This book is a unique and up-to-date introduction to moral philosophy. Kerner defines ethics as the study of what makes life worth living and gives it meaning. Rather than cataloging how various ethical theories bear on ethical issues, he poses the central question: is objective moral knowlege possible? To address that question, he provides an exacting analysis of the works of Mill, Kant, and Sartre, and finally agrees with Sartre that such knowlege is not possible; in morality there are no (...) objective answers but only questions direted at our deep subjectivity. (shrink)

v. 1. 1797-1823 -- v. 2. 1823-1826 -- v. 3. 1827-1828.

Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a (...) case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science. (shrink)

Philosophers have cataloged a range of genealogical methods by which different sorts of normative conclusions can be established. Although such methods provide diverging ways of pursuing genealogical inquiry, they typically converge in eschewing historiographic methodology, in favor of a uniquely philosophical approach. In contrast, one genealogist who drew on historiographic methodology is Michel Foucault. This article presents the motivations and advantages of Foucault's genealogical use of such a methodology. It advances two mains claims. First, that Foucault's early 1970s work (...) employs a distinct genealogical method, which borrows from contemporary historiographic models of explanation to expand the range of objects that are proper to genealogical accounts of historical change. I demonstrate how Foucault modifies two central commitments of Nietzsche by broadening the dimensions of genealogical inquiry and explanation. Second, that historical method has normative relevance for genealogy, insofar as different historiographic choices can lead to different normative conclusions. I motivate this second claim by explaining how Foucault's multidimensional genealogical method expands both (a) the range of objects that are subject to evaluative assessment, and (b) the set of possible prescriptive recommendations that follow from such assessment. (shrink)

Two new philosophical problems surrounding the gradation of certainty began to emerge in the 17th century and are still very much alive today. One is concerned with the evaluation of inductive reasoning, whether in science, jurisprudence, or elsewhere; the other with the interpretation of the mathematical calculus of change. This book, aimed at non-specialists, investigates both problems and the extent to which they are connected. Cohen demonstrates the diversity of logical structures that are available for judgements of probability, and explores (...) the rationale for their appropriateness in different contexts of application. Thus his study deals with the complexity of the underlying philosophical issues without simply cataloging alternative conceptions or espousing a particular "favorite" theory. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of quantum theory commonly suppose that the observables of a quantum system form a Type-I factor von Neumann algebra. Such algebras always have atoms, which are minimal projection operators in the case of quantum mechanics. However, relativistic quantum field theory and the thermodynamic limit of quantum statistical mechanics make extensive use of von Neumann algebras of more general types. This chapter addresses the question whether interpretations of quantum probability devised in the usual manner continue to apply in the (...) more general setting. Features of non-type I factor von Neumann algebras are cataloged. It is shown that these novel features do not cause the familiar formalism of quantum probability to falter, since Gleason's Theorem and the Lüders Rule can be generalized. However, the features render the problem of the interpretation of quantum probability more intricate. (shrink)

No return to sweetness. The philosophical poem book Heavy Poems is drawn from splatter films and catalogs of violence and sex, but the language of poetry is the poet’s own. -/- The world of these poems is authentic, true, and sincere. Life and death measure each other. How is human value calculated? Which of us is valuable and who is worthless?

CRISPR Cas9-powered gene drive allows for the rapid alteration of malaria-causing mosquitoes to spread an infertility gene or resistance to malaria among their species. Malaria eradication would be a great boon to human health. But many are concerned with driving genetic changes through a natural species. This chapter catalogs objections to the use of gene drive in mosquitoes for eradicating malaria. In-principle objections to gene drive use are not compelling. The most urgent concerns are related to the safety of (...) the technology for the environment and human health. Philosophers play a critical role in working along scientists to develop risk/benefit models that weigh the reasons for and against gene drive to eradicate malaria based on our best scientific knowledge and rigorous normative reasoning. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Speeches of Cicero: Context, Law, RhetoricJohn NicholsonPaul MacKendrick. The Speeches of Cicero: Context, Law, Rhetoric, with the technical assistance of Emmett L. Bennett, Jr. London: Duckworth, 1995. viii + 627 pp. Cloth, £55.Readers familiar with MacKendrick’s 1989 study of The Philosophical Books of Cicero will have an idea what to expect from his new companion work on Cicero’s speeches. It is essentially a factual handbook providing a (...) full and careful summary of the contents of Cicero’s major orations, along with some basic background information and a rhetorical analysis. The treatment is quite detailed so that, despite a length of well over 600 pages, the book covers only half of the fifty-eight extant Ciceronian speeches. Regrettably omitted on account of limitation of space are all the Verrines and all the Philippics, as well as any representatives of the early orations. But otherwise, we get a judicious, well-balanced selection from all rhetorical types, lengths, and audiences.MacKendrick begins in medias res. What he calls chapter 1 is actually only a two-page chronological outline of Cicero’s life, and this is the only preface we get before plunging into the presentation of the first speech (On Pompey’s Command) which comprises chapter 2. It would have been helpful if MacKendrick had begun with some kind of statement about his aims and methods, and perhaps some introduction to the ways and means of classical rhetoric in general, and of Ciceronian oratory in particular. Such preliminaries will be especially missed by neophyte readers who select this book as an introduction to Cicero’s speeches. Otherwise the work is well suited to this audience since MacKendrick takes little for granted, translates into English virtually all the Latin he quotes, and repeatedly defines technical terms.The format of each chapter is strictly uniform, divided into four sections. First comes an outline summarizing in full detail the content of the speech under consideration, with the standard divisions marked off and labeled. (Here alone MacKendrick fails to define rhetorical terminology; structural labels like narratio, partitio, peroratio, etc. are left unexplained.) Second, there comes a section called “Context” succinctly describing the historical background. Third, MacKendrick gives a summary of the legal points raised by each speech, which is kept quite brief, depending largely on the conclusions of standard modern authorities, especially A. H. C. Greenidge’s time-honored Legal Procedure of Cicero’s Time (which is unfortunately missing from the intended key reference on 460). The fourth and final section, called “Rhetoric,” is the fullest, and is divided into the subcategories of Word Frequency, Metaphor, and Other Rhetorical Devices.While the first three sections of each chapter merely rehearse basic information in a useful handbook format, it is in the fourth section on rhetoric that we get MacKendrick’s main original contribution, essentially a quantified word study of the speeches. Though he nowhere explicitly declares his analytical strategy, an early note decrying “the shapeless gobbledegook” (460 n. 2) of much [End Page 654] modern criticism reveals his contempt for sloppy subjective evaluation. Accordingly, his own approach here is largely statistical in nature, presumably based on computer-generated tabulations. The preoccupation is with quantitative analysis via word frequency lists and the counting and cataloging of metaphors and various rhetorical figures used by Cicero over the course of his career.MacKendrick first examines the semantic range and varying significance of the most commonly repeated words in each oration, and shows how Cicero manipulates them in different contexts. Personal pronouns usually head the lists, followed by terms such as res publica, urbs, civi[ta]s, consul, senatus, salus, omnis, lex, dignitas, bellum, and populus Romanus.Next he counts and classifies metaphors, a category which he defines very broadly—at times to the point of robbing the term of practical descriptive value inasmuch as extremely common words are analyzed as though poetic figures. For example, the verb fero and its many compounds are considered “metaphors of touch” even in standard idioms such as legem fero, while aequus is called a “metaphor of earth” (a subcategory of “metaphors of nature”), and intellego is called a “metaphor of agriculture” (since it literally means “to glean... (shrink)

Reconstructing the genetic traits of the Last Common Ancestor and the Tree of Life are two examples of the reaches of contemporary molecular phylogenetics. Nevertheless, the whole enterprise has led to paradoxical results. The presence of Lateral Gene Transfer poses epistemic and empirical challenges to meet these goals; the discussion around this subject has been enriched by arguments from philosophers and historians of science. At the same time, a few but influential research groups have aimed to reconstruct the LCA (...) with rich-in-detail hypotheses and high-resolution gene catalogs and metabolic traits. We argue that LGT poses insurmountable challenges for detailed and rich in details reconstructions and propose, instead, a middle-ground position with the reconstruction of a slim LCA based on traits under strong pressures of Negative Natural Selection, and for the need of consilience with evidence from organismal biology and geochemistry. We defend a cautionary perspective that goes beyond the statistical analysis of gene similarities and assumes the broader consequences of evolving empirical data and epistemic pluralism in the reconstruction of early life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:UntitledDale JacquetteI recently acquired the unpublished manuscripts of an obscureearly twentieth-century philosopher. Among the papers is included a detailed account of the semantics of untitled artworks and literary productions. I am convinced of the truth of this important aesthetic theory, and I wish to serve as editor to help see the work to publication. Unfortunately, the manuscript is untitled, which poses an interesting difficulty.The principles of the theory are (...) these:1. A title is an important part of any text or artwork.2. Every text and artwork must be titled for publication.3. ”Untitled” (and the equivalent) is a (convention-governed) title.4. When an author or artist titles a work “Untitled,” the decision may be (inclusively) made for these three reasons, and accordingly have (inclusively) these three implicit meanings or interpretations:a. The author or artist is unable to assign a more satisfactory content-descriptive or connotative title, and so by default, when nothing better offers, decides to title the work “Untitled.”b. The author or artist wishes for reasons of prestige to have the work included in the category of untitled productions (works left untitled often by famous authors or artists).c. The author or artist chooses the title “Untitled” as a purely arbitrary label for the work, in that the name is not supposed [End Page 102] to express any particular content-descriptive or connotative meaning, or intent to include the project in the established category of untitled works.5. When an author or artist leaves an untitled work to posterity, it is an editorial-curatorial offense according to condition (1) to impose a content-descriptive or connotative title on the work in order to satisfy condition (2) for purposes of publication.The author emphasizes the significance of titles as an integral part of any text or artwork. Titles do not merely name and identify a piece for purposes of reference, but are often as valuable as any component of the body of a production. Some works cannot be understood without their titles, while for others, especially in modern art and literature, the title may actually be the main point, to which the attached body of work is secondary and accidental.Although every text and artwork according to proposition (2) must be titled for public presentation, the theory maintains that it is the greatest presumption for an editor, literary executor, art dealer, museum curator, or the like to impose an unauthorized title on an untitled production, at the risk of contradicting, distorting, or misrepresenting an artist’s or author’s original ideas. The only proper, semantically neutral, procedure for publishing an artist’s untitled production is to title it “Untitled” (or the equivalent). The theory gains strength from the fact that it reasonably explains this frequently followed editorial-curatorial practice. It incorporates a normative judgment about the correct policy for managing certain literary and other art productions, based on a sensitive appreciation of the semantic role of titles in the holistic meaning of a text or artwork.Here is my problem. The theory seems correct to me; I accept the author’s injunction against the imputation of substantive titles on untitled works, and I want to act in accordance with it. Proposition (2) requires that I give the work a title if it is to be published. The manuscript cannot appear indecently with a blank cover page, and it cannot be cataloged, reviewed, or entered into bibliographies as a null entry. But if I title the work “Untitled,” as proposition (3) permits, I violate the injunction not to impose a content-descriptive or connotative title on the work for purposes of publication. This is unavoidable in the nature of this special case, simply because the manuscript happens to be about that which is untitled. The same is true if I try to title the piece “‘Untitled’” or “[No Title]” or “The Semantics of Untitled Productions.” These are also unauthorized descriptive editorial [End Page 103] impositions. If the theory is true, the manuscript cannot be legitimately titled, even as an untitled work. Oddly, what may well be the most correct theory of untitled productions forbids all and only the titling of untitled manuscripts... (shrink)

Jerry H. Gill provides a fresh angle of interpretation for the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein by exploring his use of metaphor, as well as the implications of this use for new insights into his view of language in particular and philosophy in general. The first part of the work catalogs the major metaphors in the Tractatus, the Philosophical Investigations, and On Certainty. The second part explores what these metaphors mean in the context of a broader interpretation of Wittgenstein—an approach (...) that has not been developed by other interpreters. (shrink)

Le catalogue est une forme de base de la littérature grecque. Elle se trouve, pour nous, la première fois chez Hésiode , se recristallise, en prose, dans l’opposition à la forme sérielle qu’Aristote oppose aux formes bouclées des périodes en prose. Or, on peut suivre sa tradition jusque dans l’antiquité dite tardive. Les Vies de philosophes et de sophistes de l’historien Eunape de Sardes peuvent l’illustrer que cette continuité est toujours comprise comme un recours aux catalogues hésiodiques ou autres de (...) l’époque archaïque. Nous procédons selon trois critères : premièrement, la tendance hésiodique de cacher un récit dans une énumération prétendument sobre se retrouve dans la suite de vies, qui se transforment peu à peu en histoire cohérente; deuxièmement le style sériel de la prose hérodotéenne ou d’Hypéride, lui-même héritier de la forme catalogique, se retrouve chez Eunape; troisièmement Eunape évoque comme modèle le Catalogue des femmes et présente son histoire comme une suite du catalogue des âges tel qu’il le lit dans Les Travaux et les Jours d’Hésiode.The Iron Age is over: Eunap of Sardes and the ‘Catalogic’ Pattern. In Greek literature, the catalogue is a basic pattern of epic song from the work of Hesiod onwards. Aristotle recognises this pattern by distinguishing a serial prose-style, as distinguished from a rounded prose-style, and this special pattern continues to be used even in what is called “late” Antiquity. That the writers were fairly aware of both the pattern and its origin, can be demonstrated by analysing “The Lives of Philosophers and Sophists” by Eunap of Sardes . Our study uses three criteria: firstly, the same Hesiodic tendency to conceal a story under what is presented as a mere list or enumeration, can be found in Eunap’s catalogue of Lives, which transform themselves slowly into a history of 4th century neoplatonistic philosophy; secondly, Eunap uses the same serial prose-style as do Herodotus or Hypereides, the heirs of the catalogic pattern; thirdly, Eunap himself mentions the “Catalogue of Women” as a possible model, and presents his history as a continuation of Hesiod’s catalogue of Ages in “Works and Days”. (shrink)

with the publication in this issue of Alice Ragni's "Bibliographia Claubergiana : Tracking a Crossroads in the History of Philosophy," we inaugurate a new series in the JHP, Research Tools for Historians of Philosophy. This series will publish occasional article-length studies that serve as resources for philosophers who do primary text scholarship: bibliographies, catalogs of manuscripts and correspondence, information about libraries and research collections, editions of previously unpublished sources, translations of sources previously unavailable in major European languages, and (...) so on. In the queue for volume 58 next year is an inventory of the correspondence of Elisabeth of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Experience or Interpretation:"What You See Is Not What You Read"Klaus OttmannMuseums of modern and contemporary art are growing at an unprecedented rate. New museums are being founded and existing ones are expanding exhibition spaces and acquiring more and more works of art. Concurrently, cultural institutions compete with a growing number of art fairs, biennials, galleries, and public collection spaces.Since the 1980s the focus of museums increasingly has been on (...) education and interpretation, which among other things has created a boom for audio guides and scholarly exhibition catalogs at the expense of the unmediated experience of works of art. Perhaps what is needed are exhibitions that present art again primarily as "experience," with minimal curatorial and didactic intervention. [End Page 13]I have borrowed the title of my essay from a lecture that was given by Nicolas Serota, the director of the Tate galleries in London, in 1996. His lecture was subtitled "The Dilemma of Museums of Modern Art."But the question of the presentation of art, and specifically, that of experience vs. interpretation, by no means originated in the last decades. It is at least as old a question as modern art itself, going as far back as the nineteenth-century French intellectual dispute on the museum between the poet Paul Valéry and the novelist Marcel Proust, as recounted with a sympathetic voice by the German philosopher and cultural critic Theodor Adorno in a short essay with the minimalist title "Valéry Proust Museum."There is much to be learned from reading this small text. Paul Valéry criticized the museum of his time (the Louvre) for creating confusion in the mind of the spectator by reducing the experience to the level of information only. No one would want to listen to ten orchestras at once, he argued, yet we are forced to apprehend, at the same moment, a seascape, a portrait, and a still-life, or worse, painting styles completely incompatible with each other. He warned that excess of information would lead to impoverishment of the senses, as art was becoming a matter of education. Valéry's view could be regarded as the conservative position.Marcel Proust's view was more modernist: he regarded the museum as the best place to view art. Devoid of décor and other commonplace distractions, its galleries symbolized for him the inner spaces into which the artist withdraws to create works of art.Both Valéry and Proust emphasized that art should be enjoyed. But while for Valéry art lost its vitality in the museum and effectively "died," Proust saw an afterlife of art in the museum and in the subjective stream of consciousness of the viewer.For Adorno, both views were too one-sided and extreme. Valéry's absolute unwavering contemplation of pure art takes the risk of neutralization, unless the work can point beyond itself toward a social context. Thus, a work of art is neither an embodiment of a Platonic idea, as Valéry believed, nor is it exclusively a reflection of the soul, as Proust understood it. Rather, in Adorno's view, art is a "force field" between the art and the viewer, both passive and active.In his 1931 lectures on "Art as Experience," the American philosopher John Dewey said:The trouble with existing theories [of art] is that they start from ready-made compartmentalization, or from a conception of art that "spiritualizes" it out of connection with the objects of concrete experience. The alternative, however, to such spiritualization is not a degrading... materialization of works of fine art, but a conception that discloses the way in which these works idealize qualities found in common experience.1 [End Page 14]In my book The Genius Decision: The Extraordinary and the Postmodern Condition, I describe the creative act as an active-passive leap that the artist is impelled to make and the viewer is challenged to repeat.Wittgenstein often spoke about the inexpressible, that which is beyond the limits of language. He called it "running against the boundaries of language." It is something any poet, musician, or painter is familiar with; they all run against boundaries of language, sound, or color... (shrink)

The crisis of western civilization is a crisis of public philosophy. This is the charge of Public Philosophy and Political Science, a stunning new collection of essays edited by E. Robert Statham Jr. Vividly cataloging the decay of the moral and intellectual foundations of civic liberty, the book portrays a generation of Americans alienated from institutions built on public philosophy. The work exposes the failure of America's political scientists to acknowledge and understand this alarming crisis in the American body politic. (...) The distinguished contributors examine the evolution of public philosophy; the inextricable relationship between politics and philosophy; and the interplay between public philosophy, the constitution, natural law, and government. They reveal the dire threat to deliberative democracy and the fundamental order of constitutional society posed by public philosophy's waning power to refine, cultivate, and civilize. The work is an indictment of a society which has discarded a way of life rooted in natural law, democracy and the traditions of civility; and is a denunciation of an educated elite that has divorced itself from the standards upon which public philosophy rests. It is essential reading for philosophers and political and social scientists seeking to resurrect the standards of American public life. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to offer a specific perspective on Puritan philosophy. Most of the early American philosophy of the Puritans dealt with theological issues, the main topics of philosophical speculation were the ideas of God, salvation, freedom, and others. However, there were some ideas, the presence of which is an important factor, which until now has been little taken into account. This factor is the genuine interest of the Puritans in the natural sciences. Both in England and (...) in America, there were favorable conditions for the new natural philosophy proclaimed by Francis Bacon, this natural philosophy offered a new type of thought. The English philosopher struggled with obstacles in the way of research, one of which was infallible authority, for example, the authority of Aristotle. One of the most curious facts about the colonial life of American settlers is the construction of Harvard College, which from the first days, preserved and increased knowledge. Among the sciences taught was astronomy, which indicates the interest of the Puritans in the study of space. The most important change in the scientific worldview of the times of the first colonies in North America was the adoption of the heliocentric system of Nicolaus Copernicus to replace the geocentric system of Ptolemy, which had existed for many centuries. Among the first books printed in the colonies were mainly religious texts, but there were also scientific ones, for example, astronomical almanacs and catalogs appeared. The information in these books helped in observing the heavenly bodies, for which the first optical instruments, telescopes, were used. Several decades after the first settlers in Plymouth, the first telescope appeared in America thanks to John Winthrop Jr. Taken together, these facts show that in addition to religious reflections, American Puritan thinkers were also interested in cosmological problems. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The View from Pȏle NordSartre, Beauvoir, and Girard on Mimesis, Embodiment, and DesireMartha J. Reineke (bio)Simone Beauvoir's novel She Came to Stay immerses readers in a 1930s Parisian social scene, thanks in part to the character Françoise. Eavesdropping with Françoise on a man and woman seated at a table in the Pȏle Nord café, readers of the novel hear the woman confide, "I've never been able to follow the (...) rules of flirting. I have a morbid horror of being touched."1 As Françoise invites us to turn our gaze toward another couple seated nearby, we observe a possible instance of the very discomfort to which the first woman has attested. A hapless female looks "uncertainly at a man's huge (grosse) hand that has just pounced on hers (s'abattre sur)."2 Of these two scenes from She Came to Stay, Jean-Paul Sartre memorializes only the second.3 As described by Sartre in Being and Nothingness, a man and a woman on their first date are seated at a table. The man "takes" (prend) the hand of a woman and holds it between "his warm hands" (les mains chaudes) while the woman makes her hand inert, even as she "permits herself to enjoy his desire."4 Thanks to the pervasive influence of Being and Nothingness on the philosophical canon, the disquieting scene Françoise describes in She Came to Stay largely has been forgotten. Sartre sets the [End Page 1] terms for the unfortunate woman's ongoing life: She is a paradigm of "bad faith." Two decades later, her immortality is secured by René Girard: The woman is a prime exemplar of coquetry, a "fundamental" concept in the development of Girard's theory of mimetic desire.5In the wake of today's #metoo headlines, we may find ourselves eager to weigh in anew on the scene at Pȏle Nord. Are we witnesses to flirtation? Seduction? Unwanted sexual attention? Debates about coercion and guile, predators and prey, are unlikely to be productive; after all, Girard has advised that participants in such debates flounder in a problematic victimology.6 Nevertheless, Sartre and Girard's fascination with the mise en scène at Pȏle Nord warrants reexamination on other grounds. Sartre's discussion of the young woman beset by bad faith in Being and Nothingness is one of several instances in which Sartre is shown exerting a significant influence on Girard. Focusing closely on these occurrences, we can identify features of Sartrian existentialism that contribute constructively to the development of Girard's thought. So also can we uncover a problematic view of the body in mimetic theory. Girard shares with Sartre a profound ambivalence toward embodiment. An alternative perspective visible in Beauvoir's writing could enhance the treatment of the body and eroticism in mimetic theory.Girard's early work attests to Sartre's influence. Writing in Evolution of Desire, Cynthia Haven introduces the topic of Sartre's impact on Girard by recounting Parisian intellectuals' responses to tensions between Camus and Sartre: "Everyone took one side or the other." Girard's friends reported that Girard "was on the Sartre side."7 In an interview with Rebecca Adams, Girard states that "I was influenced by Sartre and Camus, like other people of my generation, especially by Sartre."8 Girard acknowledges Sartre's influence in several other contexts. In a 2007 interview with Pierpaolo Antonello, Girard recalls his early philosophical interests: "… From Sartre I went to Merleau-Ponty and all the authors related to phenomenology, which fascinated me and for a while I wanted to write in the phenomenological style."9 Commenting in the 2008 preface to La Conversion de l'art, Girard states that he is struck by the Sartrian "tone" of his own writing.10 Scholarly explorations of the specifics of the influence of Sartre on Girard have cataloged the most important Sartrian concepts: a lack of being, the in-itself/for-itself (en-soi/pour-soi); the "projet"; patterns of desire (e.g., masochism and sadism), and bad faith.11 These themes are discussed in what follows, with special attention to Girard and Sartre's perspectives on human... (shrink)

“To arrange in or analyse into classes according to shared qualities or characteristics; to make a formal or systematic classification” (OED). For many, classification provokes images of dull cataloging and arcane knowledge. However, in the eighteenth century it was neither dull nor arcane and had momentous import for natural philosophers and everyday individuals alike. Susannah Gibson has captured this expertly in her new book, and the subtitle accents the stakes: How Eighteenth-Century Science Disrupted the Natural Order. Although originating out (...) of a doctoral dissertation, this is not a dense monograph. Instead, Gibson targets a wider academic audience using compelling vignettes in digestible chapters with compact endnotes and helpful suggestions for further reading. On the whole, the book is a success, though more illuminating in some places than others. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a third way in debates over the scope of phenomenal consciousness, in the form of a novel synthesis of liberal and conservative introspective observations. My primary claim is that at least some liberal observations arise due to the existence of a heretofore unrecognized type of phenomenal concepts, liberal phenomenal concepts, while conservative observations arise by virtue of the nonexistence of at least some types of liberal phenomenal contents. Liberal phenomenal concepts, when deployed in direct introspection (...) on phenomenal consciousness, misrepresent consciousness as including high-level, liberal contents. The misattribution of these contents to consciousness is partly defeasible, however: by using a more methodical, stringent heuristic for cataloging the introspected contents of consciousness, it is possible to note the nonexistence of liberal phenomenal contents. Thus, at least in some cases, conservatives are right and liberals are wrong about the scope of phenomenal consciousness. However, liberals have picked up on something conservatives have missed: an inaccurate introspective appearance caused by liberal phenomenal concepts. The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin by defending the faithfulness to introspection of liberal and conservative observations in the context of the debate over the existence of cognitive phenomenology. I then show how liberal phenomenal concepts can explain these observations, and discuss three jointly sufficient conditions whose collective truth serves to establish that a type of liberal content is misattributed to phenomenal consciousness by such concepts. Before concluding, I briefly consider an explanation for why liberal phenomenal concepts might exist. (shrink)

_A Companion to the Philosophers_ surveys the major philosophical thinkers in Western and non-Western traditions. Multicultural in its approach, it provides authoritative coverage of the major Chinese, Indian, Japanese, African, Jewish, and Islamic philosophers, as well as European and American thinkers.

The concept of religion necessarily splits into two categories, the substantive principles that are polarized about the idea of the revered object, and the manner of' applying them in the private behavior of the worshiper or in the public institutions of the state. Theory and practice are not conflicting terms. Philosophy, however, has its roots in principles and hesitates to shape the external forms in which its counsels may be expressed. Therefore the studies here are confined to the didactic issues (...) at stake, and religion is not defined except as the thinker defines it himself. The philosophers appearing in this book are: Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Marcus Aurelius, Augustine, Leibniz, Spinoza, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Auguste Comte--ten thinkers of the western world, from many ages and diverse stocks, who offer us their beliefs and conclusions. Though many distinguished names could be added to this list, the philosophies here expounded will serve to reflect the unflagging interest of humanity in this subject. (shrink)

The volume is a collection of essays about prominent Polish 20th century philosophers of science and scientists who were concerned with problems in the philosophy of science. The contribution made by Polish logicians, especially those from the Lvov-Warsaw School, like Lukasiewicz, Kotarbiński, Czeżowski or Ajdukiewicz, is already well known. One of the aims of the volume is to offer a broader perspective. The papers collected here are devoted to the work of such philosophers as Zawirski, Metallmann, Dąmbska, Mehlberg, (...) Szaniawski and Giedymin as well as to the work of such scientists as Smoluchowski, Fleck, Infeld and Chyliński. The introduction to the volume, written by the editor and Jacek Jadacki, presents an overview of the history of the Polish philosophy of science from the foundation of the Cracow Academy (in 1364) to the present. (shrink)

This book is available either individually, or as part of the specially-priced Arguments of the Philosphers Collection.

This book presents the views of 22 women philosophers from outside the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian worlds. These eminent thinkers are from Mesopotamia, India, Tibet, China, Korea, Japan, Australia, America, the Philippines and Nigeria. Six philosophers, the earliest of whom predates the Greek pre-Socratics by two thousand years, lived at “the dawn of philosophy”; another six from late Antiquity through the Classical period; five more taught and wrote during the Middle Ages up to the Age of Exploration, and yet (...) five others were active during the modern period to the mid-twentieth century. Most belonged to major philosophical traditions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Zen, or Sufism. The chapters of the book describe the life and views of the philosophers, outline the fundamental features of their respective schools, and contain translations of their writings. The book is intended for scholars of philosophy and women’s studies who wish to expand their knowledge of non-Western philosophical traditions and is ideally suited for undergraduate education. Comprehensive multilingual bibliographies of carefully documented sources offer scholars many promising resources for further research. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophers' Walks by Bruce BaughTim IngoldBaugh, Bruce. Philosophers' Walks. Routledge, 2022. 252pp.Yesterday evening, much to my satisfaction, I finished reading Bruce Baugh's Philosophers' Walks. The author ends by putting down his pen. It is time, he declares, "to put my boots on and walk out into the world" (236). For me, it was bedtime, but knowing that I was to write this review, I resolved (...) to sleep on it. On waking, I set out, as is my wont, for the short walk I take every morning before breakfast. The walk itself is nothing special: it takes in the streets of my neighborhood and a nearby park. Yet every day is different as the weather changes, trees come in and out of leaf, blooms flourish and wilt in front gardens, children on their way to school throng the streets in term-time only to vanish in vacations. Lately, a nineteenth-century fountain in the park has been lovingly restored, and every morning I am refreshed by its water-jets and tinkly sound. Most days I am writing in my head, on whatever I have on the go at the time. Walking briskly and on my own, I find that words that had tied me in knots the day before miraculously straighten themselves out with a rhythm and fluency matching my pace. I cannot, however, walk and write at the same time. It is physically impossible. So as the words come, I have to keep repeating them to myself, until I make it home. With no time to lose, I seize notebook, pencil, and spectacles to jot them down. Only when I have done so can I finally sit down to breakfast. And that's exactly what happened this morning. With my hastily scribbled notes, some good words, and the odd finished sentence, I am ready to write this review.I am not, of course, the first to have discovered the benefits of thinking-while-walking. Countless predecessors have done so before me, including some of the most celebrated figures of the past four centuries of European intellectual history. And so has Baugh. The idea behind his book is that if by walking, philosophers have arrived at many of their most cherished insights, then perhaps we could better take the measure of these insights not merely by reading their words but by retracing their steps, walking the same paths as they did. And this, precisely, is what [End Page 131] Baugh, often accompanied by his wife Diane Lindsay, set out to do. Each chapter, barring the introduction and conclusion, is devoted to one or sometimes two characters, and each blends reflection on their ideas and life-histories of walking with the author's recollection of attempting to follow in their footsteps, and of the experience and even self-knowledge gained from doing so. Some walks are in verdant countryside, or more spectacular Alpine scenery, others are in big cities like London and Paris. Baugh does not pretend that the walks of his chosen characters can be replicated exactly when so much has changed, in both rural areas and the urban fabric, since their heydays. Nor can we ever know exactly what was going through their heads at the time. It is nevertheless surprising how many echoes you can pick up from the past, so long as you keep your ears to the ground, and Baugh is an astute listener. For us, his readers, the book is an invitation to join in his travels, albeit at a distance, and by doing so, to enrich our understanding not only of his characters and of how they thought, but of ourselves as well.Though the book is called Philosophers' Walks, Baugh has cast his net wide to include characters for whom the epithet "poet," "artist," or "writer" might sooner come to mind than "philosopher." No matter: all such labels are a touch arbitrary, and it's the thought that counts. So here they are, in chronological order (not the order in which they appear in the book): Pierre Grassendi, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Søren Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Virginia Woolf, André Breton, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de... (shrink)

Following recent debate on the relations between philosophy of science and the sciences, we wish to draw attention to some actual ways of training both young philosophers of science and young life scientists and clinicians. First, we recall a successful case of training philosophers of the life sciences in a strictly scientific environment. Second, after a brief review of the reasons why life scientists and clinicians are currently asking for more ethics, more methodology of science, and more philosophy (...) of science in the training of life scientists and clinicians, we present two training models that could spur the discussion on how to meet the requests coming from the scientific community. We argue that in order to reflect on mutual relations between philosophy of science and the sciences and to foster proper interactions, issues regarding the topics considered, the features of educational curricula, and the institutional organizations should be addressed jointly. (shrink)

Within the last decade or so several philosophers have argued against handgun prohibition on the ground that it violates the right to self-defense. However, even these philosophers grant that the right to own handguns is not absolute and could be overridden if doing so would bring about an enormous social good. Analysis of intra-United States empirical data cited by gun rights advocates indicates that guns do not make us safer, while international data lends powerful support to the thesis (...) that guns do indeed increase homicide. If handguns do not make us safer, then appealing to the right to self-defense as an objection to prohibition is moot. Prohibition neither violates the right to self-defense nor sacrifices anyone’s interests for the common good, since it makes each person less likely to be murderedthan the current permissive handgun laws. Moreover, we also must take into account the right to life of victims of handgun crimes made possible by liberal handgun laws. Consequently, invoking the right to self-defense does not provide any sound reason against handgun prohibition over and above familiar utilitarian objections, which are themselves refuted by the empirical evidence. (shrink)

Now here this (3:19) -- Angels (3:40) -- Highway philosophers (3:49) -- Careful porcelain doll (3:14) -- You USA (3:29) -- Sailing to Newfoundland (3:51) -- Fault lines (4:04) -- Shine sister shine (3:44) -- Castle walls (4:49) -- The tiger and I (3:46) -- Rise (3:29) -- In your corner (3:44) -- Wingspan (acoustic) (3:26) -- From a dream (2:54).

This history of philosophy is a history of men. Or at least, that’s how it has been told over the past several hundred years. But, over the last few decades, we’ve begun to see more and more recognition of women philosophers and the huge impact that they have had on the course of our discipline. There have always been philosophers who happened to be women. Hypatia of Alexandria was known by her contemporaries simply as The Philosopher, and hundreds (...) of young men travelled from throughout the region to attend her public lectures. Philosophers who happen to be women, then, are nothing new. But our failure to recognise them as full contributors to the subject makes them appear to us as something of a surprise. A result of this is that women are often remembered as women first: they are seen more as women than they’re seen as philosophers. (shrink)