Successful social functioning requires quick and accurate processing of emotion and generation of appropriate reactions. In typical individuals, these skills are supported by embodied processing, recruiting central and peripheral mechanisms. However, emotional processing is atypical in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Individuals with ASD show deficits in recognition of briefly presented emotional expressions. They tend to recognize expressions using rule-based, rather than template, strategies. Individuals with ASD also do not spontaneously and quickly mimic emotional expressions, unless the task encourages (...) engagement. When processing emotional scenes, ASD individuals show atypical basic motivational responses, despite intact ability to verbally determine stimulus valence. We discuss how these findings highlight the contribution of both embodied and disembodied mechanisms to typical and atypical emotional functioning. (shrink)

The paper examines the Tattvôpaplava-siṁha of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa, and presents an analysis of his positive arguments that can be traced in the work. Despite the widely held opinion that Jayarāśi was a sceptic or held no positive opinions, the author concludes that, first, Jayarāśi does not fit a standard description of a sceptic. What may appear as an approach to philosophical problems, typical of a sceptic, turns out to be Jayarāśi’s particular method of critical examination on the part of a (...) rationalist. Second, a number of positive views Jayarāśi entertains can be identified in his work, and most of them overlap with much of the doctrine of the Cārvākas and Lokāyatas and materialist tradition recorded as early as the Sāmañña-phala-sutta. Therefore, Jayarāśi should be classified as a representative of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata tradition. (shrink)

What is the class of possible semiotic systems? What kinds of systems could count as such systems? The human mind is naturally considered the prototypical semiotic system. During years of research in semiotics the class has been broadened to include i.e. living systems like animals, or even plants. It is suggested in the literature on artificial intelligence that artificial agents are typical examples of symbol-processing entities. It also seems that semiotic processes are in fact cognitive processes. In consequence, it is (...) natural to ask the question about the relation between semiotic studies and research on artificial cognitive systems within cognitive science. Consequently, my main question concerns the problem of inclusion or exclusion from the semiotic spectrum at least some artificial systems. I would like to consider some arguments against the possibility of artificial semiotic systems and I will try to repeal them. Then I will present an existing natural-language using agent of the SNePS system and interpret it in terms of Peircean theory of signs. I would like also to show that some properties of semiotic systems in Peircean sense could be also found in a discussed artificial system. Finally, I will have some remarks on the status of semiotics in general. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 1, January 2022.

This article focuses on Bob Zajonc’s views on unconscious emotion, especially in the context of the debates about the independence of affect and cognition. Historically, Bob was always interested in the “mere”—basic, fundamental processes. His empirical demonstrations of precognitive and preconscious emotional processes, combined with his elegant expositions of them, sharply contrasted with cold and complex cognitive models. Interestingly, Bob tended to believe that whereas the causes of emotion can be unconscious, the emotional state itself tends to be conscious. However, (...) he reconsidered this assumption and in his later work showed that subjects in affective priming experiments do not experience conscious affect, but instead act on basic preferences. Today, Bob’s insights continue to inspire research on “unconscious emotion.”. (shrink)

In this article, I examine Michael Bratman’s account of stability in his planning theory of intention. Future-directed intentions should be stable, or appropriately resistant to change, over time. Bratman claims that the norm of stability governs both intentions and plans. The aim of this article is to critically enrich Bratman’s account of stability by introducing plasticity as an additional norm of planning. I construct plasticity as a kind of stability of intentions which supplements Bratman’s notion of “reasonable stability.” Unlike the (...) latter, plasticity applies mainly to cases in which plan states are abandoned without reconsideration. I focus on the intra-theoretical problems of PTI and elucidate: the distinction between future-directed intentions and plans, the conceptual difference between stability and inertia, which is only implicit in PTI, and the role of the environment of the planner, which has a vestigial role in Bratman’s work. I also defend my incorporation of pl... (shrink)

It seems that nonmonotonicity of our reasoning is an obvious truth. Almost every logician not even believes, but simply knows very well that a human being thinks in a nonmonotonic way. Moreover, a nonmonotonicity of thinking seems to be a phenomenon parallel to the existence of human beings. Examples allegedly illustrating this phenomenon are not even analyzed today. They are simply quoted. Nowadays, this is a standard approach to nonmonotonicity. However, even simple analysis of those “obvious” examples shows that they (...) illustrate various problems of our thinking, among which none concerns nonmonotonicity. (shrink)

In the paper I explore the relations between a relatively new and quickly expanding branch of artificial intelligence –- the automated discovery systems –- and some new views advanced in the old debate over scientific realism. I focus my attention on one such system, GELL-MANN, designed in 1990 at Wichita State University. The program's task was to analyze elementary particle data available in 1964 and formulate an hypothesis (or hypotheses) about a `hidden', more simple structure of matter, or to put (...) it in contemporary terms –- the discovery of quarks. The central thesis of my paper is that systems like GELL-MANN not only discover (or rediscover) the hidden structure of matter, but also provide independent strong evidence in favor of scientific realism about entities involved in that structure. I make an attempt to show how an argument for scientific realism about sub-microscopic entities can be constructed that would parallel Ian Hacking's `argument from coincidence' presented with respect to microscopic objects in his famous book Representing and Intervening. (shrink)

Planning organizes our actions and conditions our effective-ness. To understand this philosophical hint better, the author investigates and juxtaposes two important accounts in action theory. He discusses the concept of a plan proposed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński in his praxiology (theory of efcient action), and the so called “planning theory of intention” by Michael E. Bratman. The conceptual meeting of these two proposals helps to remove aws in Kotarbiński’s action theory, it also shows the way, in which we can enrich the (...) idea of plans in the frame-work of intentions. Generally, praxiology occurs to be still an important perspective in action theory, which particularly shows how we can improve our understanding of planning when confronted with infuentialcontemporary accounts. (shrink)

We study the structure of the partial order induced by the definability relation on definitions of truth for the language of arithmetic. Formally, a definition of truth is any sentence $$\alpha $$ which extends a weak arithmetical theory (which we take to be $${{\,\mathrm{I\Delta _{0}+\exp }\,}}$$ ) such that for some formula $$\Theta $$ and any arithmetical sentence $$\varphi $$, $$\Theta (\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner )\equiv \varphi $$ is provable in $$\alpha $$. We say that a sentence $$\beta $$ is definable (...) in a sentence $$\alpha $$, if there exists an unrelativized translation from the language of $$\beta $$ to the language of $$\alpha $$ which is identity on the arithmetical symbols and such that the translation of $$\beta $$ is provable in $$\alpha $$. Our main result is that the structure consisting of truth definitions which are conservative over the basic arithmetical theory forms a countable universal distributive lattice. Additionally, we generalize the result of Pakhomov and Visser showing that the set of (Gödel codes of) definitions of truth is not $$\Sigma _2$$ -definable in the standard model of arithmetic. We conclude by remarking that no $$\Sigma _2$$ -sentence, satisfying certain further natural conditions, can be a definition of truth for the language of arithmetic. (shrink)

The paper addresses some of the aspects of the neo-Aristotelian concept of good on the basis of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. The author’s general thesis is that the idea of good organizes its normativity along two vectors pointed towards nature and emancipation, which are interlinked, that is — the normativity of the good is always organized by both of them and it is inappropriate to refer to one of them only. This fault is made, the author believes, by Nussbaum who (...) does not offer enough resources to establish a sound naturalistic evaluative standard in her theory. To address this issue the author starts by discussing the capabilities approach as a form of the concept of good and proceeds by analysing Nussbaum’s view on family as an exemplar of the inadequacies of the approach. (shrink)

The structure of this paper is as follows. My starting point is psychological flexibility (henceforth, PF) as it has been presented in psychology. Here I offer a synthetic view which embraces the most crucial aspects of flexibility, and describes its functional roles and underlying mechanisms. Secondly, I move my attention onto the field of current action theory and discuss two elementary concepts we commonly use when describing our actions: intention and desire. Of course, there are many “theories of desire” and (...) there is no point in trying (nor even the option) to discuss all of them under one heading. To show where the question of PF sneaks into the scene of action theory, I explore the idea of the resistance of desire, as proposed by Timo Airaksinen. The second concept to investigate at this stage is intention. As in the previous case, it is plain that there are plenty of accounts of intentions and there are many roles they play in the phenomenology of action. For the purposes of this paper, we need only something that can be interpreted as an approach to PF. Such an approach can be found in the idea of stability of intention or a plan, discussed famously by Michael Bratman. According to my interpretation, these two ideas, resistance of desire and stability of intention, allow to initially understand some important aspects of PF in action theory. To get a slightly more comprehensive view – and to supplement the outcomes gained on the grounds of the analyses of these two accounts – I introduce, in the third step, the concept of plasticity which comes from the so-called praxiology proposed by Tadeusz Kotarbiński (Lvov-Warsaw School). I try to show how this concept is still feasible and how it may enrich current philosophical accounts of agential flexibility. The strategy behind this stage of the paper is to enrich the Bratmanian approach to psychological stability. The last part of the paper contains some remarks on the philosophical outcome of the interdisciplinary approach to PF. (shrink)

The issue “Human being in the digital era” is not superfluous. Every technology, i.e. literacy, print etc., gives tools, but at the same time impacts deeply human being. The article attempts to answer the following questions: what kind of change is taking place nowadays? what are the associated challenges? Is it true what Einstein once said: “The problems that exist in the world today cannot be solved by the level of thinking that created them”?

This article is a critical discussion of the book Setting Health-Care Priorities by Torbjörn Tännsjö. This critique targets mainly Tännsjö’s method, but also several unjustified conclusions and some implicit assumptions.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications flowing from adopting methodological naturalism in science, with special emphasis on the relation between science and religion. Methodological naturalism, denying supernatural and teleological explanations, influences the content of scientific theories, and in practice leads to vision of science as compatible with ontological naturalism and in opposition to theism. Ontological naturalism in turn justifies the acceptance of methodological naturalism as the best method to know the reality. If we accept realistic interpretation (...) of scientific theories, then methodological naturalism conflicts science with religion. Theistic evolution does not seem to be a proper way to reconcile Darwinism and methodological naturalism with theism. Many of such propositions are boiled down to deism. Although evolution can be interpreted theistically, it is not the way in which majority of modern scientists and respectable scientific institutions understand it. (shrink)

We propose developing the theory of consequences of morasses relevant in mathematical applications in the language alternative to the usual one, replacing commonly used structures by families of sets originating with Velleman’s neat simplified morasses called 2-cardinals. The theory of related trees, gaps, colorings of pairs and forcing notions is reformulated and sketched from a unifying point of view with the focus on the applicability to constructions of mathematical structures like Boolean algebras, Banach spaces or compact spaces. The paper is (...) dedicated to the memory of Jim Baumgartner whose seminal joint paper :109–129, 1987) with Saharon Shelah provided a critical mass in the theory in question. A new result which we obtain as a side product is the consistency of the existence of a function \ with the appropriate \-version of property \ for regular \ satisfying \. (shrink)

This article introduces a model of levels of analysis applied to statements found in philosophical, scientific, and religious discourses in order to facilitate a more accurate description of the relation between science and religion. The empirical levels prove to be the most crucial for the relation between science and religion, because they include statements that are important parts of both scientific and religious discourse, whereas statements from metaphysical levels are only important in terms of religion and are neutral in relation (...) to particular scientific theories. In particular, the rejection of certain ontological assumptions behind special divine action logically entails the rejection of the literal meaning of empirical statements describing special open expression of supernatural factors in nature. Such a rejection also entails an essential revision of many religious systems of beliefs, including traditional Christian theism. (shrink)

Should we approach the lived experience and/or understand the other with the sense of things? If this is the case, how are we to treat the human experience par excellence? Paradoxically, Edith Stein gives a fresh meaning to the Husserlian term “leiblicheSelbstgegebenheit.” In contrast to Max Scheler’s account, she develops the “persönliche Note” criterion of authenticity. And against Maetin Heidegger’s existential philosophy, a concern for human existence itself resonates. Based on these three dimensions, this article discusses the idea of “the (...) lived experience” according to Edith Stein, that is, the human experience contemplated by the humanities. -------------------------- Received: 03/02/2023. Reviewed: 16/03/2023. Accepted: 30/03/2023. (shrink)

Among different types of autonomy of ethics, semantic autonomy seems to be the most interesting. It is a thesis about irreducibility of meaning of ethical terms to some other types of discourse. The paper proposes an argument for the semantic autonomy of ethics, based on a detailed interpretation of the Open Question Argument by G.E. Moore, and followed up by the reading of Philippa Foot's argument about weak objectivity of evaluative meaning of ethical terms. The result of investigation gives the (...) two-fold picture of modern understanding of morality: irrevisability of moral demands as attempted by any theoretical armchair endeavors, which are external to the moral practice, and democratic intersubjectivity of moral discourse. (shrink)

Zasadnicza teza tekstu brzmi, że możliwość totalnego chaosu empirycznego, która jest rozpatrywana w ramach eksperymentu unicestwienia świata, nie jest możliwością realną, lecz możliwością logiczną. Według Husserla hipoteza totalnego chaosu empirycznego pozostaje w związku z zasadniczą nieadekwatnością doświadczenia świata, która nie wyklucza możliwości nieistnienia świata. Unicestwienie świata jako efekt całkowitego załamania się doświadczenia świata mogę jednak przyjąć tylko hipotetycznie i taka fikcyjna możliwość nie ma charakteru możliwości realnej, ponieważ absolutny fakt mojego doświadczenia poprzedza wszelkie możliwości, nadając im dopiero znaczenie możliwości realnych. (...) Doświadczenie w swej pierwotnej strukturze obejmuje zarówno doświadczenie świata, jak i doświadczenie ego cogito i jest jednym, absolutnym doświadczeniem, tak że możliwość globalnego chaosu empirycznego okazuje się jedynie pustym eksperymentem myślowym i jako taka możliwość ta pozostaje w zasadniczej analogii do możliwości niepoznawalnych rzeczy samych w sobie. Słowa kluczowe: fenomenologia transcendentalna, eksperyment unicestwienia świata, doświadczenie świata, doświadczenie ego cogito, realna możliwość, logiczna możliwość. (shrink)

A few years ago, believing that human thinking is nonmonotonic, I tried to reconstruct a nonmonotonic reasoning by application of two monotonic procedures. I called them “step forward” and “step backward” . The first procedure is just a consequence operation responsible for an extension of the set of beliefs. The second one, defined on the base of the logic of falsehood reconstructed for the given logic of truthfulness, is responsible for a reduction of the set of beliefs. Both procedures taken (...) together were successfully verified by using so-called AGM , postulates for expansion, contraction and revision formulated by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson . Reasoning composed of the mutual application of both procedures seemed to be quite natural for modeling our thinking. At that time, I supposed that it should be nonmonotonic but I was wrong. It turned out impossible to satisfy a definition of the nonmonotonic inference by reasoning composed both steps. To understand why this is impossible, I began to analyze how nonmonotonicity is obtainable in some well-known cases in the literature. I analyzed the problem from two points of view: non-formal examples for nonmonotonicity and formal constructions of nonmonotonic operations/relations. The result of those investigations was astonishing: none of the considered by me cases of nonmonotonicity belonging to point and almost none belonging to satisfies the definition of nonmonotonic inference. Arguments against the nonmonotonic character of well-known examples for nonmonotonicity of human thinking are more precisely presented in [6]. I present them below an abbreviated version of them. (shrink)

Recent literature in experimental philosophy has postulated the existence of the abstract/concrete paradox : the tendency to activate inconsistent intuitions depending on whether a problem to be analyzed is framed in abstract terms or is described as a concrete case. One recent study supports the thesis that this effect influences judicial decision-making, including decision-making by professional judges, in areas such as interpretation of constitutional principles and application of clear-cut rules. Here, following the existing literature in legal theory, we argue that (...) the susceptibility to such an effect might depend on whether decision-makers operate in a legal system characterized by the formalist or particularist approach to legal interpretation, with formalist systems being less susceptible to the effect. To test this hypothesis, we compare the results of experimental studies on ACP run on samples from two countries differing in legal culture: Poland and Brazil. The lack of significant differences between those results suggests that ACP is a robust effect in the legal context. (shrink)

Affective knowledge of God is a kind of knowledge which follows human affectivity. This knowledge takes place on two levels: the level of the natural inclination of man towards God and the level of the religious bias of man towards God. What is the nature of affective knowledge of God? It seems there are three problems in question. First of all, as there is a natural inclination towards God in man, one will be restless unless one recognizes or finds God. (...) Secondly, one who loves God has a new deeper knowledge of the divine things through connaturality and inclination. Thirdly, as the result of one's encounter with God and of uniting with Him, man experiences certain subjective states which cannot be expressed by words. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Życie a orientacja w rzeczywistości przyrodniczej [Life and Orientation in Natural Reality], by Jolanta Koszteyn.

Leading authors in their fields present an interdisciplinary panorama of vital themes of the philosophy of language and track their historical origins. This book gives new life to historical ideas and additional depth to current debates.

Technically, online space seems to be connective beyond national borders and could serve for mass communication between Europeans, both European Union citizens and candidate countries’ citizens. With high internet penetration rates and Web 2.0 tools availability never before had there been such huge potential of growth in communication. Does it mean that European information society emerges? Or contrary: does it seem that pan-European institutions use online tools in non-pan-European or even counter-pan-European ways? Illustrations from Poland's first ten years after EU (...) accession suggest misusing online space fixed website as exemplified by Europa.eu. (shrink)

Summary This article revises the existing explanations for the marriage between Octavian and Scribonia, which emphasised the young Caesar’s desire for an accommodation with Sextus Pompeius, including a mutual normalization of relations and even an alliance. In reality, such actions were never on the agenda of either politician. The marriage to Scribonia was primarily a message addressed by Octavian to Antonius during a period of tense relations in the year 40 BCE, but also to the Roman plebs and to the (...) veterans. (shrink)

Electronic technologies, from the internet to virtual reality and advanced robotics, are transforming the world we live in, and especially our methods of learning, far more radically than any factors since the invention of the printing press. The process is at its beginnings; it is largely unavoidable; it also presents an opportunity for learning and research. We academics ought to meet this educational and civilizational challenge and make it our own. Otherwise, the process may be appropriated by bureaucratic and narrow (...) business interests, largely to the detriment of academic learning. We have a chance to enjoy shared knowledge as never before, which I call opening the doors to the true Library of Alexandria.Structural changes are necessitated by this new paradigm. Those incorporate three aspects: First, integration of the web into our lives; second, the use of such integration in research and education, which highly increases the opportunities but is unforgiving of excessive individualism and other inefficiencies; third the philosophically broad perspective of non-reductive naturalism facilitated by this global integration. (shrink)

The article covers the problem of testability of intelligent design theory. The objection that intelligent design theory does not correspond to principle of methodological naturalism is discussed. I show that recognizing intelligent causes is commonly applied in science. I present the "specification-complexity" criterion, an attempt to generalize the criteria used to define the problem in particular sciences. This criterion - together with the concept of explanatory filter - is to guarantee the testability of intelligent design theory. The irreducible complexity criterion, (...) which is to recognize design in biology, is brought forward. The problem of progressiveness of intelligent design theory is also reported. The analysis leads to the conclusion that functioning in intelligent design theory criterion of design recognition belongs to probability and complexity theory and that theory discussed is empirically testable. (shrink)

This article aims to analyse Wittgenstein’s 1929–1932 notes concerning Frege’s critique of what is referred to as old formalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Wittgenstein disagreed with Frege’s critique and, in his notes, outlined his own assessment of formalism. First of all, he approvingly foregrounded its mathematics-game comparison and insistence that rules precede the meanings of expressions. In this article, I recount Frege’s critique of formalism and address Wittgenstein’s assessment of it to show that his remarks are not so much (...) a critique of Frege as rather a defence of the formalist anti-metaphysical investment. (shrink)

Panentheism and classical theism. Comments on the basis of Jacek Wojtysiak’s criticism of Józef Życiński’s position The article was inspired by the tenth anniversary of the death of Archbishop Życiński and the article containing polemic with his panentheism published by Wojtysiak. Wojtysiak claims that the essence of theism is the thesis about the existential selfsufficiency of God and the resulting asymmetry of his causal relationship with the world, which consists in the fact that God can exert causal influence on the (...) world, but the world cannot influence God in this way. Since Życiński contradicts this thesis, according to Wojtysiak, his panentheism is not theism at all. I do not agree with this judgment, and what Wojtysiak calls ‘theism’ I call ‘classical theism’. Both panentheism and classical theism constitute legitimate versions of theism. Ishow that the classical theism in the version proposed by Wojtysiak is entangled in serious difficulties. One of them is that on cosmological level it harmonizes best with occasionalism, that is, with full theological determinism. Another one is connected with the thesis t that God is impassible, which deprives him of the possibility of fulfilling these pro-religious functions, which are crucial for Christianity, such as God’s experiential involvement in the history of the world. I propose that the recognition of divine passibility be the minimum condition for any panentheism or position similar to it. Meeting this condition does not require the rejection of the thesis about the classically understood divine immutability, omnipotence or the creation of the world ex nihilo, but it is conducive to the revision of these notions. I point out that revisions proposed by Życiński in his version of panentheism were incomparably smaller than those proposed by Whitehead or especially Hartshorne, but still they cannot be treated as a minor supplement to classical theism. They constitute version of panentheism or neoclassical theism, which is a much better philosophical basis for Christianity. (shrink)

Meaning-making processes, understood hierarchically, in line with the Semiotic Hierarchy framework, change on various timescales. To account for and predict these changes, one can take a cognitive view on semiosis. I adopt an interdis-ciplinary approach combining semiotic studies and cognitive studies in an attempt to account for meaning-making activity and to predict the course of semiosis. In this context, I consider meaning-making activity as shaped by both “external” (to a semiotic system) as well as “internal” factors. I also show how (...) both the “external” and “internal” sources of the dynamicity of meaning-making should be framed in terms of studies on cognition.I start with a non-standard, 4e approach to meaning-making. According to this framework, meaning-making processes are constituted by (and not just depen-dent on) environmental and bodily factors. The dynamicity of semiosis can be accounted for in terms of an experiencing, embodied subject (agent) enacting her/his/its own domain of meaningful phenomena. As I argue, this perspective on meaning-making is the cognitive foundation of the first two levels of the Semiotic Hierarchy. In the following sections I present the Peircean view on signs and semiosis, according to which semiosis is a result of the very nature of a sign and a sign system. In this view, the dynamicity of semiosis has primarily “internal” sources: it stems from the unavoidable fallibility of interpretation and synechism of signs. As I show, this aspect of semiosis can be addressed by means of standard (cognitivist) cognitive science and by means of cognitive modelling. Ultimately, I sketch a proposal of an attempt to develop a uniform cognitive framework allowing for integration of the above-mentioned aspects of semiosis – a framework based on Rowlands’ idea of the Amalgamated Mind. (shrink)

In his texts, Józef Tischner referred to significant problems characteristic of the end of the communist regime and the first years of the liberal-democratic system in Poland. He tried to understand, among other things, the sources of Polish society’s disappointment with their regained political and economic freedom. This article discusses the late period of Tischner’s life and work, when his philosophy was heavily influenced by the ideas of Charles Taylor. On the one hand, the author analyzes Tischner’s attitude toward the (...) concept of ordinary life, while on the other, Tischner’s understanding of solidarity combined with the concept of the spirit of capitalism. The article shows numerous similarities and significant differences between the way of thinking of both philosophers. The former concern above all the consentaneous assessment of the disappearance of heroism in liberal-democratic societies, while the latter concern the discrepancies in the assessment of the possibility of fully implementing the idea of solidarity in these societies. (shrink)

As the concept of recognition shifts from philosophical theory to other fields of the humanities and social sciences, this volume explores the nature of this border category that exists in the space between sociological and philosophical considerations, related as it is to concepts such as status, prestige, the looking-glass self, respect, and dignity - at times being used interchangeably with these terms. Bringing together work from across academic disciplines, it presents theoretical conceptualizations of recognition, demonstrates its operationalization in historical and (...) literary research, considers recognition as a fundamental problem of sociological theory and examines the concept as a marker of social distances and redistribution. An examination and demonstration of the full potential of recognition as a category, Understanding Recognition: Conceptual and Empirical Studies explores the contemporary meanings and manifestations of recognition and sheds light on its capacity to complement the notions of status, class or prestige. As such, it will appeal to scholars of sociology and social theory, philosophy, history and literary studies. (shrink)

Biologists are not used to the term „substance". They prefer to say „a living being", „an organism", a „specimen of species Homo sapiens'' - for instance. Chemists, on the other hand, when they say „this is a new substance" they usually mean the same Aristotle would mean - I think. The chemical meaning of the term „substance" is closest to the one I am going to discuss in this paper. To know a substance, one has to accumulate and store a (...) multitude of different forms of evidence concerning this „natural behavior". So that concept of the „nature" of a given chemical substance is necessarily very complex and it cannot result from a single sensation, or a momentary observation. (shrink)

Our everyday thinking consists of two steps: "forward" extending our beliefs, "backward" reducing them. The "forward" step is formalized by deductive logic, but existing logics formalising "rejected sentences" reasoning are unvalid for the "backward" reasoning. We need two logics: one for the set of accepted sentences, another for the set of rejected sentences. They work on the same class of sets, so the second component of the pair must be a reasoning decreasing sets of accepted sets.

The book is addressed to all readers interested in cognitive science, and especially in research combining a logical analysis with psychological, linguistic and neurobiological approaches. The publication is the result of a collaboration between the Department of Cognitive Science at University of Lodz and the Department of Cognitive Science at Lund University. It is intended to provide a comprehensive presentation of the key research issues undertaken in both Departments, including considerations on meaning, natural language and reasoning, linguistic as well as (...) numerical competence, the theory of decision making, modelling of conceptual representations, cognitive and game theoretic approach to social interactions. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to discuss the general idea of a Central-European ethos in comparison with the values that shaped the contemporary form of Western societies. My argument is threefold. First, I briefly discuss the emergent character of Western modernization. Second, I pinpoint those historical and material conditions that have shaped the general situation of Central Europe in the last two hundred years in order to indicate their influence on what Charles Taylor calls "social imaginaries", shared by the (...) peoples of the region. And in part three, I attempt to point out some consequences of the otherness of the Central-European mode of modernization for regional ethos and its perspectives. My general thesis is that the countries of Central Europe, members of what-is-now the Visegrad Group, that is to say, for the last two hundred years (and some of them, like Poland for instance, for last three or even four centuries) are in the process of some kind semi-modernization, This semi-modernization concerns not only their economies and social relations, but also certain moral and world views (Weltsschauungen), whose basic outlines are derived from inferiority complex about the modernized West. But at the same time they are mostly unable, for the reason I shall refer to below, to propose their own way of modernization. Hence, claims to equality and justice made within Central-European are are of a special kind, which involves a strong recognition of history as the source and basis for them. (shrink)