Epistemic deontology is the view that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological: a justified belief is, by definition, an epistemically permissible belief. I defend this view against the argument from doxastic involuntarism, according to which our doxastic attitudes are not under our voluntary control, and thus are not proper objects for deontological evaluation. I argue that, in order to assess this argument, we must distinguish between a compatibilist and a libertarian construal of the concept of voluntary control. If we (...) endorse a compatibilist construal, it turns out that we enjoy voluntary control over our doxastic attitudes after all. If, on the other hand, we endorse a libertarian construal, the result is that, for our doxastic attitudes to be suitable objects of deontological evaluation, they need not be under our voluntary control. (shrink)

In this paper, we trace the conceptual history of the term ?metamathematics? in the nineteenth century. It is well known that Hilbert introduced the term for his proof-theoretic enterprise in about 1922. But he was verifiably inspired by an earlier usage of the phrase in the 1870s. After outlining Hilbert's understanding of the term, we will explore the lines of inducement and elucidate the different meanings of ?metamathematics? in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Finally, we will investigate the (...) earlier occurrences and come to the conclusion that the conceptual prehistory of the Hilbertian notion of metamathematics dates back to 1870, whereas the history of the word starts in 1799 at the latest. What is this: metamathematics? It is something amazing everybody, [?] since it makes the mind dizzy and withdraws thinking its sole fulcrum.1 1 Brunner 1898, p. 832: ?Was ist das: Metamathematik? Es ist etwas, was einen Jeden in das äusserste Staunen versetzt, [?] was das Gehirn schwindlig macht und dem Denken seinen einzigen Stütz- und Angelpunkt zu entziehen droht? (shrink)

Doerig et al. have set several criteria that theories of consciousness need to fulfill. By these criteria, higher-order theories fare better than most existing theories. But they also argue that higher-order theories may not be able to answer both the ‘small network argument’ and the ‘other systems argument’. In response, we focus on the case of the Perceptual Reality Monitoring theory to explain why higher-order theories do just fine.

In the face of the ever-growing effect the actions of the present may have upon future people, most conspicuously around climate change, democracy has been accused, with good justification, of a presentist bias: of systemically favouring the presently living. By contrast, this paper will argue that the intimate relation, both quasi-ontological and normative, that Derrida's work establishes between temporality and justice insists upon another, more future-regarding aspect of democracy. We can get at this aspect by arguing for two consequences of (...) the deconstructive affirmation of sur-vivre, of the alterity of death in life. Firstly, justice is not first of all justice for the living, but intergenerational from the start. This is so because no generation coincides with itself; rather, it dies and is reborn at every moment, and so – and this is the second consequence – consists in taking turns. Affirming life as living-on means affirming that it involves exchanging life's stations, as the young become the old, and the unborn become the dead. In this sense, the justice of living-on, I will argue, shares an essential feature with democracy, whose principle of exchanging the rulers with the ruled led Derrida to characterize it in terms of the wheel. Democracy consists in the principled assent to power changing hands, a switchover life demands of every generation at every turn. This assent further requires an acceptance of the gift of inheritance without which no life can survive. But as the gift can also never be fully acknowledged or appropriated, it must be passed on to the indefinite, unknown future, in a turning that is the time of life. (shrink)

Having a confirmation bias sometimes leads us to hold inaccurate beliefs. So, the puzzle goes: why do we have it? According to the influential argumentative theory of reasoning, confirmation bias emerges because the primary function of reason is not to form accurate beliefs, but to convince others that we’re right. A crucial prediction of the theory, then, is that confirmation bias should be found only in the reasoning domain. In this article, we argue that there is evidence that confirmation bias (...) does exist outside the reasoning domain. This undermines the main evidential basis for the argumentative theory of reasoning. In presenting the relevant evidence, we explore why having such confirmation bias may not be maladaptive. (shrink)

Parsons’ sick role concept has become problematic in the face of the increased significance of chronic illnesses and the growing emphasis on lifestylecentred health promotion. Both developments de-limit the medical system so that it extends into the world of health, fundamentally changing the doctor-patient relationship. But as the sick role is firmly based on the reciprocities of a resiliently capitalist achievement society it still informs normative expectations in the field of health and illness. The precarious social position of chronic patients (...) between being governed by and being consumers of medicine, I will argue, can only be adequately understood if one involves, as Parsons did, the moral economy surrounding health and illness. (shrink)

The literature on agentive or practical knowledge tends to be focused on knowing what one is doing or what one is going to do. Knowing what one has done and has achieved thereby seems to be another matter. In fact, achievements are often taken to be beyond the ken of practical knowledge. I argue that this is a mistake. The intelligibility of the very idea of practical knowledge depends on the possibility of knowing one's achievements in the same manner. For (...) if it is to be intelligible as knowledge of the actuality of one's action in the material world, knowing what one is doing has to include knowledge of what one has done so far. (shrink)

This study endorses the use of data envelopment analysis, which uses benefit-of-the-doubt weighting to evaluate the social, economic and overall performance of social enterprises. This methodology is especially useful for creating composite indicators based on multiple outputs expressed in different measurement units, and allows for enterprise-specific weighting of the different objectives. Applying this methodology on a unique longitudinal dataset of Flemish sheltered workshops suggests that social enterprises may face different types of mission drift. Further, our results show that top-performing social (...) enterprises are more economically and socially efficient than low performers. These top performers also have a stronger economic orientation, which sheds new light on the balance between social and economic orientations in social enterprises. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 7, Page 1014-1034, September 2022. The plural, impure or discordant nature of time has become an important theme in recent critical social and political theory. Against Althusser’s dismissal of Sartre’s presumedly Hegelian understanding of time and history, this article establishes Jean-Paul Sartre as a key figure in this debate on the plurality of temporalities. Especially in the Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre understands history and the social in terms of a multiplicity of uneven (...) and non-synchronous temporalisations, rejecting an notion of time as a universal container within which events take place. The originality of Sartre’s approach is that it establishes a link between the notion of the plurality of temporalities and the problem of freedom and domination. His mature social and political theory allows us to understand temporalisation as a strategy for domination, and objective social temporality as key to a form of anonymous or structural domination. A reconstruction of this highly complex and sophisticated approach to thinking domination through time can also shed an original light on the temporal dimension of democracy and totalitarianism. (shrink)

This paper defends the normativity of meaning thesis by clearing up a misunderstanding about what the thesis amounts to. The misunderstanding is that according to it, failing to use an expression in accordance with the norms which constitute its meaning amounts to changing the expression’s meaning. If this was what the thesis claimed, then it would indeed be easy to show that meaning norms do not yield prescriptions and cannot be followed. However, there is another reading: what is constitutive of (...) meaning is not the norm’s being followed, but the norm’s being applicable. On this reading, some standard arguments against the thesis lose their force. After discussing the alternative reading and its consequences, the paper goes on to sketch a model of how norms of meaning become applicable in the first place. This model supports the view that talk of meaning has its pragmatic home in contexts of linguistic calibration. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Das Mittelalter Jahrgang: 19 Heft: 2 Seiten: 302-325.

This paper argues that ceteris paribus (cp) laws exist based on a Lewisian best system analysis of lawhood (BSA). Furthermore, it shows that a BSA faces a second trivialization problem besides the one identified by Lewis. The first point concerns an argument against cp laws by Earman and Roberts. The second point aims to help making some assumptions of the BSA explicit. To address the second trivialization problem, a restriction in terms of natural logical constants is proposed that allows one (...) to describe regularities, as specified by basic generics (e.g. ‘birds can fly’) and universals (e.g. ‘all birds can fly’). It is argued that cp laws rather than strict laws might be a part of the the best system of such a regularity-based BSA, since sets of cp laws can be both (a) simpler and (b) stronger when reconstructed as generic non-material conditionals. Yet, if sets of cp laws might be a part of the best system of a BSA and thus qualify as proper laws of nature, it seems reasonable to conclude that at least some cp laws qualify as proper laws of nature. (shrink)

The Norwegian National Committee for Research Ethics inScience and Technology (NENT), collaborating with The NorwegianFisherman''s Association and The Research Council of Norway,started in 1999 a project aiming at an ethical assessment of Norwegian fisheries for the year 2020. The project was to preparethe ground for ethical debate in and of the fishery sector inview of pending important decisions on long term strategies. Thispaper has its focus on the method used for achieving these aims,rather than the substantive results concerning the fisheries. (...) Amethod was developed for this purpose, called the ethicalscenario process. This included the construction of scenarios forthe future of Norwegian fisheries, using an ethical matrix for evaluating strategies, and organizing a ``value workshop'''' whereparticipants from different stakeholder groups came together todo ethical evaluations. The positive achievements and theshortcomings of this method are discussed in this paper. The useof an ethical matrix was meant to combine a participatory approachwith insights from theoretical ethics. The project revealedinherent tensions between these two objectives. Possible ways ofdealing with this tension are indicated, but in general a goodgrasp of the socio-political context might be the best guardianagainst the possible pitfalls involved in such an approach. (shrink)

Assuming an essential difference between scientific data and phenomena, this paper argues for the view that we have to understand how empirical findings get transformed into scientific phenomena. The work of scientists is seen as largely consisting in constructing these phenomena which are then utilized in more abstract theories. It is claimed that these matters are of importance for discussions of theory choice and progress in science. A case study is presented as a starting point: paleomagnetism and the use of (...) paleomagnetic data in early discussions of continental drift. Some general features of this study are presented in formalized language. It is suggested that the presentation given is particularly suited for a semantic conception of theories. Even though the construction of scientific phenomena is the main topic of this paper, the view presented here is more adapted to realism than social constructivism. (shrink)

Freges Kontextprinzip "Nur im Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Wörter etwas" hat auch nach der von ihm vollzogenen Angleichung von Behauptungssätzen an Eigennamen Gültigkeit für die formale Sprache der "Grundgesetze". Der Bedeutungsvollständigkcitsbeweis, den er für sein Logiksystem anstrebt, schließt eine unmittelbare Anwendung dieses Prinzips nicht nur auf die unvollständigen Funktionsausdrücke, sondern auch auf die leerstellenfreien Wertverlaufsnamen ein. Wahrheitsnamen (Sätze) zeichnen sich vor anderen symbolsprachlichen Eigennamen in mehrfacher Hinsicht, insbesondere durch ihre semantische Selbständigkeit aus. Wertverlaufsnamen haben nur im Zusammenhang eines Wahrheitswertnamens (...) eine Bedeutung. Ihre Bedeutung besteht in ihrem Beitrag zur Bestimmung der Bedeutung von Wahrheitswertnamen, in denen sie vorkommen. (shrink)

This work considers Valkyries in the medieval Scandinavian mythology and literature and places them in the context of the early history of European religion. Drawing on textual and archaeological sources, a detailed review of Celtic, Etruscan and Graeco-Roman female demons of the battlefield and of death is presented, and their remarkable similarity with the Valkyries analysed against the background of Mediterranean-transalpine cultural contacts.

(2013). Critical notice of Aaron James, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 382-401.

Expert athletes are determined to make faster and better decisions, as revealed in several simple heuristic studies using verbal reports or micro-movement responses. However, heuristic decision-making experiments that require motor responses, also being considered as the embodied-choice experiments, are still underrepresented. Furthermore, it is less understood how decision time and confidence depend on the type of embodied choices players make. To scrutinize the decision-making processes, this study investigated the embodied choices of male athletes with different expertise in a close-to-real-life environment; (...) 22 elite, and 22 amateur team handball players performed a sport-specific embodied-choice test. Attack sequences were shown to the players, who had to choose between four provided options by giving a respective sport-specific motor response. We analyzed the frequencies of specific choices and the best choice, as well as the respective decision time and decision confidence. Elite and amateur players differed in the frequencies of specific choices, and elite players made the best choice more often. Slower decision times of elite players were revealed in specific choices and in best choices, the confidence of decisions was rated equally high by both player groups. Indications are provided that elite players make better choices rather slower, instead of faster. We suppose this is due to specific sensorimotor interactions and speed-accuracy-tradeoffs in favor of accuracy in elite players. Our findings extend expert decision-making research by using an embodied-choice paradigm, highlighting considerations of decision time and confidence in future experiments. (shrink)

Unter »globaler Armut« wird das Phänomen verstanden, dass Teile der Weltbevölkerung über so wenig Ressourcen verfügen, dass sie ihre Grundbedürfnisse nicht befriedigen können. In der Debatte um globale Armut wird gefragt, wer in globaler Perspektive arm ist; welche Ursachen und welche Folgen diese Armut hat; warum und wie sie bekämpft werden sollte. Die globale Perspektive gibt dabei in drei Hinsichten vor, wie der Armutsbegriff in diesem Kontext zu verstehen ist, und diese drei begrifflichen Festlegungen prägen die gesamte Debatte um das (...) Phänomen globaler Armut. (shrink)

Das Kernanliegen der philosophischen Arbeiten Ludwig Sieps ist die Formulierung einer praktischen Philosophie für die Gegenwart. In seinen jüngeren Arbeiten sind insbesondere der Begriff der Natur und der Begriff der Erfahrung in den Fokus gerückt. Eine plausible Ethik muss nach Siep einerseits eine evaluative Naturbetrachtung und insbesondere eine Reflexion der Natur des Menschen umfassen. Andererseits muss sie aber auch, weil sie sich nicht auf apriorische Prinzipien stützen kann, ein Konzept der historischen Erfahrung heranziehen, wenn sie Antworten auf die heute relevanten (...) Fragen geben möchte. Der Band behandelt anlässlich des 75. Geburtstages Ludwig Sieps zentrale Aspekte seiner jüngeren Arbeiten, teils kritisch und teils mit Vorschlägen für mögliche Weiterentwicklungen. Ziel dieser Auseinandersetzung mit dem philosophischen Denken Ludwig Sieps ist es, entlang der systematischen Linien »Natur« und »Erfahrung« Bausteine zu einer praktischen Philosophie der Gegenwart zu diskutieren. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:From Dilthey to Mead and Heidegger: Systematic and Historical Relations MATTHIASJUNG FOR TODAY'S READER, G. H. Mead's lectures on Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century offer a surprise: Mead, despite having attended his lectures from 1889 to 1891, does not mention the name of Wilhelm Dilthey, who nowadays is regarded as one of the classical authors of nineteenth-century philosophy. Mead's lectures lack any sign of awareness concerning the (...) hermeneutic tradition, represented by such names as Friedrich Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Droysen and, of course, Dilthey. Nevertheless it is, as I would like to show in the following pages, quite obvious that Mead's own philosophical conception shows some striking parallels with Dilthey's thought, which can be explained partly through direct influence, partly through the similarity of the questions both tried to answer. For Mead's missing reference to the mentioned tradition, I see two complementary explanations. Firstly, the philosophical importance of the hermeneutic tradition in nineteenth-century philosophy was mainly a retrospective matter. Only after 1927, when Martin Heidegger published Being and Time, did philosophical interest in hermeneutics begin; and then it took thirty-three years more till Hans-Georg Gadamer's Truth and Method brought about a historical interest in the development of hermeneutic thought. Secondly, Mead's own passion for the development of science may have forced him to neglect these philosophical movements, which seemed to resist the autocracy of (natural) science. Wilhelm Dilthey's thought, especially around the year 189o, can systematically be interpreted as a common starting-point for two of the most important directions of contemporary philosophy: pragmatism and hermeneutics. It is but a small exaggeration to say that G. H. Mead drew out the pragmatic, Martin Heidegger the hermeneutic consequences of Dilthey's concept of [661 ] 662 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33:4 OCTOBER ~995 Seelenleben, understood as a "best~indige Wechselwirkung zwischen unserem Eigenleben und dem Milieu. ''1 Mead's phase-model of acting, his whole idea of understanding meaning as the result of a social process, are paralleled and partly anticipated by Dilthey, as is Heidegger's conception of Dasein as "beingin -the-world" and his attempt to understand the inner historicity of life.2 In pointing this out, I do not want to claim that Mead was conscious of the systematic relation of his theories to Dilthey's work; nevertheless I will argue that Dilthey's ideas may have served as a source of inspiration and, furthermore, that this inspiration was made possible through some important similarities in the systematic architecture of both hermeneutics and pragmatism.3 I begin by working out the historical dimension, which Hans Joas characterized as "Meads biographische Abkunft von Dilthey"4 (section l). After that, I will sketch Dilthey's philosophical position around 189o in order to show how he works to transform the German tradition of "philosophy of consciousness" into a new concept of interaction between the life-processes of detranscendentalized subjects and their environment (section 2). Having done this, I will be ready to discuss the parallels between Mead's pragmatic approach to the life-process and Dilthey's work (section 3). Finally, the early Heidegger's and Mead's transformations of "philosophy of consciousness" will briefly be interpreted as different ways of overcoming the inherent problems of Dilthey 's attempt (section 4). Between April 23, 1889 and October ~4, 1891 G. H. Mead was registered at the Humboldt-University of Berlin.5 During this period Wilhelm Dilthey, who had come from Breslau to Berlin in 1882, gave the following lectures: "Geschichte der neueren Philosophie"; "Geschichte und System der P/idagogik "; "Logik und Erkenntnistheorie"; "Psychologie als Erfahrungswissen- ' Wilhelm Dilthey, DichterischeEinbildungskraft und Wahnsinn, in GesammelteSchriften, Bd. VI (Stuttgart/G6ttingen: Teubner/Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht, 1962),95. 9In Sein und Zeit (cited from the 15th edition, Tfibingen: Niemeyer, 1979),Heidegger refers frequently to Dilthey: 46, 47, 2o5, 2~ 249, 376f-, 385, 397-4o4 9The two most important sources concerning his early reception of Dilthey'swork are the lecture from the summer semester of 192o,Phi~nomenologieder Anschauung und des Ausdrucks, ed. C. Strube (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1993) and the "Kasseler Vortr~ge," given in 1925 under the title "Wilhelm Diltheys Forschungsarbeit und der... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 45 Heft: 1 Seiten: 158-177.

Dass eine Norm aus dem Naturrecht begründet ist, kann entweder bedeuten, dass sie aus einem Katalog naturrechtlicher Normen entnommen oder abgeleitet ist oder dass sie vom Urheber des Naturrechts angeordnet wurde oder dass unter Rückgriff auf das Naturrecht ihre Richtigkeit und daher auch ihre Geltung bewiesen werden kann. Diese Differenzierung korrespondiert teilweise einer stark schematisierenden Einteilung, nach der man die Naturrechtsgeschichte als Aufeinanderfolge eines Rechtes aus der Natur, eines Rechtes aus der Natur des Menschen und eines Rechtes aus der Natur (...) des Rechts zu fassen versucht. Diese Ansätze, die sich natürlich nicht genau separieren lassen und häufig ineinander greifen, waren für die Konzeption dessen, was unter Recht zu verstehen sei und wie man es bestimmen könne, zusammen mit dem römischen Recht und traditionellen Rechtsauffassungen im europäischen Raum für lange Zeit konstitutiv. (shrink)

Wenn Kant in der Einleitung zur Rechtslehre der Metaphysik der Sitten das Recht nach dem Satz vom Widerspruch "mit der Befugniß zu zwingen" verbindet , so scheint dies den völligen Verzicht auf die für das neuzeitliche Naturrecht typischen anthropologischen Prämissen zur Rechtfertigung des Zwanges zu implizieren. Auf der anderen Seite wird in § E die Verknüpfung des Rechtsbegriffs mit gleichem, wechselseitigen Zwang nach allgemeinen Gesetzen als dessen "Darstellung in der reinen Anschauung a priori" bezeichnet, was auf ein synthetisches Urteil apriori (...) hinzuweisen scheint. In einem ersten Abschnitt wird daher gezeigt, daß es sich hier nicht etwa um eine Inkonsistenz in Kants Werk handelt, sondern um eine Anwendung seiner Methodenlehre, parallel zum Begriff der Materie in den Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft. Die Anschauung in Form einiger basaler Kenntnisse über menschliches Verhalten sichert die Anwendbarkeit des Rechtsbegriffs, der dann tatsächlich analytisch mit der Befugnis zu zwingen verknüpft ist. In einem zweiten Abschnitt wird dem möglichen Vorwurf, dies ermögliche eine Legitimation beliebigen staatlichen Zwanges als rechtmäßig, damit begegnet, daß Kant gerade die Gleichheit, Wechselseitigkeit und Gesetzesbindung des Zwanges in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Der dritte Abschnitt weist darauf hin, daß gerade die elementaren Wahrheiten über menschliches Verhalten, die für die Rechtstheorie relevant sind, nicht ins empiristische analytisch-synthetisch-Schema passen, daß bestimmte fundamentale Annahmen über den Zweck von Recht und Moral jedenfalls nicht denselben Status besitzen wie jederzeit falsifizierbare empirische Resultate. (shrink)

The article shows that with respect to increasing complaints about the social coldness of our current society and awareness of the urgent needs in the global south it should be clear that we need a moral motivation to solidarity beyond all legal regulations. While at first glance it may seem seducing to draw on the concept of community in the sense of Tönnies, it becomes quickly clear that this is much more dangerous but useful. As the application of universal ethics (...) may be difficult in intercultural correlations, an interpretation of discourse ethics by Seyla Benhabib seems promising. The idea of identity may provide us with a number of insights, but it leads into a misinterpretation of democracy and, in the end, it is extremely dangerous for society if it is split into a growing number of identity groups. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: Is it the brain that makes a human being a person? This anthropological question has been raised because of the findings of modern human brain research, and there are severe ethical consequences anew: If the appropriate anthropological answer is yes, then all invasive research would be problematic, because one would touch the basis of human essence. The problem is that the two major philosophical paradigms that offer an answer to the anthropological question, dualism and monism, have (...) opposing concepts. Arguments: This paper argues that the error of these two paradigms is that they understand the human body and the human mind as ’res’– as things. The explanation of the human being as an interactive unit of body and mind is impossible in both paradigms. A third anthropological view that tries to make that understandable is the anthropology of the Hebrew Bible. It does assume the category ’thing’ while speaking about humans, it presumes the category ’aspect’. There is no Hebrew word for ’mind’ in contrast to ’body’ or vice versa. The biblical language only knows terms for the unity of human beings seen under a certain aspect. Conclusion: Here, the body and thus the brain are important and necessary condition for human essence, but this is not a sufficient explanation for the human personality. Invasive research on the human brain is here neither generally forbidden nor tolerated – one has to demonstrate in every single case whether the planned operation touches regions that are crucial for the personality of the human subject. (shrink)