Although previous studies have acknowledged that leaders’ such environmental behaviors and environmental issues are becoming critical for long-term development, little research has focused on why, how and when perceived environmentally specific servant leadership contributes to employees’ workplace environmentally friendly behavior in the hotel industry. This paper aims to fill this research gap by using social identity theory to test employees’ green role identity as a mediator and their perceived corporate environmental responsibility and perceived coworkers’ work group green advocacy as moderators (...) in the relationship between perceived environmentally-specific servant leadership and workplace environmentally friendly behavior. Using a sample of 527 leader-follower dyads from six hotels in mainland China at two points in time, we found that employees’ green role identity mediates the positive relationship between perceived environmentally specific servant leadership and employees’ workplace environmentally friendly behavior. Moreover, employees’ perceived corporate environmental responsibility and perceived coworkers’ work group green advocacy were found to positively moderate the relationship between perceived environmentally-specific servant leadership and green role identity and between green role identity and workplace environmentally friendly behavior, respectively. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

We examined employees’ green organizational identity as a mediator and green organizational climate as a moderator in the relationship between environmental leadership and follower green innovation behavior. Through collecting data from public organizations in China at different times, we found that environmental leadership is positively related to employees’ green innovation behavior through increasing their green organizational identity. Meanwhile, the mediating relationship is conditional on the moderator of green organizational climate. The current study aims to clarify the mechanism and boundary condition (...) in the relationship between environmental leadership and employees’ green innovation behaviors. (shrink)

The potential anesthetic neurotoxicity on the neonate is an important focus of research investigation in the field of pediatric anesthesiology. It is essential to understand how these anesthetics may affect the development and growth of neonatal immature and vulnerable brains. Functional magnetic resonance imaging has suggested that using anesthetics result in reduced functional connectivity may consider as core sequence for the neurotoxicity and neurodegenerative changes in the developed brain. Anesthetics either directly impact the primary structures and functions of the brain (...) or indirectly alter the hemodynamic parameters that contribute to cerebral blood flow in neonatal patients. We hypothesis that anesthetic agents may either decrease the brain functional connectivity in neonatal patients or animals, which was observed by fMRI. This review will summarize the effect and mechanism of anesthesia on the rapid growth and development infant and neonate brain with fMRI through functional connectivity. It is possible to provide the new mechanism of neuronal injury induced by anesthetics and objective imaging evidence in animal developing brain. (shrink)

Drawing on team creativity literature and social comparison theory, we investigate how leader-member exchange differentiation influences team creativity. Using a survey based on 91 R&D teams from Chinese companies, we observe that LMX differentiation is negatively related to team creativity. More importantly, we demonstrate that team behavioral integration mediates the relationship between LMX differentiation and team creativity, and team emotional intelligence moderates the relationship between LMX differentiation and team behavioral integration, such that LMX differentiation has a weaker negative influence on (...) team behavioral integration when TEI is higher. These results provide relevant suggestions for organizational team building, management, and development. (shrink)

ObjectiveThe present study aimed to identify and analyze the bibliometric characteristics of the 100 top-cited studies on neuropsychology.MethodsWe searched the Web of Science Core Collection database to collect studies on neuropsychology from inception to 31st December 2019. Two authors independently screened the literature and extracted the data. Statistical analyses were performed using R software.ResultsThe 100 top-cited articles were cited a total of 166,123 times, ranging from 736 to 24,252 times per article. All of the studies were published from 1967 to (...) 2014 in 47 journals. Neuropsychologia had the highest number of articles, followed by Neurology. The top three most productive countries were the USA, England, and Canada. Eight authors contributed the same number of studies as the first author or corresponding author. The most productive institute was the University of California, followed by the University of Pennsylvania. Of the 100 top-cited publications, 64 were original articles, and 36 were reviews. The top three Web of Science categories were clinical neurology, behavioral sciences, and psychiatry.ConclusionThis study provides insight into the impact of neuropsychology research and may help doctors, researchers, and stakeholders to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of trends and most influential contributions to the field, thus promoting ideas for future investigation. (shrink)

Background and ObjectivesAnxiety plays an important role in psychology. An exploration of anxiety and its associated reactions may provide insight into measures for addressing mental health problems caused by the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Data from this study provide potential correlational responses to anxiety.MethodsA cross-sectional study using data collected via an online self-reported questionnaire was conducted in Japan during the COVID-19 pandemic. Using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, we assessed anxiety levels and explored the relationship between anxiety STAI-6 score, sources of (...) COVID-19 information, the influences of COVID-19, social anxiety symptoms, discrimination, and evaluation of the government.ResultsA total of 4,127 participants were included in the analysis. The level of anxiety was not equally distributed across the general population with respect to age, gender, educational level, occupation, income, presence of underlying disease, and location. The number of sources of information on COVID-19 had a positive correlation with the STAI-6 score. The influence of the pandemic was correlated with moderate–severe anxiety. A high level of anxiety added to social anxiety and discriminatory behavior. Being female and from a non-emergency area was related to higher STAI scores, and higher education, and income decreased the STAI score. The respondents who had a lower evaluative score of the preventive activities undertaken by the national and local governments had higher STAI-6 scores.ConclusionOur findings provide statistical evidence for the associated reaction of anxiety and that anxiety reactions may vary in predictable ways. Further studies should focus on the strategic interventions that may decrease the associated responses to anxiety, to address mental health issues due to the pandemic. (shrink)

Background: Physical exercises can affect executive function both acutely and chronically, with different mechanisms for each moment. Currently, only a few reviews have elaborated on the premise that different types of exercises have different mechanisms for improving executive function. Therefore, the primary purpose of our systematic review was to analyze the effects of acute and chronic exercises on executive function in children and adolescents.Objective: We identified acute and chronic exercise studies and randomized controlled trials of executive function in children and (...) adolescents that reported overall effect, heterogeneity, and publication bias of acute and chronic exercises on executive function.Methods: We searched for RCTs of exercise interventions in children and adolescents from databases including PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus, The Cochrane Library, CNKI, and Wanfang, from January 1 2009 to December 31 2019. We performed methodological quality evaluations on the included literature using the Physiotherapy Evidence Database Scale and graded evidence with a meta-analysis using Stata 12.0 software.Results: In total, 36 RCTs were included ; the overall results of the meta-analysis indicated that acute exercises significantly improved working memory = −0.72; 95% confidence interval −0.89 to −0.56; p < 0.001), inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility, whereas chronic exercises significantly improved working memory, inhibitory control, and cognitive flexibility.Conclusion: Acute and chronic exercises can effectively improve the executive function of children and adolescents. The effects on inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility are considered as small effect sizes, while the effects on working memory are considered as moderate effect size. Limited by the quantity and quality of the included studies, the above conclusions need to be verified with more high-quality studies. (shrink)

Patients with bipolar disorder may experience family dysfunction, which might result in worse psychosocial functioning through environmental and psychological factors. Research investigating the mediating role of social support, resilience and suicidal ideation on family and psychosocial functioning in BD is rare. The study aims to explore the predicting and mediating effects of social support, resilience and suicidal ideation on family and psychosocial functioning in BD patients. Two hundred forty-six patients with BD and sixty-nine healthy controls were recruited. The Family Assessment (...) Device, Functioning Assessment Short Test, Social Support Rating Scale, Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale and Beck Scale for Suicide Ideation were used to assess family functioning, psychosocial functioning, social support, resilience and suicidal ideation, respectively. Bipolar patients exhibited worse family and psychosocial functioning than healthy controls. Family functioning, social support, resilience and suicidal ideation significantly predict psychosocial functioning in the bipolar group. Social support, resilience and suicidal ideation indirectly mediate the effect of family functioning on psychosocial functioning in bipolar patients. Cross-sectional design and mixed sample including acute and remitted stages. Treatments for patients with bipolar disorder should be combined with family strategies that are formulated to improve psychosocial functioning. An emphasis should be placed on enhancing social support and resilience while paying attention to suicidal ideation. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo investigate the characteristics of response inhibition of overweight/obese people, using behavior experiments combine with neural electrophysiological technology and discussing the difference in impulse level between obesity/overweight and normal-weight people through EEG data, questionnaire, and behavior experiment.Method All participants completed the Go/Nogo task; meanwhile, behavior data and 64 channel EEG data were recorded. Participants completed the Stop-Signal task and behavior date was recorded.Results During Go/Nogo task, no significant differences were found in reaction time, omission errors of the Go task between (...) the two groups, while commission errors of the Nogo task of the control group were significantly greater than the overweight/obesity group. About SSRT during the Stop-Signal Task, the interaction of stimulus type and group was significant. No significant differences were found between the two groups in amplitude and latency of N2. About the amplitude of P3, the interaction of task type, electrode point, and groups were significant, the control group P3 amplitude was significantly greater than overweight/obesity group during the Nogo task. Regarding about latency of P3, the interaction of group and electrode point were not significant, but the main effect of task type was significant.Conclusion In terms of behavioral outcomes, overweight–obese subjects had lower dominant response inhibition and response cessation compared to normal-weight subjects. In terms of EEG results, overweight–obese subjects showed no difference in processing speed and level of conflict monitoring for early inhibitory processing compared to normal-weight subjects, but there was a deficit in behavioral control for late inhibitory processing. (shrink)

This paper calls for a paradigm shift in studying academic dependency, towards the paradigm of brokered dependency. Using Chinese academia as an example, I demonstrate how the neocolonial condition of academic dependency is always mediated through blockage-brokerage mechanisms. The two most salient blockage-brokerage mechanisms of dependency in the Chinese context are linguistic barrier and authoritarian malepistemization, and the effects of the latter consist of three layers: institutional, informational and incorporational. On top of their domestic impacts, those mechanisms jointly exacerbate spectacularized (...) postcoloniality in anglophone-hegemonic global academic publishing. The paradigm of brokered dependency not only represents a more nuanced approach to the study of academic dependency, but also underscores the fact that the dismantling of the neocolonial condition cannot be conceived and pursued in isolation from comprehending and confronting the authoritarian condition, especially when the latter pertains under the disguise of anticolonialism. (shrink)

According to the experience requirement on well-being, differences in subjects’ levels of welfare or well-being require differences in the phenomenology of their experiences. I explain why the two existing arguments for this requirement are not successful. Then, I introduce a more promising argument for it: that unless we accept the requirement, we cannot plausibly explain why only sentient beings are welfare subjects. I argue, however, that because the right kind of theory of well-being can plausibly account for that apparent fact (...) about welfare subjects even if the requirement is false, this argument does not succeed. I tentatively conclude that no compelling case can be made for the requirement. (shrink)

Invariabilism is the view that the same theory of welfare is true of every welfare subject. Variabilism is the view that invariabilism is false. In light of how many welfare subjects there are and how greatly they differ in their natures and capacities, it is natural to suppose that variabilism is true. I argue that these considerations do not support variabilism and, indeed, that we should accept invariabilism. This has important implications: it eliminates many of the going theories of welfare (...) while making some of the remaining ones more attractive. (shrink)

Robots today serve in many roles, from entertainer to educator to executioner. As robotics technology advances, ethical concerns become more pressing: Should robots be programmed to follow a code of ethics, if this is even possible? Are there risks in forming emotional bonds with robots? How might society--and ethics--change with robotics? This volume is the first book to bring together prominent scholars and experts from both science and the humanities to explore these and other questions in this emerging field. Starting (...) with an overview of the issues and relevant ethical theories, the topics flow naturally from the possibility of programming robot ethics to the ethical use of military robots in war to legal and policy questions, including liability and privacy concerns. The contributors then turn to human-robot emotional relationships, examining the ethical implications of robots as sexual partners, caregivers, and servants. Finally, they explore the possibility that robots, whether biological-computational hybrids or pure machines, should be given rights or moral consideration. Ethics is often slow to catch up with technological developments. This authoritative and accessible volume fills a gap in both scholarly literature and policy discussion, offering an impressive collection of expert analyses of the most crucial topics in this increasingly important field. (shrink)

Subjectivism about welfare is the view that something is basically good for you if and only if, and to the extent that, you have the right kind of favorable attitude toward it under the right conditions. I make a presumptive case for the falsity of subjectivism by arguing against nearly every extant version of the view. My arguments share a common theme: theories of welfare should be tested for what they imply about newborn infants. Even if a theory is intended (...) to apply only to adults, the fact that it is false of newborns may give us sufficient reason to reject it. (shrink)

As robots slip into more domains of human life - from the operating room to the bedroom - they take on our morally important tasks and decisions, as well as create new risks from psychological to physical. This book answers the urgent call to study their ethical, legal, and policy impacts.

Although the idea that sexual violence is a “structural” problem is not new, the lack of specification as to what that entails blocks effective responses to it. This paper illustrates the concept of sexual violence as structural in the sense of containing a type of moral wrong called “structural wrong” and discusses its practical implications. First, I introduce a distinction between two types of moral wrongs—interactional wrongs and structural wrongs—and I argue that the moral problem of sexual violence includes both (...) types, each of which calls for a different set of moral responses. Second, drawing on Iris Marion Young’s social connection model of responsibility, I argue that recognizing the structural-wrong element of sexual violence does not reduce individual perpetrators’ responsibility for it. Instead, it implies that a broader group of agents are required to join collective actions to reform the social structure. I conclude by evaluating some preventive programs against sexual violence through the lens of structural wrongs and providing directions to advance them. (shrink)

On phenomenological theories of pleasure, what makes an experience a pleasure is the way it feels. On attitudinal theories, what makes an experience a pleasure is its relationship to the favorable attitudes of the subject who is having it. I advance the debate between these theories in two ways. First, I argue that the main objection to phenomenological theories, the heterogeneity problem, is not compelling. While others have argued for this before, I identify an especially serious version of this problem (...) that resists existing solutions, and I explain why even this version of the problem does not undermine phenomenological theories. Second, I argue that a grand reconciliation can be effected between the two types of theory: it can be true both that pleasures are pleasures in virtue of the way they feel and that they are pleasures in virtue of how they are related to their subjects’ favorable attitudes, so long as the attitudes that are constitutively related to pleasures are ones that feel a certain way. Hybrid views of this sort have significant advantages over pure attitudinal or phenomenological views. (shrink)

In Spinoza’s metaphysics, we encounter many puzzling doctrines that appear to entangle metaphysical notions with cognitive, logical, and epistemic ones. According to him, a substance is that which can be conceived through itself and a mode is that which is conceived through another. Thus, metaphysical notions, substance and mode, are defined through a notion that is either cognitive or logical, being conceived through. He defines an attribute as that which an intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance. Intellectual (...) perception, something cognitive, is used to define an attribute, something metaphysical. And he claims that if something exists there is a reason why it exists and if something doesn’t exist there is also a reason why it doesn’t. Thus, a reason, something cognitive or epistemic, is necessary for existence or nonexistence. What are we to make of the intimate connections that Spinoza sees between metaphysical, cognitive, logical, and epistemic notions? Between being and reason? In this book, I argue for what might be called a realist interpretation: although Spinoza is confident that the order of being mirrors the order of reason, he believes that they are two orders, not one. There is inherence over and above conceptual dependence; there is causation in addition to causal explanation; the world has a nature that we can grasp and that our way of grasping it does not interpose an impenetrable conceptual veil between it and us. (shrink)

Theories of well-being purport to identify the features of lives, and of intervals within lives, in virtue of which some people are high in well-being and others are low in well-being. They also purport to identify the properties that make some events or states of affairs good for a person and other events or states of affairs bad for a person. This article surveys some of the main theories of well-being, with an emphasis on work published since the turn of (...) the century. (shrink)

Increasing concerns have been raised regarding artificial intelligence (AI) bias, and in response, efforts have been made to pursue AI fairness. In this paper, we argue that the idea of structural injustice serves as a helpful framework for clarifying the ethical concerns surrounding AI bias—including the nature of its moral problem and the responsibility for addressing it—and reconceptualizing the approach to pursuing AI fairness. Using AI in healthcare as a case study, we argue that AI bias is a form of (...) structural injustice that exists when AI systems interact with other social factors to exacerbate existing social inequalities, making some groups of people more vulnerable to undeserved burdens while conferring unearned benefits to others. The goal of AI fairness, understood this way, is about pursuing a more just social structure with the development and usage of AI systems when appropriate. We further argue that all participating agents in the unjust social structure associated with AI bias bear a shared responsibility to join collective action with the goal of reforming the social structure, and we provide a list of practical recommendations for agents in various social positions to contribute to this collective action. (shrink)

A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism (the view that there is more than one basic good) and subjectivism (the view, roughly, that every basic good involves our favourable attitudes). Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire satisfactionism. In (...) the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever someone experiences an attitudinal pleasure, his welfare is (other things equal) higher during the pleasure. Finally, I argue that any subjectivist about welfare should find disjunctive desire satisfactionism highly attractive. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that subjectivists about welfare must claim that the favorable attitudes whose satisfaction is relevant to your well-being are those that you would have in idealized conditions (e.g. ones in which you are fully informed and rational). I argue that this is false. I introduce a non-idealizing subjectivist view, Same World Subjectivism, that accommodates the two main rationales for idealizing: those given by Peter Railton and David Sobel. I also explain why a recent argument from Dale Dorsey (...) fails to show that subjectivists must idealize. Because Same World Subjectivism is a plausible non-idealizing view, subjectivists about welfare needn't idealize. (shrink)

Theories of well-being purport to identify the basic goods and bads whose presence in a person's life determines how well she is faring. Monism is the view that there is only one basic good and one basic bad. Pluralism is the view that there is either more than one basic good or more than one basic bad. In this paper, I give an argument for pluralism that is general in the sense that it does not purport to identify any basic (...) goods or bads. If I am right, then even if you cannot name a single basic good or bad, you can know that pluralism is true. (shrink)

When thinking about the debate between frequentists and Bayesians on scientific methodology, it is unproductive and misleading to choose from two dichotomized, oversimplified positions. A spectrum is developed here to make explicit some remarkable options, organized by two dimensions---or two questions. First, ask what kinds of probabilities exist. Only frequencies? Or only degrees of belief? Or both? Then ask what standards should be used to assess inference procedures. Only frequentist standards? Or just Bayesian ones? Or both? Or something else? In (...) combination, there are at least five positions that have been seriously defended in the history and philosophy of statistics. (shrink)

Many believe that normative reasons for action are necessarily connected with the promotion of certain states of affairs: on Humean views, for example, there is a reason for you to do something if and only if it would promote the object of one of your desires. But although promotion is widely invoked in discussions of reasons, its nature is a matter of controversy. I propose a simple account: to promote a state of affairs is to make it more likely to (...) obtain than it previously was. I argue that this view has been unfairly neglected, that it avoids serious problems faced by many other views, and that it is a contender for the correct theory of promotion. (shrink)

Which entities should the desire theory of well-being deem basically good for you—good for you in the most fundamental way? On the object view, what is basically good for you when one of your desires is satisfied is the object of that desire. On the combo view, what is basically good for you when one of your desires is satisfied is the combination or conjunction of the object of that desire and the fact that you have that desire. I argue (...) that which of these views the desire theory accepts makes no difference to what it implies about anyone’s amount of well-being. Then, I consider the main arguments that have been given for the superiority of one or the other of those two views. Finding none of those arguments persuasive, I conclude that we lack good grounds for rejecting the initial impression that it would be natural to have about those views: that it does not matter which of them the desire theory accepts. (shrink)

Modern technology (Technik, la technique) has constituted the gears on which the wheels of the modern world keep turning. The later Heidegger devotes sustained reflection to this unprecedented phenomenon in human history. It is notable that, compared with other figures from twentieth-century continental philosophy, Heidegger has served as the most frequent reference point in current philosophy of technology (Technikphilosophie). This field of philosophy came into being after the so-called empirical turn of “Science and Technology Studies.” While relevant scholars focus mainly (...) on “Die Frage nach der Technik” of 1953, “Das Ge-stell” of 1949,1 and some other texts written in that period,2 the time span of Heidegger’s .. (shrink)

The debate between scientific realism and anti-realism remains at a stalemate, making reconciliation seem hopeless. Yet, important work remains: exploring a common ground, even if only to uncover deeper points of disagreement and, ideally, to benefit both sides of the debate. I propose such a common ground. Specifically, many anti-realists, such as instrumentalists, have yet to seriously engage with Sober's call to justify their preferred version of Ockham's razor through a positive account. Meanwhile, realists face a similar challenge: providing a (...) non-circular explanation of how their version of Ockham's razor connects to truth. The common ground I propose addresses these challenges for both sides; the key is to leverage the idea that everyone values some truths and to draw on insights from scientific fields that study scientific inference—namely, statistics and machine learning. This common ground also isolates a distinctively epistemic root of the irreconcilability in the realism debate. (shrink)

Pluralistic theories of well-being might appear unable to accommodate just how important pleasure and pain are to well-being. Intuitively, there is a finite limit to how well your life can go for you if it goes badly enough hedonically (e.g. because you never feel any pleasure and you spend two years in unrelenting agony). But if there is some basic good distinct from pleasure, as any pluralistic theory must claim, then it seems that you could be made arbitrarily well off (...) by being given enough of that good even if your life is hedonically terrible. My aim is to defend pluralistic theories against this objection. After replying to the simplest version of it, I will answer a more sophisticated version of it that has recently been leveled by Theron Pummer. (shrink)

Desire-satisfaction theories of welfare must answer the timing question: when do you benefit from the satisfaction of one of your desires? There are three existing views about this: the Time of Desire view, on which you benefit at just those times when you have the desire; the Time of Object view, on which you benefit just when the object of your desire obtains; and Concurrentism, on which you benefit just when you have the desire and its object obtains. This paper (...) introduces a new view, Asymmetrism, on which you sometimes benefit at the time of desire and sometimes benefit at the time of object. On this view, if the time at which you have a desire is later than the time at which its object obtains, then you benefit at the time of the desire. On the other hand, if the time of object is later than the time of desire, then you benefit at the time of object. Three arguments are given for the conclusion that Asymmetrism is superior to the Time of Desire and Time of Object views. It is argued that Asymmetrism and Concurrentism are the most credible answers to the timing question. (shrink)

The desire-satisfaction theory of welfare says that what is basically good for a subject is the satisfaction of his desires. One challenge to this view is the existence of quirky desires, such as a desire to count blades of grass. It is hard to see why anyone would desire such things, and thus hard to believe that the satisfaction of such desires could be basically good for anyone. This suggests that only some desires are basically good when satisfied, and that (...) desire satisfactionists owe us an account of which desires these are, and why. In "Quirky Desires and Well-Being," Donald Bruckner proposes such an account: a desire is welfare-relevant (i.e., such that its satisfaction would be basically good for its subject) if and only if and because its subject could describe its object in a way that makes it comprehensible what about the object attracts him or appeals to him. We are inclined to view quirky desires as welfare-irrelevant because we assume that their objects cannot be described in such a way. But if there were a quirky desire whose object could be so described by the subject whose desire it is, then this desire would be relevant to that subject's welfare. I will argue that while Bruckner's view delivers plausible verdicts about the cases to which it is meant to apply, its account of what makes a desire welfare-relevant is unmotivated and implausible. Desire satisfactionists can retain what is plausible about his view while endorsing a better explanation of why welfare-relevant desires have that status if they accept the following account instead: a desire is welfare-relevant if and only if and because something about its object attracts, or appeals to, the subject who has the desire. (shrink)

While the traditional conception of inductive logic is Carnapian, I develop a Peircean alternative and use it to unify formal learning theory, statistics, and a significant part of machine learning: supervised learning. Some crucial standards for evaluating non-deductive inferences have been assumed separately in those areas, but can actually be justified by a unifying principle.

Humeans about normative reasons claim that there is a reason for you to perform a given action if and only if this would promote the satisfaction of one of your desires. Their view has traditionally been thought to have the revisionary implication that an agent can sometimes lack any reason to do what morality or prudence requires. Recently, however, Mark Schroeder has denied this. If he is right, then the Humean theory accords better with common sense than it has been (...) thought to. I argue that Schroeder is mistaken, even if welfare is understood in terms of the satisfaction of one’s desires: any Humean must concede that one can sometimes lack any reason to act morally or prudently. I also identify a novel variant on Humeanism that could perhaps avoid its revisionary implications about prudence if desire satisfactionism is the correct theory of welfare. (shrink)

As social media becomes increasingly popular, human subjects researchers are able to use these platforms to locate, track, and communicate with study participants, thereby increasing participant retention and the generalizability and validity of research. The use of social media; however, raises novel ethical and regulatory issues that have received limited attention in the literature and federal regulations. We review research ethics and regulations and outline the implications for maintaining participant privacy, respecting participant autonomy, and promoting researcher transparency when using social (...) media to locate and track participants. We offer a rubric that can be used in future studies to determine ethical and regulation-consistent use of social media platforms and illustrate the rubric using our study team’s experience with Facebook. We also offer recommendations for both researchers and institutional review boards that emphasize the importance of well-described procedures for social media use as... (shrink)

The aim of this study was to compare the learning effectiveness of peer tutored problem-based learning and conventional teaching of nursing ethics in Taiwan. The study adopted an experimental design. The peer tutored problem-based learning method was applied to an experimental group and the conventional teaching method to a control group. The study sample consisted of 142 senior nursing students who were randomly assigned to the two groups. All the students were tested for their nursing ethical discrimination ability both before (...) and after the educational intervention. A learning satisfaction survey was also administered to both groups at the end of each course. After the intervention, both groups showed a significant increase in ethical discrimination ability. There was a statistically significant difference between the ethical discrimination scores of the two groups (P < 0.05), with the experimental group on average scoring higher than the control group. There were significant differences in satisfaction with self-motivated learning and critical thinking between the groups. Peer tutored problem-based learning and lecture-type conventional teaching were both effective for nursing ethics education, but problem-based learning was shown to be more effective. Peer tutored problem-based learning has the potential to enhance the efficacy of teaching nursing ethics in situations in which there are personnel and resource constraints. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWittgenstein’s remark that one cannot follow a rule only once has generated two puzzles: how can everyone accept it to be true? and why does Wittgenstein advance it? These two puzzles have tormented commentators for decades. In this paper I put forward a new interpretation and explain away the two puzzles. I shall show that Wittgenstein’s remark is plain truth and that his motivation behind making it is to dissolve the picture theory of meaning propounded in the Tractatus. This interpretation (...) also helps us to see that Wittgenstein’s other remark, that to follow a rule is a custom, is also a grammatical one. (shrink)

In this paper, I first review previous interpretations of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language, revealing their inadequacies, and then present my own interpretation. Basing mainly on Wittgenstein's notes for lectures on private sensations, I establish the following points: ‘remembering the connection right’ means ‘reidentifying sensation-types’; the reason for ‘no criterion of correctness’ is that nothing, especially no inner mechanisms nor external devices, can be utilised by the private speaker to tell whether some sensations are of one type or different types; (...) and private names are not really names, private language is not really a language, therefore, private language is a grammatical illusion. My interpretation has the advantage of being able to reconcile Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, which is to dissolve philosophical problems by rearranging grammatical facts, with his actual philosophical practice, at least in the case of private language. (shrink)

It is often thought that, although Spinoza develops a bold and distinctive conception of God (the unique substance, or Natura Naturans, in which all else inheres and which possesses infinitely many attributes, including extension), the arguments that he offers which purport to prove God’s existence contribute nothing new to natural theology. Rather, he is seen as just another participant in the seventeenth century revival of the ontological argument initiated by Descartes and taken up by Malebranche and Leibniz among others. That (...) this is the case is both puzzling and unfortunate. It is puzzling because although Spinoza does offer an ontological proof for the existence of God, he also offers three other non‐ontological proofs. It is unfortunate because these other non‐ontological proofs are both more convincing and more interesting than his ontological proof. In this paper, I offer reconstructions and assessments of all of Spinoza’s arguments and argue that Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism and his commitment to something like a Principle of Sufficient Reason are the driving force behind Spinoza’s non‐ontological arguments. (shrink)

The 2021 Nobel Prize in Economics recognized an epistemology of causal inference based on the Rubin causal model (Rubin 1974), which merits broader attention in philosophy. This model, in fact, presupposes a logical principle of counterfactuals, Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM), the locus of a pivotal debate between Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973) on the semantics of counterfactuals. Proponents of CEM should recognize that this connection points to a new argument for CEM---a Quine-Putnam indispensability argument grounded in the Nobel-winning applications of (...) the Rubin model in health and social sciences. To advance the dialectic, I challenge this argument with an updated Rubin causal model that retains its successes while dispensing with CEM. This novel approach combines the strengths of the Rubin causal model and a causal model familiar in philosophy, the causal Bayes net. The takeaway: deductive logic and inductive inference, often studied in isolation, are deeply interconnected. (shrink)

Every episodic memory entails a sense of identity, which allows us to mentally travel through time. There is a special way by which the subject who is remembering comes into contact with the self that is embedded in the episodic simulation of memory: we can directly and robustly experience the protagonist in memory as ourselves. This paper explores what constitutes such experience in memory. On the face of it, the issue may seem trivial: of course, we are able to entertain (...) a sense of identity—the experience of our recollection structurally resembles our perception of the original event. However, given the phenomenon of observer memory, in which our visual perspective is decoupled from our embodied dimension, it is unclear whether it is the observing or the embodied one that is identified. This phenomenon is important not only in illustrating the complexity of identification but also in assessing how best to address it. In this paper, the issue is analyzed through concepts introduced from the literature on bodily self-consciousness. The potential approaches to addressing the issue of identification are examined, including the inheritance view, according to which the identification relies on the inheritance of mnemonic content from the original experience. I propose and argue for the self-simulation view, which suggests that what results in the experience of “I am this” in memory is the observing and the embodied dimensions as well as the relation between them, which enable different ways of projecting oneself into an episodic simulation. (shrink)

The problem of theory choice and model selection is hard but still important when useful truths are underdetermined, perhaps not by all kinds of data but by the kinds of data we can have access to ethically or practicably—even if we have an infinity of such data. This article addresses a crucial instance of that problem: the problem of inferring causal structures from nonexperimental, nontemporal data without assuming the so-called causal Faithfulness condition or the like. A new account of epistemic (...) evaluation is developed to solve that problem and justify a standard practice of causal inference in data science. (shrink)

Prudential value is the kind of value that something has when it is good for someone, in the sense that is conceptually tied to welfare or well‐being. Impersonal value is the kind of value that something has when it is good simply, absolutely, or “from the point of view of the universe.” According to the Moorean position on prudential value, the concept of prudential value can be analyzed in terms of that of impersonal value and is unintelligible if it is (...) not so analyzed. I answer some recent arguments for the Moorean position due to Kris McDaniel and Thomas Hurka, and I make a more comprehensive case than has thus far been made for rejecting that position. (shrink)