The Defining Issues Test 2 (DIT-2) and Engineering Ethical Reasoning Instrument (EERI) are designed to measure ethical reasoning of general (DIT-2) and engineering-student (EERI) populations. These tools—and the DIT-2 especially—have gained wide usage for assessing the ethical reasoning of undergraduate students. This paper reports on a research study in which the ethical reasoning of first-year undergraduate engineering students at multiple universities was assessed with both of these tools. In addition to these two instruments, students were also asked to create personal (...) concept maps of the phrase “ethical decision-making.” It was hypothesized that students whose instrument scores reflected more postconventional levels of moral development and more sophisticated ethical reasoning skills would likewise have richer, more detailed concept maps of ethical decision-making, reflecting their deeper levels of understanding of this topic and the complex of related concepts. In fact, there was no significant correlation between the instrument scores and concept map scoring, suggesting that the way first-year students _conceptualize_ ethical decision making does not predict the way they behave when _performing_ scenario-based ethical reasoning (perhaps more situated). This disparity indicates a need to more precisely quantify engineering ethical reasoning and decision making, if we wish to inform assessment outcomes using the results of such quantitative analyses. (shrink)

The semantic paradoxes are often associated with self-reference or referential circularity. Yablo (Analysis 53(4):251–252, 1993), however, has shown that there are infinitary versions of the paradoxes that do not involve this form of circularity. It remains an open question what relations of reference between collections of sentences afford the structure necessary for paradoxicality. In this essay, we lay the groundwork for a general investigation into the nature of reference structures that support the semantic paradoxes and the semantic hypodoxes. We develop (...) a functionally complete infinitary propositional language endowed with a denotation assignment and extract the reference structural information in terms of graph-theoretic properties. We introduce the new concepts of dangerous and precarious reference graphs, which allows us to rigorously define the task: classify the dangerous and precarious directed graphs purely in terms of their graph-theoretic properties. Ungroundedness will be shown to fully characterize the precarious reference graphs and fully characterize the dangerous finite graphs. We prove that an undirected graph has a dangerous orientation if and only if it contains a cycle, providing some support for the traditional idea that cyclic structure is required for paradoxicality. This leaves the task of classifying danger for infinite acyclic reference graphs. We provide some compactness results, which give further necessary conditions on danger in infinite graphs, which in conjunction with a notion of self-containment allows us to prove that dangerous acyclic graphs must have infinitely many vertices with infinite out-degree. But a full characterization of danger remains an open question. In the appendices we relate our results to the results given in Cook (J Symb Log 69(3):767–774, 2004) and Yablo (2006) with respect to more restricted sentences systems, which we call $\mathcal{F}$ -systems. (shrink)

William Lane Craig's defence of the kalam cosmological argument rests heavily on two philosophical arguments against a past-eternal universe. In this article I take issue with one of these arguments, what I call the – namely, that the metaphysical absurdity of an actually infinite number of things existing precludes the possibility of a beginningless past. After explaining this argument, I proceed to raise some initial doubts. After setting those aside, I show that the argument is ineffective against proponents of presentism. (...) The remainder of the article considers and rejects possible replies on Craig's behalf. (shrink)

Benchmark theory , introduced by Ralph Wedgwood, departs from decision theories of pure expectation maximization like evidential decision theory and causal decision theory and instead ranks actions according to the desirability of an outcome they produce in some state of affairs compared to a standard—a benchmark—for that state of affairs. Wedgwood motivates BT through what he terms Gandalf’s principle, that the merits of an action in a given state should be evaluated relative only to the performances of other actions in (...) that state, and not to their performances in other states. Although BT succeeds in selecting intuitively rational actions in a number of cases—including some in which EDT or CDT seem to go wrong—it places constraints on rational decision-making that either lack motivation or are untenable. Specifically, I argue that as it stands BT is committed both to endorsing and rejecting the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Furthermore its requirement that weakly dominated actions be excluded from consideration of rational action lacks motivation and threatens to collide with traditional game theory. In the final section of the paper, I construct a counterexample to BT. (shrink)

Aristotle offers apparently inconsistent explanations for paronymous expressions derived from matter: on the received picture, derived from Metaphysics Θ.7, such expressions are used in all and only cases of substantial change, because predicating the matter directly of a substance would be false; on the error picture, derived from Metaphysics Z.7, the same expressions are used in all and only cases of change from an unclear and nameless privation, because ordinary language users conflate such privations with matter. I propose a resolution: (...) the received picture explains why the usage is fitting, but the error picture explains how the usage originated. (shrink)

Background Despite the growth of biomedical research in South Africa, there are few insights into the operation of Research Ethics Committees (RECs) in this setting. We investigated the composition, operations and training needs of health RECs in South Africa against the backdrop of national and international guidelines. Methods The 12 major health RECs in South Africa were surveyed using semi-structured questionnaires that investigated the composition and functions of each REC as well as the operational issues facing committees. Results Health RECs (...) in SA have an average of 16 members and REC members are predominantly male and white. Overall, there was a large discrepancy in findings between under-resourced RECs and well resourced RECs. The majority of members (56%) are scientists or clinicians who are typically affiliated to the same institution as the health REC. Community representatives account for only 8% of membership. Training needs for health REC members varied widely. Conclusion Most major health RECs in South Africa are well organized given the resource constraints that exist in relation to research ethics in developing countries. However, the gender, racial and occupational diversity of most of these RECs is suboptimal, and most RECs are not constituted in accordance with South African guidelines. Variability in the operations and training needs of RECs is a reflection of apartheid-entrenched influences in tertiary education in SA. While legislation now exists to enforce standardization of research ethics review systems, no provision has been made for resources or capacity development, especially to support historically-disadvantaged institutions. Perpetuation of this legacy of apartheid represents a violation of the principles of justice and equity. (shrink)

The use of the symbol ∨for disjunction in formal logic is ubiquitous. Where did it come from? The paper details the evolution of the symbol ∨ in its historical and logical context. Some sources say that disjunction in its use as connecting propositions or formulas was introduced by Peano; others suggest that it originated as an abbreviation of the Latin word for “or,” vel. We show that the origin of the symbol ∨ for disjunction can be traced to Whitehead and (...) Russell’s pre-Principia work in formal logic. Because of Principia’s influence, its notation was widely adopted by philosophers working in logic (the logical empiricists in the 1920s and 1930s, especially Carnap and early Quine). Hilbert’s adoption of ∨ in his Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik guaranteed its widespread use by mathematical logicians. The origins of other logical symbols are also discussed. (shrink)

Professor Scott in his paper on ‘Eurynome and Eurycleia’ was inclined to believe, although he did not press the point, that Eurynome and Actoris were one and the same servant, the name Actoris being a patronymic. This explanation was offered also by Hayman, who compares Actorion , but it has been ignored by Wilamowitz and by van Leeuwen-Mendes da Costa, who reject ψ 226 sqq. It is an ingenious attempt to solve a small Homeric problem, and would be convincing but (...) for two reasons, of which the first has to do with the poet's manner and the second with the circumstances of the recognition scene in ψ. (shrink)

Canon law has an abiding purpose in the Church: to aid in the creation of a community that is a true sign of the fellowship of love.

This paper argues identity documents (ID) prefigure wearables as artefacts connected with archives. As participants with human practices, they constitute an apparatus that engenders sensibilities about the proper way to participate in society, through the use of socio-technical systems. The use of these artefacts is necessary to make individuals legible to the state. Refusing them renders us insensible. Through a media archaeology of the history and use of IDs through modern Europe, an understanding emerges of the agential properties of artefacts (...) and their essential role in establishing a social imaginary of the state. (shrink)

Prior to their announcement of the birth of gene-edited twins in China, Dr. He Jiankui and colleagues published a set of draft ethical principles for discussing the legal, social, and ethical aspects of heritable genome interventions. Within this document, He and colleagues made it clear that their goal with these principles was to “clarify for the public the clinical future of early-in-life genetic surgeries” or heritable genome editing. In light of He’s widely criticized gene editing experiments it is of interest (...) to place these draft principles in the larger ethical debate surrounding heritable genome editing. Here we examine the principles proposed by He and colleagues through the lens of Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics. We also analyze the stated goal that the “clinical future” of heritable genome editing was clarified by He and colleagues’ proposed principles. Finally, we highlight what might be done to help prevent individual actors from pushing forward ahead of broad societal consensus on heritable genome editing. (shrink)

Social scientists agree that women are generally more religious than men, but disagree about whether the differences are universal or contingent on social context. This study uses General Social Survey data to explore differences in religiosity between, as well as among, women and men by level of individual earned income. Extending previous research, I focus on high earners with other groups included for comparison. Predicted probabilities based upon fully interacted models provide four key findings: There are no significant gender differences (...) among high earners; high-earning women are less religious than low-earning women; high-earning men are more religious than low-earning men; and differences among women and among men at different earnings levels are just as large as average differences between women and men. Further analyses demonstrate that the relationship between gender, earnings, and religiosity varies by race. The findings demonstrate the utility of intersectional approaches for understanding gender differences in religiosity. Beyond the implications specific to the gender differences in religiosity literature, this study also indicates that religion is an important, yet often underemphasized, aspect of our intersectional selves. (shrink)

In this dissertation, I argue that aesthetic experience is a kind of valuing experience that has certain, objective features not dependent on the psychological state of the subject. Accounts of aesthetic experience can generally be divided into two categories: internalist and externalist. The former pick out aesthetic experience as a being a certain kind of psychological state on the part of the subject, whereas the latter specify it based on features external to the experience itself, usually by reference to the (...) object. My account is neither strictly internalist nor externalist, but combines features of both. Like an internalist account, it requires that the subject be in a certain mental state – the subject must be having a valuational experience. Like an externalist account, it insists that there are features of aesthetic experience that are not part of the phenomenal character of the experience – that is, the type of value assigned is in fact subjective, regardless of how the subject perceives it. It is my contention that such a hybrid account is broadly explanatory while avoiding the problems that plague other accounts. (shrink)

In this paper I pose four questions raised by Mark Textor’s The Disappearance of Soul and the Turn Against Metaphysics. These are: (1) When did Bertrand Russell abandon the subject? (2) Is acquaintance always a polyadic relation? (3) Does Idealism follow from the thesis that all relations are internal? (4) Is the development of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of mathematics linked together, that is, did the New Logic substantially influence British analytic philosophizing about the soul, or did the New (...) Logic develop independently of theorizing about soul? (shrink)

Conceptual engineers have made hay over the differences of their metaphilosophy from those of conceptual analysts. In this article, I argue that the differences are not as great as conceptual engineers have, perhaps rhetorically, made them seem. That is, conceptual analysts asking ‘What is X?’ questions can do much the same work that conceptual engineers can do with ‘What is X for?’ questions, at least if conceptual analysts self-understand their activity as a revisionary enterprise. I show this with a study (...) of Russell's metaphilosophy, which was just such a revisionary conception of conceptual analysis. (shrink)

Though the interaction of philosophy with pop culture has so far mostly taken the form of books for nonphilosophers that use various shows and movies as sources of examples to illustrate “traditional” philosophical issues, this article contends that serious engagement with the informal philosophical discussions expressed in popular entertainments constitutes a kind of “ethnophilosophy” and should be considered an important part of the discipline. Our disciplinary responsibility for maintaining and considering the history of philosophy ought to include even the philosophical (...) conversations that occur outside the academy; however unlike “proper” philosophy this material may be, it nonetheless represents engagement—sometimes substantial engagement—with the same issues that concern those of us who are considered “professional” philosophers, and thus is legitimately of interest to us. (shrink)

I critically discuss a new proposal for a metaphysics of sense-data. This proposal is due to Peter Forrest. Forrest argues that, if we accept Platonism about universals, sense-data are best understood as structured universals–in particular, as structured universals with temporal and spatial properties as components. Against this proposal, I argue sense-data as structured universals are not universals at all.

The traditional problem of incontinence raises the question of whether there is any way to account for action contrary to judgment. When one acts, rather than only being acted upon by circumstances, the action is explained in terms of the reasons for action one judges oneself to have. It therefore seems impossible to explain action that iscontrary to such judgment. This paper examines the question of how such explanation would be possible. After excluding accounts that either eliminate incontinence or render (...) it inexplicable, I argue that genuine incontinence would require three components: first, a distinction between the types of judgments simultaneously present in the agent; second, the Aristotelian idea that not all of those types of judgments can be directly action-guiding; and third, that the judgments that are action-guiding can be pre-conceptual perceptions. I then use elements of Collingwood's aesthetics to make the case that although such pre-conceptual perceptions would not be propositional judgments and the relationship between them and the behaviors of the agent could not be causal, those behaviors could still qualify as incontinent actions. (shrink)

As interest in Owen Barfield grows, we aim to meet the need for a scholarly introduction to his thought. Our primary purpose is to present an overview, analysis, and synthesis of Barfield's most salient ideas in a manner that will be of interest to neophytes and initiates alike. Barfield's work can, at time, be difficult to understand; C. S. Lewis put it well when he described Barfield's style of argument as 'dark, labyrinthine,' and 'pertinacious.' But Lewis ardently promoted Barfield's work (...) because he knew that people who willingly walk in those dim and winding corridors are, in time, richly rewarded by the bright light at their end. We offer the present work in service to those who wish to undertake this adventure. While the present book will help those readers who wish to engage Barfield for the sake of achieving a greater understanding of and appreciation for other writers who have been associated with or influenced by him, we aim first and foremost to present Barfield as a profound and original thinker in his own right. (shrink)

Don didn’t grasp what would eventually come to be one of the most successful ad campaigns ever because he didn’t recognise the person presenting the evidence as being appropriately trustworthy. He failed to know because Dr Guttman’s say-so was not enough to provide justification for a belief. But why would he think that? To get to the bottom of this, we need the help of an analytical approach known as standpoint theory.

The notion that something can exist a se is central to Descartes’s overall metaphysics of causation. In the Meditations, divine aseity plays the role of explaining not only God’s existence but ultimately the existence of everything else apart from God. Yet in the Meditations proper, as well as in the early Replies, Descartes does little to clarify exactly what his view of divine aseity is and how it might differ from the sort of aseity commonly posited by the Scholastics. Despite (...) Descartes’s later attempts to assuage this worry and clarify his position, the positive aseity charge has not gone away. Here I shall argue that the charge is unjustified on all counts. Baldly stated, Descartes’s notion of aseity is no different than the negative sense of aseity endorsed by his Scholastic predecessors - especially Aquinas. Understanding this not only helps in clarifying the overall picture of Cartesian causality but also aids in seeing how commentaries on the Meditations, old and new, have obscured it. (shrink)

A fundamental goal of research in neuroscience is to uncover the causal structure of the brain. This focus on causation makes sense, because causal information can provide explanations of brain function and identify reliable targets with which to understand cognitive function and prevent or change neurological conditions and psychiatric disorders. In this research, one of the most frequently used causal concepts is ‘mechanism’ — this is seen in the literature and language of the field, in grant and funding inquiries that (...) specify what research is supported, and in journal guidelines on which contributions are considered for publication. In these contexts, mechanisms are commonly tied to expressions of the main aims of the field and cited as the ‘fundamental’, ‘foundational’ and/or ‘basic’ unit for understanding the brain. Despite its common usage and perceived importance, mechanism is used in different ways that are rarely distinguished. Given that this concept is defined in different ways throughout the field — and that there is often no clarification of which definition is intended — there remains a marked ambiguity about the fundamental goals, orientation and principles of the field. Here we provide an overview of causation and mechanism from the perspectives of neuroscience and philosophy of science, in order to address these challenges. (shrink)

This paper will set out in plain language the basic ontology of “Deleuze’s Spinoza”; it will then critically examine whether such a Spinoza has, or indeed could have, ever truly existed. In this, it will be shown that Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza involves the imposition of three interlocking, formal principles. These are (1) Necessitarianism, (2) Immanence, and (3) Univocity. The uncovering of Deleuze’s use of these three principles, how they relate to one another, and what they jointly imply in terms (...) of ontology, will occupy Part 1 of this paper. The critique of these principles from a Spinozist perspective, i.e. that their use by Deleuze is incompatible with Spinoza’s own metaphysics, will occupy Part 2 of this paper. (shrink)

Interactive theorem provers might seem particularly impractical in the history of philosophy. Journal articles in this discipline are generally not formalized. Interactive theorem provers involve a learning curve for which the payoffs might seem minimal. In this article I argue that interactive theorem provers have already demonstrated their potential as a useful tool for historians of philosophy; I do this by highlighting examples of work where this has already been done. Further, I argue that interactive theorem provers can continue to (...) be useful tools for historians of philosophy in the future; this claim is defended through a more conceptual analysis of what historians of philosophy do that identifies argument reconstruction as a core activity of such practitioners. It is then shown that interactive theorem provers can assist in this core practice by a description of what interactive theorem provers are and can do. If this is right, then computer verification for historians of philosophy is in the offing. (shrink)

Russell derived many of his logical symbols from the pioneering notation of Giuseppe Peano. Principia Mathematica (1910–13) made these “Peanese” symbols (and others) famous. Here I focus on one of the more peculiar notational derivatives from Peano, namely, Principia ’s dual use of a squared dot or dots for both conjunction and scope. As Dirk Schlimm has noted, Peano always had circular dots and only used them to symbolize scope distinctions. In contrast, Principia has squared dots and conventions such that (...) some dots mark scope distinctions while others symbolize conjunction. How did this come to pass? In this paper I trace a genealogy of Principia ’s square dots back to Russell’s appropriation of Peano’s use of circular dots. Russell never explicitly justifies appropriating Peano’s notations to symbolize two distinct notions, but below I explain why Russell deployed Peano’s dot notations in this manner. Further, I argue that it was Cambridge University Press who squared the circular dots. (shrink)

BackgroundCommentators believe that the ethical decision-making climate is instrumental in enhancing interprofessional collaboration in intensive care units. Our aim was twofold: to determine the perception of the ethical climate, levels of moral distress, and intention to leave one's job among nurses and physicians, and between the different ICU types and determine the association between the ethical climate, moral distress, and intention to leave.MethodsWe performed a cross-sectional questionnaire study between May 2021 and August 2021 involving 206 nurses and physicians in a (...) large urban academic hospital. We used the validated Ethical Decision-Making Climate Questionnaire and the Measure of Moral Distress for Healthcare Professionals tools and asked respondents their intention to leave their jobs. We also made comparisons between the different ICU types. We used Pearson's correlation coefficient to identify statistically significant associations between the Ethical Climate, Moral Distress, and Intention to Leave.ResultsNurses perceived the ethical climate for decision-making as less favorable than physicians. They also had significantly greater levels of moral distress and higher intention to leave their job rates than physicians. Regarding the ICU types, the Neonatal/pediatric unit had a significantly higher overall ethical climate score than the Medical and Surgical units and also demonstrated lower moral distress scores and lower “intention to leave” scores compared with both the Medical and Surgical units. The ethical climate and moral distress scores were negatively correlated ; moral distress and "intention to leave" was positively correlated ; and ethical climate and “intention to leave” were negatively correlated.ConclusionsSignificant differences exist in the perception of the ethical climate, levels of moral distress, and intention to leave between nurses and physicians and between the different ICU types. Inspecting the individual factors of the ethical climate and moral distress tools can help hospital leadership target organizational factors that improve interprofessional collaboration, lessening moral distress, decreasing turnover, and improved patient care. (shrink)

Beginning from an analysis of what factors disqualify a person from complaining about a given moral breach, I show that the prima facie presumption that a complaint is justified in the face of non-moral offense in the context of a business transaction must be balanced against the potential consequences to the object of the complaint, especially given the particular realities of popular employment practices. In particular, I will identify three cases in which complamts are justified, presuming unjust employment arrangements, as (...) a way of showing that complaints in other situations should be, contrary to naive intuition, considered inappropriate. (shrink)