This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral philosophy of ‘universal prescriptivism’. The second part, and the core of the book, consists of five chapters originally presented as a lecture series under the title ‘A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories’. Hare identifies descriptivism and non‐descriptivism as the two main positions in modern moral philosophy. (...) The former he divides into Naturalism and Intuitionism, and the latter into Emotivism and Rationalism. Hare argues that all forms of descriptivism tend to lead to Relativism because the truth conditions of moral statements are culturally variant. Of the positions discussed, only Hare's own position, a form of Rationalism, which he calls Universal Prescriptivism, meets all of the requirements that an adequate ethical theory should meet. Part III consists of Hare's previously published essay ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Utilitas 5, 1993). Here, Hare puts forward the controversial thesis that Kant's moral philosophy is, in its basic principles, compatible with utilitarianism. (shrink)

BLWith new text and full apparatus criticus The Eudemian Ethics was one of two ethical treatises which Aristotle wrote on the subject of ethica or `matters to do with character'. Although the two works cover much the same ground, the Nicomachean Ethics is better known; the poor manuscript tradition of the Eudemian Ethics has made correct translation and interpretation of the text extremely difficult. The subject of the work is the choice of a certain means of conduct, made by a (...) `man of practical wisdom', between two extremes of behaviour: asceticism and yielding to uncontrolled impulses. Aristotle also stresses the notion of moral intention and the importance of virtue of character. This new Oxford Classical Text of the Eudemian Ethics is the result of many years of work. After Sir David Ross's death, his original text was substantially reworked and revised by his friend and colleague R. R. Walzer, who was aided in the revision by his former pupil Mrs Jean Mingay, who continued his work after his death in 1974. Mrs Mingay was fortunate in being able to make use of previously unpublished contributions from D. J. Allan after his death in the late seventies, and more recently has been helped in her work by the suggestions of Professor D. A. Russell, David Robinson, and Christopher Rowe. (shrink)

Using H. Whitney's algebra of physical quantities and his definition of a similarity transformation, a family of similar systems (R. L. Causey [3] and [4]) is any maximal collection of subsets of a Cartesian product of dimensions for which every pair of subsets is related by a similarity transformation. We show that such families are characterized by dimensionally invariant laws (in Whitney's sense, [10], not Causey's). Dimensional constants play a crucial role in the formulation of such laws. They are represented (...) as a function g, known as a system measure, from the family into a certain Cartesian product of dimensions and having the property gφ =φ g for every similarity φ . The dimensions involved in g are related to the family by means of certain stability groups of similarities. A one-to-one system measure is a proportional representing function, which plays an analogous role in Causey's theory, but not conversely. The present results simplify and clarify those of Causey. (shrink)

Spinoza felsefe tarihinde ve felsefi düşüncede daha çok monist ontolojisi ve panteist teolojisi ile dikkatleri çeken bir filozoftur. Ancak o aynı zamanda önemli bir ahlak ve siyaset teorisyenidir. Özellikle siyasal felsefesinde düşünce ve ifade özgürlüğüne ve din-devlet ilişkisine dair, çağının sınırlarını aşan özel ve özgün görüşlere sahip olduğu ve yaşadığı çağda önemli bir demokrasi ve düşünce özgürlüğü savunucusu olduğu söylenebilir. Ne var ki felsefesinde ontolojiye ve teolojiye dair görüşlerinin ön plana çıkarılması nedeniyle olsa gerek, onun ahlaka ve siyasete ilişkin görüşleri (...) biraz geri planda kalmış ve görmezlikten gelinmiş gibidir. İşte bu çalışmada Spinoza’nın hem düşünce ve ifade özgürlüğüne hem de din-devlet ilişkisine dair görüşleri, genel felsefesi bağlamında tartışılmaya çalışılmaktadır. (shrink)

A provocative collection of technical and popular essays dealing with a variety of scientific and political topics which Popper has treated in his major works. For the most part Popper develops, sharpens, and extends to new areas, themes which he has already explored. The major theme running through the essays is that knowledge grows by unjustified and unjustifiable anticipations, guesses and conjectures. These are controlled by criticisms and refutations. Theories can never be positively justified; they can only prove to be (...) resistant to rational criticism. The boldness of Popper's conjectures demands attempted refutations on the part of the reader.--R. J. B. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:R. D. Ackerman BELIEVING IN A FICTION: WALLACE STEVENS AT THE LIMITS OF PHENOMENOLOGY The "ring of men" of "Sunday Morning" will chant their "devotion to the sun, / Not as a god, but as a god might be, / Naked among them, like a savage source" (CP, pp. 69-70).' Solar nakedness is deferred even as it is named. The problem for belief is the question of appearance and (...) representation. Things appear as and like.... The phenomenological return to things is also a turn to fiction, as Husserl understood: "If anyone loves a paradox, he can really say... that the element which makes up the life of phenomenology... is fiction. ' " The sun is divine, and it is not; it is both naked and clothed, savage and civilized, source (or end) and means. But such paradox is ultimately unsatisfying, and as we will see with Stevens, the need for belief—for an image or idea of totality—forces the issue of fiction and reality. The Stevens we will have in view is not the Stevens—as if there were such a creature. Our Stevens is the one most persuaded by promises such as those of phenomenology, the one most concerned with decreation (reduction) and fresh beginnings, with discovery and recognition, with imagination, the body, and the earth. This is the Stevens for whom the barrier of language presages at last not absence and difference but fictive recovery of presence and identity, the one for whom poetry represents a way of belief beyond mysticism even as it bodes mythic proximity. Finally, this is the Stevens who predominates throughout the prose (as well as in much of the poetry), who tries mightily to secure a belief while disencumbering himself of metaphysics—but alas, I think, with small success. Although Stevens's association of the problem of belief with the idea of fiction occurs in early poems such as "A High-Toned Old Christian 79 80Philosophy and Literature Woman" and "To the One of Fictive Music," his most intensive involvement with fiction as belief dates from the early 1940s and spans the period of his major essays and his last four volumes of poems. He recounts, for instance, a 1942 conversation with a student: "I said that I thought that we had reached a point at which we could no longer really believe in anything unless we recognized that it was a fiction. The student said that that was an impossibility, that there was no such thing as believing in something that one knew was not true. It is obvious, however, that we are doing that all the time" (L, p. 430). What does it mean to believe in a fiction? That is my main subject here, as we seek out the limits of the phenomenological Stevens. His letters of this period are preoccupied with the problem of fictive belief: "If one no longer believes in God (as truth), it is not possible merely to disbelieve; it becomes necessary to believe in something else.... A good deal of my poetry recently has concerned an identity for that thing.... In one of the short poems that I have just sent to the harvard advocate, I say that one's final belief must be in a fiction. I think that the history of belief will show that it has always been in a fiction" (L, p. 370). The poem referred to, "Asides on the Oboe," begins: The prologues are over. It is a question now, Of final belief. So, say that final belief Must be in a fiction. It is time to choose. (CP, p. 250) Acknowledging that "in the long run, poetry would be the supreme fiction" (L, pp. 430-31), Stevens nonetheless singles out the nominative function of poetry as the essence of its claim to supremacy: "Poetry means not the language of poetry but the thing itself.... The subject matter is what comes to mind when one says of the month of August... 'Thou art not August, unless I make thee so'" (L, p. 377). The quoted line (also from "Asides") underscores the paradox that for Stevens the essence of fiction (the nontrue) is its capacity to nominate the true or the real. This... (shrink)

H. Richard Nieburh's major work, which he did not live to complete, was to be on theological ethics. Based on the published and unpublished writings that Niebuhr completed during the last decade of his life, Roots of Relational Ethics demonstrates that Niebuhr's conception of responsibility was the culmination of his thought about self, God, Christ, the church, ethics and decision-making, and social evil. R. Melvin Keiser examines the limitations and potential of Niebuhr's use of responsibility in comparison with relevant themes (...) in liberation and feminist theological ethics. He suggests that Niebuhr's mature work can contribute to the alleviation of environmental exploitation, sexism, anti-Judaism, war, racism, and classism. (shrink)

The author urges that psychology take a more liberal approach "without sacrificing its gains." Psychology, in trying to be too "scientific," has imposed upon itself artificial limits, which have become barriers to an adequate study of individual personality, especially in its moral and religious aspects. Given originally as the Yale University Terry Lectures for 1954.--R. H.

A provocative contribution to the new approach to the history and philosophy of science which emphasizes the role of radically new paradigms in scientific revolutions. While normal science proceeds as puzzle-solving within a relatively fixed paradigm, scientific crises lead to new paradigms where data, scientific problems, procedures, and standards for solutions are all altered. Scientific revolutions do not simply modify our understanding of a world which exists independently--they change the data and the world in which the scientist works. The essay (...) is filled with fascinating historical interpretations, though the analysis of the concept of a paradigm and scientific revolution is more suggestive than rigorous.--R. J. B. (shrink)

During the past decade some of the most provocative and controversial disputes concerning the philosophy and history of science have centered about the work of Thomas Kuhn and Sir Karl Popper. One, therefore, looks with anticipation to this volume which is based on a symposium held in July, 1965 where Kuhn, Popper and several of Popper's former students met for an intellectual confrontation. But the result is depressing. The volume is an editorial mess. Two of the main scheduled speakers never (...) appeared at the symposium, although papers by them are published here. Some of the remarks published here seem to be those spoken on the day the symposium was held while others, like Kuhn's answer to his critics, were written four years after the symposium. The result is a confusing and distracting editorial unevenness. While Kuhn's fair-minded opening paper raises some of the most important issues to be confronted, one quickly senses that the Popperians are not really very much interested in discussing Kuhn's work but rather in pushing their own pet theses. Kuhn puts this rather generously when he labels it an example of "talking-through-each-other." Most of the Popperians seem to be obsessed with Kuhn's understanding of normal science and neglect the much more interesting questions concerning his views on scientific revolutions, the sense in which science does and does not make progress, the criteria involved in adjudicating among competing theories. It is almost with relief that one reads Margaret Masterman's remark that it is a "crashingly obvious fact" that there is normal science. Ironically, Masterman's article which is basically sympathetic to Kuhn's work is the most illuminating and the most critical. More successfully than any of other contributors she shows the ambiguities involved in Kuhn's idea of a paradigm. One's wishes that the Popperians would take a good hard look at themselves and what they are doing as it is so disastrously illustrated here. Although ostensibly dedicated to serious critical rationalism, they seem more eager to score points than to understand what they are criticizing. Although they supposedly abhor clubiness, they are rapidly forming themselves into a scholastic circle where the object seems to be to show how brilliant or how stupid some other student of Popper is. Although they scorn the quest for origins, they are almost compulsive in attempting to show that anything worthwhile was previously said by Sir Karl. This book illustrates the faults of the Popperians at their worst and few of their virtues. There is much heat and wit, but little light.--R. J. B. (shrink)

An extended version of the James W. Richard Lectures delivered by the author at the University of Virginia in the fall of 1951. The first six chapters develop the seemingly irreconcilable contrast between Biblical personalism and the categories of ontology. The last two chapters indicate briefly how they supplement each other. Theologians accuse Tillich of slighting Biblical concepts; philosophers taunt him for too readily despairing of ontology. In this book he tries to do justice to both.--D. R.

A defence of the idea that there are sui generis duties of love: duties, that is, that we owe to people in virtue of standing in loving relationships with them. I contrast this non‐reductionist position with the widespread reductionist view that our duties to those we love all derive from more generic moral principles. The paper mounts a cumulative argument in favour of the non‐reductionist position, adducing a variety of considerations that together speak strongly in favour of adopting it. The (...) concluding section connects this debate with larger issues in moral theory concerning the general idea of obligation. (shrink)

The title essay was originally presented as two lectures inaugurating the John Dewey lectures at Columbia. It is an important essay for understanding Quine's work for it brings together many themes at the center of his thinking since Word and Object. Quine quotes with approval Dewey's statement "meaning is primarily a property of behavior" and then goes on to consider a thesis which, according to Quine, is a consequence of such a behavioral theory of meaning, i.e., the thesis of the (...) indeterminacy of meaning and translation. Quine relates this indeterminacy thesis, which he has been defending for some time, to language learning, the foundations of mathematics, and to a general view of ontological relativity. Other essays in the volume concern natural kinds and the various paradoxes of confirmation, propositional objects, quantification and existence and the empirical basis of science. All the essays are post-1965 except the introductory essay which was Quine's Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1956. This address was something of an introduction to the ideas to appear in Word and Object and is placed at the beginning of this collection to emphasize that all the essays collected here expand on and defend some of the positions of Word and Object. Quine's fluid style is everywhere in evidence.--R. H. K. (shrink)

Its wisdom and sensitivity make Personal Knowledge required reading for epistemologists. By stressing the active components in scientific knowing--appraisal and commitment--Polanyi shows that knowledge is less "objective," more complex, and more widely distributed in nature than is tacitly supposed by most epistemologies. Knowing implies a foundation in skills, a confidence in one's ability to judge beyond the range of well-formulated rules, and a commitment to the existence of an answer to one's questions before the answer is in sight. Like a (...) Platonic dialogue, this book conveys more than it states, and the broad foundation of insight embodied in the examples would support more conceptual superstructure than Polanyi provides. But that serves to make it an instance of its thesis--that we know more than we can now say.--R. F. T. (shrink)

A new translation which is eminently readable and extremely accurate. Much of the awkwardness and unnecessary obscurity of the Ogden translation has been eliminated. The comprehensive index which combines both English and German expressions is designed to meet the special problems involved in understanding the Tractatus. Unfortunately Russell's introduction to the 1922 edition is reproduced without any indication of the controversy concerning Russell's interpretation, or subsequent interpretations of the Tractatus.--R. J. B.

The author adopts a phenomenalistic method to educe, not the content of universally valid moral judgments, but "the generic characteristics of all moral experience." Interested in describing rather than prescribing the standards of judgment, he finds that the common ground lies in a contextual "fittingness." The possibility of validating moral judgment is maintained by the enunciation of principles of the primacy of facts, of universality, and of ultimacy or obligation.--A. R.

Despite the enormous and growing interest in Marx and the availability of Marx's writing in paperback, it is scandalous how little care has been taken in producing careful texts and English translations of Marx's work. O'Malley's edition is an outstanding exception. It is carefully and intelligently edited. The result makes available an extremely interesting text of Marx. A number of scholars have already argued that in this early critique, one can discover some of the earliest formulations of distinctive Marxian themes. (...) Now the reader can judge for himself, for this is the first full English translation of Marx's Critique. But this Critique is not only extremely important for understanding Marx's intellectual development, it also helps to make Hegel's Philosophy of Right come alive. Marx's fundamental ambivalence toward Hegel is evidenced here. It is clear that Marx is still very much under Hegel's influence and we can see how deeply Hegel is shaping Marx's thought, but there is also a toughness and incisiveness in Marx's criticism of Hegel. O'Malley has provided a very extensive introduction which not only provides the necessary background for understanding this text but also explores the role of this work in the totality of Marx's development. Altogether this edition shows a care and judiciousness which is exceptional. It eminently serves the purpose of making an important text accessible.--R. J. B. (shrink)

A re-issue of Darwin's pioneer work on expression. In addition to the text, this edition includes a brief preface by Margaret Mead and added illustrations meant to show the results of some recent work in the field established by Darwin's inquiry.---R. B.

Three short essays on the position of the philosopher and philosophy in modern society. Maritain illuminates the situation of the philosopher in a milieu of conflicting systems. The final essay, which deals with the relation of science and religion, shows evidence of a growing appreciation by Maritain of the aims of modern science.--R. H. K.

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...) Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications. (shrink)

A provocative interpretation of Freud's views on civilization, incisively presented. The author offers an extended argument for the possibility, on Freudian grounds, of a civilization which is non-repressive, and he tries to adduce Freudian evidence against Freud's own view to the contrary. Two concepts central to his analysis are surplus-repression, "the restrictions necessitated by social domination," and the performance principle, "the prevailing historical form of the reality principle." Marcuse differentiates his interpretation from that of the traditional neo-Freudians, whom he attacks.--R. (...) B. (shrink)

Heidegger's book is both Kant's good fortune and ours; as a philosopher, Heidegger's treatment is guided by the thesis that ontology is founded on transcendental philosophy, and that it is prior to metaphysica specialis, i.e., cosmology, psychology, and theology. As a scholar, Heidegger finely dissects the Transcendental Analytic, arguing that man's finitude consists in the required cooperation of sensibility and understanding, both of which stem, as Kant intimated, from imagination; and time is of the essence of imagination. Heidegger's vigorous defense (...) of the Schematism is a superb example of imaginative philosophy and careful scholarship well blended. The translator lacks confidence in the English language, and often uses English merely as a clue to Heidegger's German. --R. C. N. (shrink)

A number of ordinarily separate disciplines--e.g., physics, physiology, psychology--are here brought together in an effort to reconstitute optics as the complete science of human vision, thus replacing classical optics which dealt with vision only under perfect conditions. The emphasis is primarily scientific rather than philosophical.--R. G. S.

The Republic is here treated as an introduction to philosophy. The authors systematically summarize and criticize the various topics and arguments Plato used. No line-by-line scholarly commentary is attempted; rather the emphasis is on the philosophical importance and truth of Plato's arguments. Unfortunately the result of this approach is that the Republic becomes an introduction to the British brand of philosophical analysis, rather than to Plato's philosophy. Literary form and dramatic situation are virtually ignored, and with them Plato's conception of (...) philosophy as shared inquiry. The most sympathetic chapter is the one in which analysis is subordinated to scholarship.—R. J. W. (shrink)

The key word in the title of this book is "essay," for Strawson has not written an introduction to Kant, nor a commentary on the Critique. It would be closer to truth to say that Strawson has attempted to extract and to translate into a contemporary idiom what he takes to be philosophically important in the Critique. Kant's major positive achievement, according to Strawson, is the partial carrying out of a certain program, viz., "that of determining the fundamental general structure (...) of any conception of experience such as we can make intelligible to ourselves." But this program can be dissociated from the Kantian motif that the structure of experience is "imposed by our capacities." Thus Strawson speaks of the "doctrinal fantasies of transcendental idealism." Given Strawson's concern with what he takes to be Kant's positive achievement, he doesn't hesitate to expose the weakness of some of Kant's arguments, to restate many of them in a more convincing way, or even to supply new arguments. But Strawson also exhibits a remarkable sensitivity to many recondite aspects of the Critique, e.g., the role of "pure intuition" in Kant's theory of geometry, and the status of "self-consciousness." The result of Strawson's essay is a philosophically exciting encounter where one can learn as much about Kant as he can about Strawson's own central concerns, and indeed about some of the most central issues of philosophy, both past and present.—R. J. B. (shrink)

A sampler of Russell's writings from 1963 to 1959 which provides representative selections from his multifarious writings. The book is designed more for the general reader than for the scholar interested in piecing together the complex mosaic of the man and his work. There is a preface by Bertrand Russell. Handsomely printed, the total effect shows once again how unique and many-sided is this twentieth-century intellectual explorer.--R. J. B.

A collection of essays by a group of international scholars from Israel, England, the United States, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Sweden, and Argentina testify to the humane influence of Baumgardt. There is little that unites the subject matter of these essays and only one deals explicitly with the thought of Baumgardt. A bibliography of Baumgardt's writings is included.—R. J. B.

This second volume in the series designed to review the work done in various areas of philosophy during the period 1956-1966 is concerned with the philosophy of science. There are forty essays on a variety of topics in the philosophy of science describing the work done in that area in the past decade and a bibliography covering the same period. Most are in English, some in French or German. Some representative topics and their authors are: Laws, Models, Causality, Induction and (...) Probability, Scientific Methodology, Time, Space, Cosmology, Philosophy and Physics, Quantum Theory, Biology and Philosophy. In addition there are several general essays on the influence of various philosophers and scientists on current developments in the philosophy of science, on the ethical and philosophical implications of science, on Cybernetics, Information Theory, Game theory and a number of essays on the development of philosophy of science in different countries of Western and Eastern Europe and Japan. Like the first volume of this series, this book is an indispensable guide to anyone interested in the field, and a place should be made for it on every library shelf---where there is an interest in philosophy of science.--R. H. K. (shrink)

The Rector of the University of Buenos Aires here briefly outlines and criticizes some of the present-day subjectivist and objectivist positions, and suggests a means of reconciling the two. --R. D. G.

A study of the conditions necessary for the freedom of man's action, this work concludes that the source of meaningfulness lies in man's relation to God, and in man's search for His will.--A. R.

An important contribution to the philosophical inquiry on death. Ferrater Mora rescues the problem from the underground men of philosophy and places it in the ample yet fastidious perspective of reason. The first three chapters discuss "death" or "cessation" in inorganic, organic, and human nature. The last resumes the history of Western opinion on the subject. The subtitle, "an outline of an integrationist philosophy," indicates no facile eclecticism but a willingness to avoid absolutes. The main asset of this enormously learned (...) book is the brilliance with which the author leads us through a labyrinth of conflicting attitudes and presuppositions, always sustained by the dynamism of an inquiry in which doubt is not an abyss but a ground.--A. R. (shrink)

Taking the artistic return to "primitive symbols" to be a sign of renewed religious consciousness, Mr. Baird analyzes in detail the use and meaning of symbols in the work of Melville, Gaugin, Stevenson, and others who have travelled in the East. The author, who is much influenced by Jung and Langer, finds this atavistic return promising both artistically and culturally. An erudite work, critically perceptive, but far more valuable for its literary insights than for its psychological theses.--A. R.

An analysis of the realism of M. Blondel, with an attempt to distinguish its traditional elements from its novel features. Blondel's emphasis on the inseparability of philosophy and action is argued to be the foundation of his return to Christian realism.--A. R.

A short study of the historical circumstances to which Marxism responded, and of the systematic character of its dialectic. The strength of Marxism the author finds to lie in its comprehensiveness, its weakness in the contradiction which arises from its espousal of humanitarian goals and its rejection of individual freedom.--A. R.

A philosophical diary, bringing together the previously published "Prelude to the Life of an Ordinary Man," "Commentary on Common Sense," and "Common Experience," with a new essay, "The Right Time."--A. R.

A discussion of the influence of Nietzsche in the Spanish-speaking world, extensive in scope but lacking in depth. Rukser fails to evaluate properly the extent and significance of Nietzsche's effect upon Machado, and he treats Baroja at length but superficially. The bibliography of works on Nietzsche in Spanish is unusually extensive. Unfortunately his acquaintance with the material often does not extend beyond the title, and many important works are left unevaluated.--A. R.

This book attempts to place the problems of logic, epistemology, science, history, and ethics on a new scientific basis.--A. R.

Selected chapters from the first half of Reality, translated into Hebrew. Includes an introduction, especially written for this edition, which was also published in this Review, VII, pp. 558-62.--A. R.

The author attempts, in this study of the controversy between Rosmini and Gioberti, to reconcile the two positions. He agrees with Rosmini that intuition is not thought, but he finds Gioberti correct in insisting that it is the condition for thought. Besides an exposition and criticism of the epistemologies of Rosmini and Gioberti, the book includes a general historical chapter on Italian philosophy from 1815 to 1830.--A. R.

An informative study of the conditions, the strengths, and the weaknesses of Russian totalitarianism by an expert on Russian affairs. The "Keys" are: the necessity of a struggle for power within the totalitarian regime, the necessity for secrecy and the complete control of all activity, the proscription of labor, the contempt for democratic election, the constant need for colonial expansion, and the subordination of the people to the state.--A. R.

An analysis of the source and value of human dignity, this book treats of the practical as well as the theoretical issues of individualism. The foreword is by Cardinal Spellman.--A. R.

An attempt to unite the inwardness of the existentialists with a Thomistic teleological realism. Because man is a creature in nature, with ends external to himself, he has desires which can only be fulfilled by appropriating the goods of the world ; because he is also a person, whose ends are internal to himself, who must communicate as well as appropriate, he must seek his perfection inwardly. These two strains are necessary ingredients in man, and in him they find their (...) reconciliation. The first chapter was first printed in this Review, VIII, pp. 225-45.--A. R. (shrink)

A collection of excerpts from Mead's three posthumous volumes, with a short introduction offering a concise presentation of Mead's pragmatic analysis of the role of evolution in the formation of the self and its relation to society.--A. R.

Analytic philosophers have been rather timid about moving beyond the relatively well defined epistemological issues and meta-ethical issues which have been the central concern of Anglo-Saxon philosophers. Yet there has always been the implicit claim that analytic tools could be extended to a much larger horizon. While there is little that is dramatic in this collection of essays, it does present some of the best contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophers attempting to chart the logical geography of the concept of education and to (...) clear up a number of muddles that persistently cling to discussions of education. In addition to Peters, there are essays by Hamlyn, Hirst, Vesey, Dearsen, Black, Ryle, Scheffler, Oakeshott, J. P. White and Passmore.--R. J. B. (shrink)

Consisting largely of lectures given at various universities on his first trip to this country in 1951, this small volume contains some of the most thought-provoking material on the philosophy of religion and related topics to appear in recent years. Of particular interest is his critique of Sartre, Heidegger and Jung in the essay, "Religion and Modern Thinking." The last chapter is a reply to Jung's answer to this essay. It is regrettable that Jung's answer is not given in his (...) own words. --D. R. (shrink)

A sympathetic and knowledgeable discussion of Freud in relation to literature and the present state of our culture. The crisis to which the title refers concerns the "progressive deterioration of accurate knowledge of the self and of the right relation between the self and the culture." Freud's contribution to our understanding of the self in culture is deftly outlined, and it is suggested that his theories of culture are not so fantastic as has often been supposed.--D. R.

The principal aim of this book is to show the relevance of Jung's psychology for the study of history, culture, and the social sciences generally. While the exposition of Jung's thought in Part I is not as thorough as some other presentations, it is accurate as far as it goes. In Part II, the author successfully makes out his case for the social implications of this immense body of thought and indicates some of the paths that might be followed by (...) further research. The Epilogue is a particularly good statement of the conclusions and of Jung's bearings in relation to his predecessors and contemporaries. --D. R. (shrink)

With the subtitle, "A consideration of some aspects of An Essay concerning Human Understanding," this book concentrates on Locke’s doctrine of natural or scientific laws and our knowledge of them. By dealing with a limited theme, Woolhouse feels that he is able to provide a treatment lengthier than usual of central topics of Locke’s thought. The topics selected are: "trifling" and "instructive" propositions; "certain knowledge" and "probable opinion"; the notion of an "idea"; simple and complex ideas; the distinction between modes (...) and substances; the notions of Substance, and of real and nominal essences. In elaborating these topics, Woolhouse tries to pay great attention to the actual text of the Essay and to the adequacy or inadequacy of its interpretation by recent commentators. In addition, he has "tried to explain and evaluate Locke’s thought in terms of the positions, views, and interests of twentieth-century philosophy." The book is based on Woolhouse’s Ph.D. thesis at Cambridge in 1968 entitled, ‘Natural necessity in Locke’s Essay and some recent philosophy'. It includes an eight page bibliography of works referred to and a ten page index.—D. R. P. (shrink)