In this paper I consider what it might mean to see society as a kind of Rortian conversation. Although the idea of conversation is not always explicit in Rorty's social thought, it is, I think, implicitly present. To therefore invoke it as a model is not to do an injustice to Rorty, but to bring out features of his own thought that he tends to underplay. In suggesting that we take seriously the notion of society as a kind (...) of conversation, we should be careful not to overplay the aspect of talking, which is only a part of conversation. We should bear in mind that it also means living together. It must be admitted, nevertheless, that Rorty introduces the idea of conversation as a way of thinking about discourse, and so the notion as Rorty uses it prioritises the notion of talking. I would argue, however, that Rorty leaves his notion sufficiently vague and undefined to make it amenable to extension. In order to argue that we should look to the idea of conversation as a way of thinking about society more generally, I will proceed as follows. I will begin by considering the notion of conversation as discourse, focusing on two particularly prominent strands of criticism in response to this idea, namely that it ignores the role of argument and reason, and that it is a pointless sort of practice. Having rebutted these strands of criticism, I will outline a way in which we can extend the notion of conversation to society as a whole, and I will do this by debating with critics who see Rorty as privileging language over the more material and institutional aspects of society. Finally, I will argue that the conversational model is superior to the more entrenched deliberative model of democracy. Through an examination of one particular phenomenon, claro culture, which causes practical and theoretical difficulties for the deliberative model, I will offer a prima facie reason for suggesting conversation as a superior and more pragmatic alternative. (shrink)

Most normative accounts of meaningful work have focused on the value of autonomy and capability for self-development. Here, I will propose that contribution–having a positive impact on others through one’s work–is another central dimension of meaningful work. Being able to contribute through one’s work should be recognized as one of the key axiological values that work can serve, providing one independent justification for why work is valuable and worth doing. Conversely, I argue that having to do work that has no (...) positive impact, or where one is separated from such impact, is an underrecognized type of alienation. Such alienation as pointlessness can be as harmful as the more recognized types of alienation such as powerlessness. Recognizing contribution as a core dimension of meaningful work is compatible with both subjectivist and objectivist accounts of meaningfulness, but I come to support a mixed view where the subjective sense of contributing must be sufficiently warranted by the facts of the situation. Recognizing the inescapable interest humans have for being able to contribute and engage in work that is not pointless has implications for the duties societies, organizations, and individuals have as regards ensuring that work conducted includes a recognizable positive impact. Along with autonomy and self-development, contribution should thus be seen as an independent axiological value that work can serve, its frustration being associated with a specific type of alienation, and it itself playing a key role in what makes work valuable and meaningful. (shrink)

The article presents a communication-based analysis of the function of the ‘bez sensu’ [meaningless/ pointless/makes no sense etc.] phraseme. The author discusses the conversational and discursive opportunities for using it. He applies the methodology of communicational grammar, which enables the analysis of communications at the ideational and interactive levels. Within the semantic level, ‘bez sensu’ removes the value of the trivialised semantic standard. In conversations, it is the reaction to scripts which contradict natural logic and the common-sensical cause-and-effect course (...) of things. An important function is the bringing forward of scripts of failure, wastefulness, redundancy, and lack of benefit or expected or actual harm. At the interactive level, the ‘bez sensu’ expression fulfils the function of support for the argumentative power of a communication; it is also a measure of undermining an argumentation – it emphasises the frailty of its premises. In axiological strategies, ‘bez sensu’ is a major component of emotive acts and the building block of the emotional tension between interlocutors. In this instance, it is mostly used to bring forward the experience of a negative emotion. One negative outcome of using the ‘bez sensu’ expression is the introduction distance to interpersonal contact, and in some cases the sense of intellectually debasing the sender of a communication. The article includes several examples of media-based political statements with the ‘bez sensu’ expression, which are used for discrediting political opponents. (shrink)

State spaces are, in the most general sense, sets of entities that contain information. Examples include states of dynamical systems, processes of observations, or possible worlds. We use domain theory to describe the structure of positive and negative information in state spaces. We present examples ranging from the space of trajectories of a dynamical system, over Dunn’s aboutness interpretation of fde, to the space of open sets of a spectral space. We show that these information structures induce so-called hype models (...) which were recently developed by Leitgeb. Conversely, we prove a representation theorem: roughly, hype models can be represented as induced by an information structure. Thus, the well-behaved logic hype is a sound and complete logic for reasoning about information in state spaces. As application of this framework, we investigate information fusion. We motivate two kinds of fusion. We define a groundedness and a separation property that allow a hype model to be closed under the two kinds of fusion. This involves a Dedekind–MacNeille completion and a fiber-space like construction. The proof-techniques come from pointless topology and universal algebra. (shrink)

In the management and organization studies literature, a key question to explore and explain is that of the family as an organizational stakeholder, particularly when working-from-home became the “new normal”. Departing from meta-analytic studies on the work-family relation and connecting with scholarly conversation on work-family boundary dynamics, we identify three main narratives. In the _separation narrative,_ work and family belong to different realms, and including the family in the domain of organizational responsibility is seen as pointless. The _interdependence (...) narrative_ stresses that organizations and families are overlapping domains in which it is important to acknowledge that the policies and practices of the former might have an impact on family life, and vice-versa. The _embeddedness narrative_, brought to the fore by the COVID-19 pandemic, sees employment and family as progressively convergent and hybrid work domains. The evolution of employment relations towards increased hybridity of the work situation being embedded in the familial/household context increasingly calls for consideration of the family/household as an integral rather than a peripheral stakeholder. (shrink)

In response to the dozen essays published here, which relate my 1964 paper on “The Nature of Belief Systems in the Mass Publics” to normative requirements of democratic theory, I note, inter alia, a major misinterpretation of my old argument, as well as needed revisions of that argument in the light of intervening data. Then I address the degree to which there may be some long‐term secular change in the parameters that I originally laid out. In the final section, I (...) provide a case study of public understanding of factual trends in federal tax policy in recent decades which seems commendably veridical on average. The preferences of the public thereon add up to a remarkably clear popular mandate. But this mandate seems to disappear rather magically in the voting booth, probably due to a combination of limited contextual information on the public side, and considerable skill on the elite side in manipulating apparent political realities. (shrink)

You ought to believe in accordance with available evidence. This evidential norm, as widely recognized, can be implausibly demanding by requiring you to hold pointless beliefs. In this paper, I first consider some seemingly promising versions of the positive evidential requirement to form beliefs in accordance with your evidence and argue that they either fail to avoid the problem of pointlessness or fail to bind you independently of practical requirements. I then show that even the negative requirement not to (...) believe against your evidence falls prey to the same problem: either it enjoins pointlessness or its binding force depends essentially on practical norms. This is puzzling, as our epistemic practice seems to presuppose evidential standards that are independent of practical rationality. I suggest that the alleged evidential “norms” are evaluative ‘ought’-statements about what it would be epistemically ideal for you to do, which, on their own, do not issue any genuine prescriptions or demands. (*published with open access). (shrink)

This paper looks at how the idea of pointless topology itself evolved during its pre-localic phase by analyzing the definitions of the concept of topological space of Menger and Nöbeling. Menger put forward a topology of lumps in order to generalize the definition of the real line. As to Nöbeling, he developed an abstract theory of posets so that a topological space becomes a particular case of topological poset. The analysis emphasizes two points. First, Menger's geometrical perspective was superseded (...) by an algebraic one, a lattice-theoretical one to be precise. Second, Menger's bottom–up approach was replaced by a top–down one. (shrink)

Despite numerous and increasing attempts to define what life is, there is no consensus on necessary and sufficient conditions for life. Accordingly, some scholars have questioned the value of definitions of life and encouraged scientists and philosophers alike to discard the project. As an alternative to this pessimistic conclusion, we argue that critically rethinking the nature and uses of definitions can provide new insights into the epistemic roles of definitions of life for different research practices. This paper examines the possible (...) contributions of definitions of life in scientific domains where such definitions are used most (e.g., Synthetic Biology, Origins of Life, Alife, and Astrobiology). Rather than as classificatory tools for demarcation of natural kinds, we highlight the pragmatic utility of what we call operational definitions that serve as theoretical and epistemic tools in scientific practice. In particular, we examine contexts where definitions integrate criteria for life into theoretical models that involve or enable observable operations. We show how these definitions of life play important roles in influencing research agendas and evaluating results, and we argue that to discard the project of defining life is neither sufficiently motivated, nor possible without dismissing important theoretical and practical research. (shrink)

Jonathan Kvanvig has recently attempted to reconcile the problem of (apparently) pointless truths with the claim that the value of truth is unrestricted—that truth is always and everywhere valuable. In this paper, I critically evaluate Kvanvig’s argument and show it to be defective at a crucial juncture. I propose my own alternative strategy for generating Kvanvig’s result—an alternative that parts ways with Kvanvig’s own conception of the cognitively ideal.

Epistemic objectivists and epistemic subjectivists might agree that inquiry pursues epistemic virtues (truth, knowledge, reason, or rationality) while disagreeing over their objectivity. Objectivists will evaluate this disagreement in terms of the epistemic virtues objectively construed, while subjectivists will not. This raises a rhetorical problem: objectivists will fault subjectivism for lacking some objective epistemic virtue, whereas subjectivists, by rejecting objectivity, won’t see this as a fault. My goal is to end this impasse by offering a new solution to the rhetorical problem. (...) My strategy is to identify a common-ground virtue valuable to objectivists and subjectivists but unavailable to subjectivism. The virtue is usefulness. Subjectivism can be useful only if it relies upon the very objective epistemic virtues it rejects; so it cannot be useful. Whether or not subjectivism has any objective epistemic virtues, it may be rejected as pointless. (shrink)

In this new book, Slavoj Žižek and Glyn Daly engage in a series of entertaining conversations which illustrate the originality of Žižek’s thinking on psychoanalysis, philosophy, multiculturalism, popular/cyber culture, totalitarianism, ethics and politics. An excellent introduction to one of the most engaging and controversial cultural theorists writing today. Žižek is a Slovenian sociologist who trained as a Lacanian and uses Lacan to analyse popular culture and politics. Illustrates the originality of Žižek’s thinking on psychoanalysis, philosophy, multi-culturalism, popular/cyber culture, totalitarianism, ethics (...) and politics. Provides a unique glimpse of Žižek’s humour and character and offers new material and fresh perspectives which will be of interest to followers of Žižek’s writings. (shrink)

Montrer que le rapport de la conversion au Souverain Bien chez Pascal nous invite à ausculter philosophiquement la notion d'émotion : c'est ce que Jean-Louis Bischoff entend montrer dans la présente étude. L'enjeu de son enquête est clair : il entend affoler et subvertir l'approche commune du mot « émotion ». Pour mener à bien son projet, l'auteur mobilise les lumières de philosophes comme Marion, Levinas, Ricoeur, Greisch ou Romano.

Interpreting three conversion accounts, Morrison accents the categorical difference between the experience of conversion and written narratives about it. He explains why experience and text can only be related to each other in fictive ways.

The vocabulary of wine is large and exceptionally vibrant -- from straight-forward descriptive words like "sweet" and "fragrant", colorful metaphors like "ostentatious" and "brash", to the more technical lexicon of biochemistry. The world of wine vocabulary is growing alongside the current popularity of wine itself, particularly as new words are employed by professional wine writers, who not only want to write interesting prose, but avoid repetition and cliche. The question is, what do these words mean? Can they actually reflect the (...) objective characteristics of wine, and can two drinkers really use and understand these words in the same way?In this second edition of Wine and Conversation, linguist Adrienne Lehrer explores whether or not wine drinkers (both novices and experts) can in fact understand wine words in the same way. Her conclusion, based on experimental results, is no. Even though experts do somewhat better than novices in some experiments, they tend to do well only on wines on which they are carefully trained and/or with which they are very familiar. Does this mean that the elaborate language we use to describe wine is essentially a charade? Lehrer shows that although scientific wine writing requires a precise and shared use of language, drinking wine and talking about it in casual, informal setting with friends is different, and the conversational goals include social bonding as well as communicating information about the wine. Lehrer also shows how language innovation and language play, clearly seen in the names of new wines and wineries, as well as wine descriptors, is yet another influence on the burgeoning and sometimes whimsical world of wine vocabulary. (shrink)

There exist well‐known conundrums, such as measure‐theoretic paradoxes and problems of contact, which, within the context of classical physics, can be used to argue against the existence of points in space and space‐time. I examine whether quantum mechanics provides additional reasons for supposing that there are no points in space and space‐time.

An increasing number of Muslim asylum seekers and refugees convert to Christianity in Europe. The conversion motifs in these individuals are unknown. In this study, we applied biographical interviews in 124 converts. There were two dominant patterns: intellectual —intellectual plus experimental motifs, and mystical —mystical plus affectional motifs. Pure experimental and affectional motifs were rare, and there were no revivalist and coercive motifs. Demographic parameters did not predict conversion motifs. We found no evidence for social pressure. These results indicate that (...) finding meaning and consolation in Christian religious teachings and mystical experiences with a high emotional content are the two leading religious conversion motifs. (shrink)

In 1938 Wittgenstein delivered a short course of lectures on aesthetics to a small group of students at Cambridge. The present volume has been compiled from notes taken down at the time by three of the students: Rush Rhees, Yorick Smythies, and James Taylor. They have been supplemented by notes of conversations on Freud (to whom reference was made in the course on aesthetics) between Wittgenstein and Rush Rhees, and by notes of some lectures on religious belief. As very little (...) is known of Wittgenstein's views on these subjects from his published works, these notes should be of considerable interest to students of contemporary philosophy. Further, their fresh and informal style should recommend Wittgenstein to those who find his Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations a little formidable. (shrink)