Drawing on philosophy, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, Simple Minds explores the construction of the mind from the matter of the brain.

We address the controversy in the literature concerning the definition of holobionts and the apparent constraints on their evolution using concepts from community population genetics. The genetics of holobionts, consisting of a host and diverse microbial symbionts, has been neglected in many discussions of the topic, and, where it has been discussed, a gene-centric, species-centric view, based in genomic conflict, has been predominant. Because coevolution takes place between traits or genes in two or more species and not, strictly speaking, between (...) species, it may affect some traits but not others in either host or symbiont. Moreover, when interacting species pairs are embedded in a larger community, indirect ecological effects can alter the expected pairwise dynamics. Mode of symbiont transmission and the degree of host inbreeding both affect the extent of microbial mixing across host lineages and thereby the degree to which selection on one trait of either partner affects other aspects of a holobiont phenotype. We discuss several potential defining criteria for holobionts using community genetics and population genetics models, suggesting their application and limitations. Using community genetics models, we show how conflict between genomes can be self-limiting, while cooperation and mutualism tend to be self-accelerating. It is likely that this bias in the evolutionary dynamics of interaction between hosts and symbionts is an important feature of holobionts. This bias in the evolutionary dynamic could contribute to explaining the absence of cheaters from natural mutualisms, although cheaters are predicted by gene-centered conflict theory to cause the evolutionary instability of mutualisms. Additionally, it may help explain the more frequent origin of mutualisms from parasitic than from free-living systems, an evolutionary trajectory opposite to that predicted by genome conflict theory. (shrink)

When natural selection theory was presented, much active philosophical debate, in which Darwin himself participated, centered on its hypothetical nature, its explanatory power, and Darwin's methodology. Upon first examination, Darwin's support of his theory seems to consist of a set of claims pertaining to various aspects of explanatory success. I analyze the support of his method and theory given in the Origin of Species and private correspondence, and conclude that an interpretation focusing on the explanatory strengths of natural selection theory (...) accurately reflects neither Darwin's own self-consciously held views, nor the nature of his support. Darwin's methodological and philosophical arguments were at once consistently empiricist and more sophisticated than such interpretations credit to him. (shrink)

In this paper I contend that the 'superfluity' of triangles is only apparent; all those specified are indeed required for the smallest sub-units, so long as the symmetry of the final body to be constructed is taken into account at earlier stages.

Bertrand Russell was, along with G.E. Moore, deserving of accolade as a founder of analytic philosophy, and of its close companion, the linguistic turn. Here I explain how his relocates philosophy's concern with appearance and reality as a concern with grammatical surface and logical depth. I then on remark the irony of Russell's unhappiness with views to the effect that an ethical judgment is not, despite linguistic appearances, really something that can be true or false. A further irony lies in (...) Russell's error of assigning metaphysical grandeur to logical truths, an error he could have avoided by more fully appreciating how logically misleading linguistic appearances can be. (shrink)

Jean-Yves Béziau (‘Classical Negation can be Expressed by One of its Halves’, Logic Journal of the IGPL 7 (1999), 145–151) has given an especially clear example of a phenomenon he considers a sufficiently puzzling to call the ‘paradox of translation’: the existence of pairs of logics, one logic being strictly weaker than another and yet such that the stronger logic can be embedded within it under a faithful translation. We elaborate on Béziau’s example, which concerns classical negation, as well as (...) giving some additional background (especially from intuitionistic logic) to the example. Our interest is more on the logical exploration of the phenomenon Béziau’s case exemplifies than on the question of whether that phenomenon is (even prima facie ) paradoxical, though in Section 5 we do approach the latter question – somewhat obliquely – by considering an analogous phenomenon which it is hard to find puzzling. (shrink)

The paper explores an apparent tension in Spinoza's thought between his treatment of man as part of nature, with no specially privileged position within it; and his treatment of morality as circumscribed by what is good for human beings. These two themes, it is argued, are in fact interconnected in Spinoza's thought. The paper goes on to consider some possible responses, from a contemporary standpoint, to Spinoza's rejection of animal rights. Finally, it is argued that the apparent tension in Spinoza's (...) thought becomes more understandable in the light of his treatment of the importance of truth to human beings; and that this throws into relief some puzzling features of some contemporary formulations of the theme of man as part of nature. (shrink)

This is the first title in the Key Themes in Ancient Philosophy series, which provides concise books, written by major scholars and accessible to non-specialists, on important themes in ancient philosophy which remain of philosophical interest today. In this book, Professor Gerson explores ancient accounts of the nature of knowledge and belief from the Presocratics up to the Platonists of late antiquity. He argues that ancient philosophers generally held a naturalistic view of knowledge as well as of belief. Hence, knowledge (...) was not viewed as a stipulated or semantically determined type of belief but was rather a real or objectively determinable achievement. In fact, its attainment was identical with the highest possible cognitive achievement, namely wisdom. It was this naturalistic view of knowledge at which the ancient Skeptics took aim. The book concludes by comparing the ancient naturalistic epistemology with some contemporary versions. (shrink)

A sentence mentioning an object can be regarded as saying any one of several things about that object, without thereby being ambiguous. Some of the (logical) repercussions of this commonplace observation are recorded, and some critical discussion is provided of views which would appear to go against it.

"Human beings are a part of nature and apart from it." The argument of Natural Law and Justice is that the philosophy of natural law and contemporary theories about the nature of justice are both efforts to make sense of the fundamental paradox of human experience: individual freedom and responsibility in a causally determined universe. Professor Weinreb restores the original understanding of natural law as a philosophy about the place of humankind in nature. He traces the natural law tradition from (...) its origins in Greek speculation through its classic Christian statement by Thomas Aquinas. He goes on to show how the social contract theorists adapted the idea of natural law to provide for political obligation in civil society and how the idea was transformed in Kant's account of human freedom. He brings the historical narrative down to the present with a discussion of the contemporary debate between natural law and legal positivism, including particularly the natural law theories of Finnis, Richards, and Dworkin. Professor Weinreb then adopts the approach of modern political philosophy to develop the idea of justice as a union of the distinct ideas of desert and entitlement. He shows liberty and equality to be the political analogues of desert and entitlement and both pairs to be the normative equivalents of freedom and cause. In this part of the book, Weinreb considers the theories of justice of Rawls and Nozick as well as the communitarian theory of Maclntyre and Sandel. The conclusion brings the debates about natural law and justice together, as parallel efforts to understand the human condition. This original contribution to legal philosophy will be especially appreciated by scholars, teachers, and students in the fields of political philosophy, legal philosophy, and the law generally. (shrink)

Several clinical cases are presented to illustrate the phenomenon of discontinuity of personal narrative. These discontinuities are markedly and overtly present in the cases described, which include cases of bipolar disorder, incipient schizophrenia, dissociative disorder, and others. One of the patients suggests that they are also ubiquitous in people without psychiatric diagnoses.

Geach’s rich paper ‘A Program for Syntax’ introduced many ideas into the arena of categorial grammar, not all of which have been given the attention they warrant in the thirty years since its first publication. Rather surprisingly, one of our findings (Section 3 below) is that the paper not only does not contain a statement of what has widely come to be known as “Geach’s Rule”, but in fact presents considerations which are inimical to the adoption of the rule in (...) question. With regard to at least some amongst the numerous other points extracted here from Geach’s discussion, we shall not be able to reach so definitive a conclusion, and content ourselves with giving the issues an airing. (shrink)

Objectivity is not the same thing as independence from the mind. Because the word ‘mind’ has been used to cover myriad things from pains to practices, care must be taken as to just what it is independence from which is in question. The gut notion of objectivity is captured in an anecdote from the life of Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln and a political colleague were discussing how to get a policy across and the colleague suggested labelling the policy in a certain (...) way; they happened to be near a donkey and their dialogue went like this: ‘Sir, how many legs does this donkey have?’ ‘Four, Mr. Lincoln’ ‘And how many tails has it?’ ‘Why, just one, Mr. Lincoln’ ‘Tell me, sir, what if we were to call the tail a leg; how many legs would the donkey then have?’ ‘Five, Mr. Lincoln’. ‘No, sir; for you cannot make a tail into a leg by calling it one’. (shrink)

Since the fundamental challenge that I laid at the doorstep of the pluralists was to defend, with nonderivative models, a strong notion of genic cause, it is fatal that Waters has failed to meet that challenge. Waters agrees with me that there is only a single cause operating in these models, but he argues for a notion of causal `parsing' to sustain the viability of some form of pluralism. Waters and his colleagues have some very interesting and important ideas about (...) the sciences, involving pluralism and parsing or partitioning causes, but they are ideas in search of an example. He thinks he has found an example in the case of hierarchical and genic selection. I think he has not. (shrink)

Historically, all societies have used comparison to analyze cultural difference through the interaction of religion, power, and translation. When comparison is a self-reflective practice, it can be seen as a form of comparatism. Many scholars are concerned in one way or another with the practice and methods of comparison, and the need for a cognitively robust relativism is an integral part of a mature historical self-placement. This volume looks at how different theories and practices of writing and interpretation have developed (...) at different times in different cultures and reconsiders the specificities of modern comparative approaches within a variety of comparative moments. The idea is to reconsider the specificities, the obstacles, and the possibilities of modern comparative approaches in history and anthropology through a variety of earlier and parallel comparative horizons. Particular attention is given to the exceptional role of Athens and Jerusalem in shaping the Western understanding of cultural difference. (shrink)

The philosophical mind-body problem, which Chalmers has named the 'Hard Problem', concerns the nature of the mind and the body. Physicalist approaches have been explored intensively in recent years but have brought us no consensual solution. Dualistic approaches have also been scrutinised since Descartes, but without consensual success. Mentalism has received little attention, yet it offers an elegantly simple solution to the hard problem.

This book discusses how Plato, one the fiercest legal critics in ancient Greece, became – in the longue durée – its most influential legislator. Making use of a vast scholarly literature, and offering original readings of a number of dialogues, it argues that the need for legal critique and the desire for legal permanence set the long arc of Plato’s corpus—from the Apology to the Laws. Modern philosophers and legal historians have tended to overlook the fact that Plato was the (...) most prolific legislator in ancient Greece. In the pages of his Republic and Laws, he drafted more than 700 statutes. This is more legal material than can be credited to the archetypal Greek legislators—Lycurgus, Draco, and Solon. The status of Plato’s laws is unique, since he composed them for purely hypothetical cities. And remarkably, he introduced this new genre by writing hard-hitting critiques of the Greek ideal of the sovereignty of law. Writing in the milieu in which immutable divine law vied for the first time with volatile democratic law, Plato rejected both sources of law, and sought to derive his laws from what he called ‘political technique’. At the core of this technique is the question of how the idea of justice relates to legal and institutional change. Filled with sharp observations and bold claims, Platonic Legislations shows that it is possible to see Plato—and our own legal culture—in a new light “In this provocative, intelligent, and elegant work D. L. Dusenbury has posed crucial questions not only as regards Plato’s thought in the making, but also as regards our contemporaneity.”—Giorgio Camassa, University of Udine “There is a tension in Greek law, and in Greek legal thinking, between an understanding of law as unchangeable and authoritative, and a recognition that formal rules are often insufficient for the interpretation of reality, and need to be constantly revised to match it. Dusenbury’s book illuminates the sophistication of Plato’s legal thought in its engagement with this tension, and explores the potential of Plato’s reflection for modern legal theory.”—Mirko Canevaro, The University of Edinburgh. (shrink)

Conscious experience is constitutive of existence. This entails the metaphysical theory known variously as 'mental monism' and 'subjective idealism'. It is summed up by Berkeley's motto that esse is either percipere or percipi: to be is to perceive or be perceived.

This short essay is a follow-on to Mental Monism Considered as a Solution to the Mind- Body Problem, in ‘Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness’, edited by Alexander Batthyany and Avshalom Elitzur, published by Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt, December 2005. It was originally planned as a final section of that essay but, at forty-four pages the latter was already oversize, so the parapsychology section was dropped from that publication.

These are the proceedings of the First International Conference on Compu- tional Logic (CL 2000) which was held at Imperial College in London from 24th to 28th July, 2000. The theme of the conference covered all aspects of the theory, implementation, and application of computational logic, where computational logic is to be understood broadly as the use of logic in computer science. The conference was collocated with the following events: { 6th International Conference on Rules and Objects in Databases (DOOD (...) 2000) { 10th International Workshop on Logic-based Program Synthesis and Tra- formation (LOPSTR 2000) { 10th International Conference on Inductive Logic Programming (ILP 2000). CL 2000 consisted of seven streams: { Program Development (LOPSTR 2000) { Logic Programming: Theory and Extensions { Constraints { Automated Deduction: Putting Theory into Practice { Knowledge Representation and Non-monotonic Reasoning { Database Systems (DOOD 2000) { Logic Programming: Implementations and Applications. The LOPSTR 2000 workshop constituted the program development stream and the DOOD 2000 conference constituted the database systems stream. Each stream had its own chair and program committee, which autonomously selected the papers in the area of the stream. Overall, 176 papers were submitted, of which 86 were selected to be presented at the conference and appear in these proceedings. The acceptance rate was uniform across the streams. In addition, LOPSTR 2000 accepted about 15 extended abstracts to be presented at the conference in the program development stream. (shrink)

O'Brien & Opie's vehicle hypothesis is an attractive framework for the study of consciousness. To fully embrace the hypothesis, however, two of the authors' claims should be extended: first, since phenomenal content is entirely dependent on occurrent brain events and only contingently correlated with external events, it is no longer necessary to regard states of consciousness as representations. Second, the authors' insistence that only stable states of a neural network are conscious seems ad hoc.

The common belief regarding contraception is that it leads to reductions in abortion, and many in the pro-life movement hold this belief, some going so far as to support access to contraception as a means to reducing abortion. A review of the abortion industry’s own studies and statistics reveal, however, that the opposite is true—widespread access to contraceptives actually leads to increases in the abortion rate. To oppose abortion, the pro-life movement should speak with a unified voice in opposition to (...) contraception as well. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.2 : 231–239. (shrink)

Comments on Fullerton's paper, 'The doctrine of space and time' (1901). Fullerton adapts both Kantian and Berkelian doctrine of space, but his view on space is dominated more by the Berkelian views. His views on time are the same as that on space. His comparative study on animals has been criticized since it is claimed that animals are living wholes and abstracting certain parts have little value for fundamental comparison. The concepts of infinity and infinite divisibility are considered important. However, (...) he misses the real import of infinity by recognizing the possibility of infinite divisibility and ignores the distinction between being infinitely divisible and infinitely divided. The world according to him is not given directly by intuition and consciousness can only represent it. (shrink)