Scholars have given attention to the question of whether morally-neutral philosophical analysis of the concept ‘law’ is a sustainable project. Less at- tention has been given to whether the methodological approach that relies on morally-neutral description and explanation, rather than on philosophical analysis, is a defensible project. My primary goal in this paper is to argue that although descriptive/explanatory theorizing is a logically possible project, it is not a defensible one. I claim that there is no reason to insulate legal (...) theorizing from moral arguments. Indeed, it is desirable for legal theorists to employ moral considerations because it is only through moral argument that we can answer important questions we care about with respect to law.Resumen:Muchos teóricos han prestado su atención a la pregunta sobre si el análisis filosófico moralmente neutral del concepto ‘derecho’ es un proyecto sostenible. En cambio, se ha prestado menos atención a discutir si el en- foque metodológico basado en descripciones y explicaciones moralmente neutrales, en lugar del análisis filosófico, es un proyecto defendible. Mi objetivo principal en este artículo es argumentar que, si bien la labor teórica descriptiva/explicativa es un proyecto lógicamente posible, no es, sin embargo, defendible. Yo sostengo que no hay razón para aislar la labor teórico-jurídica de los argumentos morales. Por el contrario, es deseable que los teóricos del derecho empleen consideraciones morales, debido a que es sólo a través de argumentos morales como podemos responder las preguntas que nos preocupan en relación con el derecho. (shrink)

The diagnostic category of borderline personality disorder (BPD) has come under increasing criticism in recent years. In this paper, we analyze the role and impact of epistemic injustice, specifically testimonial injustice, in relation to the diagnosis of BPD. We first offer a critical sociological and historical account, detailing and expanding a range of arguments that BPD is problematic nosologically. We then turn to explore the epistemic injustices that can result from a BPD diagnosis, showing how they can lead to experiences (...) of testimonial injustice which impede patient engagement in meaning-making activities, thereby undermining standard therapeutic goals. We conclude by showing how our arguments bolster ongoing efforts to replace the diagnostic category of BPD with alternatives such as complex post-traumatic stress disorder. (shrink)

From the contents: La fenetre sur l'absolu selon Fink (Laszlo Tengelyi).- Temps, espace et monde chez le jeune Fink (Marc Richir).- L'auto-reference de la phenomenologie (Bernhard Waldenfels).- Phenomenologie et critique chez Fink et Husserl (Ronald Bruzina).- Le spectateur phenomenologisant: au seuil du non-agir et du non-etre (Natalie Depraz).- Nouvelle determination de l'ideal (Hans Rainer Sepp).

The book explores Oakeshott's thought on the key role human imagination plays in relation to the political. It addresses four main themes: imagination, foundational narratives, the question of political societies' identities as well as that of human living-together, to use Hannah Arendt's expression. The book's main objective is to show that Oakeshott may be rightfully understood to be a philosopher of the imagination as well as a foundationalist thinker in the Arendtian narrative constructivist tradition.

This book offers a radical reappraisal of the intellectual affinities between Theodor W. Adorno and Samuel Beckett, in particular with regard to freedom and its reconceptualization by Adorno.

In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipulation or by the addition of further, problematic conditions. We contend that the cooperative aspect of collective intentions is not a property of (...) the intentions themselves, but of the mode of reasoning by which they are formed. We analyse collective intentions as the outcome of team reasoning, a mode of practical reasoning used by individuals as members of groups. We describe this mode of reasoning in terms of formal schemata, discuss a range of possible accounts of group agency, and show how existing theories of collective intentions fit into this framework. (shrink)

It is evident, in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic that has physicians confronting death and dying at unprecedented levels along with growing data suggesting that physicians who care for dying patients face complex emotional, psychological and behavioural effects, that there is a need for their better understanding and the implementation of supportive measures. Taking into account data positing that effects of caring for dying patients may impact a physician’s concept of personhood, or “what makes you, ‘you’”, we adopt Radha (...) Krishna’s Ring Theory of Personhood (RToP) to scrutinise the experiences of physicians working in intensive care units (ICU) using a fictional scenario that was inspired by real events. The impact of death and dying, its catalysts, internal constituents, external factors, dyssynchrony, and buffers, specific to ICU physicians, were identified and explored. Such a framework allows for ramifications to be considered holistically and facilitates the curation of strategies for conflict resolution. This evaluation of the RToP acknowledges the experience and wide-ranging effects it has on ICU physicians. As such, our findings provide insight into their specific needs and highlight the importance of support on a personal and organisational level. Although further research needs to be conducted, the RToP could serve as the basis for a longitudinal assessment tool supported by the use of portfolios or mentorship due to their provision of personalised, appropriate, specific, timely, accessible and long-term support. (shrink)

This is the first book to explore the connections and interactions between social epistemology and epistemic relativism. The essays in the volume are organized around three distinct philosophical approaches to this topic: 1) foundational questions concerning deep disagreement, the variability of epistemic norms, and the relationship between relativism and reliabilism; 2) the role of relativistic themes in feminist social epistemology; and 3) the relationship between the sociology of knowledge, philosophy of science, and social epistemology. Recent trends in social epistemology seek (...) to rectify earlier work that conceptualized cognitive achievements primarily on the level of isolated individuals. Relativism insists that epistemic judgements or beliefs are justified or unjustified only relative to systems of standards-there is not neutral way of adjudicating between them. By bringing together these two strands of epistemology, this volume offers unique perspectives on a number of central epistemological questions. Social Epistemology and Relativism will be of interest to researchers working in epistemology, feminist philosophy, and the sociology of knowledge. (shrink)

Recent research suggests that individuals with relatively weak global precedence (i.e., a smaller propensity to view visual stimuli in a configural manner) show a reduced face inversion effect (FIE). Coupled with such findings, a number of recent studies have demonstrated links between an advantage for feature-based processing and the presentation of traits associated with autism among the general population. The present study sought to bridge these findings by investigating whether a relationship exists between the possession of autism-associated traits (i.e., as (...) indicated by individuals’“autism quotient” [(AQ) and the size of the FIE. Participants completed an on-line study in which the AQ was measured prior to a standard face recognition task where half of the faces were inverted at test. The results confirmed that higher AQ levels were predictive of smaller FIEs. Implications for a common underlying factor relating to processing orientation are discussed. (shrink)

Drawing on recent findings in the cognitive and neurosciences, this article discusses how people manage to predict each other’s actions, which is fundamental for joint action. We explore how a common coding of perceived and performed actions may allow actors to predict the what, when, and where of others’ actions. The “what” aspect refers to predictions about the kind of action the other will perform and to the intention that drives the action. The “when” aspect is critical for all joint (...) actions requiring close temporal coordination. The “where” aspect is important for the online coordination of actions because actors need to effectively distribute a common space. We argue that although common coding of perceived and performed actions alone is not sufficient to enable one to engage in joint action, it provides a representational platform for integrating the actions of self and other. The final part of the paper considers links between lower‐level processes like action simulation and higher‐level processes like verbal communication and mental state attribution that have previously been at the focus of joint action research. (shrink)

Game theory is central to modern understandings of how people deal with problems of coordination and cooperation. Yet, ironically, it cannot give a straightforward explanation of some of the simplest forms of human coordination and cooperation--most famously, that people can use the apparently arbitrary features of "focal points" to solve coordination problems, and that people sometimes cooperate in "prisoner's dilemmas." Addressing a wide readership of economists, sociologists, psychologists, and philosophers, Michael Bacharach here proposes a revision of game theory that resolves (...) these long-standing problems. In the classical tradition of game theory, Bacharach models human beings as rational actors, but he revises the standard definition of rationality to incorporate two major new ideas. He enlarges the model of a game so that it includes the ways agents describe to themselves their decision problems. And he allows the possibility that people reason as members of groups, each taking herself to have reason to perform her component of the combination of actions that best achieves the group's common goal. Bacharach shows that certain tendencies for individuals to engage in team reasoning are consistent with recent findings in social psychology and evolutionary biology. As the culmination of Bacharach's long-standing program of pathbreaking work on the foundations of game theory, this book has been eagerly awaited. Following Bacharach's premature death, Natalie Gold and Robert Sugden edited the unfinished work and added two substantial chapters that allow the book to be read as a coherent whole. (shrink)

This article focuses on the notion of affectivity, which over the last few decades has become an increasingly popular lens through which to study various themes in the humanities and social sciences, notably with respect to labour. The notion of “affective labour” has been deemed to encompass both work that requires emotional investment and work that is intended to produce emotional responses yet explorations of such work, though varied in schope, have generally not widened their breadth to include the field (...) of education, inviting the question: Can educators and their pedagogical outputs be analyzed through the same affective lens used to study other professions? The Philosophy for Children program created by Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp represents an interesting case study of education as affective labour since it involves not only live educative encounters with groups of children but also virtual ones portrayed through its curriculum of philosophical novels. This article positions the Lipmanian philosophical novel as a form of affective labour both in process and in delivery . Drawing on the ideas of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, it seeks to demonstrate how the philosophical novel captures the liberating potential of affective labour—relational autonomy within a strong community—while avoiding its negative outcomes of exploitation and alienation. In doing so, it strives to articulate what the philosophical novel has already enabled and what it should aim to make possible in its future renditions. The article begins with a brief account of affective labour as an opportunity amidst risk then proceeds to examine the philosophical novel as a writing endeavour that “authors” affect and subsequently “facilitates” affect among children engaged in collaborative dialogue. (shrink)

Feminist epistemologies hold that differences in the social locations of inquirers make for epistemic differences, for instance, in the sorts of things that inquirers are justified in believing. In this paper we situate this core idea in feminist epistemologies with respect to debates about social constructivism. We address three questions. First, are feminist epistemologies committed to a form of social constructivism about knowledge? Second, to what extent are they incompatible with traditional epistemological thinking? Third, do the answers to these questions (...) raise serious problems for feminist epistemologies? We argue that some versions of two of the main strands in feminist epistemology – feminist standpoint theory and feminist empiricism – are committed to a form of social constructivism, which requires certain departures from traditional epistemological thinking. But we argue that these departures are less problematic than one might think. Thus, (some) feminist epistemologies provide a plausible way of understanding how (some) knowledge might be socially constructed. (shrink)

This article outlines various philosophical conceptions of gender. I first explain two basic approaches: first, that gender is a social role or status that is imposed on individuals by third‐person institutional structures; and secondly, that gender is a matter of first‐person identifications, behaviors or choices. Next, I examine the notion of gender essentialism. Is gender is feature of persons that is essential to an individual being the person she is? Is there a “kind essence” or “group essence” that individuals have (...) to instantiate in order to be members of gender groups? Finally, I explain the related debate over the unification of gender categories. Realists argue that explaining group membership requires that we posit a universal, for instance, a single property “womanness” that all members of the group “women” share. Nominalists argue that weaker devices such as linguistic categorization or resemblance are adequate to unify individuals with different characteristics into the group. For nominalists, diversity within groups does not entail that groups are a myth. (shrink)

This book draws connections and explores important questions at the intersection of the debates about relational autonomy and relational equality. Although these two research areas share several common assumptions and concerns, their connections have not been systematically explored. The essays in this volume address theoretical questions at the intersection of relational theories of autonomy and equality and also consider how these theoretical considerations play out in real-world contexts. Several chapters explore possible conceptual links between relational autonomy and equality by considering (...) the role of values--such as agency, non-domination, and self-respect--to which both relational autonomy theorists and relational egalitarians are committed. Others reflect on how debates about autonomy and equality can clarify our thinking about oppression based on race and gender, and how such oppression affects interpersonal relationships. Autonomy and Equality: Relational Approaches is the first book to specifically address the relationship between these two research areas. It will be of interest to scholars and graduate students working in social and political philosophy, moral philosophy, and feminist philosophy. (shrink)

En este texto planteamos la pregunta por la inscripción de la sorpresa en la fenomenología de las emociones de Husserl. Pero antes de dar por supuesto que Husserl abordó el problema de la sorpresa, nos preguntamos si verdaderamente lo hizo y sí, incluso, se puede hablar de una "fenomenología de las emociones" en su obra. El texto está, así, motivado por dos interrogantes: ¿Es la sorpresa una emoción? ¿Husserl desarrolló verdaderamente una "fenomenología de las emociones"? Esto nos conducirá a 1) (...) plantear una redefinición de sorpresa y 2) avanzar por el camino de una fenomenología un poco reformada por el hecho de la sorpresa. En tres apartados desarrollamos este planteamiento: I. La fenomenología husserliana de las emociones, II. ¿La sorpresa es una emoción? Y III. La sorpresa, un proceso. In this paper we argue about the inscription of surprise in the phenomenology of emotions of E. Husserl. But before assuming that E. Husserl addressed the issue of surprise, we ask if he really did it and even, if it is possible to talk about a "phenomenology of emotions" his work. The paper is thus motivated by two questions: Is surprise an emotion? Did Husserl really develop a "phenomenology of emotions"? This will take us to, 1) outline a redefinition of surprise, and 2) advance through the path of a phenomenology that has been a bit reformed by the fact of surprise. This issue will be developed in three stages: I. the husserlian phenomenology of emotions, II. Is surprise an emotion? III. The surprise, a process. (shrink)

Cardiophenomenology aims at refining the neuro-phenomenological approach created by F. Varela as a new paradigm, jointly based on Husserl’s a priori dynamics of the living present and an experiment on anticipatory time-dynamics of visual motor perception. In order to do so, we will situate the paradigm of neurophenomenology at the cardio-vascular level, focusing on the emotional dynamics of lived experience and thus refining the dialogue, more precisely, the generative mutual constraints between first- and third-person analysis. In this article we present (...) the theoretical hypothesis of cardiophenomenology, which places the bodily-emotional heartsystem at its core, as an intrinsic part of the cognitive system. The latter therefore needs to be enlarged in order to include an enactive embodied cardiac-affective dimension. Here we present five main arguments for the necessary inclusion of the bodily-emotional heartsystem in the cognitive system: first, two pragmatic operational arguments, then three theoretical ones. A direct methodological-pragmatic consequence is the actual operativity of the generative mutual constraints based on an experiential -experimental continuity of the embodied cardiac-affective fold inherent in the subject. (shrink)

Trolley problems have been used in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments and behavior. Most of this research has focused on people from the West, with implicit assumptions that moral intuitions should generalize and that moral psychology is universal. However, cultural differences may be associated with differences in moral judgments and behavior. We operationalized a trolley problem in the laboratory, with economic incentives and real-life consequences, and compared British and Chinese samples on moral behavior (...) and judgment. We found that Chinese participants were less willing to sacrifice one person to save five others, and less likely to consider such an action to be right. In a second study using three scenarios, including the standard scenario where lives are threatened by an on-coming train, fewer Chinese than British participants were willing to take action and sacrifice one to save five, and this cultural difference was more pronounced when the consequences were less severe than death. (shrink)

Joseph Raz’s The Morality of Freedom is well known for defending both a perfectionist form of liberalism and an ‘externalist’ conception of autonomy. John Christman proposes that there is a logical connection between the two theses and argues that externalist accounts of autonomy should be rejected on the basis that they are perfectionist. Christman’s perfectionism argument contains two premises: externalist theories of autonomy entail political perfectionism and political perfectionism is not defensible. I argue that neither premise is true. Externalist theories (...) of autonomy do not entail political perfectionism. Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that premise is true, premise is false. The strongest challenge to political perfectionism is that it is incompatible with the value of respect. I argue that those defending political perfectionism misconstrue what is required for respect. Once we see that respect is secured through features inherent in processes, the value of respect can be reconciled with political perfectionism. Political perfectionism is a defensible thesis and premise is false. (shrink)

In this paper I make the case for a feminist hinge epistemology in three steps. My first step is to explain hinge epistemologies as contemporary epistemologies that take Wittgenstein’s work in On Certainty as their starting point. My second step is to make three criticisms of this literature as it currently stands. My third step is to introduce feminist epistemologies, which argue that social factors like race and gender affect what different people and groups justifiably believe, and argue that developing (...) a feminist hinge epistemology is both plausible and desirable. (shrink)

The definitive account of Aristotle's life and school This definitive biography shows that Aristotle's philosophy is best understood on the basis of a firm knowledge of his life and of the school he founded. First published in Italian, and now translated, updated, and expanded for English readers, this concise chronological narrative is the most authoritative account of Aristotle's life and his Lyceum available in any language. Gathering, distilling, and analyzing all the evidence and previous scholarship, Carlo Natali, one of the (...) world's leading Aristotle scholars, provides a masterful synthesis that is accessible to students yet filled with evidence and original interpretations that specialists will find informative and provocative. Cutting through the controversy and confusion that have surrounded Aristotle's biography, Natali tells the story of Aristotle's eventful life and sheds new light on his role in the foundation of the Lyceum. Natali offers the most detailed and persuasive argument yet for the view that the school, an important institution of higher learning and scientific research, was designed to foster a new intellectual way of life among Aristotle's followers, helping them fulfill an aristocratic ideal of the best way to use the leisure they enjoyed. Drawing a wealth of connections between Aristotle's life and thinking, Natali demonstrates how the two are mutually illuminating. For this edition, ancient texts have been freshly translated on the basis of the most recent critical editions; indexes have been added, including a comprehensive index of sources and an index to previous scholarship; and scholarship that has appeared since the book's original publication has been incorporated. (shrink)

This book presents a radical and intuitive argument against the notion that intentional action, agency and autonomy are features belonging only to humans. Using evidence from research into the minds of non-human animals, it explores the ways in which animals can be understood as individuals who are aware of themselves, and the consequent basis of our moral obligations towards them. The first part of this book argues for a conception of agency in animals that admits to degrees among individuals and (...) across species. It explores self-awareness and its various levels of complexity which depend on an animals’ other mental capacities. The author offers an overview of some established theories in animal ethics including those of Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Bernard Rollin and Lori Gruen, and the ways these theories serve to extend moral consideration towards animals based on various capacities that both animals and humans have in common. The book concludes by challenging traditional Kantian notions of rationality and what it means to be an autonomous individual, and discussing the problems that still remain in the study of animal ethics. (shrink)

Un sujet peu exploré dans la phénoménologie husserlienne est encore à ce jour le champ des émotions, longtemps minoré. Or la publication du volume des Husserliana 'Sentiment et valeur' montre que-les émotions sont un thème qui préoccupa Husserl durant toute sa vie. La raison de cette invisibilité est moins son manque d'importance aux yeux du phénoménologue que la difficulté de lui trouver une place cohérente. Si les actes cognitifs (perceptifs, judicatifs, mémoriels, imaginatifs) représentent souvent le cas d'étude privilégié eu égard (...) à la visée de connaissance qui y apparaît en majeur, les affects (émotions, volitions, valeurs) obéissent à une autre logique ou, du moins, à une logique plus complexe : non seulement descriptive, mais aussi génétique-dynamique. Ce qui se joue avec les émotions est moins la connaissance d'un objet que les tensions, les satisfactions et les déceptions propres aux processus vécus des forces psychiques et de leurs valeurs pour le sujet. Un tel défi est ici relevé. On identifie les lieux où les émotions entrent en scène en esthétique, dans la pragmatique de l'action et en philosophie de l'esprit, en lien avec sciences cognitives et phénoménologie. Dès lors se profile une ligne directrice nouvelle autour de la complexité de la dynamique émotionnelle et de l'obsolescence conséquente du clivage cognition-émotion"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the relationship between social epistemology and relativism in the context of feminist epistemology. I do this by focusing on one particular branch of feminist epistemology - a branch known as standpoint theory - and investigating the connection between this view and epistemic relativism. I begin by defining both epistemic relativism and standpoint theory, and by briefly recounting the standard way that the connection between these two views is understood. The literature at the moment focuses on (...) an aspect of standpoint theory called the epistemic advantage thesis, and on an aspect of relativism which has been called equality. I then show that the connection between relativism and standpoint theory actually turns on a different aspect of standpoint theory, known as the standpoint thesis, and on an aspect of relativism which has been called non-neutrality. I argue that shifting our attention to these other aspects reveals that standpoint theory is clearly and unavoidably relativist, but that this isn’t a problem - standpoint theory can capture everything that it set out to, even on a relativist understanding of the view. (shrink)

Background: Ethical conflict and subsequent nurse moral distress and burnout are common in the intensive care unit (ICU). There is a gap in our understanding of nurses’ perceptions of how organizational resources support them in addressing ethical conflict in the intensive care unit. Research question/objectives/methods: The aim of this qualitative, descriptive study was to explore how nurses experience ethical conflict and use organizational resources to support them as they address ethical conflict in their practice. Participants and research context: Responses to (...) two open-ended questions were collected from critical care nurses working in five intensive care units at a large, academic medical center in the Midwestern region of the United States. Ethical considerations: This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the organization where the study took place. Findings: Three main interwoven themes emerged: nurses perceive (1) intensive care unit culture, practices, and organizational priorities contribute to patient suffering; (2) nurses are marginalized during ethical conflict in the intensive care unit; and (3) organizational resources have the potential to reduce nurse moral distress. Nurses identified ethics education, interprofessional dialogue, and greater involvement of nurses as important strategies to improve the management of ethical conflict. Discussion: Ethical conflict related to healthcare system challenges is intrinsic in the daily practice of critical care nurses. Nurses want to be engaged in discussions about their perspectives on ethical conflict and play an active role in addressing ethical conflict in their practice. Organizational resources that support nurses are vital to the resolution of ethical conflict. Conclusion: These findings can inform the development of interventions that aim to proactively and comprehensively address ethical conflict in the intensive care unit to reduce nurse moral distress and improve the delivery of patient and family care. (shrink)