Treatise on the passions and the affections of the mind -- Ethical questions; or Specualtions on the principal subjects of controversy in moral philosophy.

This book is a comprehensive introduction to critical thinking skills and the philosophical and factual bases of critical thinking.

V.H. Dudman has argued that a better semantic account of the conditional emerges from placing grammar ‘in the driver's seat’. His account of their grammar identifies two main categories, which differ from those postulated by traditional theorists, and which he claims correspond to two very different and deep‐rooted styles of thought. I show that it is unlikely that a perfect match exists between styles of thought and grammatical categories in the way that Dudman postulates. I consider arguments by Dale and (...) Edgington in this context. More importantly, however, I also show that even if there were a perfect match, Dudman's account would still obscure semantic similarities between ‘if’‐sentences which are arguably of greater importance than the ones he highlights. This, I suggest, has implications extending far beyond Dudman's work. (shrink)

On Sartre's own admission, his account of the emotions discloses them as functional. As such, the emotions aim to serve a particular purpose for which he provides the phenomenology. Sartre's phenomenology discloses consciousness as being-in-the-world in two ways, actually as having two worlds. One is a deterministic world, the other magical. Emotion is the drop from the deterministic world to the magical. In order for emotion to perform the function Sartre has in mind it performs, it is crucial there be (...) a certain tension between the deterministic world and the magical world. I argue that given what Sartre himself says about the magical world, the necessary tension can never arise; hence, no functional thesis of emotion is possible if it is formed along Sartre's lines. (shrink)

Some attempts to understand emotion have failed to account for important features of our emotional experience ? notably, the experience of gaining insight when we express our emotions. In this essay I will hold that if we properly understand emotions, then we see that the expression of emotion contributes to the growth of consciousness by providing a process wherein consciousness can recognize and reclaim its inherent wholeness, and thereby overcome fragmentation. Hence, in this essay I will strive to: (1) demonstrate (...) that we do get insight when we express our emotions, (2) offer a suggestion as to why this feature is often overlooked, (3) propose a model for understanding the emotions that helps to explain this holistic feature of emotion, and (4) show how this insight into the nature of emotion contributes to our understanding of the growth of consciousness. (shrink)

The outcomes of psychoanalysis, as with other psychotherapies, vary considerably. _Psychoanalytic Treatment in Adults _examines the results of a longitudinal study of change during psychoanalysis, illuminating the characteristics of patients, analysts and analyses which can help to predict outcomes of treatment. Written by experienced psychologists and psychoanalysts, chapters in the book draw upon sixty case studies to consider how patients with very different analytic outcomes respond at both the beginning and end of their analysis. Psychoanalysts used a clinician report measure, (...) the Shedler-Westen Assessment Procedure, to describe a patient at the beginning of psychoanalysis and every six months until the analysis ended. This allowed the authors to learn about changes over analysis and, in turn, improved treatment planning and practice for the well-being of other patients. Chapters explore five outcomes: a negative therapeutic reaction; attrition when the patient drops out; attrition due to external events; mutual agreement between patient and analyst without maximum benefits; and mutual agreement between patient and analyst with maximum benefits. The findings from these chapters will be of interest to researchers and academics in the fields of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, psychodynamic therapy, psychoanalytic education, psychiatry and psychology. The results should also help clinicians recognize potential problems early in analytic treatments so that they can work more effectively with patients. (shrink)

The most prominent — and certainly the most controversial — feature of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is the so-called “individual mandate,” which attempts to address the problem of 50 million uninsured by requiring nearly all Americans, beginning in 2014, to obtain health insurance. While expanded access to health insurance has been both the cornerstone and the lightening rod of the ACA, the Act also contains significant public health provisions focusing on, among other things, promoting the availability of (...) prevention and wellness services. Although these public health provisions have been greeted with mixed reviews, there has been very little discussion of what may be the ACA’s most significant public health feature: the preventive services mandate. In a bold stroke, the ACA changes the way evidence-based preventive services will be provided and paid for by private health insurance plans, Medicare, and Medicaid. By requiring these health plans to provide evidence-based preventive services with no out-of-pocket costs, the ACA transforms the U.S.’s public and private health care financing systems into vehicles for promoting public health. (shrink)

Greta Gaard, Tucson, AZ, The University of Arizona Press, 2007, ix +211 pp., paper, $17.95, ISBN: 978-0-8165-2576-8 Roger Paden, Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2007, xiii +209 pp., paper, $26.95, ISB...

Deontic Logic goes back to Ernst Mally’s 1926 work, Grundgesetze des Sollens: Elemente der Logik des Willens [Mally. E.: 1926, Grundgesetze des Sollens: Elemente der Logik des Willens, Leuschner & Lubensky, Graz], where he presented axioms for the notion ‘p ought to be the case’. Some difficulties were found in Mally’s axioms, and the field has much developed. Logic of Knowledge goes back to Hintikka’s work Knowledge and Belief [Hintikka, J.: 1962, Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of (...) the Two Notions, Cornell University Press] in which he proposed formal logics of knowledge and belief. This field has also developed quite a great deal and is now the subject of the TARK conferences. However, there has been relatively little work combining the two notions of knowledge (belief) with the notion of obligation. (See, however, [Lomuscio, A. and Sergot, M.: 2003, Studia Logica 75 63–92; Moore, R. C.: 1990, In J. F. Allen, J. Hendler and A. Tate (eds.), Readings in Planning, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, San Mateo, CA]) In this paper we point out that an agent’s obligations are often dependent on what the agent knows, and indeed one cannot reasonably be expected to respond to a problem if one is not aware of its existence. For instance, a doctor cannot be expected to treat a patient unless she is aware of the fact that he is sick, and this creates a secondary obligation on the patient or someone else to inform the doctor of his situation. In other words, many obligations are situation dependent, and only apply in the presence of the relevant information. Thus a case for combining Deontic Logic with the Logic of Knowledge is clear. We introduce the notion of knowledge based obligation and offer an S5, history based Kripke semantics to express this notion, as this semantics enables us to represent how information is transmitted among agents and how knowledge changes over time as a result of communications. We consider both the case of an absolute obligation (although dependent on information) as well as the (defeasible) notion of an obligation which may be over-ridden by more relevant information. For instance a physician who is about to inject a patient with drug d may find out that the patient is allergic to d and that she should use d′ instead. Dealing with the second kind of case requires a resort to non-monotonic reasoning and the notion of justified belief which is stronger than plain belief, but weaker than absolute knowledge in that it can be over-ridden. This notion of justified belief also creates a derived notion of default obligation where an agent has, as far as the agent knows, an obligation to do some action a. A dramatic application of this notion is our analysis of the Kitty Genovese case where, in 1964, a young woman was stabbed to death while 38 neighbours watched from their windows but did nothing. The reason was not indifference, but none of the neighbours had even a default obligation to act, even though, as a group, they did have an obligation to take some action to protect Kitty. (shrink)

This is a reply to de Sousa's 'Emotional Truth', in which he argues that emotions can be objective, as propositional truths are. I say that it is better to distinguish between truth and accuracy, and agree with de Sousa to the extent of arguing that emotions can be more or less accurate, that is, based on the facts as they are.