Air temperature prediction can play a significant role in studies related to climate change, radiation and heat flux estimation, and weather forecasting. This study applied and compared the outcomes of three advanced fuzzy inference models, i.e., dynamic evolving neural-fuzzy inference system, hybrid neural-fuzzy inference system, and adaptive neurofuzzy inference system for AT prediction. Modelling was done for three stations in North Dakota, USA, i.e., Robinson, Ada, and Hillsboro. The results reveal that FIS type models are well suited when handling highly (...) variable data, such as AT, which shows a high positive correlation with average daily dew point, total solar radiation, and negative correlation with average wind speed. At the Robinson station, DENFIS performed the best with a coefficient of determination of 0.96 and a modified index of agreement of 0.92, followed by ANFIS with R2 of 0.94 and md of 0.89, and HyFIS with R2 of 0.90 and md of 0.84. A similar result was observed for the other two stations, i.e., Ada and Hillsboro stations where DENFIS performed the best with R2: 0.953/0.960, md: 0.903/0.912, then ANFIS with R2: 0.943/0.942, md: 0.888/0.890, and HyFIS with R2: 0.908/0.905, md: 0.845/0.821, respectively. It can be concluded that all three models are capable of predicting AT with high efficiency by only using DP, TSR, and WS as input variables. This makes the application of these models more reliable for a meteorological variable with the need for the least number of input variables. The study can be valuable for the areas where the climatological and seasonal variations are studied and will allow providing excellent prediction results with the least error margin and without a huge expenditure. (shrink)

Sur quelles raisons Nietzsche fonde-t-il sa critique de la vérité et quelles en sont les retombées pour la caractérisation de la pratique philosophique? La découverte d'un antagonisme entre pensée et verité établit que l'irréfutable n'est pas assimilable au vrai, et en quoi la vérité est interprétation. Se révèle alors son statut de valeur, ainsi que la logique d'incorporation dont elle relève, qui en fait un genre d'erreur devenu pour nous indispensable. À titre de conséquence, la philosophie ne peut plus se (...) comprendre comme recherche de la vérité, mais bien plutôt comme interrogation sur la valeur de cette valeur et création de « vérités » nouvelles. Le philosophe authentique, esprit libre, est alors à penser comme amateur d' énigmes, sur un modèle épicurien et non plus platonicien. What are Nietzsche's reasons for criticizing truth, and how does he understand the consequences of his position for the philosophical praxis? The discovery of the opposition of truth and thought shows that being irrefutable cannot be assimilated to being true, and that truth is interpretation. It appears therefore to be a value, a type of error which has become essential for us, linked to a process of physical-psychological absorption. As a consequence, philosophy cannot be equated with the pursuit of truth any longer ; its aim is to investigate the value of this particular value, and to create new « truths ». Being a free spirit, the genuine philosopher is to be thought of as a lover of riddles, shaped on Epicure's pattern rather than on Plato's. (shrink)

In this ground-breaking new text, Patrick Baert analyses the central perspectives in the philosophy of social science, critically investigating the work of Durkheim, Weber, Popper, critical realism, critical theory, and Rorty's neo pragmatism. Places key writers in their social and political contexts, helping to make their ideas meaningful to students. Shows how these authors’ views have practical uses in empirical research. Lively approach that makes complex ideas understandable to upper-level students, as well as having scholarly appeal.

A corrupt proverb in the paroemiographic corpus relates to an incident recounted in Caesar’s Bellum Civile, and elucidates the stemma of the Aurelii Cottae.

In this introduction to a special subsection of Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics comprising separate reviews of the Springer Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine, and The Bloomsbury Companion to Contemporary Philosophy of Medicine, I compare the three texts with respect to their overall organization and their approach to the relation between the science and the art of medicine. I then indicate two areas that merit more explicit attention in developing a comprehensive philosophy of (...) medicine going forward: health economics and systematic relations within the field as a whole. The reviews that follow speak for themselves. (shrink)

The ArgumentIn this rejoinder to Gyorgy Markus, I argue that although there are nonphilosophical hermeneutical studies of communication among scientists from which much can be learned about scientific practices, there is also the philosophical genre of a hermeneutics of natural science, with which this paper is concerned. The former is the nonphilosophical use of hermeneutics in the study of texts and historical sources; the latter is a philosophy pursued within a working canon of philosophical works defined principally by the writings (...) of Heidegger and Husserl. There is also a hermeneutically sensitive analytic philosophy of science, such as in the work of Kuhn, Toulmin, and Elkana. These genres are distinguished by their literary canons and their basic phenomenologies or critical experiential givens; each genre comprises an exemplary phenomenology as understood with the help of a characteristic fundamental literary canon.I argue that analytic philosophy is pursued within a canon that makes it difficult to raise hermeneutical questions about natural science, and that it assumes a generally positivistic phenomenology. I argue that hermeneutical phenomenology currently defines itself in dialectical opposition to “science” as understood by analytic philosophy, and has failed to exploit the opportunity of making its own positive contribution to the philosophy of science by examining for itself the phenomenology of laboratory work, especially data production, and the transformation of the language of theory into a descriptive language of scientific phenomena. A “strong” hermeneutical philosophy of natural science, then, challenges both analytic philosophy and the existing tradition of hermeneutical phenomenology. (shrink)

This paper lays out the epistemology of Maria Montessori . I start with what I call Montessori's ‘interested empiricism’, her empiricist emphasis on the foundational role of the senses combined with her insistence that all cognition is infused with ‘interest’. I then discuss the unconscious. Partly because of her emphasis on early childhood, Montessori puts great emphasis on unconscious cognitive processes and develops a conceptual vocabulary to make sense of the continuity between conscious and unconscious processes. The final sections turn (...) to two brief but important applications of this general epistemic framework, the importance of ‘meditation’ as an epistemic practice and Montessori's accounts of epistemic virtues. (shrink)

This paper explores themethodological consequences of AmericanPragmatism for the social sciences. It alsocriticises some rival perspectives onmethodology of social research, in particularfalsificationist, realist and someanti-naturalist views. It is argued thatAmerican Pragmatism shows striking affinitieswith the genealogical method of history and thereflexive turn in cultural anthropology. It isalso argued that Pragmatism forces us to thinkdifferently about the relationship betweentheory and empirical research.

This article is concerned to formulate some open problems in the philosophy of space and time that require methods characteristic of mathematical traditions in the foundations of geometry for their solution. In formulating the problems an effort has been made to fuse the separate traditions of the foundations of physics on the one hand and the foundations of geometry on the other. The first part of the paper deals with two classical problems in the geometry of space, that of giving (...) operationalism an exact foundation in the case of the measurement of spatial relations, and that of providing an adequate theory of approximation and error in a geometrical setting. The second part is concerned with physical space and space-time and deals mainly with topics concerning the axiomatic theory of bodies, the operational foundations of special relativity and the conceptual foundations of elementary physics. (shrink)

This article investigates Husserl’s arguments for the constitutive role of memory in producing the awareness of objective time. Husserl explicitly connects his thoughts on time and memory to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, while developing an original understanding of the syntheses of recognition and reproduction. This offers a novel avenue for considering what is transcendental about Husserl’s phenomenology of memory. I contend that Husserl developed three transcendental functions of memory with a quasi-Kantian cast in writings from 1917 to 1926. These (...) three functions concern the re-identifiability of objects over time, the objectuality (Gegenständlichkeit) of moments in time, and the rigidity of the relations between moments. An exposition of these three transcendental functions and a comparison with Kant’s critical philosophy of time establish what sort of legitimacy objective time had for Husserl and how memory served as its subjective condition of possibility. This article also offers an account of the connection between individuation and memory and a novel comparison between Husserl and Kant on the topic of memory in transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

In his published work and even more in conversations, Tarski emphasized what he thought were important philosophical aspects of his work. The English translation of his more philosophical papers [56m] was dedicated to his teacher Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and in informal discussions of philosophy he often referred to the influence of Kotarbinski. Also, the influence of Leiniewski, his dissertation adviser, is evident in his early papers. Moreover, some of his important papers of the 1930s were initially given to philosophical audiences. For (...) example, the famous monograph on the concepotf truth ([33”], [35b]) was first given as twol ectures to the Logic Section of the Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1930. Second, his paper [33], which introduced the concepts of co-consistency and co-completeness as well as the rule of infinite induction: was first given at the Second Conference of the Polish Philosophical Society in Warsaw in 1927. Also [35c] was based upon an address given in 1934 to the conference for the Unity of Science in Prague; C361 and [36a] summarize an address given at the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy in Paris in 1935. The article [44a] was published in a philosophical journal and widely reprinted in philosophical texts. This list is of course not exhaustiveb ut only representative of Tarski’s philosophical interactions as reflected in lectures given to philosophical audiences, which were later embodied in substantial papers. After 1945 almost all of Tarski’s publications and presentations are mathematical in character with one or two minor exceptions. This division, occurring about 1945, does not, however, indicate al oss of interest in philosophical questionbsu t is a result of Tarski’s moving to the Department of Mathematics at Berkeley. There he assumed an important role in the development of logic within mathematics in the United States. (shrink)

Contrary to what has been widely supposed, Bayesian theory deals successfully with the introduction of new theories that have never previously been entertained. The theory enables us to say what sorts of method should be used to assign probabilities to these new theories, and it allows that the probabilities of existing theories may be modified as a result.

In this paper, I advocate a value realist interpretation of Kant’s ethics by examining, in some detail, both Kant’s discussion of the grounding of the moral law in Groundwork II and his discussion of the “paradox of method” in the Critique of Practical Reason. On a plausible reading of both the Groundwork and second Critique, Kant maintains that human beings, and more generally, rational beings, have dignity or inner worth. We cognize through the moral law that our existence and inner (...) value is the objective ground of the law and that we are the “subject[s] of the moral law.” This dignity of rational beings is fundamental and irreducible. This qualifies as a distinctive kind of value realism. (shrink)

One hundred years of French social theory : from structuralism to pragmatism -- The biological metaphor : functionalism and neo-functionalism -- The enigma of everyday life : symbolic interactionism, the dramaturgical approach and ethnomethodology -- The invasion of economic man : from rational choice theory to the new institutionalism -- Sociology meets history : Giddens's theory of modernity -- The history and the present : Foucault's archaeology and genealogy -- The spread of reason : Habermas's critical theory and beyond -- (...) A brave new world? : the empirical turn in social theory -- Conclusion : social theory for the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Hume's conception of causation and induction is discussed in the context where the causal evolution is represented by the motion of a free particle in space. The difference between classical and relativistic mechanics is shown to be significant for the discussion.

ABSTRACT In this article I consider alternate but often complementary models for women’s republicanism from those discussed by Sandrine Bergès. In particular, I make use of Bergès’s insights about extending philosophical inquiry beyond traditional texts to analyse how militant political action was both informed by and informed the creation of philosophical texts, and consider the possibility of bringing direct action into the realm of philosophical investigation.

Albert Einstein's attitude towards quantum mechanics—and statistical physics in general—was a puzzle to many of his contemporaries, and has remained a puzzle to the present. Though he made many significant contributions to statistical physics, he continually refused to regard that branch of science as fundamental. The present essay demonstrates that his attitude towards statistical physics was formed during his earliest investigations—between 1901 and 1903. In particular, it is shown that in Einstein's view, statistical laws are based upon non-statistical assumptions. This (...) view influenced much of his later thinking. A few illustrations are offered, concluding with a discussion of his opposition to quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Logic in the Community -- Logic in Action -- Logic in Reasoning -- Logic in the Weird.

Many professional associations have policies explaining when it is or is not acceptable for health-care professionals to refuse to participate in the administration of certain interventions on grounds of conscience. In both Canada and the United States, nursing associations tend to have much more detailed, permissive policies than medical associations. There are reasons to think that this distinction is not justifiable, and I argue that some specific North American medical associations should endorse policies regarding conscientious refusals that are modeled on (...) those endorsed by nursing associations and the United Kingdom’s General Medical Council. (shrink)

Occupation, intellectual collaboration and the resistance -- The purge of collaborationist intellectuals -- Intellectual debates around the purge : responsibility, purity, patriotism -- The autumn of 1945 -- Sartre's committed literature in theory and practice -- Rise and demise : a synthesis -- Explaining intellectuals : a proposal.

Perhaps, nothing matters. Life might be devoid of value and meaning. Such thoughts can prompt feelings of angst. What kind of philosophical view could provide us with comfort? Some moral realists think that moral realism can. Moral realism does not comfort me. I think the comfort it gives others is an illusion. If we are moral realists, moral facts may be forever beyond our grasp. However, if we are anti-realist sentimentalists, then moral facts are built for us to find. If (...) we want to avoid angst, we can find solace in sentimentalism. That is not a reason to think sentimentalism is true. However, it is a reason to prefer that it is true. (shrink)

L’essentiel des œuvres de Patočka et du dernier Foucault peut se lire à la lumière de la figure de Faust. Celle-ci éclaire en effet, au fil de ses variantes, ce qui oppose savoir de spiritualité et savoir de connaissance. Si l’on entend par spiritualité l’effort pour penser ensemble l’acte de connaissance et une transformation dans l’être du sujet, la légende faustienne illustre autant qu’elle questionne la pratique qui établit l’individu comme un être à même de se soucier de soi. Nous (...) préciserons cette idée à partir d’un exemple, celui de l’idéalisme allemand, en nous demandant s’il a su prendre la mesure de cette dimension faustienne de la philosophie et chercherons à savoir si c’est effectivement « le souci du souci de soi » qui l’a mis en mouvement ou l’a conduit à rechercher les conditions d’une spiritualité moderne. Nous nous demanderons, pour le dire dans des termes plus proches de ceux de Patočka, si l’on peut déjà apercevoir dans le postkantisme quelque chose qui anticipe l’idée d’une vue intellectuelle rendue possible par le phénomène. (shrink)

This paper explores the role of ethics in design. Traditionally, ethical questions have been seen as marginal issues in the design of technology. Part of the reason for this stems from the widely held notion of technology being “out of control.” This notion is a barrier to what I call “ethical design” because it implies that ethics has no role to play in the development of technology. This view, however, is challenged by recent work in the field of Science and (...) Technology Studies (STS). Looking into the dynamics of technological change, STS scholars argue that human choices are present at every stage of a technology’s development and, furthermore, that human values are reflected in the very design of artifacts. This alternative view suggests that ethics can and should be included in the design process. Drawing on examples from the privacy arena. I point to some of the potential advantages of addressing ethical concerns early on in the design of a technology. I conclude with some general strategies for bringing ethics back into design. (shrink)

Harm minimisation has been proposed as a means of supporting people who self-injure. When adopting this approach, rather than trying to stop self-injury immediately the person is allowed to injure safely whilst developing more appropriate ways of dealing with distress. The approach is controversial as the health care professional actively allows harm to occur. This paper will consider a specific objection to harm minimisation. That is, it is a misguided collaboration between the health care professional and the person who self-injures (...) that is morally and clinically questionable. The objection has two components. The first component is moral in nature and asserts that the health care professional is complicit in any harm that occurs and as a result they can be held morally responsible and subject to moral blame. The second component is clinical in nature and suggests that harm minimisation involves the health care professional in colluding in the perpetuation of self-injury. This element of the objection i... (shrink)

This paper provides a response to Hanna Pickard and Stephen Pearce’s paper ‘Balancing costs and benefits: a clinical perspective does not support a harm minimisation approach for self-injury outside of community settings.’ This paper responded to my article ‘Should healthcare professionals sometimes allow harm? The case of self-injury.’ There is much in the paper that I would agree with, but I feel it is important to respond to a number of the criticisms of my paper in order to clarify my (...) position and to facilitate ongoing debate in relation to this important issue. (shrink)

This article introduces and critically analyses Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism as a contribution to the philosophy of social sciences. Although Rorty has written little about philosophy of social sciences as such, it is argued that his overall philosophical position has significant ramifications for this subject area. The first part of the article sets out the implications of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism for various issues in the philosophy of social sciences, for instance, the doctrine of naturalism, the nineteenth-century Methodenstreit, the philosophical tenets of Marxism, (...) and the relatively recent wave of post-structuralism. The second part presents a constructive critique of Rorty’s neopragmatist philosophy of social sciences. Although critical of some aspects of Rorty’s argument, it is argued that his stance could provide a base for a fruitful view of social sciences, aiming at enlarging human potentialities rather than representation. (shrink)