This article examines the business practices of Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata, the founder the Tata group of business in India in the 19th century, from the perspective of stakeholder welfare. Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata was concerned about the welfare of all major stakeholder constituents. His business practices promoted the welfare of employees, customers, society, owners, competitors, environment and other stakeholders. He implemented several measures even before law mandated them thus acting as a forerunner in promoting stakeholder welfare. His business plans became the (...) foundation for an economically strong India. This article, after an initial overview of the stakeholder framework, describes the business practices of Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata with regard to major stakeholder constituents. Relevant research findings regarding each stakeholder constituent studied have been cited to show that the practices of Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata have relevance to business even today. (shrink)

"--Brian Greene, Columbia University "This book includes material that is intellectually innovative and comes as a surprise even to specialists in the field.

Fruto de una convergencia de motivos e intereses procedentes de diversas disciplinas, los estudios sobre la argumentación han adquirido sus propias señas de identidad como conocimiento, análisis y evaluación del discurso argumentativo a través de sus dimensiones o proyecciones lógica, dialéctica, retórica y socio-institucional. La presente obra trata de reunir, precisar y articular las nociones básicas y los conceptos determinantes de los desarrollos que hoy tienen lugar en ese campo. Este Compendio de lógica, argumentación y retórica se ofrece como una (...) obra de referencia, una herramienta de trabajo y un estímulo para los estudiantes de —y los interesados o los preocupados por— la argumentación, tanto en el plano internacional como, primordialmente, en el medio cultural hispánico e hispanoamericano. No existía hasta ahora una publicación de estas características, a pesar de su necesidad tanto desde el punto de vista didáctico, y en atención a intereses prácticos, como desde el punto de vista teórico. Su elaboración ha ocupado a 59 autores, especialistas y estudiosos de diversos medios académicos y nacionalidades, en la confección de las 176 entradas de las que consta. (shrink)

Context: Immunity includes cognitive concepts: the organism is thought to specifically recognize foreign materials and develop a memory of these encounters. Vaccines are thought to work by enhancing this immunological memory. Lymphocytes are key cells and specific antibodies are key molecules in immune recognition. Antibodies are blood proteins called “immunoglobulins.” Spontaneously formed immunoglobulins are seen as “natural” antibodies to dietary components and commensal bacteria. Immune cognition is used simply as a didactic metaphor. Problem: Do the cognitive aspects of immunology stem (...) from the activities of cells and molecules, or are they ascribed by the immunologist operating as a human observer? (1) An immense variety of immunoglobulins may bind to the same antigen with different binding energies. It is the immunologist who arbitrates the boundary between those that are specific (and declared antibodies) and those that are not. Specific antibodies serve as functional labels pasted onto natural immunoglobulins, as if they were recognizing elements. Is this “arbitration” the true cognitive event ascribed to immunoglobulins and lymphocytes? (2) A major impasse exists between progress in experimental immunology and its translation into clinical results. A proper understanding of immunological activity demands a wider view of an organism’s biology and, also, of the interference of human observers in delineating experimental realities, such as the specificity of immune recognition. Maturana’s biology of cognition and language provides one such approach. Method: Use of Maturana’s biology of cognition and language concepts to describe immunological activity. Results: A whole new understanding of immunological activity is suggested. Implications: A major change in the way of seeing is proposed that may eventually help the translation of this knowledge into clinical results. Furthermore, the immune system may also become a proper model for cognitive analyses. (shrink)

Juzʼ 1. al-Falsafah al-Yūnānīyah minṬālīs ilá Aflāṭūn al-Ṭabʻah 2. 1965 -- juzʼ 2. Arisṭū. 1966 -- juzʼ 6. al-Falsafah al-ḥadīthah. al-Ṭabʻah 1. 1969 --.

Articles, chiefly on Islamic philosophy.

This paper answers the title question, “Yes,” on both counts. The first part of the paper argues that modern liberals are socialists, and the second part argues that they are also social democrats. The main idea behind the first argument is that the state has effectively taken control of the incidents of ownership through its taxation, spending, and regulatory policies. The main idea behind the second argument is that the institutions of social democracy are replicated by the institutions favored by (...) modern American liberalism. Specifically, the takeover of the American healthcare system, Social Security, employers' mandatory contributions to unemployment insurance, and workers' compensation insurance replicate the institutions of social democracy. (shrink)

To understand the distinctive characteristics of the institutions of law, one needs to understand the idea of law. Understanding the nature of law is not ultimately a matter of achieving a careful description of social practices but a matter of grasping the idea towards which those practices must be understood as oriented. The idea of law is the focal point that enables us to make coherent sense of the otherwise diverse features of practice, but it is not itself a matter (...) of observable practice. It resembles a notional point in space that enables us to grasp the relationship between various parts of a complex drawing, although in itself it forms no part of the drawing. But how is such an idea to be investigated? We expect a clear understanding of the idea of law to explain our settled understandings about what will and will not count as an instance of legal ordering. We expect it, in other words, to explain some at least of the minimum conditions for applicability of the idea. But, since the idea of law is invoked within the practices of law, we also expect a philosophical understanding of that idea to clarify its role in guiding and orienting practice, and not simply in describing practice. Although the practices of law are oriented towards the idea of law, that idea is not straightforwardly available to be read in the surface appearance of the practices. For such practices, while involving systematic appeal to the idea of law, operate for the most part on the basis of that unreflective conformity that assists the stable functioning of most human institutions. Can we begin by identifying a "minimum specification" of the concept of law, in the form of a set of conditions without which nothing could count as law at all? From such a minimum specification, can we proceed in some orderly and intellectually defensible way towards "later phases" of the concept, with their "qualitative changes as well as additions and complications"? The possibility is worth exploring, however unfashionable may be the philosophical viewpoint from which it springs. Fuller's famous story of Rex, and his failed attempts to enact law, identifies the minimum conditions that something must satisfy in order to count as an instance of law. Fuller's theory becomes interesting when he proceeds to demonstrate that the eight desiderata (identified as minimum conditions), when taken collectively, be regarded as a guiding ideal for legal thought: the ideal that we usually label "the rule of law". Fuller claimed that his eight requirements represent an "inner morality of law". Hart's critique of Fuller appeared to suggest that the moral value of compliance with the eight requirements is wholly contingent upon the law's content, and that the eight requirements are more akin to precepts of efficiency than to moral standards. This criticism has been widely endorsed as correct. In fact, the criticism is not correct. The eight requirements are not principles of efficacy, but (when taken together) represent a moral ideal for legal systems. Fuller never really succeeded in giving a clear explanation of the moral status of his eight requirements. I argue that Fuller's eight desiderata represent an intrinsically moral ideal that we may call "freedom as independence from the power of another". This is the aspect of freedom that distinguishes the slave from the free man. My theory seeks to establish the existence of a very tight and necessary connection between law and morality. Positivists will find it impossible to deny that governance by law involves some degree of compliance with Fuller's eight requirements, and that such compliance necessarily involves the realisation of some degree of freedom as independence. If they are tempted to deny that freedom as independence is a distinct aspect of freedom, they must also argue that connections between slavery and the lack of freedom are purely contingent. If they accept that the lack of freedom as independece is what makes a slave a slave, but they deny that freedom as indepenence is a moral value, they must say that there is nothing intrinsically morally wrong with slavery: the moral wrongness of slavery would then have to be seen as stemming from purely contingent features of the slave's position. The value of freedom as independence may be thin. But it is real, it is genuinely valuable, and it is tightly connected to the existence of law. (shrink)

Sobre dialéctica recoge las principales aportaciones –inéditas en su mayor parte– de Manuel Sacristán Luzón (1925-1985) en torno a esta debatida noción, entre las que se incluye el importante prólogo que escribió en 1964 para su traducción castellana del Anti-Dühring, prólogo que Javier Muguerza ha caracterizado como “el texto filosófico más significativo de Sacristán –el que más me impactó cuando lo leí y prolongó más duraderamente dicho impacto” y del que Gregorio Morán escribió que “otro tanto ocurrió con su soberbio (...) prólogo al Anti-Dühring…; fue un texto capital en la formación marxista de una generación”. Como señaló Sacristán, y tal como reflejan los distintos textos que configuran este volumen, la dialéctica es una visión global del mundo, no un método, y una hipótesis de estas características no se aplica: se realiza, se concreta, y para ello hay que trabajar de verdad y verazmente. Miguel Candel Sanmartín, Manuel Monleón Pradas y Félix Ovejero Lucas son los autores del prólogo, nota final y epílogo del volumen. Antoni Domènech ha traducido para esta edición la “Loa a la dialéctica” de Brecht. Manuel Sacristán Luzón (Madrid, 1925-Barcelona, 1985) estudió Derecho y Filosofía y Letras en la Universidad de Barcelona y cursó estudios de lógica y epistemología en el Instituto de Lógica Matemática e Investigación de Fundamentos de la Universidad de Münster (Westfalia, Alemania) entre 1954 y 1956. Sacristán se doctoró en Filosofía en 1959 con una tesis sobre Las ideas gnoseológicas de Heidegger y en 1964, dos años después de que le fuera negada la cátedra de lógica de la Universidad de Valencia, publicó Introducción a la lógica y al análisis formal, uno de los textos que más contribuyeron a la presencia y consolidación de la lógica formal en la cultura científica y filosófica española. Profesor de “Fundamentos de Filosofía” y de “Metodología de las ciencias sociales” en la Universidad de Barcelona, impartió durante el curso 1982-1983 dos seminarios de postgrado en la UNAM de México. Miembro del comité central del PCE y del PSUC, entre 1965 y 1970 formó parte del comité ejecutivo del PSUC. En su faceta de filósofo marxista, destaca la sensatez y originalidad con que siempre trató el complejo, y en ocasiones oscuro, tema de la dialéctica y su concepción del marxismo como una tradición de política revolucionaria. De uno de los escritos aquí recogidos, Félix Ovejero Lucas señaló en 1985: “Apenas veinte páginas tenía la introducción de Manuel Sacristán a la edición castellana del Anti-Dühring, de Engels; veinte páginas que enseñaron a varias generaciones de marxistas mucho más acerca de lo que significaba ser marxista que la marabunta editorial de unos años más tarde”. (shrink)

Three essays on the nature of the philosophical task. The author's view is that the primary focus of philosophy should be critical.

Abstract Global climate change will have a strong impact on Nigeria, particularly on agricultural production and associated livelihoods. Although there is a growing scientific consensus about the impact of climate change, efforts so far in Nigeria to deal with these impacts are still rudimentary and not properly coordinated. There is little evidence of any pragmatic approach towards tracking climate change in order to develop an evidence base on which to formulate national adaptation strategies. Although Nigeria is not alone in this (...) regard, the paper asserts that National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy could help address this situation by guiding the integration of climate change adaptation into government policies, strategies, and programs, with particular focus on the most vulnerable groups and the agricultural sectors. There is an urgent need to adopt abatement strategies that will provide economic incentives to reduce the risk from disasters, such as developing agricultural practices that are more resilient to a changing climate. Content Type Journal Article Category Articles Pages 1-11 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9336-0 Authors N. A. Onyekuru, Ecosystems and Society Research Cluster, Department of Environment, University of York, York, UK Rob Marchant, Ecosystems and Society Research Cluster, Department of Environment, University of York, York, UK Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863. (shrink)

Die Herrschaft des Behaviorismus in der Psychologie ist gebrochen! Das ist die Ausgangsthese dieses Buches, die im Rahmen des Modells revolutionärer Wissenschaftsentwicklung (Kuhn) als Behauptung eines Paradigmawechsels präzisiert wird. Die Argumentation beschränkt sich nicht nur auf den Nachweis des Niedergangs des Behaviorismus, sondern gibt auch konstruktiv das mögliche neue Paradigma an: als Psychologie des reflexiven Subjekts, das wie der Wissenschaftler (subjektive) Theorien aufstellt, überprüft, bewertet. Der Aufriss einer solchen Psychologie des epistemischen Subjekts unter allgemein-, sozial-, pädagogisch- und klinisch-psychologischem Aspekt thematisiert (...) vor allem: die Rationalität der Reflexionen, Normenkritik und -begründung im Austausch von wissenschaftlichen und naiven Theorien sowie die Berücksichtigung von Reflexivität in der therapeutischen Praxis. Die Rückwendung dieser pychologisch-metatheoretischen Perspektiven auf die Wissenschaftstheorie führt auch zu einer neu. (shrink)

By ‘the logic of religious language’ I understand both a problem: What is the correct account of the logic of religious language? and a theme, a recurrent theme in the modern philosophical discussion of religion, which raises a related but distinguishable question: Is the approach to religion of linguistic analysis an adequate approach? Can we do justice to the logic of religious language by attending to the recognition and analysis of different linguistic forms?