A popular version of anti-Humeanism is one that views fundamental properties as being irreducibly dispositional in nature, and it is a view to which I am attracted. Proponents of this view typically object to Humean regularity theories of laws on the basis that they do not explain why our world is regular rather than chaotic from moment to moment. It is thought that, for this reason, Humeanism does not provide firm enough foundations for induction. However, in this paper I argue (...) that it is far from clear how these anti-Humeans can themselves explain this regularity. This is because it is far from clear how they can explain why the entities in our world do not change their dispositional properties arbitrarily over time. This is a neglected problem, which I call the retention problem. In an attempt to solve this problem, several naturalistic explanations of retention are explored. Unfortunately, none of these explanations is free of problems, showing that dispositional forms of anti-Humeanism may not have as many advantages as some have assumed where the problem of induction is concerned. (shrink)

I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners ofpresentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. (...) In closing, I argue that the proposed manners of presentation are consistent with key direct-realist claims about the structure of visual awareness. (shrink)

The aim of this volume is to critically assess the philosophical importance of phenomenology as a method for studying the normativity of meaning and its transcendental conditions. Using the pioneering work of Steven Crowell as a springboard, phenomenologists from all over the world examine the promise of phenomenology for illuminating long-standing problems in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, action theory, the philosophy of religion, and moral psychology. The essays are unique in that they engage with the phenomenological tradition not as (...) a collection of authorities to whom we must defer, or a set of historical artifacts we must preserve, but rather as a community of interlocutors with views that bear on important issues in contemporary philosophy. The book is divided into three thematic sections, each examining different clusters of issues aimed at moving the phenomenological project forward. The first section explores the connection between normativity and meaning, and asks us to rethink the relation between the factual realm and the categories of validity in terms of which things can show up as what they are. The second section examines the nature of the self that is capable of experiencing meaning. It includes essays on intentionality, agency, consciousness, naturalism, and moral normativity. The third section addresses questions of philosophical methodology, examining if and why phenomenology should have priority in the analysis of meaning. Finally, the book concludes with an afterword written by Steven Crowell. Normativity, Meaning, and the Promise of Phenomenology will be a key resource for students and scholars interested in the phenomenological tradition, the transcendental tradition from Kant to Davidson, and existentialism. Additionally, its forward-looking focus yields crucial insights into pressing philosophical problems that will appeal to scholars working across all areas of the discipline. ks us to rethink the relation between the factual realm and the categories of validity in terms of which things can show up as what they are. The second section examines the nature of the self that is capable of experiencing meaning. It includes essays on intentionality, agency, consciousness, naturalism, and moral normativity. The third section addresses questions of philosophical methodology, examining if and why phenomenology should have priority in the analysis of meaning. Finally, the book concludes with an afterword written by Steven Crowell. Normativity, Meaning, and the Promise of Phenomenology will be a key resource for students and scholars interested in the phenomenological tradition, the transcendental tradition from Kant to Davidson, and existentialism. Additionally, its forward-looking focus yields crucial insights into pressing philosophical problems that will appeal to scholars working across all areas of the discipline. (shrink)

This book examines the origins and subsequent evolution of multicellularity. The transition from unicellular to multicellular life was one of a few major events in the history of life that created new opportunities for more complex biological systems to evolve.

When Saint Thomas Aquinas makes claims such as “that which is not just seems to be no law at all” it is a bit difficult to discern what he means. Some think that Aquinas is defending what is now called the Strong Natural Law Thesis: for all X, X is a law only if X is just. Others think that Aquinas is defending what is now called the Weak Natural Law Thesis: for all X, X is a non-defective law only (...) if X is just. In this paper, focusing on Aquinas’s metaphysics, I argue that both of these interpretations are mistaken. Aquinas is primarily defending what we can call The Metaphysical Natural Law Thesis: since being and goodness are convertible, legal validity comes in degrees—and this entails that the justice of a law literally increases the amount of being a law possesses, while the injustice of a law literally decreases the amount of being a law possesses. On this interpretation, then, the injustice of a law entails an ontological attenuation of the law without entailing an ontological annihilation of the law. (shrink)

Contemporary scholarship concerning science diplomacy is increasingly taking a historical approach. In our introduction to this special issue, we argue that this approach promises insight into science diplomacy because of the tools historians of science bring to their work. In particular, we observe that not only are historians of science currently poised to chart the diplomatic aspects involved in the transnational circulation of technoscientific knowledge, materials, and expertise. They are ready to bring critical global analysis to an important phenomenon that (...) has too often been treated as a benign diplomacy device deployed by the Global North without equal reference to the Global South. Through cases discussed in the articles of the special issue, however, we see that historically, in the Global South as well as the Global North, science diplomacy has often functioned to mediate the circulation of technoscientific knowledge and materials, and its historical study helps to better illuminate the resulting knowledge-power nexus. (shrink)

This essay criticises ‘modest’ one‐child policies, which would impose sanctions upon parents who create multiple children. Specifically, this article considers what the state owes individuals who would be born (illegally) beneath restrictive procreative policies and argues that such policies would fail to show due respect to second‐ or third‐born individuals created beneath them. First, I argue that modest procreative restrictions (like sanctions) are likely to generate only modest compliance. I then suggest it is reasonable to think a one‐child policy fails (...) to demonstrate due respect to existing second and third children. I argue that such a policy generates an undue burden on any second or third children who would be born beneath them, before concluding by considering whether the state might be able to avoid effectively reinscribing ‘bastardy’ into its law by locating responsibility for the effects of such a policy entirely on the parents, rather than on children. (shrink)

Neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC) are foundational to the scientific study of consciousness. Chalmers (2000) has provided the most informative and influential definition of NCC, according to which neural correlates are minimally sufficient for consciousness. However, the sense of sufficiency needs further clarification since there are several relevant senses with different entailments. In section one of this article, we give an overview of the desiderata for a good definition of NCC and Chalmers’s definition. The second section analyses the (...) merit of understanding the sufficiency of neural correlates for corresponding consciousness according to three relevant types of sufficiency: logical, metaphysical, and physical. In section three, a theoretical approach to consciousness studies is suggested in light of the sense in which NCC are sufficient for consciousness. Section four addresses a concern some might have about this approach. By the end, it will become apparent that our conception of NCC has important implications for research methodology, neuroethics, and the vitality of the search for NCC. (shrink)

In four studies, we investigated the role of remembering, reflecting on, and mutating personal past moral transgressions to learn from those moral mistakes and to form intentions for moral improvement. Participants reported having ruminated on their past wrongdoings, particularly their more severe transgressions, and they reported having frequently thought about morally better ways in which they could have acted instead (i.e., morally upward counterfactuals; Studies 1–3). The more that participants reported having mentally simulated morally better ways in which they could (...) have acted, the stronger their intentions were to improve in the future (Studies 2 and 3). Implementing an experimental manipulation, we then found that making accessible a morally upward counterfactual after committing a moral transgression strengthened reported intentions for moral improvement—relative to resimulating the remembered event and considering morally worse ways in which they could have acted instead (Study 4). We discuss the implications of these results for competing theoretical views on the relationship between memory and morality and for functional theories of counterfactual thinking. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the causal framework within which integrated information theory of consciousness makes it claims. We argue that, in its current formulation, IIT is threatened by the causal exclusion problem. Some proponents of IIT have attempted to thwart the causal exclusion problem by arguing that IIT has the resources to demonstrate genuine causal emergence at macro scales. In contrast, we argue that their proposed solution to the problem is damagingly circular as a result of inter-defining information and (...) causation. As a solution, we propose that IIT should adopt the specific interventionist causal framework that we offer and show how IIT can harness this interventionist framework to avoid the causal exclusion problem. We demonstrate how our argument remains fully compatible with the methodology, empirical data, and conceptual aims of the theory. (shrink)

The scientific challenges and ethical controversies facing human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research continue to command attention. The issues posed by patenting hESC technologies have, however, largely failed to penetrate the discourse, much less result in political action. This paper examines U.S. and European patent systems, illustrating discrepancies in the patentability of hESC technologies and identifying potential negative consequences associated with efforts to make available hESC research tools for basic research purposes while at same time strengthening the position of certain (...) patent-holders' rights. Differences between the U.S. and the European contexts may in part explain why the course of hESC research in those jurisdictions ultimately diverges. Nevertheless, questions about whether and how patenting, related agreements, and licensing practices progress and shape the field of hESC research in both the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere must no longer be marginalised. These questions are fundamentally important in determining what benefits are likely to result from hESC research. Assuring these benefits is the moral issue with which patent systems are most intrinsically concerned, and that governments must begin to directly address rather than assume or ignore. (shrink)

Can a scientific naturalist be a mathematical realist? I review some arguments, derived largely from the writings of Penelope Maddy, for a negative answer. The rejoinder from the realist side is that the irrealist cannot explain, as well as the realist can, why a naturalist should grant the mathematician the degree of methodological autonomy that the irrealist's own arguments require. Thus a naturalist, as such, has at least as much reason to embrace mathematical realism as to embrace irrealism.

This article argues that considering cross-sector collaborations through the lens of indigenous-corporate engagements yields a more comprehensive understanding of the range of cross-sector engagement types, emphasizes the importance of cross-cultural bridge building which has received little attention in the literature :849–873, 2005), and highlights the potential for innovation via collaborations with fringe stakeholders. The study offers a more overarching typology of cross-sector collaborations and, building on an ethical approach to sustainable development with indigenous peoples, proposes a theoretical framework for cross-cultural (...) bridge building between businesses and fringe stakeholders. By incorporating this framework into the literature on value creation in cross-sector collaborations, we suggest a model for value creation in cross-sector collaborations with fringe stakeholders. Finally, using case studies to illustrate the article’s theoretical arguments, we demonstrate the model’s usefulness for the analysis and development of indigenous-corporate collaborations. (shrink)

The rise of populism and nationalism in the West have raised concerns about the fragility of liberal political values, chief among them tolerance. But what alternative social resources exist for cultivating the interpersonal relationships and mutual goodwill necessary for sustainable peace? And how might the lived practices of religious communities carry potential to reinterpret or re-circuit these interpersonal tensions and transform the relationship with the cultural "other" (Fremde) from "foe" (Feind) to "friend" (Freund)? This volume contributes a unique analysis of (...) this shifting discourse by viewing the contemporary socio-political upheaval through the lens of Friedrich Schleiermacher's theology, with a focus on the themes of friendship, interpersonal subjectivity, and sociability as a path beyond mere tolerance. Each of the essays of the volume is written by an internationally recognized scholar in the field, and the volume examines Schleiermacher's novel reflections across multiple social contexts, including North America, Great Britain, western Europe, and South Africa. As these essays demonstrate, the implications of this conversation continue to resound in contemporary religious communities and political discourse. (shrink)

This thesis offers an original theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments based on the Francophone interpretation of the Hellenistic conception of self-cultivation. Recently Harry Frankfurt, Bernard Williams, and Susan Wolf have argued that practical philosophers must direct more attention to how our passionate attachments radically affect our resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’. By neglecting this topic, these thinkers argue, we overlook some of the strongest and most distinctively human motivations that guide our practical (...) lives, ones that have a powerful effect on our capacity to flourish. Not only should philosophers explain how our moral obligations and prudential concerns guide our conduct, they should also explain how and why we are guided by deep-seated passionate attachments, considerations that Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf argue provide the conditions for leading a life with a sense of meaning and purpose. Despite viewing passionate attachments as being vitally important, Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf offer separate accounts of either why we cannot actively cultivate them, or why we cannot form a philosophical theory of doing so. If there is a way in which we can cultivate our passionate attachments, then these thinkers argue that we must look outside philosophy: to the contingency of personal preference, to self-help instruction manuals, to guidance from religious traditions, or in extremis to clinical psychology. My study aims to show that this attitude is overly pessimistic. Not only do we have reason to view passionate attachments as susceptible to growth, change, and improvement, but we should view these entities as amenable to self-cultivation. Only by understanding this process can we construct a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments. Focusing on Pierre Hadot’s and Michel Foucault’s respective accounts of Hellenistic self-cultivation, provides vital conceptual tools to formulate a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments. First, their accounts of Hellenistic self-cultivation offer the conceptual resources for a philosophical theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. Second, the exercises of self-cultivation they focus on allow us to outline a practical method though which we can cultivate our passionate character. This takes the exercises of self-cultivation beyond their historical use, as well as beyond their role in the respective projects of these Francophone thinkers. Doing this brings out a significantly new dimension to the role of the passionate attachments in the flourishing life: not only are they valuable in the way Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf suggest, but we can offer theoretical and practical accounts how we can cultivate them based on the Hellenistic conception of self-directed character change. (shrink)

Much critical attention has been given to Isabella’s non-answer to Duke Vincentio’s marriage proposal at the conclusion of Measure for Measure. What critics have failed to notice is that Isabella’s non-answer is not a unique or singular moment in the play. In fact, this paper will apply the theories of Slavoj Žižek to argue that the logic of subtraction, the negative gesture of non-compliance to which Isabella gives especially pronounced form, is fundamental to the structure of the play in its (...) entirety. Two characters in particular, Isabella and Barnardine, demonstrate the possibility of occupying a subjective orientation that is at once under the sway of the law and aware of the law’s incomplete hold on the subject. Ultimately, I will show that the logic of subtraction and refusal has important implications for how the play understands the potential political power of various forms of labor, especially sexual labor. (shrink)

This chapter follows Conee and Feldman in assuming the traditional conception of the mental. Thus, the author takes it that mentalistic evidentialism is inconsistent with process reliabilism. It examines Goldman's critique of evidentialism's account of the justification of memory beliefs and discusses a problem for Goldman's own reliabilist account of memory beliefs. The chapter distinguishes two sorts of epistemic status at issue and not usually clearly separated in these debates, historical justification vs. justification to retain a belief. It raises doubts (...) about the resources of reliabilism for explaining justification to retain beliefs; and makes a plea for a less ambitious account of justification to retain beliefs, a restricted form of epistemic conservatism. The chapter argues that the conservative account that the author recommend represents a kind of neutral baseline, insofar as there are both reliabilist‐friendly as well as evidentialist‐friendly arguments for it. (shrink)

Re-Reading Hanslick’s Aesthetics: Die Rezeption Eduard Hanslicks im englischen Sprachraum und ihre diskursiven GrundlagenWILFINGALEXANDERHollitzer Wissenschaftsverlag. 2019. pp. 432. £60.00.

To corroborate the music and social bonding hypothesis, we propose that future investigations isolate specific components of social bonding and consider the influence of context. We deconstruct and operationalize social bonding through the lens of social psychology and provide examples of specific measures that can be used to assess how the link between music and sociality varies by context.

_Evil Media_ develops a philosophy of media power that extends the concept of media beyond its tried and trusted use in the games of meaning, symbolism, and truth. It addresses the gray zones in which media exist as corporate work systems, algorithms and data structures, twenty-first century self-improvement manuals, and pharmaceutical techniques. _Evil Media _invites the reader to explore and understand the abstract infrastructure of the present day. From search engines to flirting strategies, from the value of institutional stupidity to (...) the malicious minutiae of databases, this book shows how the devil is in the details. The title takes the imperative "Don't be evil" and asks, what would be done any differently in contemporary computational and networked media were that maxim reversed. Media here are about much more and much less than symbols, stories, information, or communication: media do things. They incite and provoke, twist and bend, leak and manage. In a series of provocative stratagems designed to be used, Evil Media sets its reader an ethical challenge: either remain a transparent intermediary in the networks and chains of communicative power or become oneself an active, transformative medium. (shrink)

This volume brings together for the first time a collection of studies that investigates how multilingual speakers construct emotions in their talk as a joint discursive practice. The contributions draw on the well established, converging traditions of conversation analysis, discursive psychology, and membership categorization analysis together with recent work on interactional storytelling, stylization, and multimodal analysis. By adopting a discursive approach to emotion in multilingual talk, the volume breaks with the dominant view of emotions as cognitive and intra-psychological phenomena and (...) their study through self-report. Through detailed analyses of original recorded data, the chapters examine how participants produce emotion-implicative actions, identities, stances, and morality through their interactional work in ordinary face-to-face conversation, computer-mediated interaction, institutional talk in medical, educational, and broadcast media settings, and in research interviews. The volume addresses itself to students and researchers interested in language and emotion, multilingual speakers and settings, pragmatics, and discourse analysis. (shrink)

How should contemporary Thomistic theologians speak of providence and predestination? This essay suggests that St. Catherine of Siena’s approach to the doctrine provides a model for Thomistic theology today. After examining biblical teaching and the guidelines proposed by the Catechism of the Catholic Church, I explore in some detail the positions of Hans Urs von Balthasar and Jacques Maritain, both of whom sought to overcome what they perceived to be difficulties in the Thomistic account of predestination. I conclude by proposing (...) a retrieval of the perspective of St. Catherine of Siena. (shrink)

Some philosophers argue that we are justified in rejecting skepticism because it is explanatorily inferior to more commonsense hypotheses about the world. Focusing on the work of Jonathan Vogel, I show that this “abductivist” or “inference to the best explanation” response rests on an impoverished explanatory framework which ignores the explanatory gap between an object's having certain properties and its appearing to have those properties. Once this gap is appreciated, I argue, the abductivist strategy is defeated.

If the end of metaphysics is not upon us, then phenomenology must be at an end instead. Or so we are told, at least, by the “new realists,” or at least by some of the thinkers I’ll refer to using this term. And why shouldn’t we agree with them? If there’s anything at all to be said for the line of thinking that they advance, then today, we are at long last licensed to speak about beings once again; but apparently, (...) phenomenology deals only with consciousness, which we must admit—assuming we have a realist bone in our bodies—does not determine beings themselves at all. To persist with the phenomenological method, rather, would be to block all progress in philosophy—or so, again, some of these “new realists” will... (shrink)

During the past few decades, Quentin Skinner has been one of the most prominent critics of the ideas about negative liberty that have developed out of the writings of Isaiah Berlin. Among Skinner?s principal charges against the contemporary doctrine of negative liberty is the claim that the proponents of that doctrine have overlooked the putative fact that people can be made unfree to refrain from undertaking particular actions. In connection with this matter, Skinner contrasts the present-day theories with the prototypical (...) liberal account of negative freedom propounded by Thomas Hobbes. The present essay challenges Skinner?s position both philosophically and exegetically. Because an agent can always elect to cease his activity as an agent, the ostensible inescapability of certain actions is not the same as the outright inescapability of certain instances of inaction. Once this point is properly recognized, the way is clear for a re-evaluation of Hobbes (and of Skinner on Hobbes). (shrink)

I expose a tension in Bertrand Russell's, _Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, between his account of logical truth and his view that logical truth is knowable without taking into account what the world is like. Russell makes the logical truth of a sentence turn on the actual truth of its second-order universal closure. But this results in making logical truth relative to the number of worldly individuals. I aim to use the tension in _Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy to classify the status (...) of the model-theoretic account as an analysis of the modal notions in classical logic. (shrink)