For creatures like us, entertaining possible future scenarios of how our life might play out is often accompanied or “charged” with emotions like hope and anxiety. What will interest me in this article is whether the epistemic profile of hope and anxiety, and in particular the fact that they are directed at uncertain outcomes, might pose a threat to the stability of their valence. Hope and anxiety are not emotions which relate us to evaluative properties of actual events, they relate (...) us to evaluative properties of relevant possibilities (Gordon, 1969; Kurth, 2018; Benton, 2019). I will present and discuss two philosophical accounts according to which hope and anxiety do not have a proprietary and consistent valence. According to the first account, anxiety is an intrinsically ambivalent emotion, as a result of involving an awareness of conflicting possibilities or ways in which the future might unfold (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2015). According to the second, hope is not a strictly positive emotion, as certain specific occurrences of hope are negatively valenced (Stockdale, 2019). Finally, I argue that an evaluative theory of valence helps us clearly conceive of hope and anxiety as two polar opposite experiences of uncertainty. (shrink)

Here, for the first time, development studies encounters the set of ideas popularly known as 'Chaos Theory'. Samir Rihani applies to the processes of economic development, ideas from complex adaptive systems like uncertainty, complexity, and unpredictability. Rihani examines various aspects of the development process - including the World Bank, debt, and the struggle against poverty - and demonstrates the limitations of fundamentally linear thinking in an essentially non-linear world.

Juliette Roussin | : Cet article a pour objet d’interroger la tendance actuelle des démocraties à s’entourer d’institutions indépendantes au fort degré de compétence en vue de limiter et de corriger les défaillances éventuelles des corps démocratiques élus et représentatifs. La légitimité démocratique de ces institutions contre-majoritaires leur viendrait, selon certains théoriciens de la démocratie, de ce qu’elles offrent la possibilité de contester les décisions collectives lorsque celles-ci sont mauvaises ou injustes, contribuant ainsi à l’amélioration globale des performances du (...) régime démocratique. À partir notamment d’une lecture des travaux de Philip Pettit sur la démocratie contestataire et d’une réflexion sur l’approche épistémique défendue par David Estlund, nous questionnons au contraire le caractère démocratique de ces formes institutionnelles de contestation et montrons que, tant qu’elles ne font pas l’objet d’un contrôle démocratique plus étroit, elles peuvent être interprétées comme des modes de contestation de la démocratie plutôt que comme des instruments de son amélioration. | : This paper investigates a current tendency among democracies to appeal to highly competent independent institutions in order to constrain and amend the potential deficiencies of elected and representative democratic bodies. According to some democratic theorists, these counter-majoritarian institutions enjoy democratic legitimacy because they allow the contestation of ill-devised or unjust collective decisions, and hence contribute to the global improvement of democratic results. Based on a reading of Philip Pettit’s work on contestatory democracy and of David Estlund’s epistemic approach, the paper questions the democratic nature of these institutional forms of contestation and shows that, as long as they are not subjected to tighter democratic control, these institutions can be interpreted as ways of contesting democracy rather than as implements for its improvement. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction Juliette Kennedy and Roman Kossak; 2. Historical remarks on Suslin's problem Akihiro Kanamori; 3. The continuum hypothesis, the generic-multiverse of sets, and the [OMEGA] conjecture W. Hugh Woodin; 4. [omega]-Models of finite set theory Ali Enayat, James H. Schmerl and Albert Visser; 5. Tennenbaum's theorem for models of arithmetic Richard Kaye; 6. Hierarchies of subsystems of weak arithmetic Shahram Mohsenipour; 7. Diophantine correct open induction Sidney Raffer; 8. Tennenbaum's theorem and recursive reducts James (...) H. Schmerl; 9. History of constructivism in the 20th century A. S. Troelstra; 10. A very short history of ultrafinitism Rose M. Cherubin and Mirco A. Mannucci; 11. Sue Toledo's notes of her conversations with Gödel in 1972-1975 Sue Toledo; 12. Stanley Tennenbaum's Socrates Curtis Franks; 13. Tennenbaum's proof of the irrationality of [the square root of] 2́. (shrink)

Emotions might contribute to our being rational cognitive agents. Anxiety – and more specifically epistemic anxiety – provides an especially interesting case study into the role of emotion for adaptive cognition. In this paper, I aim at clarifying the epistemic contribution of anxiety, and the role that ill-calibrated anxiety might play in maladaptive epistemic activities which can be observed in psychopathology. In particular, I argue that this emotion contributes to our ability to adapt our cognitive efforts to how we represent (...) the practical factors relevant to the task at hand, by sig- naling the need for increased cognitive processing and evidence gathering in high- stakes situations. I hypothesize that dysfunctional or ill-calibrated epistemic anxiety might play an important role in the motivation driving persons with obsessive- compulsive disorder (OCD) to invest high amounts of cognitive resources into the resolution of apparently simple and innocuous questions. As I argue, OCD might be conceived as a case in which epistemic anxiety is inappropriately elicited, represent- ing these as high-stakes questions, and inadequately signaling a need for cognition. In this paper, I thus make use of the concept of (epistemic) anxiety as developed in the philosophy of emotion and in epistemology, to propose an account of the role of anxiety in the pathological doubt that is central to obsessive-compulsive disorder. (shrink)

The authors show. by means of a finitary version $\square_{\lambda D}^{fin}$ of the combinatorial principle $\square_\lambda^{h*}$ of [7]. the consistency of the failure, relative to the consistency of supercompact cardinals, of the following: for all regular filters D on a cardinal A. if Mi and Ni are elementarily equivalent models of a language of size $\leq \lambda$ , then the second player has a winning strategy in the Ehrenfeucht- $Fra\uml{i}ss\acute{e}$ game of length $\lambda^{+}$ on $\pi_{i} M_{i}/D$ and $\pi_{i} N_{i}/D$ . (...) If in addition $2^{\lambda} = \labda^{+}$ and i < $\lambda$ implies | $M_{i}$ | +| $N_{i}$ | $\leq$ \lambda^{+} this means that the ultrapowers are isomorphic. This settles negatively conjecture 18 in [2]. (shrink)

This study investigates how business leaders dynamically narrate their aspirational ethical leadership identities. In doing so, it furthers understanding of ethical leadership as a process situated in time and place. The analysis focuses on the discursive strategies used to narrate identity and ethics by ethnic Chinese business leaders in Indonesia after their conversion to Pentecostal–charismatic Christianity. By exploring the use of metaphor, our study shows how these business leaders discursively deconstruct their ‘old’ identities and construct their ‘new’ aspirational identities as (...) ethical leaders. This leads to the following contributions. First, we show that ethical leadership is constructed in identity talk as the business leaders actively narrate aspirational identities. Second, the identity narratives of the business leaders suggest that ethical leadership is a context-bound and situated claim vis-à-vis unethical practice. Third, we propose a conceptual template, identifying processes of realisation and inspiration followed by significant shifts in understanding, for the study of aspirational ethical leadership. (shrink)

We work in set theory ZF without axiom of choice. Though the Hahn-Banach theorem cannot be proved in ZF, we prove that every Gateaux-differentiable uniformly convex Banach space E satisfies the following continuous Hahn-Banach property: if p is a continuous sublinear functional on E, if F is a subspace of E, and if f: F → ℝ is a linear functional such that f ≤ p|F then there exists a linear functional g : E → ℝ such that g extends (...) f and g ≤ p. We also prove that the continuous Hahn-Banach property on a topological vector space E is equivalent to the classical geometrical forms of the Hahn-Banach theorem on E. We then prove that the axiom of Dependent choices DC is equivalent to Ekeland's variational principle, and that it implies the continuous Hahn-Banach property on Gateaux-differentiable Banach spaces. Finally, we prove that, though separable normed spaces satisfy the continuous Hahn-Banach property, they do not satisfy the whole Hahn-Banach property in ZF+DC. (shrink)

Precise spatiotemporal control of gene expression during normal development and cell differentiation is achieved by the combined action of proximal (promoters) and distal (enhancers) cis‐regulatory elements. Recent studies have reported that a subset of promoters, termed Epromoters, works also as enhancers to regulate distal genes. This new paradigm opened novel questions regarding the complexity of our genome and raises the possibility that genetic variation within Epromoters has pleiotropic effects on various physiological and pathological traits by differentially impacting multiple proximal and (...) distal genes. Here, we discuss the different observations pointing to an important role of Epromoters in the regulatory landscape and summarize the evidence supporting a pleiotropic impact of these elements in disease. We further hypothesize that Epromoter might represent a major contributor to phenotypic variation and disease. (shrink)

La nature, l'environnement sont au centre des préoccupations de tous, mais peinent à entrer dans le discours politique sous une forme cohérente. Mouvement contestataire et libertaire - particulièrement en France - l'écologie politique manque de bases théoriques, préfère les déclarations d'éthique au travail législatif, met en doute l'efficience des institutions et dénonce parfois de manière irréaliste la technique, les sciences, l'industrie. Ce livre intègre la dimension écologique à la philosophie politique moderne et particulièrement à un républicanisme rénové. La protection de (...) la nature comme "Bien commun" y est considérée comme le nouveau visage du " Bien public". En annexe, l'auteur propose quelques idées concrètes. (shrink)

Saisir est une association d’éducation populaire et d’éducation aux médias qui organise des « ateliers populaires de décryptage de l’actualité ». Le principe en est simple : une organisation – association, entreprise, café, collectivité locale – propose à son public de se réunir environ deux heures pour débriefer ensemble de l’actualité du moment. Derrière ce format se cache le triple pari de l’ oralité, de l’ altérité et de l’ unité de temps et d’espace. Au lieu d’écouter ou de voir (...) les informations en état de solitude passive, Saisir invite à formuler avec autrui ce qui peut être une signification commune de ces informations. (shrink)

English summary: Taking into account the relevant and mostly contemporary ango-american debates concering collective intentionality, the author eximanes what it means to share reasons and other intentional states such as thoughts and emotions. The guiding question of the dissertation is in what way and to what extent morality and therefore self-consciousness can be understood as conditions of possibility for the sharing of mental states, especially reasons. The dissertation is a contribution mainly to fields of research in practical philosophy (normative ethics (...) and moral psychology) and in social philosophy (collective intentionality analysis) and rational choice theory. German description: Juliette Gloors Monographie fragt aus hauptsachlich analytischer Perspektive und unter spezieller Berucksichtigung der einschlagigen anglo-amerikanischen Debatten, was es bedeutet, Grunde und andere intentionale Einstellungen zu teilen. Die Leitfrage der Untersuchung lautet, inwiefern Moral und damit Selbstbewusstsein als Bedingungen der Moglichkeit solchen Teilens begriffen werden konnen. Die Dissertation ist ein Beitrag zur Forschung innerhalb des Gebiets der Praktischen Philosophie (insbesondere der normativen Ethik) und der Sozialphilosophie (speziell im Bereich der Kollektiven Intentionalitat). (shrink)

How does doubt come about? What are the mechanisms responsible for our inclinations to reassess propositions and collect further evidence to support or reject them? In this paper, I approach this question by focusing on what might be considered a distorting mirror of unreasonable doubt, namely the pathological doubt of patients with obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD). Individuals with OCD exhibit a form of persistent doubting, indecisiveness, and over-cautiousness at pathological levels (Rasmussen and Eisen in Psychiatr Clin 15(4):743–758, 1992; Reed in Obsessional (...) experience and compulsive behaviour: a cognitive-structural approach, Academic Press, Cambridge, 1985; Tolin et al. in Cogn Ther Res 27(6):657–669, 2003). I argue that the failure in OCD is of an affective nature, involving both excessive epistemic anxiety and hyperactive feelings of uncertainty. I further argue that our adaptive disposition to inquire about the right matters—that is, about propositions which are both epistemically risky and imply harmful possibilities—might depend on these affective mechanisms. (shrink)

Feeling confused can sometimes lead us to give up on the task, frustrated. What is less emphasized is that confusion may also promote happy (epistemic) endings to our inquiries. It has recently been argued that confusion motivates effortful investigative behaviors which can help us acquire hard-to-get epistemic goods (DiLeo et al., 2019; D’Mello & Graesser, 2012). While the motivational power of confusion and its benefits for learning has been uncovered in recent years, the exact nature of the phenomenon remains obscure. (...) In this paper we attempt to shed light on the nature and epistemic value of an experience we are all familiar with: the experience of being confused at an object, a statement, etc. We first review the psychological literature on confusion, where it is most often considered to be an epistemic emotion. We then propose a refined account of confusion, by drawing on the literature on metacognitive or noetic feelings, both in psychology and in the philosophy of mind. In particular, we claim that confusion centrally involves the experience of the limits of one’s cognitive capacities, because it results from a monitoring of our cognitive activities as we encounter a cognitive obstacle while processing a given content. Finally we show how our account may explain findings about the role of the experience of confusion in motivating deeper inquiry into complex problems and bringing about epistemic success in these cases. (shrink)

In earlier work by the first and second authors, the equivalence of a finite square principle $\square^{\mathrm{fin}}_{\lambda,D}$ with various model-theoretic properties of structures of size $\lambda $ and regular ultrafilters was established. In this paper we investigate the principle $\square^{\mathrm{fin}}_{\lambda,D}$—and thereby the above model-theoretic properties—at a regular cardinal. By Chang’s two-cardinal theorem, $\square^{\mathrm{fin}}_{\lambda,D}$ holds at regular cardinals for all regular filters $D$ if we assume the generalized continuum hypothesis. In this paper we prove in ZFC that, for certain regular filters (...) that we call $\mathit{doubly}^{+}$ regular, $\square^{\mathrm{fin}}_{\lambda,D}$ holds at regular cardinals, with no assumption about GCH. Thus we get new positive answers in ZFC to Open Problems 18 and 19 in Chang and Keisler’s book Model Theory. (shrink)

We show that many singular cardinals λ above a strongly compact cardinal have regular ultrafilters D that violate the finite square principle $\square _{\lambda ,D}^{\mathit{fin}}$ introduced in [3]. For such ultrafilters D and cardinals λ there are models of size λ for which Mλ / D is not λ⁺⁺-universal and elementarily equivalent models M and N of size λ for which Mλ / D and Nλ / D are non-isomorphic. The question of the existence of such ultrafilters and models was (...) raised in [1]. (shrink)

Rousseau avait tout lieu, dans la controverse qui oppose au xviii e siècle partisans et pourfendeurs des voyages d’éducation, de prendre position contre ces voyages, suivant en cela les déclarations de Béat de Muralt, qu’il approuvait dans une large mesure. Nous constatons pourtant qu’en abordant « la question des voyages », l’auteur de l’Émile se voit obligé, tout en condamnant cette « mode », à la manière de Muralt, d’opérer un glissement théorique et de conférer à l’expérience du voyage, comme (...) expérience critique de la pluralité et de la liberté, une place essentielle dans son système, place rendue nécessaire par sa théorie des affects politiques. (shrink)

In April and May 1994, several thousand Tutsi were massacred by militiamen in the convent of Sovu in Rwanda, with the complicity of the Mother Superior, Sister Gertrude. In 2001, a Brussels court found her guilty and sentenced her to prison for involvement in the killings. Using the trial records, this article examines the way her authority was exercised in the convent at the time of the genocide. Her defence lawyers adopted a gendered strategy, claiming the impossibility of her being (...) engaged in violence. But the testimony of victims pointed to the nun’s integration in local political networks, and the way in which she mobilized the resources available to her to exclude from the convent’s protection the Tutsi seeking refuge there. (shrink)

In France, establishments and services of assistance through work (ESAT) are medico-social establishments in which disabled workers -supervised by employees and accompanied by medico-social and educational support- carry out activities of a professional nature aimed at economic production. Echoing their normal functioning, the options chosen in ESAT in response to the upheaval caused by the health crisis of March 2020 and its subsequent generalized lockdown showed contrasting realities. Relying on various understanding of what the notion of disability covers, arguments developed (...) by supervisors led to opposite solutions: total closure, operation with employees only or with disabled workers. Which disability constitutes a strict contraindication to work or an argument for continuity or resumption of their activities. In addition, the new organization of workshops, under health constraints, was an opportunity to look at some working conditions. The view taken of the skills of disabled workers in this context and the enhancement of their activities through the award of a bonus have showed that some ESAT reconsidered the importance of their contribution to the production carried out. (shrink)

This Element takes a deep dive into Gödel's 1931 paper giving the first presentation of the Incompleteness Theorems, opening up completely passages in it that might possibly puzzle the student, such as the mysterious footnote 48a. It considers the main ingredients of Gödel's proof: arithmetization, strong representability, and the Fixed Point Theorem in a layered fashion, returning to their various aspects: semantic, syntactic, computational, philosophical and mathematical, as the topic arises. It samples some of the most important proofs of the (...) Incompleteness Theorems, e.g. due to Kuratowski, Smullyan and Robinson, as well as newer proofs, also of other independent statements, due to H. Friedman, Weiermann and Paris-Harrington. It examines the question whether the incompleteness of e.g. Peano Arithmetic gives immediately the undecidability of the Entscheidungsproblem, as Kripke has recently argued. It considers set-theoretical incompleteness, and finally considers some of the philosophical consequences considered in the literature. (shrink)

I hold up my hand and I count five fingers. I take it on faith that the mapping from fingers onto numbers is recursive in the sense of the mathematician’s definition of the informal concept, “human calculability following a fixed routine.” I cannot prove the mapping is recursive—there is nothing to prove! Of course, mathematicians can prove many theorems about recursiveness, moving forward, so to speak, once the definition of the concept “recursive” has been isolated. Moving backwards is more difficult (...) and this is as it should be: for how can one possibly hope to prove that a mathematical definition captures an informal concept? This paper is about just that one word, capture, or more precisely the rela- tion “x captures y,” and the question, if y is taken to be computability, definabil- ity or provability, does there exist an adequate and unique choice of x? (shrink)

There has been a renewed interest in the role of hope for our ability to act rationally under uncertainty, where accounts have tended to focus on either one of two (apparently contradictory) aspects of this attitude. On the one hand, like faith, hope is viewed as an attitude which grants us resolve and determination to continue striving towards uncertain goals. On the other hand, like worry, hope is also viewed as a process in which we cognitively engage with possible futures, (...) motivated to reduce the epistemic uncertainty surrounding the occurrence of goal-relevant outcomes. I spell out how an emotional account of the psychological nature of hope is able to accommodate both of these claims, as well as classic challenges (such as cases of “recalcitrant hopes”). Within this framework, hope is both a positive emotion (it consistently evaluates its object as good) and also an “emotion of uncertainty” or epistemic emotion, through which we apprehend that a given goal-relevant outcome is possible, albeit uncertain. (shrink)

This paper aims to reconstruct the history of the link drawn up by Pseudo-Longinus and Quintilian between phantasia, defined as a faculty of mental visualization, and enargeia, that is the self-evidence of the speech. Actually, the two notions are already linked in the Stoa, which associates enargeia with the « comprehensive representation » (phantasia kataleptike), defined as the support of knowledge and action. The treatise On the Sublime suggests a shift from the Stoic definition of phantasia, considered as « common (...) », to the rhetorical definition of phantasia, presented as the result of a specialization of the first phantasia and still associated with the enargeia. This original relation, taken up by Quintilian, allows to grasp the philosophical background of the rhetorical theories of image and reveals the permeability between the two fields during the Roman period. (shrink)

If we replace first-order logic by second-order logic in the original definition of Gödel’s inner model L, we obtain the inner model of hereditarily ordinal definable sets [33]. In this paper...

PIERRE-YVES MONIN. — Que dit la chanson?JULIETTE. — La chanson ne dit rien. Et la chanson peut tout dire. Cela doit dépendre de la bouche qui la fredonne et l’invente. Elle reflète peut-être le monde, la société qui l’a vue naître. Elle reflète peut-être aussi la Vérité, la vraie, celle qui sort, toute nue, de son puits. Mais elle...

What is epistemically required of the rationally hopeful? In this paper, I propose that, as a subject becomes hopeful that p, she also adopts an inquiring attitude toward the question of whether p. Moreover, remaining rationally hopeful requires maintaining an inquiring attitude toward those possibilities we are hopeful about. On top of being led by a particular practical goal (that of attaining p), I suggest that the hopeful agent is also led by the epistemic goal of knowing whether p. Adding (...) the “inquiry” criteria to rational hopefulness helps explain our intuition that there is something wrong with being hopeful that p and not disposed to inquire into whether p. It also helps us further distinguish hopefulness from other positive attitudes we adopt in the face of uncertainty, such as optimism, and faith. (shrink)

Is the capacity to experience hope central to our ability to entertain desirable future possibilities in thought? The ability to project oneself forward in time, or to entertain vivid positive episodic future thoughts, is impaired in patients with clinical depression. In this article, I consider the causal relation between, on the one hand, the loss of the affective experience of hope in depressed patients, and on the other hand, the reduced ability to generate and entertain positive episodic future thinking. I (...) suggest that findings in the philosophy of emotion may shed light on this causal relation. (shrink)

In this paper we isolate a notion that we call "formalism freeness" from Gödel's 1946 Princeton Bicentennial Lecture, which asks for a transfer of the Turing analysis of computability to the cases of definability and provability We suggest an implementation of Gödel's idea in the case of definability, via versions of the constructible hierarchy based on fragments of second order logic. We also trace the notion of formalism freeness in the very wide context of developments in mathematical logic in the (...) 20th century. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Anabases. Traditions et réceptions de l'Antiquité, n° 20, 2014. Nous remercions Pascal Payen, la revue Anabases et Juliette Lormier de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Résumé : Cet article propose d'analyser deux entreprises de traduction en hexamètres français : celle des Travaux et des Jours d'Hésiode par Jean-Antoine de Baïf dans ses Étrénes de poézie fransoeze an vers mezurés, et celle de l'Iliade d'Homère par Philippe Brunet. Il s'agit de resituer ces (...) - Poétique et Études littéraires – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Why do thoughts involving harm and damage trigger guilt in certain individuals and not in others? The significance of this question comes into view when considering the medical and psychological literature on patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Patients with OCD feel guilt in response to having certain recurring, negative thoughts whose content evoke scenarios of harm and damage. This, however—at least in most readings of what those thoughts consist of—is puzzling. The transition from having a thought about being the source (...) of harm popping up in one’s mind to feeling guilty is not straightforward, and it calls for explanation. Indeed, OCD appears to challenge a traditional picture of what guilt is all about... (shrink)