The grand duchy of Luxembourg is a showcase example for the constructed nature of national identities. This book explores this construction process from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century, focusing on representations of the past, space and language.

Context: Varela’s neurophenomenology was conceived from the outset as a criticism and dissolution of the “hard problem” of the physical origin of consciousness. Indeed, the standard (….

There is a striking difference between the methodology of the young Einstein and that of the old. I argue that Einstein’s switch in the late 1910s from a moderate empiricism to an extreme rationalism should at least in part be understood against the background of his crushing personal and political experiences during the war years in Berlin. As a result of these experiences, Einstein started to put into practice what, drawing on Schopenhauer, he had preached for years, namely to use (...) science as his means of escaping from “the merely personal.” Whatever the exact sources of Einstein’s about-face, the older man has left us with a highly misleading picture of how the younger man achieved the successes that we still celebrate today. This has had a harmful influence on theoretical physics. If the young Einstein’s successes are any guide as to how successful theoretical physics is done, close adherence to general features of the empirical data is much more and mathematical elegance is much less important than the old Einstein wanted us to believe. (shrink)

The mechanisms by which bacteria adapt to changes in their environment involve transcriptional regulation in which a transcriptional regulator responds to signal(s) from the environment and regulates (positively or negatively) the expression of several genes or operons. Some of these regulators exert a positive feedback on their own expression. This is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for the occurrence of multistationarity. One biological consequence of multistationarity may be epigenetic modifications, a hypothesis unusual to microbiologists, in spite of some well-known (...) epigenetic modifications in bacteria. We propose here that the occurrence of mucoidy in the opportunistic pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa, which is currently attributed to mutations only, may also be an epigenetic modification. A theoretical approach using a generalised logical analysis lends credit to this hypothesis and suggests experiments to ascertain it. (shrink)

This book is an English-language translation of a bestselling book in France that explores the relationship between humans and new technologies.

As I am not at all a specialist on Gottlob Frege’s work, my comments intended initially to be focused on an aspect that emerges in the last part of Peter Clark’s paper “Frege, neo-logicism and applied mathematics” 1, where he treats the question of “applied mathematics” — an aspect that appealed to me and that was triggered by Frege’s relationship between numbers and concepts, and reasoning. Starting with this concern, I have been led by my subject to propose some considerations (...) about foundations and rationality which will go — briefly — in two directions. The first direction is that of a distinction between logical and rational foundations, whilst the second direction is that of taking into account as a fact the historical development of mathematics among the sciences, which modifies the terms of any foundational program. In delineating these considerations, I found that what I had in mind could apply to mathematics itself as well as to “applied mathematics”, thus deviating somewhat from my first explicit intention. In conclusion I shall consider the possibility of a rational foundation programme for mathematical and physico-mathematical sciences which would take into account the changes in the scientific contents and the widenings of the forms of rationality that, in my view, make these changes possible. Such foundations for knowledge would not be any more static, but dynamical and would be possibly considered only retrospectively: they would be “forward foundations”, in a sense that will be discussed in detail elsewhere. (shrink)

Toute science, admet-on, commence par détacher un objet en le rendant indépendant des sujets et des situations. Mais cette conception étroite de la connaissance scientifique laisse subsister des zones d'ombre. La conscience n'est pas un objet. Elle est ce sans quoi rien ne pourrait être pris pour objet. La conscience n'est pas détachable des sujets, car elle s'identifie à ce qui est vécu par un sujet. De façon analogue, en physique quantique, un phénomène n'est pas dissociable de son contexte expérimental, (...) car il s'identifie à ce qui se manifeste à grande échelle au laboratoire. Que faire pour ne pas laisser ces cas extrêmes de côté? Généraliser la méthode scientifique. Ne plus la borner à définir et à caractériser des objets, mais l'étendre à la coordination directe des expériences. Telle est la révolution de pensée qu'il faut accomplir pour résoudre, ou plutôt dissoudre, deux questions-limites de la science : le problème de l'origine de la conscience et le paradoxe du "chat de Schrödinger" en physique quantique. (shrink)

According to the traditional view, meaning presents itself under the form of some kind of identity.

ABSTRACT: In the 18th century, Kant evaluated that his historical period was not a time of enlightenment, but rather minority, because of man’s inability to use his own understanding. Adorno updated this problem, interpreting the minority in our presente in terms of loss of experience. Men are no longer apt to experience, because the technical and economic apparatus prevents the clarification and awareness of reality. From this diagnosis, The aim of this article is to investigate Adorno’s educational thought in its (...) possibilities of emancipation. In our point of view, the role of education, in the thoughts of the Frankfurtian, is to recover the critical autonomy of individuals, through dialectical thinking, to rebuild the damaged experience. (shrink)

Political participation in Belgium is analysed according to two types of political participation : conventional participation and protestation, measured by a Guttman scale. The study describes the two types of political participation in the different regions in Belgium: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. A comparaison with some western countries is made. Political participation in Belgium is weak. It depends on the regional division and the sociological characteristics. Moreover, political participation is linked to the Belgian traditionnal clivages.

More or less explicitly inspired by the Aristotelian classification of arguments, a wide tradition makes a sharp distinction between argument and proof. Ch. Perelman and R. Johnson, among others, share this view based on the principle that the conclusion of an argument is uncertain while the conclusion of a proof is certain. Producing proof is certainly a major part of mathematical activity. Yet, in practice, mathematicians, expert or beginner, argue about mathematical proofs. This happens during the search for a proof, (...) then when the proof is presented and discussed by experts, and finally when it is taught or used in didactical contexts. (shrink)

Rather than opposing hermeneutics and pragmatism, this contribution, without denying their differences, aims to lay the foundations of a pragmatist hermeneutics by taking the relationship between meaning and experience as a common thread. The challenge is to analyze this relationship from three distinct angles: immediate experience (and spontaneous understanding), acquired experience (and pre-understanding) and creative experience (and interpretation). From each of these perspectives, the aim is to grant a meaningful place to non-verbal – and specifically bodily – experience, which calls (...) for a somahermeneutics. (shrink)

This book provides an innovative way to revisit the depth and scope of our moral/post-moral worldviews, while undertaking an ontic reflection about organizational life. The ontic dimension of life refers to existing entities’ lived experiences. It has nothing to do with psychological and relational processes. The ontic level of analysis mirrors a philosophical outlook on organizational life. Unlike moral worldviews, post-moral worldviews oppose the existence of Truth-itself. Post-moral worldviews rather imply that dialogical relationships allow people to express their own truth-claims (...) and welcome others’ truth-claims. The purpose of this book is to explain the philosophical implications of moral and post-moral worldviews and the way to move from a moral to a post-moral worldview. Moreover, this book explores the possibility to transcend the moral/post-moral dualism, through moral deliberation processes and a reinterpretation of the Presence of the Infinite in all dimensions of human life. This book could eventually help to better grasp the basic philosophical challenges behind ethical reflection about organizational issues. (shrink)

À travers le cas clinique d’un jeune homme violent, radicalisé politiquement aux thèses de l’ultra-droite et suivi en psychothérapie à raison de deux fois par semaine pendant près de deux ans, l’article aborde les questions de la radicalisation à travers le prisme de l’effondrement du sentiment de continuité d’être. Ce sentiment s’effondre plus particulièrement au moment de son adolescence du fait d’une histoire traumatique démaillante affectant ses contenants individuels, familiaux et collectifs réactivant ainsi ses angoisses primitives de désunification corporelle. Ce (...) jeune trouvera dans le modèle de la filiation narcissique un « maillage » de substitution pour faire face à ces angoisses primitives. (shrink)

On connaît l’histoire rapportée – ou inventée – par Borges, de ce pays où des géographes de plus en plus compétents et de plus en plus exigeants, à force de perfectionner l’art de la cartographie, en étaient arrivés à produire une carte de l’empire « qui avait le format de l’empire, et qui coïncidait avec lui point par point ». L’histoire de l’exégèse aristotélicienne, dans ses périodes les plus fécondes – et notre époque en fait incontestablement partie – pourrait parfois (...) évo­quer cet apolog... (shrink)

En contrepoint à son œuvre mathématique et physique — et en relation avec elle — d'Alembert a développé une théorie de la connaissance influencée par Locke et le sensualisme de Condillac, mais centrée avant tout sur une épistémologie de la physique newtonienne. Réaliste, prônant le recours à l'expérience, il est en même temps profondément rationaliste, et même précisément, quoiqu'il s'en défende plutôt, dans la lignée de Descartes, Mais, bien que la Raison soit sa référence fondamentale, à tel point qu'il voudrait (...) fonder sur ses principes les plus évidents toute la science physico-mathématique — c'est-à-dire par excellence la Mécanique —, son programme ne peut être dit cartésien : non seulement il rejette les idées innées, mais il accepte la critique d'une rationalité apparente requise par la considération de faits irréductibles (l'attraction par exemple). Son épistémologie est un réalisme rationnel référé à l'être même de la Nature (la Raison et la Nature se rejoignent en profondeur). C'est en fonction de ces conceptions qu'il accepte ou rejette certaines notions physiques soit ambiguës, soit incertaines. Son rejet du concept de force comme celui de la considération d'une texture intime des corps semblent en faire, par le refus de ce qui ne serait pas directement mesurable, l'annonciateur du positivisme de Laplace et de Comte : une telle interprétation serait inexacte, et d'Alembert considère que la pensée peut parvenir à la connaissance du réel. Si ses conceptions s'élaborent en contrepoint de son activité scientifique, c'est en même temps en lutte et polémique contre la métaphysique, au sein de son engagement philosophique — il est tête de file, avec Voltaire, du « parti philosophique » — et notamment dans l'Encyclopédie. Bien qu'il se réfère, comme Newton, à une Intelligence suprême à l'œuvre dans l'Univers, il n'est pas déiste et affiche bientôt une position sceptique. Sa recherche et son affirmation de l'autonomie des lois de la Nature sont a-thées au sens privatif qui annonce Laplace. Il s'oppose au matérialisme de d'Holbach ou Helvétius, mais il se rapproche peu à peu — et notamment vers 1765, sans doute sous l'influence de Diderot qui rédigea vers cette époque Le rêve de d'Alembert et avec qui il venait de renouer — d'un matérialisme dynamique : mais, ce matérialisme, il ne le professe qu'en privé (essentiellement dans sa correspondance avec Frédéric de Prusse). L'âme est matérielle, et si « le plus simple raisonnement prouve qu'il y a un être éternel » , ce Dieu est matériel, il « n'est que la matière en tant qu'intelligente » , ce qui rejoint la définition du matérialisme donnée par Diderot dans l'Encyclopédie. Toutefois, refusant de se prononcer sur l'en-soi des choses, et sur la nature de la matière elle-même, comme de se définir métaphysiquement, son matérialisme tardif est encore marqué de scepticisme. (shrink)

Comme la musique, la psychanalyse est un art d'interprétation. Mais on ne trouvera pas ici de déchiffrement de l'inconscient des œuvres musicales ou d'analyse de leurs auteurs. Il s'agit plutôt de l'autre sens du mot interpréter : jouer un morceau, en donner sa version, le dire dans sa propre langue en espérant qu'elle sera entendue par d'autres. Ce livre s'adresse à ceux pour qui la musique n'est pas une question de savoir, de culture ou de distinction, mais qui entrent en (...) elle comme dans la nuit. Ceux qui entretiennent avec toutes choses des relations musicales inconscientes. Ceux qui cherchent en elle non l'avoir, mais l'être. Ceux pour qui, disait Nietzsche, " la vie sans la musique serait une erreur ". (shrink)

According to interpretationism, nothing can be intentionally meant, thought or performed independently of our interpretational practice. The presence of an interpretation (explicit or implicit) is a necessary condition on the existence of intentional contents expressed by verbal, mental or behavioral occurrences. In this paper, I criticize Donald Davidson’s interpretationism. I first characterize the view in its broad outlines. I then proceed to formulate some criticisms against it, and sketch an alternative approach : institutionalism. This approach suggests another way to conceive (...) of the relationship between meaning, understanding, intentional states and actions on the one hand, and ascriptive practices on the other hand. It is a relation between types and not between occurrences, and it is claimed that the types of states or acts that can express intentional contents do not exist independently of certain types of institutional facts. (shrink)

French geographers have been interested in the evolution of contemporary Greece since the beginnings of scientific geography at the end of the 19th century. They progressively distanced themselves from the traditional historical geography. Elisée Reclus is still over anxious to detect ancient Greece in contemporary descriptions. Paul Vidal de la Blache, who began his career as an epigraphist in Athens, became the founder of the French School of geography, without, however, Greece ever playing an important part in his scientific development (...) or his writings. From the time of his experiences in the First World War on the Salonica front, Jacques Ancel compiled a remarkable description of contemporary Macedonia, although it is to Jules Sion that we owe the best picture of Greece in the interwar years. (shrink)