Boyers, R. and Orrill, R. Preface.--Rieff, P. The impoverishment of Western culture.--Rieff, P. Observations on the therapeutic.--Kolakowski, L. The psychoanalytic theory of culture.--Jones, J. Five versions of psychological man.--Cioran, E. M. Civilized man.--Jameson, F. Herbert Marcuse.--Beldoch, M. The therapeutic as narcissist.--Huizinga, J. Puerilism.--Brown, N. O. Rieff's "fellow teachers."--Nelson, B. and Wrong, D. Perspectives on the therapeutic in the context of contemporary sociology.--Sedgwick, P. Mental illness is illness.--Foucoult, M. History, discourse and discontinuity.

Ce qui compte, ce n'est pas la question "aristocratique" des fondements d'une proposition, mais la question "démocratique" de la valeur de ses conséquences pratiques : en morale, ce n'est pas l'expérience, mais notre conscience qui décide d'accepter telle ou telle conséquence. Rawls oppose déontologie et téléologie : la première classe de théories définit le juste indépendamment du bien, la seconde le définit comme maximisation du Bien. Mais les approches déontologiques ne sont pas anti-conséquentialistes : "Ne pas prendre en compte les (...) conséquences serait irrationnel, fou". Toute théorie morale rationnelle est une "morale de la responsabilité", et non de la conviction, même si certains énoncés de base de l'intuition sont pour nous des "points fixes". Le conséquentialisme n'est pas nécessairement utilitariste, car l'on peut vouloir minimiser l'injustice. Ces considérations sont appuyées sur l'analyse de plusieurs exemples juridiques, dont celui de la responsabilité civile. (shrink)

Ne lire par commodité que Le Prince nous procure une vision partielle, voire tronquée, de la philosophie politique de Machiavel. Il est donc nécessaire de la compléter par la lecture des Discours sur la première décade de Tite-Live pour en apprécier l’unité : il n’y a pas d’un côté le conseiller du prince et de l’autre le républicain. On y verra alors une conception du monde dont la modernité s’enracine paradoxalement dans des catégories anciennes comme l’astrologie et la médecine antiques, (...) et où les « choses humaines », aussi déterminées soient-elles par les « choses du monde », se caractérisent par une certaine liberté, ce qui permet aux hommes d’avoir une histoire. (shrink)

Entre les états (2, 3) et (2, 4), le Principe de Différence (PD) choisit-t-il le premier, le second, ou est-il indifférent? Cette dernière interprétation est confortée par le choix par Rawls des courbes en L pour illustrer le PD (Rawls 1999 [1971], § 13, fig. 5), formellement analogue au Maximin en théorie de la décision, et qui admettrait des courbes d’indifférence ; une fois le plus mal loti maximisé, on est indifférent entre les états des mieux lotis ; le Leximin (...) enjoint lui de choisir le second état, puisqu’il réitère le PD sur le dernier plus mal loti. La plupart des commentateurs choisissent le Leximin ; or ce principe est inégalitaire, car il peut laisser s’enrichir les riches alors que les pauvres stagnent. Le PD sélectionne en fait le premier état. Si l’on peut passer du premier état au second, on doit pouvoir passer du premier à un état (2+n, 3-n). Le PD est univoque, différent du Maximin et du Leximin, qui peut favoriser des sociétés duales, où seuls les riches s’enrichissent. On n’a pu généraliser le résultat à plus de deux classes, même en tenant compte de la « connexion en chaîne », laquelle exprime l’idée fondamentale de Rawls : la solidarité via la coopération.Code JEL : I13. (shrink)

L’ Apologie de John Rawls a paru aux Puf en 2018. Son objectif principal était le suivant : à supposer que la critique rawlsienne de la notion (ou de l’absence de la notion) de la personne dans la pensée utilitariste soit fondée, est-il légitime, étant donné la caractérisation par Rawls de son « principe de différence », de retourner sa propre critique anti-utilitariste contre lui, en arguant que lui non plus ne permet pas de fonder une notion concrète et complexe (...) de personne, ne laissant au lecteur qu’un pseudo-soi, purifié, hyper-abstrait, nouménal, détaché et désencastré de tout, une personne sans qualités, sans talents, aussi peu épaisse que la pseudo-personne utilitariste justement dénoncée par l’auteur de la TJ lui-même? Il s’agit donc de prendre au sérieux et de réfuter un argument de type Tu Quoque!, lequel retourne contre un argumentateur l’un de ses arguments critiques, en montrant que, malgré qu’il en eût, il tombe lui-même sous la critique qu’il a émise contre une tierce position. Cette stratégie argumentative, légitime, a été utilisée contre la TJ d’abord par Nozick, puis reprise et approfondie par le « communautarien » républicain anti-libéral Michael Sandel, et considérée comme valide par de nombreux auteurs. L’Apologie tente donc de répondre à cette accusation, et l’acquittement de John Rawls est proposé au lecteur. Ce ne sont pas les talents qui appartiennent au collectif, mais leur distribution différente peut être utilisée par la société comme fournissant une base adéquate pour des complémentarités et des coopérations bénéfiques à tous et en particulier aux plus démunis. L’argument de Nozick selon lequel le principe de différence n’est pas compatible avec tous les concepts parétiens est repris comme étant quant à lui valide. Une erreur terminologique sur les progressions parétiennes forte/faibles est ici corrigée. De plus, on tente d’y résoudre une perplexité sensible à la fin du chapitre V de l’Apologie. Il y a trois interprétations possibles du principe de différence, dont l’une est le simple maximin, et l’autre le leximin. On argue que ce principe n’est ni l’un ni l’autre, mais qu’il est formé par le couple lexicalement ordonné maximin et minimisation des inégalités, ce qui rend le principe de différence décisif, comme le leximin, sans courbes d’indifférence, comme en a le maximin. Malheureusement, cette caractérisation ne fonctionne qu’avec deux classes. Il faut sans doute admettre qu’il y a moins d’intuitions fortes concernant le sort des différentes classes moyennes pour définir la justice que concernant les actifs sur tout une vie, respectivement, des plus riches et des plus pauvres. Mais dans ce cas simple, représentable sur le plan, l’ambiguïté qui persistait dans l’Apologie est ici éliminée. (shrink)

Les théories physiques sont aujourd'hui très mathématisées, et ce que les scientifiques manipulent pour décrire, prédire et contrôler les phénomènes, ce sont (entre autres) des équations, comportant de nombreux symboles mathématiques. Ces objets mathématiques n'ont pas de signification physique en eux-mêmes : ils ne « parlent » pas d'eux-mêmes des phénomènes. Une interprétation est nécessaire. Ce qui nous intéresse dans cet article est ainsi l'interprétation dont une théorie physique doit faire l'objet pour remplir son rôle. Nous commençons par expliciter une (...) distinction traditionnelle : l'interprétation « pauvre » (simple instrument permettant d'assigner aux symboles de la théorie un sens physique strictement limité aux résultats des expériences) diffère de l'interprétation « riche » (laquelle compose une image du monde compatible avec la façon dont la théorie décrit mathématiquement les résultats des expériences). Notre but dans cet article est de montrer que cette distinction doit être amendée. Nous nous appuyons sur l'exemple de la mécanique quantique, mais la distinction se veut valable en général pour toute théorie physique. (shrink)

En 1950, Paul Ricœur publia une imposante Philosophie de la volonté, vite brocardée par la vague structuraliste et les critiques de toute « philosophie de la conscience ». On y trouve notamment une analyse du phénomène de l’hésitation qui contient bien des éléments encore pertinents. Phénomène bien connu, l’hésitation n’a pas été vraiment thématisée en tant que telle, même si, comme le montre Ricœur, l’histoire de la philosophie est susceptible d’aider à le faire. Mais le doute cartésien, par exemple, n’est (...) guère hésitant. Ce chapitre fourmille d’analyses denses mais claires, d’allusions qu’il faut expliciter, de métaphores « vives » très riches, qui permettent de concevoir un sujet se cherchant dans l’hésitation avant de se choisir dans la décision. Il y a là un concept indispensable à toute théorie de l’action.Philosophie de la volonté, a major work published by Ricœur in 1950, was quickly derided by members of the structuralist trend and by those critical of every single « philosophy of consciousness ». The book includes notably an analysis of the phenomenon of hesitation, many elements of which are still relevant. Although a well known phenomenon, hesitation has never been fully analyzed in itself, even though the history of philosophy, as Ricœur shows, might be helpful in such an endeavor. Cartesian doubt, for instance, shows hardly any hesitation. This chapter is replete with dense yet clear discussions, with allusions that require elucidation, and with a wealth of vivid metaphors which help us to envisage a subject in search of himself through hesitation, before choosing himself through decision. Such a concept is indispensable for any theory of action. (shrink)

Le maître mot de la philosophie poppérienne est l’ouverture. Cette conception de la rationalité, fondée sur le thème de la faillibilité, échappe à la mise en question de la clôture de la raison moderne dominatrice. La rationalité n’est pas tant un ensemble de techniques qu’une attitude morale d’ouverture à l’autre, reposant sur l’idée qu’à la violence peut être substitué un jeu polémique, la discussion critique, codifiée par des règles. « Vous pouvez avoir raison et je peux avoir tort, mais nous (...) pouvons en confrontant nos points de vue nous efforcer ensemble de nous rapprocher de la vérité » et « Ne considère jamais l’autre seulement comme un réceptacle passif de tes idées, mais toujours comme un critique potentiel de celles-ci! », telles sont les formules qui caractérisent le « rationalisme critique ». (shrink)

Il ne suffit plus de s'interroger sur l'art littéraire mis au service de la composition des récits bibliques ; il faut poser aux textes eux-mêmes la question de la littérature, discerner l'effet de la littérature sur ce qu'on appelle la Bible. Car la littérature n'est pas un simple effet construit, mais d'abord, culturellement, un mode d'expression qui induit également une réception, une compréhension de ce qu'il exprime. L'exemple de l'appel d'Abraham et de la “ ligature d'Isaac ”, le rappel de (...) la création et la figure de Job ouvrent à cette dimension littéraire essentielle à la Bible qui ne se contente pas d'échanger ou de transmettre des expériences, mais se définit elle-même comme expérience ou épreuve adressée à ses lecteurs.It is no longer enough to question oneself about literary art put to the service of the composition of biblical narratives. One must put the question of literature to the texts themselves, discern the effect of literature on that which one calls the Bible. For literature is just no simply composed, but above all a cultural type of expression that calls for a reception, an understanding of that which it expresses. The examples of the call of Abraham, and the "binding of Isaac ", the recall of creation and the figure of job, give this a literary dimension that is essential to the Bible, which does not stop at exchanging or transmitting some experiences, but defines itself as experience or test addressed to its readers. (shrink)

On oppose traditionnellement deux approches méthodologiques en sciences sociales : le holisme et l'individualisme. Il est tentant d'identifier cette opposition à celle du structuralisme et de l'atomisme. Ainsi, dans Les institutions du sens, Vincent Descombes propose de récuser l'individualisme méthodologique et de lui substituer une approche « holiste structuraliste », susceptible de permettre d'échapper aux mirages des « entités collectives » aussi bien qu'aux aportes de l'atomisme logique et du psychologisme, en mettant en avant la notion d'institution et celle d'esprit (...) objectif. Cette analyse passe par une critique logique radicale des arguments de Karl Popper en faveur du « nominalisme méthodologique ». On conteste cette présentation des thèses de l'auteur de Misère de l'historicisme, en montrant que sa philosophie n'est en rien un psychologisme et un atomisme, mais qu'elle accorde au contraire une importance capitale à la notion de « causalité structurale » comme à celles d'institution et d'esprit objectif. L'individualisme institutionnel n'est peut-être pas en ce sens un obstacle à la compréhension du problème plus général du tout et des parties. La querelle des sciences sociales et celle des universaux sont décidément solidaires l'une de l'autre. One commonly distinguishes two different approaches in the methodology of the social sciences, namely (methodological) individualism and holism. One can be tempted to identify this opposition to that between atomism and structuralism. For instance, in his book Les institutions du sens, Vincent Descombes argues that we have to substitute for methodological individualism a holistic but not collectivistic approach, so as to be able to escape the illusions of collectivism as well as the traps of logical atomism and of psychologism, putting a premium on the notions of institution and of « objective spirit ». (Similar proposals had been made independently by Philipp Pettit in his The Common MindJ. Descombes' target is mainly Popper's argument against essentialism and holism in The Poverty of Historicism, which he submits to a radical logical criticism. This paper disputes this rendering of Popper's view, which is emphatically anti-psychologistic and not ontologically nominalistic, and which gives a great significance to the very notions of institution, of objective spirit and even of structural causality. His « institutional individualism » is perhaps not a bad tool for handling partially the notorious problem of the hole and the parts. The modern controversy about the methods used in the social sciences and the venerable one about universals are decidely interconnected. (shrink)

Cet article a pour but de montrer que l’analyse humienne de la justice, et en particulier de l’obligation des promesses telle qu’elle est présentée à la section 5 de la seconde partie du livre III du Traité de la nature humaine, repose sur une conception fictionnaliste de la motivation morale, au sens où l’obligation naturelle de justice (notamment de fidélité) est une fiction. Si cette conception est cohérente avec d’autres aspects de la philosophie de Hume, d’une part, et si elle (...) est une preuve supplémentaire que Hume n’est pas un précurseur de l’utilitarisme, d’autre part, celle-ci risque néanmoins de réduire la justice à une forme de superstition utile. (shrink)

Le fait d'être humain ne procède pas uniquement de nous-mêmes, comme le fait d'être d'une culture, d'une histoire ne procède pas d'un seul autre, ou d'un seul semblable, mais de l'ensemble des autres, de tous les semblables, et plus loin encore de l'autre à venir, du dissemblable, de l'étranger, de l'autre culture, de l'autre histoire. Où et comment se pose la question de l'honneur à cet instant? N'est-ce pas à cette pliure que fait courir à l'espèce le mépris, l'incompréhension, le (...) refus de l'autre? Aujourd'hui nous devons faire face. Et savoir d'instinct, savoir sans le comprendre que la seule force, la seule valeur, la seule dignité, c'est de ne pas comprendre si comprendre nous fait renoncer à l'amour de l'autre. Voilà ce qui fonde, voilà ce qui fait la légitimité non seulement d'une existence mais de toute communauté. (shrink)

Le chapitre de L’Être et le néant sur « les conduites de mauvaise foi » est connu pour ses exemples comme « une femme qui s’est rendue à un premier rendez-vous » ou « le garçon de café », mais aussi pour sa critique de la psychanalyse. Or, il s’agit pour Sartre de montrer que ce qui est en jeu dans la mauvaise foi, comme dans la sincérité d’ailleurs, c’est qu’alors que les choses sont ce qu’elles sont, l’homme fuit ce (...) qu’il est, à savoir « un être qui est ce qu’il n’est pas et qui n’est pas ce qu’il est ». Dès lors, l’enjeu de ce chapitre est : qu’en est-il au juste de l’authenticité? (shrink)

Karl Popper est né à Vienne en 1902, et mort à Londres en 1994. En 2002, j’ai cru devoir organiser le premier colloque international consacré à son œuvre en Sorbonne, où il vint en 1937 parler de Tarski à l’occasion d’un fameux Congrès de Philosophie des Sciences, où étaient présents des penseurs aussi différents que Cavaillès et Reichenbach. Que l’on accepte ou non ses principales thèses, il s’agit à n’en pas douter de l’un des penseurs les plus importants du siècle (...) dernier, fondateur du « r... (shrink)

We are pleased to present the following Review Forum of Harvey Whitehouse’s book, Arguments and Icons: Divergent Modes of Religiosity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 204 pages. ISBN 0-19- 823414-7 (cloth); 0-19-823415-5 (paper). We have given the contributors and the book’s author sufficient space to discuss its themes carefully and thus make a significant contribution to the further analysis of religion and ritual generally.

In their environment, plants are continuously submitted to natural stimuli such as wind, rain, temperature changes, wounding, etc. These signals induce a cascade of events which lead to metabolic and morphogenetic responses. In this paper the different steps are described and discussed starting from the reception of the signal by a plant organ to the final morphogenetic response. In our laboratory two plants are studied: Bryonia dioica for which rubbing the internode results in reduced elongation and enhanced radial expansion and (...) Bidens pilosa for which the response occurs at distance, hence pricking the cotyledon of a plantlet induces the growth inhibition of both the hypocotyl and the axillary bud of the pricked cotyledon. Reception of the signal and transmission of the message. In Bryonia the signal is received by epidermal cells while in Bidens they are the cells adjacent to the midrib of the cotyledon which receive the mechanical signal. In both plants the message is transmitted via a wave of electric depolarization. This latter is composed of an action potential associated with a slow wave whose transmission rates are respectively 1cm s−1 and 1 mm s−1. Recent results have shown the involvement of Ca2+ in the triggering of the slow wave and the role of the H+ pump during the slow wave. Transient and fast biochemical responses. An entry of extraceilular Ca2+ into the cells and a transient increase in IP3 occur within seconds following the mechanical stimulus. At the same time, the membrane becomes more fluid, correlated with qualitative changes in phospholipids. The rapid increase in the concentration of peroxidated lipids may be correlated with ethylene biosynthesis which is stimulated after rubbing. Other parameters such as cytoplasmic pH, relative water content, hydric potential, membrane potential and modifications of K+, Mg2+-ATPase and Ca2+-ATPase activities, play a key role in the early responses induced by the traumatisms. Irreversible-biochemical responses. The mechanical stimulus performed on a Bryonia internode induces an acceleration of: i) enzymatic activities related to the lignification, ii) esterification of phenolic acids in the cell wall. Consequently the lignification process is accelerated. Storage of the information. After being received by the target cells the information can be stored during several days before being expressed. At the level of cotyledonary bud, the first message, previously stored, can be expressed or not by a second treatment. Bidens thus behaves as if it was able to “store” and to “retrieve” morphogenetic messages, using a sort of rudimentary memory. The nuclei of the bud cells of the pricked cotyledon show that these cells, initially in G2 phase, divide and then remain in the G1 phase. In Bryonia, calli derived from young stimulated internodes, keep thigmomorphogenetic characteristics during several weeks. In the last part of this paper the particularity of our plant model which permits a study of the transmission and storage of the message, is underlined. The links between the different steps induced by the stimulus are discussed. Special attention is devoted to second messengers and to the amplification of the message. (shrink)

In their environment, plants are continuously submitted to natural stimuli such as wind, rain, temperature changes, wounding, etc. These signals induce a cascade of events which lead to metabolic and morphogenetic responses.In this paper the different steps are described and discussed starting from the reception of the signal by a plant organ to the final morphogenetic response. In our laboratory two plants are studied: Bryonia dioica for which rubbing the internode results in reduced elongation and enhanced radial expansion and Bidens (...) pilosa for which the response occurs at distance, hence pricking the cotyledon of a plantlet induces the growth inhibition of both the hypocotyl and the axillary bud of the pricked cotyledon. (shrink)

Attempts to solve the puzzling problem of oxidative phosphorylation led to four very different hypotheses each of which suggested a different view of the ATP synthase, the phosphorylating enzyme. During the 1960s and 1970s evidence began to accumulate which rendered Peter Mitchell’s chemiosmotic hypothesis, the novel part of which was the proton translocating ATP synthase (ATPase), a plausible explanation. The conformational hypothesis of Paul Boyer implied an enzyme where ATP synthesis was driven by the energy of conformational changes in (...) the respiratory proteins. This was finally abandoned as an explanation of the overall process. Nevertheless the conformational understanding of the enzyme became an acceptable proposal during the early 1970s and eventually led Boyer to a view of the enzyme that incorporated both hypotheses. The correspondence between Mitchell and Boyer, both Nobel laureates, exposes their different approaches to both this enzyme and to the hypotheses of oxidative phosphorylation and illuminates a key step in the development of bioenergetics. In particular Boyer was suspicious of proton gradients, because he could not envisage a chemical mechanism for the synthesis of ATP, while Mitchell distrusted conformational arguments because he believed the proton must act vectorially at the active site of the enzyme. This resulted in two different views of the mechanisms operating in this enzyme. Ultimately while Boyer was able to marry the two approaches, Mitchell retained his insistence on the role of the proton at the active site and was thus unable to give significance to Boyer’s conformational ideas. The underlying issues in this debate are discussed particularly with reference to the differing styles of Boyer and Mitchell and the influence of molecular biology, especially the development of protein technology. (shrink)

The automatic verification of large parts of mathematics has been an aim of many mathematicians from Leibniz to Hilbert. While Gödel's first incompleteness theorem showed that no computer program could automatically prove certain true theorems in mathematics, the advent of electronic computers and sophisticated software means in practice there are many quite effective systems for automated reasoning that can be used for checking mathematical proofs. This book describes the use of a computer program to check the proofs of several celebrated (...) theorems in metamathematics including those of Gödel and Church-Rosser. The computer verification using the Boyer-Moore theorem prover yields precise and rigorous proofs of these difficult theorems. It also demonstrates the range and power of automated proof checking technology. The mechanization of metamathematics itself has important implications for automated reasoning, because metatheorems can be applied as labor-saving devices to simplify proof construction. (shrink)

In this article the phenomenon of religious imagination is taken as a test case for discussing the relevance of cognitive science to philosophy of religion and theology. With Lakoff and Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh, it is argued that all human cognitive faculties are both propelled and constrained by metaphors originating from the movements of self-aware bodies in space; accordingly, religious concepts and images are to be treated on par with all other concepts and images. Pascal Boyer’s Religion Explained (...) is then critically discussed. It is argued that Boyer’s claim of having ‘explained’ religious imagination as counterintuitive blendings of evolutionarily inherited templates is highly problematic. Evolutionary psychology has not yet given any evidence of an evolutionary hard-wiring of religious concepts, and Boyer’s reference to the mind-set of hunterers and gatherers does not catch the complexity of later developments in religious thought. For all, the internal systematization of religious imageries, and the possibility of a religious self-criticism in terms of philosophy is not reflected in Boyer’s theory. Religious imagination may indeed be natural; but its naturalness neither counts for nor against the truth-claims involved in religious images. (shrink)

In 1973-1974 Stanley N. Cohen of Stanford and Herbert W. Boyer of the University of California, San Francisco, developed a laboratory process for joining and replicating DNA from different species. In 1974 Stanford and UC applied for a patent on the recombinant DNA process; the U.S. Patent Office granted it in 1980. This essay describes how the patenting procedure was shaped by the concurrent recombinant DNA controversy, tension over the commercialization of academic biology, governmental deliberations over the regulation of (...) genetic engineering research, and national expectations for high technology as a boost to the American economy. The essay concludes with a discussion of the patent as a turning point in the commercialization of molecular biology and a harbinger of the social and ethical issues associated with biotechnology today. (shrink)

L’ambiguïté qui existe entre l’interprétation du principe de différence par le maximin ou par le leximin est reconsidérée. Le maximin satisfait seulement le principe de Pareto-faible (x>y ssi chaque composante de x > la composante correspondante de y), tandis que le leximin satisfait le principe de Pareto-fort. À la différence du maximin, le leximin n’est pas représentable par des courbes d’indifférence. Dans la position originelle, le choix leximin l’emporterait sur le choix maximin ((2, 4) > (2,3)), qui semble plus proche (...) des formulations de Rawls. Plusieurs solutions de l’ambiguïté sont évoquées, notamment celle que propose Alain Boyer, qui consiste à distinguer le maximin et le principe de différence en précisant que le second est le premier couplé à une règle tierce, la minimisation de l’inégalité. Cette solution, qui s’appuie par ailleurs sur un raisonnement suspect de Rawls sur la possibilité de trouver un troisième vecteur en enlevant n au plus riche, ce qui semble présupposer, comme le fait Boyer, que l’existence du fisc redistributeur est reconnue comme une possibilité dans la position originelle, est jugée insuffisante, en ce qu’elle ne vaut que pour le cas de deux individus (même si Rawls parle de deux classes). On suggère d’utiliser, pour les cas où le nombre des individus ou des classes est >2, un critère tel que la variance. Mais cela s’avère toujours insuffisant, et non justifiable dans la position originelle, et l’on fait appel à la théorie de la décision proposée par Gilboa et Schmeidler (1989 ; 1997) pour suggérer, par exemple, que le choix juste à faire entre (1, 2, 3) et (0, 3, 3) se porte sur le second état (où le plus pauvre a moins que dans l’autre cas). Cette règle demeure cependant plus proche du maximin (généralisé) que du leximin, peut être rapprochée de ce que l’on appelle le prioritarisme, et peut donc conserver une coloration appréciablement rawlsienne. (shrink)

A critique of dubious contrasts between "science" and "religion" drawn on the basis of cognitive-evolutionary accounts of human psychology, e.g.,. the claim that religious concepts are “likely” and “natural” for the human mind whereas scientific thinking is “rare” and “unnatural.” Initially made by biologist Lewis Wolpert in *The Unnatural Nature of Science* (1993) and anthropologist Pascal Boyer in *Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought* (2001), they are developed at length by philosopher R. N. McCauley in a*Why Religion (...) is Natural and Science is Not* (2011). These contrasts involve tendentiously narrow or broad definitions of the terms “science” and “religion” and the obliteration of the complex historical and intellectual relations between the ideas and practices currently identified by those terms. (shrink)

With contributions from founders of the field, including Justin Barrett, E. Thomas Lawson, Robert N. McCauley, Paschal Boyer, Armin Geertz and Harvey Whitehouse, as well as from younger scholars from successive stages in the field's development, this is an important survey of the first twenty-five years of the cognitive science of religion. Each chapter provides the author's views on the contributions the cognitive science of religion has made to the academic study of religion, as well as any shortcomings in (...) the field and challenges for the future. Religion Explained? The Cognitive Science of Religion after Twenty-five Years calls attention to the field whilst providing an accessible and diverse survey of approaches from key voices, as well as offering suggestions for further research within the field. This book is essential reading for anyone in religious studies, anthropology, and the scientific study of religion. (shrink)

Hors du temps d’Alain Boyer est l’un de ces livres qui prêtent volontiers à la critique et à la discussion, non seulement en raison des thèses soutenues par l’auteur, qui sont, de son propre aveu, controversées, mais à cause également du ton employé, souvent polémique, parfois même irrévérencieux ou iconoclaste. Et sans doute l’un des buts essentiels de l’ouvrage consiste-t-il à déboulonner une statue, non pas tant celle du philosophe Kant, dont l’auteur reconnaît le génie et l’importance, mais celle (...) d’un certain Kant élevé au rang de chantre des modernes ou d’apôtre du pluralisme, de la liberté d’expression et du dialogue intersubjectif. Bien qu’il ne conteste pas complètement la vision poppérienne d’un Kant Aufklärer, Alain Boyer entend néanmoins la nuancer: maints aspects de la philosophie de Kant s’éloignent effectivement de l’Aufklärung. Il s’agira pour lui de montrer que Kant est un philosophe tant de l’ordre que de la liberté et que bien qu’il soit le père du criticisme, il n’en est pas moins lui-même un métaphysicien dogmatique cherchant avant tout à sauver la morale et la religion du péril que lui font courir ses principaux ennemis: les sceptiques empiriques, les rêveurs délirants ou les librespenseurs. Il entend également dénoncer l’imposture de certains interprètes de Kant qui passent volontiers sous silence les aspects les plus problématiques de sa pensée pour ne retenir que ce qui s’accorde avec leurs propres convictions, projetant ainsi sur sa pensée, de manière anachronique, leurs propres idées. Parmi les thèses kantiennes que l’on tente prudemment d’écarter se trouvent entre autres la condamnation absolue du mensonge, le refus du droit de résistance, la liberté intelligible ou encore l’énigmatique chose en soi. (shrink)

Clarifying the mission of the American high school / Ernest L. Boyer--Educational goals and curricular decisions in the new Carnegie Report / John Martin Rich--Essential schools : a first look / Theodore R. Sizer--Teaching and learning : the dilemma of the American high school / Chester E. Finn, Jr.--The paideia proposal : rediscovering the essence of education / Mortimer Adler--The paideia proposal : noble amibitions, false leads, and symbolic politics / Willis D. Hawley--Cultural literacy : let's get specific / (...) E.D. Hirsch, Jr.--Cultural literacy : what every educator needs to know / Thomas H. Estes, Carol J. Gutman, and Elise K. Harrison--A blueprint for public education / John E. Chubb--Should market forces control educational decision making / Jack Tweedie--Teachers as transformative intellectuals / Henry A. Giroux--Dilemma language / Colin Lacey--Rich schools, poor schools : the persistence of unequal education / Arthur E. Wise and Tamar Gendler--Partial privatization of publice school finance / Thomas G. Fox and John Riew--Quality and equality in American education : public and Catholic schools / James S. Coleman--Oranges plus apples, Dr. Coleman, give you oranges plus apples / James Rogers--Synthesis of research on school-based management / Jane L. David--Unfulfilled promises / Betty Malen, Rodney T. Ogawa, and Jennifer Kranz--Effective high schools--What are the common characteristics? / Joseph Murphy and Philip Hallinger--Effective schools : a friendly but cautionary note / Larry Cuban--In education, magnets attract controversy / Mary Haywood Metz--Schools of choice : a path to educational quality or 'Tiers of inequity'? / Kathleen Sylvester--Interesting times / Alan H. Jones--Making a difference in educational quality through teacher education / Carolyn M. Evertson, Willis D. Hawley, and Marilyn Zlotnik--Developing a career ladder : getting down to the basics / Thomas Deering--The career ladder and lattice : a new look at the teaching career / Timothy J.L. Chandler, Stacey L. Lane, Janice M. Bibik, and Bernard Oliver--Equity, quality, and effectiveness in bilingual education / George M. Blanco--Bilingual--No! / Muriel Paskin Carrison--Multiethnic education and the quest for equality / James A. Banks--The limits of pluralism / M. Donald Thomas--The case for keeping mentally retarded children in your regular classrooms / Martin Tonn--Mainstreaming : a formative consideration / Harry N. Chandler--Reflections on three decades of eduction of the gifted / A. Harry Passow--Equity vs. excellence : an eductional drama / James J. Gallagher. (shrink)

Traces the development of the integral and the differential calculus and related theories since ancient times.

Presents results of free‐recall experiments conducted in France, Gabon and Nepal, to test predictions of a cognitive model of religious concepts. The world over, these concepts include violations of conceptual expectations at the level of domain knowledge (e.g., about ‘animal’ or ‘artifact’ or ‘person’) rather than at the basic level. In five studies we used narratives to test the hypothesis that domain‐level violations are recalled better than other conceptual associations. These studies used material constructed in the same way as religious (...) concepts, but not used in religions familiar to the subjects. Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed a distinctiveness effect for such material. Experiment 3 shows that recall also depends on the possibility to generate inferences from violations of domain expectations. Replications in Gabon (Exp. 4) and Nepal (Exp. 5) showed that recall for domain‐level violations is better than for violations of basic‐level expectations. Overall sensitivity to violations is similar in different cultures and produces similar recall effects, despite differences in commitment to religious belief, in the range of local religious concepts or in their mode of transmission. However, differences between Gabon and Nepal results suggest that familiarity with some types of domain‐level violations may paradoxically make other types more salient. These results suggest that recall effects may account for the recurrent features found in religious concepts from different cultures. (shrink)

Ritualized behavior, intuitively recognizable by its stereotypy, rigidity, repetition, and apparent lack of rational motivation, is found in a variety of life conditions, customs, and everyday practices: in cultural rituals, whether religious or non-religious; in many children's complicated routines; in the pathology of obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD); in normal adults around certain stages of the life-cycle, birthing in particular. Combining evidence from evolutionary anthropology, neuropsychology and neuroimaging, we propose an explanation of ritualized behavior in terms of an evolved Precaution System geared (...) to the detection of and reaction to inferred threats to fitness. This system, distinct from fear-systems geared to respond to manifest danger, includes a repertoire of clues for potential danger as well as a repertoire of species-typical precautions. In OCD pathology, this system does not supply a negative feedback to the appraisal of potential threats, resulting in doubts about the proper performance of precautions, and repetition of action. Also, anxiety levels focus the attention on low-level gestural units of behavior rather than on the goal-related higher-level units normally used in parsing the action-flow. Normally automatized actions are submitted to cognitive control. This “swamps” working memory, an effect of which is a temporary relief from intrusions but also their long-term strengthening. Normal activation of this Precaution System explains intrusions and ritual behaviors in normal adults. Gradual calibration of the system occurs through childhood rituals. Cultural mimicry of this system's normal input makes cultural rituals attention-grabbing and compelling. A number of empirical predictions follow from this synthetic model. (Published Online February 8 2007) Key Words: childhood ritual; compulsion; event boundaries; evolutionary psychology; obsessive-compulsive disorder; ritual; thought intrusion. (shrink)

Current scientific research almost always requires collaboration among several (if not several hundred) specialized researchers. When scientists co-author a journal article, who deserves credit for discoveries or blame for errors? How should scientific institutions promote fruitful collaborations among scientists? In this book, leading philosophers of science address these critical questions.

Ownership is universal and ubiquitous in human societies, yet the psychology underpinning ownership intuitions is generally not described in a coherent and computationally tractable manner. Ownership intuitions are commonly assumed to derive from culturally transmitted social norms, or from a mentally represented implicit theory. While the social norms account is entirelyad hoc, the mental theory requires prior assumptions about possession and ownership that must be explained. Here I propose such an explanation, arguing that the intuitions result from the interaction of (...) two cognitive systems. One of these handles competitive interactions for the possession of resources observed in many species including humans. The other handles mutually beneficial cooperation between agents, as observed in communal sharing, collective action and trade. Together, these systems attend to specific cues in the environment, and produce definite intuitions such as “this is hers,” “that is not mine.” This computational model provides an explanation for ownership intuitions, not just in straightforward cases of property, but also in disputed ownership (squatters, indigenous rights), historical changes (abolition of slavery), as well as apparently marginal cases, such as the questions, whether people own their seats on the bus, or their places in a queue, and how people understand “cultural appropriation” and slavery. In contrast to some previous theories, the model is empirically testable and free ofad hocstipulations. (shrink)

Epistemic accounts of scientific collaboration usually assume that, one way or another, two heads really are more than twice better than one. We show that this hypothesis is unduly strong. We present a deliberately crude model with unfavorable hypotheses. We show that, even then, when the priority rule is applied, large differences in successfulness can emerge from small differences in efficiency, with sometimes increasing marginal returns. We emphasize that success is sensitive to the structure of competing communities. Our results suggest (...) that purely epistemic explanations of the efficiency of collaborations are less plausible but have much more powerful socioepistemic versions. (shrink)

Recent work in biology, cognitive psychology, and archaeology has renewed evolutionary perspectives on the role of natural selection in the emergence and recurrent forms of religious thought and behavior, i.e., mental representations of supernatural agents, as well as artifacts, ritual practices, moral systems, ethnic markers, and specific experiences associated with these representations. One perspective, inspired from behavioral ecology, attempts to measure the fitness effects of religious practices. Another set of models, representative of evolutionary psychology, explain religious thought and behavior as (...) the output of cognitive systems (e.g., animacy detection, social cognition, precautionary reasoning) that are not exclusive to the religious domain. In both perpectives, the question remains open, whether religious thought and behavior constitute an adaptation or a by-product of adaptive cognitive function. (shrink)

A part of the scientific literature consists of intermediate results within a longer project. Scientists often publish a first result in the course of their work, while aware that they should soon achieve a more advanced result from this preliminary result. Should they follow the proverb “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush”, and publish any intermediate result they get? This is the normative question addressed in this paper. My aim is to clarify, to refine, and (...) to assess informal arguments about the choice whether to publish intermediate results. To this end, I adopt a rational decision framework, supposing some utility or preferences, and I propose a formal model. The best publishing strategy turns out to depend on the research situation. In some simple circumstances, even selfish and short-minded scientists should publish their intermediate results, and should thus behave like their altruistic peers, i. e. like society would like them to behave. In other research situations, with inhomogeneous reward or difficulty profiles, the best strategy is opposite. These results suggest qualified philosophical morals. (shrink)

The domain of “folk-economics” consists in explicit beliefs about the economy held by laypeople, untrained in economics, about such topics as, for example, the causes of the wealth of nations, the benefits or drawbacks of markets and international trade, the effects of regulation, the origins of inequality, the connection between work and wages, the economic consequences of immigration, or the possible causes of unemployment. These beliefs are crucial in forming people's political beliefs and in shaping their reception of different policies. (...) Yet, they often conflict with elementary principles of economic theory and are often described as the consequences of ignorance, irrationality, or specific biases. As we will argue, these past perspectives fail to predict the particular contents of popular folk-economic beliefs and, as a result, there is no systematic study of the cognitive factors involved in their emergence and cultural success. Here we propose that the cultural success of particular beliefs about the economy is predictable if we consider the influence of specialized, largely automatic inference systems that evolved as adaptations to ancestral human small-scale sociality. These systems, for which there is independent evidence, include free-rider detection, fairness-based partner choice, ownership intuitions, coalitional psychology, and more. Information about modern mass-market conditions activates these specific inference systems, resulting in particular intuitions, for example, that impersonal transactions are dangerous or that international trade is a zero-sum game. These intuitions in turn make specific policy proposals more likely than others to become intuitively compelling, and, as a consequence, exert a crucial influence on political choices. (shrink)

Human agents happen to judge that a conjunction of two terms is more probable than one of the terms, in contradiction with the rules of classical probabilities—this is the conjunction fallacy. One of the most discussed accounts of this fallacy is currently the quantum-like explanation, which relies on models exploiting the mathematics of quantum mechanics. The aim of this paper is to investigate the empirical adequacy of major quantum-like models which represent beliefs with quantum states. We first argue that they (...) can be tested in three different ways, in a question order effect configuration which is different from the traditional conjunction fallacy experiment. We then carry out our proposed experiment, with varied methodologies from experimental economics. The experimental results we get are at odds with the predictions of the quantum-like models. This strongly suggests that this quantum-like account of the conjunction fallacy fails. Future possible research paths are discussed. (shrink)

Religions “in the wild” are the varied set of religious activities that occurred before the emergence of organized religions with doctrines, or that persist at the margins of those organized traditions. These religious activities mostly focus on misfortune; on how to remedy specific cases of illness, accidents, failures; and on how to prevent them. I present a general model to account for the cross-cultural recurrence of these particular themes. The model is based on features of human psychology—namely, epistemic vigilance, the (...) set of systems whereby we evaluate the quality of information and of sources of information, and threat-detection psychology, the set of evolved systems geared at detecting potential danger in the environment. Given these two sets of systems, the dynamics of communication will favor particular types of messages about misfortune. This makes it possible to predict recurrent features of religious systems, such as the focus on nonphysical agents, the focus on particular cases rather than general aspects of misfortune, and the emergence of specialists. The model could illuminate not just why such representations are culturally successful, but also why people are motivated to formulate them in the first place. (shrink)

Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support ''naturalized epistemology'' arguments to the effect that a general epistemic stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved ''natural metaphysics''. This consists in a system of categories and category-specific inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation. Evidence for this (...) system provides a better understanding of the limited ''plasticity'' of ontological commitments as well as a computationally plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about innateness. This may provide a starting point for a ''naturalized epistemology'' that takes into account evolved properties of human conceptual structures. (shrink)