The preparation of layers of amorphous Se by plasma-enhanced CVD using the hydride H2Se as precursor gas is described. Information concerning the structure of the films was obtained from Raman spectroscopy. The spectra of amorphous Se indicated that the dominant molecular structure is the eight-membered ring and/or a chain with Se8 molecular fragments. This material exhibited reversible photodarkening when illuminated at 77 K. In order to explain this phenomenon, we propose a mechanism which takes into account the role of the (...) lone-pair electron orbitals of Se in their contribution to structural ordering. Illumination can cause a distortion in the normal bonding direction between nearest-neighbour Se atoms and induce in this way intrinsic defect states located at the band edges. In the photo-darkened state, optical transition will occur between these defect states. (shrink)

It is rare to see books whose titles compare them to philosophical masterpieces. In Hollywood, a sequel is most often a calculated, crass attempt to cash in on the financial success of a popular movie. Given this current usage, it is curious to take up the gambit of a sequel in less greed-driven areas of culture. An additional curiosity in the title is the metaphor of the owl as the sun rises, a reversal of the flight of the owl of (...) Minerva. The first question a reader asks is, what sense do the phrases which compose the title make? (shrink)

Winfield asserts in his introduction that this is not a book about Hegel per se. Instead, it is a book in which Winfield uses Hegel to argue for his own position, an antifoundationalist systematic philosophy. Winfield engages in an interpretation of Hegel in order to buttress his own view.

This book about philosophical and methodological problems in psychoanalytic theory is surely one of the best pieces of literature on this subject of recent vintage. The author, a psychiatrist on the faculty of Harvard Medical School, displays considerable logical skill and philosophical sophistication, in addition to the expected familiarity with the psychoanalytic literature. The major purport of the book is a logical and philosophical defense of the claim that psychoanalytic explanations of human behavior--if constructed with proper and adequate regard for (...) relevant clinical data--are methodologically sound and genuinely scientific. One useful and novel feature of Sherwood's argument is the particular type of illustrative case material which he employs: instead of mustering various bits and instances of behavior from large numbers and varieties of cases, Sherwood considers the psychiatric explanation actually given by Freud in one of his recorded clinical case histories--the famous "Karl Lorenz" or "rat man" case. Sherwood devotes two chapters to a detailed description of this case, and an analysis of the logic of Freud's explanations of the behavior presented therein. From the point of view of logical and methodological considerations, there is an obvious advantage in such an approach, for it enables the critic to avoid leveling charges against the theory which might originate simply from extracting portions of explanatory material from their proper context. Sherwood also includes a chapter of criticism of what he calls "the thesis of the separate domain"--the view that there are fundamental differences in the logic of explanations of human behavior, cognition, and other phenomena involving reasons and intentions on the one hand, and other forms of explanation characteristic of the physical sciences, on the other. Philosophically, this is the most mature chapter of the book, and will be of interest to philosophers of mind, as well as philosophers of science, particularly for its criticism of the views of R. S. Peters. Unfortunately, however, Sherwood's argument is not unmarred by serious flaws and deficiencies. These include a highly psychologistic analysis of the logic and structure of explanation whose subsequent use repeatedly involves the author in context-of-discovery vs. context-of-justification confusions. Moreover, an apparent lapse into a non-Humean account of causality in the second section of the fifth chapter leads Sherwood to an unfortunate petitio principii on the issue of causes vs. reasons. Sherwood's critical discussion of the classical "covering-law" model of scientific explanation in the penultimate chapter exhibits numerous failures to come to grips with the essential aspects of the Braithwaite-Hempel-Oppenheim theory. Finally, an important sin of omission: Sherwood completely ignores the highly germane and decisive issues raised by authors such as Nagel and Arthur Pap, who charge the theoretical concepts of psychoanalysis with lack of cognitive and empirical significance. In sum, this is a flawed but eminently worthwhile book in the philosophy of behavioral science.--H. P. K. (shrink)

From his earliest work on personal identity to his last on the value of truthfulness, the ideas and arguments of Bernard Williams - in the metaphysics of personhood, in the history of philosophy, but especially in ethics and moral psychology - have proved sometimes controversial, often influential, and always worth studying. This book provides a comprehensive account of Williams's many significant contributions to contemporary philosophy. Topics include personal identity, various critiques of moral theory, practical reasoning and moral motivation, truth and (...) objectivity, and the relevance of ancient Greece to modern life. It not only positions Williams among these important philosophical topics, but also with regard to the views of other philosophers, including prominent forerunners such as Hume and Nietzsche and contemporary thinkers such as, Nagel, McDowell, MacIntyre and Taylor. The fragmentary nature of Williams's work is addressed and recurring themes and connections within his work are brought to light. (shrink)

The concept of consciousness has been the source of much philosophical, cognitive scientific and neuroscientific discussion for the past two decades. Many scientists, as well as philosophers, argue that at the moment we are almost completely in the dark about the nature of consciousness. Stuart Sutherland, in a much quoted remark, wrote that.

Ernest Nagel once remarked that it is fortunately not necessary to be clear about scientific philosophy and methodology in order to practice good science. He went on to say, "Even eminent scientists can make unholy spectacles of themselves when they don the mantle of philosophy and attempt to discuss the broad implications of their specialized labors." Feynman's recent venture into the philosophy of science is, unfortunately, a lucid illustration of the validity of Nagel's observations. The book is a rather literal (...) transcription of seven semi-popular lectures delivered by Feynman at Cornell in November of 1964. Feynman is a wonderful iconoclast, a legendary virtuoso of the bongo drums and—by the way—a Nobel laureate and one of the great theoretical physicists. But this is all the more reason to expect something a little more intellectually solid than is offered in this volume. It was obviously Feynman's intent to discuss some compelling problems which lie on the borderline of physics and philosophy with an intelligent lay audience. But few will be enlightened by Feynman's clever, if uninformative, discourse about such issues as the relation of mathematics to physics, symmetry and conservation laws, and probability and uncertainty. Feynman's finest hour undoubtedly comes in the lecture on quantum mechanics, in which some aspects of the wave-particle duality are presented. But the value of much of the rest of the book is severely qualified by the author's penchant for imprecise and confusing statements and, in some cases, outright mystery-mongering. This is a great pity because theoretical physics, especially in the hands of Richard Feynman, is a source of ideas which are most worth discussing.—H. P. K. (shrink)

My objective in this project is to explore the concept of moral luck as it relates to sports. I am especially interested in constitutive luck. As a foundation I draw from both Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel’s classic handling of moral luck, generally. Within the philosophy of sport are similar explorations of this nexus by Robert Simon and David Carr that also factor into the present work. My intent is to put a new lens in front of a puzzle drawn (...) from Torbjörn Tännsjö’s well-known article ‘Is Our Admiration of Sports Heroes Facistoid?’ Specifically, the idea that we might admire an athlete who excels without having worked hard for it. If we may call this puzzle ‘the talent problem,’ the questions driving the present work are as follows: what is the relationship between moral luck and the talent problem, and can this relationship provide a prescription for morally assessing the talent problem? The thesis that this exploratory work suggests that more complex games (and... (shrink)

Part I: WHAT IS ETHICS? Plato: Socratic Morality: Crito. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part II: ETHICAL RELATIVISM VERSUS ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM. Herodotus: Custom is King. Thomas Aquinas: Objectivism: Natural Law. Ruth Benedict: A Defense of Ethical Relativism. Louis Pojman: A Critique of Ethical Relativism. Gilbert Harman: Moral Relativism Defended. Alan Gewirth: The Objective Status of Human Rights. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part III: MORALITY, SELF-INTEREST AND FUTURE SELVES. Plato: Why Be Moral? Richard Taylor: On the Socratic Dilemma. David Gauthier: Morality and (...) Advantage. Gregory Kavka: A Reconciliation Project. Derek Parfit: Later Selves and Moral Principles. Bernard Williams: Persons, Character, and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IV: VALUE. Jeremy Bentham: Classical Hedonism. Robert Nozick: The Experience Machine. Richard Taylor: Value and the Origin of Right and Wrong. Friedrich Nietzsche: The Transvaluation of Values. Derek Parfit: What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best? Thomas Nagel: Value: The View from Nowhere. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part V: UTILITARIANISM AND CONSEQUENTIALISM. John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism. J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism. Kai Nielsen: Against Moral Conservatism. Bernard Williams: Against Utilitarianism. John Hospers: Rule-Utilitarianism. Robert Nozick: Side Constraints. Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VI: KANTIAN AND DEONTOLOGICAL SYSTEMS. Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysic of Morals. W. D. Ross: What Makes Right Acts Right? Onora O’Neill: Kantian Formula of the End in Itself and World Hunger. Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck. Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. Judith Jarvis Thomson: Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VII: CONTRACTARIAN ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Thomas Hobbes: The Leviathan. David Gauthier: Why Contractarianism? John Rawls: Contractualism: Justice as Fairness. T.M. Scanlon: Contractualism and Utilitarianism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VIII: VIRTUE-BASED ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Aristotle: The Ethics of Virtue. Bernard Mayo: Virtue and the Moral Life. William Frankena: A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics. Walter Schaller: Are Virtues No More than Dispositions to Obey Moral Rules? Alasdair MacIntyre: The Nature of the Virtues. Susan Wolf: Moral Saints. Louis P. Pojman: In Defense of Moral Saints. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IX: THE FACT/VALUE PROBLEM: METAETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. David Hume: On Reason and the Emotions: The Fact/Value Distinction. G. E. Moore: Non-Naturalism. A. J. Ayer: Emotivism. R. M. Hare: Prescriptivism: The Structure of Ethics and Morals. Geoffrey Warnock: The Object of Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part X: MORAL REALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF SKEPTICISM. J.L. Mackie: The Subjectivity of Values. Jonathan Harrison: A Critique of Mackie’s Error Theory. Gilbert Harman: Moral Nihilism. Nicholas Sturgeon: Moral Explanations. Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Bruce Russell: Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism. Michael Smith: A Defense of Moral Realism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XI: RELIGION AND ETHICS. Plato: Morality and Religion. Immanuel Kant: God and Immortality as Necessary Postulates of Morality. George Mavrodes: Religious and the Queerness of Morality. Kai Nielson: Ethics Without God. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XII: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO CLASSICAL ETHICAL THEORY. Part A. Sociobiology and the Question of Moral Responsibility. Charles Darwin: Ethics and the Descent of Man. E.O.Wilson: Sociobiology and Ethics. Michael Ruse: Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach. Elliot Sober: Prospects for an Evolutionary Ethics. J.L. Mackie: The Law of the Jungle, Evolution and Morality. Suggestions for Further Readingon Sociobiology. Part B. The Challenge of Determinism to Moral Responsibility and Desert. Galen Strawson: The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Louis Pojman: Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility:A Response to Galen Strawson. Richard Taylor: A Libertarian Defense of Free Will and Responsibility. Suggestions for Further Reading on Moral Responsibility. Glossary of Ethical Terms. (shrink)

Conceivability arguments play an important role in philosophy and especially in the mind/body debate. Although Descartes provides us with one of the best known conceivability arguments for dualism, conceivability arguments are in no way limited to historical positions. Conceivability has had a prominent role in contemporary philosophy of mind, primarily as evidence against materialism. In this dissertation I analyze these arguments and argue they are ultimately unsuccessful. ;My dissertation is divided into four main sections. In the first, I look at (...) Descartes' historical version of the conceivability argument. In the second, I analyze a contemporary version of the conceivability argument, namely Frank Jackson's knowledge argument and Thomas Nagel's discussion of the subjective nature of our experience of mind. I argue that these are unable to legitimize a move between conceivability to possibility. In the third section, I focus on David Chalmers' version of the conceivability argument, the zombie argument. Here I suggest that Chalmers' argument also depends on a supposed but unsupported link between our epistemological ability and a thing's ontological status. In the final section, I consider possible reasons for drawing a connection between conceivability and possibility and conclude that none of these are sufficient. ;Although Descartes attempts to fill in the steps between a person's ability to conceive of something and that something's possibility, he is unable to show that the connection between conceivability and possibility is strong enough to support his conclusion. Descartes, however, at least understands that he cannot simply assume the truth of this connection without first attempting to provide support for it. Because the contemporary philosophers in question do not attempt to legitimize their claim to a connection between conceivability and possibility, their versions of the conceivability argument are even more problematic. And, as I show in the fourth chapter, a general proof of the legitimacy of drawing metaphysical conclusions from something's epistemological status has yet to be given. Consequently, I conclude that the attempt to reject materialist accounts of consciousness on the basis of conceivability arguments is unsuccessful and ought to be abandoned. (shrink)

As inductive logic and the philosophy of probability theory have become of wider interest, it has become clear that a book of readings in these and related topics would be useful for courses since most of the important articles are scattered and inaccessible. The editors have fashioned an extensive collection of papers in four main areas: the meaning of probability, confirmation theory, simplicity of theories and structures, the justification of induction. Each chapter is preceded by an introduction which sets out (...) the basic problems of the topic under consideration. There are thirty-six papers in all, two-thirds of them in the first and last chapters. The first chapter includes articles by Ramsey, Carnap, Nagel, and Reichenbach. The second chapter is dominated by the work of Hempel, Oppenheim, and Kemeny; the third chapter features a long article by D. J. Hillman which takes as its basis the work of Goodman, and there are other papers by Bunge, Quine, and Barker. The discussion of induction and its justification contains articles by Hume and Mill, but the bulk of the papers are contemporary. There is a bibliography for each chapter at the end of the book.—P. J. M. (shrink)

Louis Pojman and Robert Westmoreland have compiled the best material on the subject of equality, ranging from classical works by Aristotle, Hobbes and Rousseau to contemporary works by John Rawls, Thomas Nagel, Michael Walzer, Harry Frankfurt, Bernard Williams and Robert Nozick; and including such topics as: the concept of equality; equal opportunity; Welfare egalitarianism; resources; equal human rights and complex equality.

There has been considerable debate in the literature as to whether work in experimental philosophy actually makes any significant contribution to philosophy. One stated view is that many X-Phi projects, notwithstanding their focus on topics relevant to philosophy, contribute little to philosophical thought. Instead, it has been claimed the contribution they make appears to be to cognitive science. In contrast to this view, here we argue that at least one approach to X-Phi makes a contribution which parallels, and also extends, (...) historically salient forms of philosophical analysis, especially contributions from Immanuel Kant, William James, Peter F. Strawson and Thomas Nagel. The framework elaborated here synthesizes philosophical theory with empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience and applies it to three perennial philosophical problems. According to this account, the origin of these three problems can be illuminated by viewing them as arising from a tension between two distinct types of cognition, each of which is associated with anatomically independent and functionally inhibitory neural networks. If the parallel we draw, between an empirical project and historically highly influential examples of philosophical analysis, is viewed as convincing, it follows that work in the cognitive sciences can contribute directly to philosophy. Further, this conclusion holds whether the empirical details of the account are correct or not. (shrink)

The debate surrounding eliminative materialism, and the role of empiricism more broadly, has been one of the more prominent philosophical debates of the last half-century. But too often what is at stake in this debate has been left implicit. This essay surveys the rhetoric of two participants in this debate, Paul Churchland and Thomas Nagel, on the question of whether or not scientific explanations will do away with the need for nonscientific descriptions. Both philosophers talk about this possibility in language (...) reminiscent of revolutionary politics. These authors do not see eliminative materialism merely as an idea to be evaluated, but a revolution to be welcomed or quashed. After surveying their rhetoric, the paper turns to the work of four philosophers—G.E.M. Anscombe, Peter Winch, Paul Holmer, and G.H. von Wright—to suggest that there is within Wittgensteinian tradition a ‘nonrevolutionary’ approach to the question of eliminative materialism. (shrink)

Thomas Nagel has recently discussed whether intelligent design theory is scientific and should be taught in public schools alongside the theory of evolution. Nagel writes: I do not regard divine intervention as a possibility, even though I have no other candidates. Yet I recognize that this is because of an aspect of my overall worldview that does not rest on empirical grounds or any other kind of rational grounds…. [S]omeone who can offer serious scientific reasons to doubt the adequacy of (...) [ET], and who believes in God, in the same immediate way that I believe there is no god, can quite reasonably conclude that the hypothesis of design should be taken seriously., pp. 187–205, p. 192.). (shrink)

1. Introduction. Professor Nagel's account of the “cognitive status” of scientific theories has been attacked by P. K. Feyerabend [5] and M. B. Hesse [8] in terms of his alledgedly misguided distinction between experimental laws and theories. The difficulty lies, these critics agree, in Nagel's attempt to find a stable basis for scientific theories in an observational basis of experimental laws. Both Feyerabend and Hesse note the vacillation in Nagel's account of the stability of the meaning of experimental terms and (...) in his discussion of the status of observational as opposed to theoretical terms. They find Nagel too “positivistic” and see as a first step toward a more adequate account of scientific theories the abandonment of the theoretical-observational dichotomy as having more than a pragmatic significance. Nagel's discussion of the theoretical-observational dichotomy is, I agree, inadequate in certain respects. I shall, however, suggest a quite different remedy from those of Feyerabend and Hesse, one that depends neither on a phenomenalistic reduction of theoretical entities nor on a blurring of the theoretical-observational dichotomy. (shrink)

It may be tempting to think that given Nagel’s much-discussed bat argument in “What Is It Like to be a Bat?” (henceforth the Bat article), Nagel qua Nagel has conceived an argument against the very idea of physicalism. For example, Tye (1986 p. 7) argues that Nagel’s argument from the Bat-Phenomenology Analogy shows that the physicalist account of the mental phenomenon is incomplete. Churchland (1995 p. 196) conceives Nagel in a similar manner: “[from the Bat Argument] Nagel concludes that conscious (...) phenomena cannot be given a purely physical explanation”. McCullough (1988 pp. 2-3), without regret, is more direct on the issue: Nagel is against physicalism because the state of what-it-is-likeness “escapes the scientific net”. The same goes with Pereboom who argues that Thomas Nagel advances an argument that shows physicalist account of the phenomenal states are “inadequate” (1994 p. 314). The most recent article dealing with the Bat argument also makes it clear that physicalism does not feature in friendly terms in Nagel’s thinking (Nagasawa 2004). While Nagasawa claims to offer a new approach to Nagel’s Bat argument in that Aquinas’ seemingly disconnected argument about the divine omnipotence can answer Nagel’s resistance to physicalism, it is quite clear that Nagel is still being treated as an anti-physicalist. Now, of course, it’s fallacious to say that all these philosophers are alike in their takes on Nagel’s alleged anti-physicalist outlook but I hope it is uncontroversial to say here that they seem to share a common view of Nagel: On Nagel’s account of conscious mental states, physicalism is false because it fails to explain exactly what it is like to be in those states. In this essay, I wish to argue that Nagel’s treatment of physicalism as demonstrated in the Bat article is much more philosophically subtle than his detractors thought him to be. From the outset, let me begin by stating that Nagel is not characteristically a foe of physicalism as most of philosophers make him to be but Nagel in the Bat article could seem beproposing three challenges to physicalism as follows: (P1) physicalism is false, (P2) physicalism is unintelligible and (P3) physicalism remains to be made intelligible. (shrink)

InThe View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel develops a theory of practical reasoning which attempts to give the personal, or subjective, point of view its due2 while still insisting on the objectivity of ethics.On the objective side, Nagel affirms that there are truths about values and reasons for action which are independent of the ways in which reasons and values appear to us, independent of our own particular beliefs and inclinations (p. 144). The objective foundation for these truths consists in a (...) certain distinctive process of understanding. Objective understanding is explicated in terms of an objective standpoint, a standpoint defined as impersonal, that is, as detached from the subjective point of view. The objective standpoint is structured by a conception ‘of the world as centerless—as containing ourselves and other beings with particular points of view’ (p. 140). As with scientific reasoning, ‘we begin from our position inside the world and try to transcend it by regarding what we find here as a sample of the whole’ (p. 141). (shrink)

Une intuition commune et tenace veut que notre discours moral renvoie à une réalité indépendante de nos jugements, lesquels peuvent ainsi être dits vrais ou faux. Des objections tout aussi communes soulignent que cette conception est mal adaptée au discours de la science, conduit au dogmatisme et néglige la dimension pratique de la moralité. La «querelle du réalisme» moral reprend au niveau philosophique ces intuitions et porte ce débat au plan de l’argumentation rationnelle. Le présent ouvrage fournit quelques pièces importantes (...) de cette querelle qui, même si elle parcourt la philosophie occidentale depuis ses débuts, connaît un renouveau dans le cadre de la tradition dite «analytique», en même temps qu’elle renouvelle celle-ci de l’intérieur tant les considérations ontologiques et métaphysiques qu’elle implique ont. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 189 progress achieved in each chapter. Further, the text includes study questions at the end of each chapter that make for a challenging review plus exercises at the back of the book which test the studrnt's skills. The teacher will find this text a imist useful tool of instruction. One can lecture on the material in one's own words. The student can read the text. Then teacher (...) and student can discuss the material as well as have interesting sessions based on the various exercises provided. ]'or those with the time, the reading· exercises offer another rich area for intellectual growth. This text is suited for superior high school seniors, college students, and excellent as a review course at the seminary level. The latter is important. Many Catholic seminaries are providing a year or at most two years of philosophy. Some subjects are given less time than needed and logic often is ignored or has a small share in the curriculum schedule. The Spangler text is ideal for such situations. Her explanations of each point in logic are crystal clear, her illustrations abundant, and her skillful use of charts to give a comprehensive picture of the whole and parts of logic is outstanding. As one who has used the text for three years in its manuscript form, the verdict is: Try it. For students interested in a further development of logic a series of appendices is provided, including a fine one on symbolic logic. Dominican House of Studies Washington, D.C. RAYMOND SMITH, O.P. The View from Nowhere. By THOMAS NAGEL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Pp. 244. $19.95. With the opening words of his Introduction, Thomas Nagel, Professor of Philosophy at New York University, makes clear the probll'rn that his book will treat: This book is about a single problem: how to combine the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the person and his viewpoint included. It is a problem that faces every creature with an impulse and the capacity to transcend its particular point of view and to conceive of the world as a whole (p. 3). Steeped in linguistic philosophy and in contemporary analysis Prof. Nagel is far from the caricature of the linguistic analyst who fiddles with word games while philosophy as metaphysics is reduced to ashes. Rather, with an evident commitment and zeal Nagel argues that the single prob- 190 BOOK REVIEWS lem he explores is central to both life and thought. Not only does he view it as the most fundamental issue about knowledge, freedom, morality, and the self, but he also believes that our reaction to the problem will greatly color both our view of our lives and our interpersonal relationships. This teacher of philosophy is no disinterested observer. Not excessively academic in either his interests or his mode of expressing those interests, Nagel is concerned with many of the questions that have preoccupied the great thinkers. In his eleven chapters Nag·el, using as a fulcrum what he refers to as the internal-external tension, examines the metaphysics of mind, theories of knowledge, value, ethics, and death, and never seems to settle for the too-easy answer. According to Nagel a view or form of thought is more objective the less it relies on the position of the individual in the world or on the particular type of personality that he has. The wider the spectrum of subjectiv.e types to which a view is accessible the more objective the view is. So, while a perspective might be more objective in relation to a personal view of an individual, that same perspective could be viewed as less objective when compared to a more theoretical view. Nagel suggests that we view reality as a series of concentric spheres and that we progressively reach those spheres as we detach ourselves from the contingencies of our particular subjective perspectives. Nagel's option for objectivity is clear early on: I shall offer a defense and also a critique of objectivity. Both are necessary in the present intellectual climate, for objectivity is both underrated and overrated, sometimes by the same... (shrink)

In this long and detailed book Bennett and Hacker set themselves two ambitious tasks. The first is to offer a philosophical critique of, what they argue are, philosophical confusions within contemporary cognitive neuroscience. The second is to present a ‘conceptual reference work for cognitive neuroscientists who wish to check the contour lines of the psychological concept relevant to their investigation’ (p.7). In the process they cover an astonishing amount of material. The first two chapters present a critical history of neuroscience (...) from Aristotle to Sherrington, Eccles and Penfield. Chapter three (to which I shall return), offers the philosophical basis for much of the book. Chapters four to twelve present detailed philosophical criticisms of a wide variety of neuroscientists (and some philosophers) on a large number of topics. These include: Crick, Damasio, Edelman, Marr and Frisby on perception (particularly the primary/secondary quality distinction and the binding problem); Milner, Squire and Kandel on memory; Blakemore and others on mental imagery; LaDoux and Damasio on the emotions; Libet on voluntary movement; and Baars, Crick, Edelman, Damasio, Penrose, Searle, Chalmers, and Nagel on consciousness (with a great deal on qualia and self-consciousness). Chapters thirteen and fourteen, along with the two appendices, contain an elaboration and defence of the book’s methodology and present explicit contrasts with the Churchlands, Dennett and Searle. Bennett and Hacker maintain that whilst neuroscientists have made significant discoveries concerning the workings of the brain, these discoveries have been obscured by their presentation within an incoherent conceptual framework. Their complaints, therefore, are often not with neuroscience itself but with what might be called its philosophical self image. (shrink)

Review of *New Essays on the A Priori*, an excellent collection edited by Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke. Contributors include: Tyler Burge; Quassim Cassam; Philip Kitcher; Penelope Maddy; Hartry Field; Paul Horwich; Peter Railton; Stephen Yablo; Bob Hale; Crispin Wright; Frank Jackson; Stewart Shapiro; Michael Friedman; Martin Davies; Bill Brewer; and Thomas Nagel.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:188 BOOK REVIEWS work. Certainly, there is much in this book to honor the memory and continue the scholarly tradition of Beryl Smalley. University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, Pennsylvania E. ANN MATTER Logic: An Aristotelian Approach. By MARY MICHAEL SPANGLER, 0.P. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1986. Pp. 270. $16.75 (paper). Certain fields of knowledge periodically require updated textbooks since new material is added and new issues arise. One (...) thinks of liturgical textbooks or those in moral theology. Why would we need a new text in Aristotelian logic 7 vVe still have the classic breakthrough text of the late John Oesterle, Logic: The Art of Defining and Reasoning. Five years later in 1957 appeared the brilliant volume of the late Vincent Edward Smith, The Elements of Logic. Still available is Dennis Kane's Logic: The Art of Predication and Inference. In one way or other all three present splendidly the basics of Aristotelian logic and Kane's book has a section on symbolic logic. However, another factor for publishing a new text even in a stable field of knowledge is the change in the student population. Oesterle's text is almost cryptic by comparison with the Spangler volume. Many, perhaps most, of today's students would find the clear, clipped style of Oesterle too bare for them. Smith's erudite case problems probably would intimidate many in our present logic classes. Spangler knows today's students. She has written a text that is developed in the same outline as the texts cited but in a language and style suited to our present student population. Indeed, Spangler, from her years of college teaching, is aware that many an otherwise competent student still lacks skills in reading and writing. Consequently this text, though primarily setting forth the principles of Aristotelian logic, at the same time provides optional exercises which relate logic to comprehension skills of reading. The result is an admirable textbook which brings together something of the Middle Ages' famous trivium of logic, grammar, and rhetoric. Repetition is the mother of learning but if done poorly repetition can be a total bore. Spangler has the gift for repeating the doctrine on each point of logic over and over but in such a pleasant and even entertaining way that the ~tudent is not bored but delighted at the almost effortless BOOK REVIEWS 189 progress achieved in each chapter. Further, the text includes study questions at the end of each chapter that make for a challenging review plus exercises at the back of the book which test the studrnt's skills. The teacher will find this text a imist useful tool of instruction. One can lecture on the material in one's own words. The student can read the text. Then teacher and student can discuss the material as well as have interesting sessions based on the various exercises provided. ]'or those with the time, the reading· exercises offer another rich area for intellectual growth. This text is suited for superior high school seniors, college students, and excellent as a review course at the seminary level. The latter is important. Many Catholic seminaries are providing a year or at most two years of philosophy. Some subjects are given less time than needed and logic often is ignored or has a small share in the curriculum schedule. The Spangler text is ideal for such situations. Her explanations of each point in logic are crystal clear, her illustrations abundant, and her skillful use of charts to give a comprehensive picture of the whole and parts of logic is outstanding. As one who has used the text for three years in its manuscript form, the verdict is: Try it. For students interested in a further development of logic a series of appendices is provided, including a fine one on symbolic logic. Dominican House of Studies Washington, D.C. RAYMOND SMITH, O.P. The View from Nowhere. By THOMAS NAGEL. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Pp. 244. $19.95. With the opening words of his Introduction, Thomas Nagel, Professor of Philosophy at New York University, makes clear the probll'rn that his book will treat: This book is about a single problem: how to... (shrink)

Thomas Nagel recognizes that it is commonly believed that people can neither be held morally responsible nor morally assessed for what is beyond their control. Yet he is convinced that although such a belief may be intuitively plausible, upon reflection we find that we do make moral assessments of persons in a large number of cases in which such assessments depend on factors not under their control. Of such factors he says: (p. 26).

<P>Experimental philosophy is one of the most active and exciting areas in philosophy today. In <EM>Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy</EM>, Elizabeth O’Neill and Edouard Machery have brought together twelve leading philosophers to debate four topics central to recent research in experimental philosophy. The result is an important and enticing contribution to contemporary philosophy which thoroughly reframes traditional philosophical questions in light of experimental philosophers’ use of empirical research methods, and brings to light the lively debates within experimental philosophers’ intellectual community. (...) Two papers are dedicated to the following four topics:</P> <P></P> <UL> <LI>Language (Edouard Machery & Genoveva Martí)</LI> <LI>Consciousness (Brian Fala, Adam Arico, and Shaun Nicols & Justin Sytsma)</LI> <LI>Free Will and Responsibility (Joshua Knobe & Eddy Nahmias and Morgan Thompson)</LI> <LI>Epistemology and the Reliability of Intuitions (Kenneth Boyd and Jennifer Nagel & Joshua Alexander and Jonathan Weinberg).</LI></UL> <P></P> <P>Preliminary descriptions of each chapter, annotated bibliographies for each controversy, and a supplemental guide to further controversies in experimental philosophy (with bibliographies) help provide clearer and richer views of these live controversies for all readers.</P> <P></P> <P> </P>. (shrink)

Sex: Nagel, T. Sexual perversion. Ruddick, S. On sexual morality.--Abortion: Ramsey, P. The morality of abortion. Foot, P. The problem of abortion and the doctrine of the double effect. Wertheimer, R. Understanding the abortion argument. Thomson, J. J. A defense of abortion.--Prejudice and discrimination: Wasserstrom, R. Rights, human rights, and racial discrimination. Roszak, B. Women's liberation. Lucas, J. R. Because you are a woman. Thomson, J. J. Preferential hiring. Singer, P. Animal liberation.--Civil disobedience: Rawls, J. The justification of civil disobedience. (...) Singer, P. Rawls on civil disobedience. Dworkin, R. M. Law and civil disobedience.--Punishment: Downie, R. S. The justification of punishment. Kneale, W. The responsibility of criminals. Hart, H. L. A. Murder and the principles of punishment: England and the United States.--War: Anscombe, G. E. M. War and murder. Wasserstrom, R. On the morality of war: a preliminary inquiry. Lackey, D. Ethics and nuclear deterrence. Narveson, J. Pacifism: a philosophical analysis.--Suicide and death: Brandt, R. B. The morality and rationality of suicide. Holland, R. F. Suicide. Nagel, T. Death. Williams, B. The Makropulos case: reflections on the tedium of immortality.--Selected bibliography (p. 432-437). (shrink)

The American philosopher Thomas Nagel famously argued that no matter how many objective facts we may know about bats, we cannot know what it is like to be a bat. There is an irreducible subjectivity to the experience of being a bat. I can only imagine what it would be like for a subject like me to be a bat but never what it is like for the actual bat to be a bat.In her book, Benvenuti demonstrates extraordinary sensitivity to (...) the subjectivity of the nonhuman animals she discusses. In addition to being an organic farmer in southern Italy, Benvenuti is also a licensed psychologist. Her training and interest in neurobiology is evident throughout the work. She walks the middle path between human exceptionalism (the “old meme” as she puts it of humans being “distinct from” and “superior to” all other animals, p. 15) on the one side and collapsing the differences on the other. While she might agree with the thrust of Nagel's claim (she never mentions him in the book) that we cannot truly know what it is like to be a bat, we are not so different to bats that we cannot empathetically understand something of a bat's experiences. We are, after all, kin. Kinship, she argues, rather than “distinct and superior” is the more correct scientific understanding (p. 18).Her work is clearly influenced by that of her mentor, Jaak Panksepp, on affective neurobiology. Like the biologist and ethologist Marc Bekoff, Benvenuti argues that it is possible to be “biocentrically anthropomorphic and do rigorous science” (p. 66). Of course, kinship does not entail sameness. “The central core of my life's work,” Benvenuti writes, “is to articulate the grounds for real relationships between humans and other animals. This implies the capacity to empathize accurately and to be able to communicate across species differences, but also the capacity to recognize that the other is not ‘just like me’” (p. 82). Importantly for her, it is not just our learning about other animals but our learning from them and they from us. It is the complex—and it is very complex—relationship that matters.Kindred Spirits is a beautifully written book, part travelogue, part personal anecdotes, with a nice mixture of scientific and philosophical musings. It begins in her own backyard (in the United States at the time) with a friendship struck up with a crow named Jason and then transports us to destinations around the world and species including bees, dogs, elephants, cheetahs, whales, and rescued farmed animals. Benvenuti spends much of her time with people trying to research, rescue, and rehabilitate endangered species. Above all, she intends it as a hopeful book. She finds great inspiration and hope in the fact that so many people around the world care about animals. She finds hope in the decline of circuses that merely use and abuse animals for human entertainment. She points to the growing understanding of animal studies and general interest in animals’ internal lives and feelings.The book makes a useful contribution to the growing literature of cognitive ethology. It is along similar lines as the works of Marc Bekoff and Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson. For those of us already convinced of our kinship and similarity with nonhuman animals, there are inspiring stories of others engaged in trying to save the world, or at least the part of it they can. One of the real strengths of the book is the constant questioning of the animal's experience. While we all appreciate those “animal ambassadors” who come to represent their kind and educate us, Benvenuti raises the important ethical question as to whether those animals want to be ambassadors at all. Sometimes a quick bite, as she once received from an African gray parrot, is enough to remind us to mind our manners around other species. It was a lesson in respecting differences and boundaries. The book does in the end inspire hope that if enough European and American scientists continue to advance the study of animal intelligence and emotion, we might one day come to the understanding that our indigenous brothers and sisters around the world have had since the beginning—that we, human and nonhuman, are all kin. (shrink)

Using the Epicurean position on death as a starting point, this article re-examines the basic assumptions of philosophers regarding their views on whether death should be seen as a bad. It questions the positions of philosophers such as Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit by applying Wittgenstein’s notion of grammar as developed by G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker. While philosophers may characterize questions such as ‘What is the nature of death?’ and ‘Is death a bad?’ as metaphysical, I (...) propose that such questions can be better characterized as grammatical. The failure to understand the grammatical character of such questions creates the illusion that questions concerning the nature of death can be adequately tackled with reference to empirical or metaphysical ‘facts’. If the arguments in this article are substantiated, some philosophical puzzles about death can be dissolved. (shrink)