, Aristotle is taken to understand perceptual self-consciousness as a function of the mind or soul’s quasi-perceptual relation to itself. I argue instead that Aristotle understands perceptual self-consciousness as the (veridical) perception that we are confronted with an external object. This is not a matter of knowing our own mental states, but of knowing that we (...) know: in particular, of knowing that an external object is apparent to us through our sense-organs. I conclude with a discussion of Aristotle’s broader interest in perceptual self-consciousness. (shrink)

In terms of income and wealth (and a variety of other measures), citizens of the United States are significantly less equal than their peers in Canada and Europe. In addition, American society is becoming increasingly less equal. Some theorists argue that this inequality is inefficient. Others claim that is unjust. Many Americans, however, are less concerned with the potential inefficiency and injustice of growing inequality. Distinguishing as Milton Friedman does between equality of result and equality of opportunity, many claim that (...) American inequality is greater because our social and political institutions hold individuals responsible for their decisions. There is nothing unjust about holding individuals responsible for their choices or preferences. This political philosophy builds from the popular idea that, in the words of Dennis Prager of the Heritage Foundation, “American individualism and the Judeo-Christian notion of personal accountability gave us the extraordinary nation that we built here.” At least since the publication of the Republican Party’s Contract with America, every prominent Republican (and many Democrats) has affirmed the importance of personal responsibility. The idea of personal responsibility plays a central role in debates over how to structure U.S. society. For these reasons, this paper considers a group of theories that Elizabeth Anderson labels “luck egalitarian.” These theories remain the most influential philosophical attempts to incorporate personal responsibility into a theory of justice. This essay takes as its staring point Anderson’s widely discussed criticisms for these theorists, and considers several of the best and most sustained responses to these criticisms (and related claims by Samuel Scheffler, Jonathan Wolff, and others). The goal is not to provide a summary of different luck egalitarian accounts of justice, a task others have performed admirably (Knight 2009, Knight and Stemplowska 2011). Furthermore, this paper will not attempt to decide which luck egalitarian theory best withstands these criticisms. Instead, this paper makes a philosophically and empirically informed case regarding how policy makers ought to utilize a principle that plays a prominent role in current American public policy debates: the role of personal responsibility. In order to make this case, I must weave normative and empirical analysis, and consider the ways in which social position in the status quo United States does not trace personal responsibility. From this analysis, I suggest three policy priorities for those interested in redeeming the oft-celebrated claim about American society: that an individual is responsible for her social position. This work promises to be of interest to any theorist or policy maker concerned with the practical implications of recent work in the moral and political philosophy of personal responsibility, or, really, anyone interested in making American society comparatively just. (shrink)

This article revises received wisdom about the Durkheimian school of sociology and its relationship to Marxism by analyzing the work of Célestin Bouglé, one of the most influential and least examined sociologists of the Durkheimian tradition. Like other better-known Durkheimians of his generation such as Marcel Mauss and Maurice Halbwachs, Bouglé engaged Durkheimian sociology with Marxian and other German traditions of social thought. In the process he also paid an important debt to the French socialists that Marx and so many (...) French Marxists have denigrated as ‘utopian’, especially Saint-Simon, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Charles Fourier. In fact, the concerns of Bouglé’s political sociology and Durkheimian sociology more generally are indissociable from the politics of Third Republic France. (shrink)

Gamma-ray bursts are the brightest--and, until recently, among the least understood--cosmic events in the universe. Discovered by chance during the cold war, these evanescent high-energy explosions confounded astronomers for decades. But a rapid series of startling breakthroughs beginning in 1997 revealed that the majority of gamma-ray bursts are caused by the explosions of young and massive stars in the vast star-forming cauldrons of distant galaxies. New findings also point to very different origins for some events, serving to complicate but enrich (...) our understanding of the exotic and violent universe. What Are Gamma-Ray Bursts? is a succinct introduction to this fast-growing subject, written by an astrophysicist who is at the forefront of today's research into these incredible cosmic phenomena. Joshua Bloom gives readers a concise and accessible overview of gamma-ray bursts and the theoretical framework that physicists have developed to make sense of complex observations across the electromagnetic spectrum. He traces the history of remarkable discoveries that led to our current understanding of gamma-ray bursts, and reveals the decisive role these phenomena could play in the grand pursuits of twenty-first century astrophysics, from studying gravity waves and unveiling the growth of stars and galaxies after the big bang to surmising the ultimate fate of the universe itself. What Are Gamma-Ray Bursts? is an essential primer to this exciting frontier of scientific inquiry, and a must-read for anyone seeking to keep pace with cutting-edge developments in physics today. (shrink)

German philosopher Immanuel Kant employs the story of Eve in the Garden of Eden as a way to think about what the development of autonomy in human beings must have involved. In the beginning, our ancestors invariably listened to their instincts, which would have seemed to them, as Kant describes it, like the “voice of God which all animals must obey”. Regardless of whether it has any basis in historical reality, that moment represents for Kant the birth of human autonomy: (...) at some point in our history, our ancestors attained self‐awareness and realized that they could disobey their instincts. There is a limited sense in which the actions that stem from internal sources, whether natural or artificial, are autonomous in the sense of involving internal control. The responsibility is one that every autonomous individual has, for better or worse, whether guest or host, in Westworld or outside of it. (shrink)

This paper suggests that some climate denialism is bullshit. Those who spread it do not display a proper concern for the truth. This paper also shows that this bullshit is harmful in some significant ways. It undermines the epistemic demands imposed on us by what we care about, by the social roles we occupy, and by morality. It is also harmful because it corrodes epistemic trust.

The proposals gathered under the rubric of “Hilbert Problems” (HPs) demonstrate the progress, the disciplinary maturity, and the distinctive analytical potential of bio-cultural approaches to the study of religion. The HPs identify and investigate the ubiquitous evolutionary, cognitive, and neural processes that undergird the disparate array of religious phenomena. Many of the proposals offer fresh perspectives on conventional components of religion by connecting the study of religion to disciplines as diverse as psychiatry, semiotics, and statistics. In these ways, the HPs (...) demonstrate the naturalness of religion in the evolution of the human species. This short commentary briefly explores the issues of the definition of religion, religion and morality, the naturalistic basis for religious hermeneutics, and tradition-centered research and suggests ways in which the humanities can inform and enrich bio-cultural approaches. It proposes that collaboration between science and the humanities can advance research and help illuminate religion’s relevance to humanity’s lived experience. (shrink)

Resolution is the most widely studied approach to propositional theorem proving. In developing efficient resolution-based algorithms, dozens of variants and refinements of resolution have been studied from both the empirical and analytic sides. The most prominent of these refinements are: DP (ordered). DLL (tree), semantic, negative, linear and regular resolution. In this paper, we characterize and study these six refinements of resolution. We give a nearly complete characterization of the relative complexities of all six refinements. While many of the important (...) separations and simulations were already known, many new ones are presented in this paper: in particular, we give the first separation of semantic resolution from general resolution. As a special case, we obtain the first exponential separation of negative resolution from general resolution. We also attempt to present a unifying framework for studying all of these refinements. (shrink)

(2013). Brandom and Gadamer on the Hermeneutical (Il)legitimacy of Rational Reconstruction. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. ???aop.label???

A punches B in the face and B subsequently develops a black eye. There seems to be little doubt that there is a causal relation here between A‟s punch and B‟s injury. However, what happens when there is no positive physical connection between A and B such as the punch? Can an omission, which is essentially an absence of positive physical action, ever be considered a cause of some particular effect? There are certain cases in which we intuit a clear (...) causal relation between an omission and an effect, yet there are cases in which, equally clearly, an omission is not causal. In this paper I investigate the notion of omissions acting as causes, in an attempt to ascertain whether causes can be considered genuine causes within a coherent theory of causation. (shrink)

A comprehensive introduction to the Classical Greek sophists, placing them afresh in their cultural context. These public figures, such as Protagoras and Gorgias, were wide-ranging experts before discipline-specialization, and represent the flourishing of linguistic, historical, and philosophical reflection in the time of Socrates.

Minority rights law has been an important axis for the evolution of international law itself. While much has been written about minority rights regimes in Europe, there is very little information available with regards to Asian experiences. Countries in Asia, with their diverse populations, are struggling with constructing legal systems that will deliver on the promise of equal rights to all its citizens. This book evaluates these attempts in four Asian states: India, China, Malaysia and Singapore by examining the theory (...) and practice of minority rights law in these vastly different settings. (shrink)

Disruptive societal changes following from emerging science and technology have recently led to a growing interest in developing ethical frameworks. Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) is such a framework that aims to improve the relationship between science and society. Now a decade after its conceptualization, it still seems to suffer from conceptual unclarity and lack of implementation. Since responsibility in research and innovation practice remains as important as ever, we propose to revive the normative potential of RRI by approaching it (...) as a matter of collective democratic experimentation. To further develop this approach, we propose a pragmatist conceptualization inspired by John Dewey, his work on democracy as an ethical way of life and his attention to the contextual nature of responsibility. Furthermore, we show how his interest in social inquiring publics provides a particularly apt foothold from which to operationalize collective democratic experimentation with RRI. We will illustrate the utility of this approach, with specific attention to the social, experimental and public character of social inquiry, by connecting it to the recent call to use social labs methodology to experiment with RRI. From this we draw lessons for future collective democratic experimentation with responsibility in research and innovation practice. (shrink)