Foundations of Dialectical Psychology is a compilation of the writings of Klaus F. Riegel on dialectical psychology. The book presents chapters discussing such topics as the dialectics of human development; history of dialectical psychology; temporal organization of dialogues; and the analysis of the concept of crisis and its underlying philosophical model and ideology. Psychologists and students will find the book invaluable.

Appraisal theories of emotion have had a strong impact on the development of theory and experimental research in the domain of the affective sciences. While there is generally a high degree of convergence between theorists in this tradition, some central issues are open to debate. In this contribution three issues have been chosen for discussion: (a) varieties of relevance detection, (b) varieties of valence appraisal, and (c) sequential-cumulative effects of appraisal results. In addressing these issues, new theoretical ideas are suggested (...) and an update of recent research on the sequence of appraisal processes is provided. Special emphasis is placed on nonverbal signatures of appraisal processes. (shrink)

Diagnosing emotion disturbances should be informed by current knowledge about normal emotion processes. I identify four major functions of emotion as well as sources for potential dysfunctions and suggest that emotions should only be diagnosed as pathological when they are clearly dysfunctional, which requires considering eliciting events, realistic person-specific appraisal patterns, and adaptive responses or action tendencies. Evidence from actuarial research on the reported length of naturally occurring emotion episodes (including potential determinants) illustrates appropriateness criteria for the clinical evaluation of (...) emotion duration—an essential element in the DSM-5 symptom catalogue for major depression episodes, especially in bereavement. The need for more actuarial evidence on normal emotion responses and its consideration by the clinical community is highlighted. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag verfolgt das Ziel, Mechanismen der Inklusion und Exklusion in Sportvereinen zu identifizieren, die die Partizipation von Personen mit Migrationshintergrund am organisierten Sport erklären können. Im Lichte von theoretischen Überlegungen zur „symbolischen Grenzziehung“ und „Zugehörigkeit“ werden Ergebnisse aus Fallstudien in Nordrhein-Westfalen und Baden-Württemberg präsentiert.

In this second part of “Negative Größen bei Diophant?” we start, as announced, by giving 33 places where Diophantus uses negative quantities as intermediate results; they appear as differences a − b of positive rational numbers, the subtrahend b being bigger than the minuend a; they each represent the (negative) basis $(\pi\lambda\varepsilon\upsilon\rho\acute{\alpha})$ of a square number $(\tau\varepsilon\tau\rho\acute{\alpha}\gamma\omega\nu o \zeta)$ , which is afterwards computed by the formula (a - b)2 = a 2 + b 2 - 2ab. Finally, we report (...) how the topic “Diophantus and the negative numbers” has been dealt with by translators and commentators from Maximus Planudes onwards. (shrink)

In this book, linguists and philosophers combine to offer a unique insight not only into Grice's contribution to philosophy of language, but on his theories of natural and non-natural meaning, implicatures and the semantic-pragmatic distinction.

I strongly endorse many of the suggestions made by the authors of the extremely useful reviews in this issue. In particular, the need to identify the complex causal mechanisms underlying the major health risk factors requires urgent attention of the research community. I suggest considering the important role of emotional disturbances as contributors to health risks given the empirically established comorbidity between mental and somatic illness. Better knowledge of these mechanisms is an essential prerequisite to develop tailored personalized prevention and (...) intervention programs, including reliable and valid assessment of deficits. (shrink)

Eine wissenschaftliche Methode oder Verfahrensweise, die man als ›die‹ philosophisch-wissenschaftliche Methode des Aristoteles bezeichnen könnte, gibt es nicht. Vielmehr ist es so, dass Aristoteles in unterschiedlichen Kontexten auch unterschiedliche Verfahren zur Anwendung bringt. Wenn man daher von einer einheitlichen philosophisch-wissenschaftlichen Methode bei Aristoteles sprechen wollte, so könnte man dies nur der Analogie nach tun.

Das Bild des »goldenen Berges« geht zurück auf geographische Angaben und Beschreibungen, die in der Antike als glaubwürdig angesehen wurden. In der Literatur illustriert die Metapher das Bedeutungsspektrum von Reichtum, Wohlergehen, Überfluss und Glück, spricht aber auch Warnungen aus. Dagegen werden in den philoso-phischen Interpretationen vor allem Konstitutionsprobleme des Fiktiven, auch der entia rationis, thematisiert. Die Metapher exemplifiziert Objekte, die logisch möglich sind, aber nicht wirk-lich existieren. In der Philosophiege-schichte – bis in die aktuellen Analysen der non-existent objects hinein – (...) wurde das Bild des »goldenen Berges« daher stets mit der Frage verbunden, welche Instanzen wir als »wirklich«, »möglich« oder »unmöglich« rechtfertigen kön-nen. Als Beispiel spiegelt die Metapher die Transformationen, in denen sich das Wirklichkeitsverständnis der philoso-phischen Tradition wie in einem Prisma gebrochen hat. (shrink)

Mimicry of appearance or of facial, vocal, or gestural expressions emerges frequently among members of different species. When such mimicry directly relates to affective aspects of an interaction, researchers talk about “emotional mimicry”. Emotional mimicry has been amply documented but its functionality is still debated. Why and when do people mimic the expressions of others, who benefits, the mimicker or the mimicked, and how do they benefit? Which processes underlie emotional mimicry? Is it completely automatic and unconscious or can it (...) be deliberate and conscious? The current Theory Section addresses these questions from different theoretical perspectives. The invited article by Hess and Fischer focused on the role of mimicry in social regulation and social bonding. The invited comment by Krets and Akyüz highlights information gathering and prediction in social interaction. The invited comment by Bernhold and Giles emphasizes vocal communication and its role in interpersonal accommodation. In this editorial, I propose the different theoretical perspectives may be integrated by assuming a multilevel appraisal and response generation mechanism. I also suggest that emotional mimicry research may be broadened by including social learning, vocal imitation, interspecies comparisons, and affective computing approaches. (shrink)

In his dialogue the Timaeus, Plato recognized two aspects of time, the past and the future, but not the present. In contrast, Aristotle's analysis of time in the Physics took its orientation from the 'now'. It is the latter path that Husserl follows with his conception of the 'original impression' (Urimpression). However, in certain parts of Husserl's Bernau Manuscripts, the present loses significance because of a novel interpretation of protention. This development, which revitalizes Plato's understanding of time, is furthered in (...) Heidegger's late lecture Time and Being: the present can be understood on the basis of the 'withdrawal' which determines the mutual relation between the arrival as authentic future and the having-been as authentic past. (shrink)

In this paper the author criticizes the way Robert Alexy reconstructs the relationship between legal and practical reasoning. The core of Alexy's argumentation (Alexy 1978) is considered the claim that legal argumentation is a “special case” of general practical discourse. In order to question this claim, the author analyzes three different types of argument: (1) that legal reasoning is needed by general practical discourse itself, (2) that there are similarities between legal argumentation and general practical discourse, (3) that there is (...) a correspondence between certain types of argument in general practical discourse and in legal argumentation.**. (shrink)

Summary The growing need for standardized units of measure led to major metrological reforms in the mid-nineteenth century. This paper focusses on their implementation in the Kingdom of Hanover and the involvement of C.F. Gauss. His papers reveal how much the success of his precision measurements hinged on the skill of his mechanic M. Meyerstein. A discussion of the regional weights and measures and the standardization procedure is followed by a description of various precision balances and the weighing methods employed (...) as well as a review of the problems posed by reliable length calibration. The success of the enterprise rested not only on intellectual prestige and ministerial clout but also on the hands-on skill of the mechanical practitioner. (shrink)

El objeto de este artículo lo constituye la idea luliana de la eviternidad que media entre la eternidad de la presencia del término en las obras Dios y la temporalidad del hombre. En el primer apartado se demuestra la presencia de Raimundo Lulio, de modo particular en su gran enciclopedia "Arbor scientae". Tras una breve exposición de la prehistoria de la idea luliana de la «eviternidad» o del «Evo» en el apartado segundo, en el tercero se destaca que Lulio, a (...) diferencia de los demás teólogos medievales, no refiere la eviternidad al tiempo de los ángeles, sino que, para él, eviternidad es un concepto escatológico que significa la medida de duración de la vida de los salvados o condenados. El artículo concluye con un repaso a una controversia teológica actual en la que se discute la utilidad del término «evo» para aclarar el carácter de la vida eterna. (shrink)

Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre läßt sich sicherlich nicht unter den klassischen Begriff der Affektenlehre bringen, schon weil sie eine systematische Grundlegung des gesamten Wissens enthält und nicht nur eine Lehre von der Ordnung und der Regelung der Affekte, die ja nur den Bereich der Ethik betrifft. Es soll auch hier gar nicht versucht werden, sie so zu interpretieren. Vielmehr geht es um einen neuen Sinn von Affektenlehre, wenn im Titel davon die Rede ist, die Wissenschaftslehre könnte sich in ihr vollenden.

Prvi in drugi del predavanja na splošno obravnavata možnosti in meje medkulturnega sporazumevanja. Pri tem se z vidika temeljnih navad in »globokih razpoloženj« razložijo razlike med kulturnimi svetovi ljudi. Iz tega se poraja razlikovanje med razsežnostjo vsakdanje prakse, ki jo lahko dandanes srečamo kjer koli v svetu in v kateri se ne pojavljajo nikakršne načelne težave medkulturnega sporazumevanja, in razsežnostjo, v kateri je treba premagovati takšne težave in v kateri zaradi tega grozi tako imenovani »clash« kultur. Tretji del predavanja poizkuša (...) na posameznih primerih konkretizirati te splošne predhodne razlage, tako da najprej osvetli pomen družine in demokracije v razvoju zahodnjaškega sveta vse tja do novoveškega gospostva principa subjektivitete in mu nasproti postavi pomen družine v vzhodni Aziji. V nadaljevanju se paradigmatično konfrontira vlogo subiectuma, torej »subjekta« v indoevropski gramatiki in zahodnjaški ontologiji z brezsubjektno strukturo japonskih stavkov in njihovim habitualnim ozadjem. Pri tem se pokaže, da je treba pri premagovanju načelnih težav medkulturnega sporazumevanja izbrati drugačno pot, kot jo ubira naturalistično vračanje k nečemu, kar je biološko skupnega vsem ljudem, ali načelno-teoretsko izpeljevanje domnevno univerzalnih norm človekovih pravic.My presentation consists of three sections. In the title of the lecture, the term “understanding” occurs – in German “Verstehen” – which is embedded in the expression “coming to an understanding,” in German “Verständigung,” i.e., an understanding which includes the effort we need in order to achieve it. Accordingly, in the first section of my reflections, I would like to explain by means of a phenomenologically oriented philosophy why such an effort is required at all, i.e., why the agreement between people does not come to be by itself. In the second section, I will concentrate upon the problem of intercultural coming to an understanding. I intend to show why there are still today fundamental obstacles standing in the way of such an understanding. In the third and final section of my reflections, I would like to explicate these principle difficulties, using the intercultural coming to an understanding between the Eastern and Western hemispheres as an example. I will then close my paper with the question how these difficulties might be overcome. (shrink)

The literature on human ethos evinces terminological arbitrariness, which can in my opinion be overcome in only one way: through historical reflection of the meaning which the moral-philosophical concepts have expressed at the very beginning of European philosophy. The first part of the paper is therefore dedicated to the reflection on Greek notions and then its Latin translations. In this respect there appears a fundamentally historical and substantial difference between classical Greek “ethos” and modern “morality”. The second part begins with (...) the nowadays prevailing impression that “ethos” is foredoomed to disappearance for the sake of “morality”. Attempts at rehabilitating the ethos of virtues in contrast to modern morality, undertaken by communitarily inclined philosophers after the publication of Alisdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, have for the most part been justly criticized. By means of the phenomenological method of stepping back to originary experience, I would like to approach this matter from a different and new angle. My thesis is that “ethos” represents the normality of the world of experience. “Morality” of the modern world is based upon the borderline case of such “normality”, which is elevated to the level of a normal case. In conclusion, I will try to provide a phenomenological explanation of this historical development by interpreting it as the process of “idealization”. (shrink)

For more than twenty years, Macedonio Melloni (1798–1854) experimented with radiant heat rays. Until 1841 he thought of them as ontologically different from light, but in 1842 he converted to the opposite view according to which they are similar in kind, but only differ in wavelength. In this article I analyze the arguments which induced him to change his interpretation of radiant heat and I describe the instruments with which he arrived at these insights.